Abstract: The disclosure of software vulnerabilities has stirred controversy for decades among security researchers and software vendors, and more recently governments. Despite increasing interdependency of software and systems (e.g., the Internet of Things) and resulting complexity in vulnerability disclosure and coordination, no unified norms have yet emerged.

This talk addresses the development of norms that (attempt to) govern the disclosure of software security flaws in relation to structural changes of the software industry and the Internet. This includes new forms of private, but monetarily rewarded disclosure on markets and through bug bounty programs, as well as government efforts to prohibit proliferation of knowledge and technology through export controls. Recently, governments acknowledged the withholding of vulnerability information on the grounds of national security and law enforcement needs, trading off against the need for defensive security of civilian computers and networks.

The talk outlines pressing policy issues and connects them to recent developments (e.g., Apple vs. FBI). It concludes by making the case for why norms on vulnerability disclosure are an essential component in shaping cybersecurity governance.

About the Speaker: Andreas Kuehn is a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Science and Technology at Syracuse University. He joined CISAC as a Zukerman Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow in October 2014. Prior, he was a visiting graduate student at Cornell University’s Department of Science & Technology Studies. He holds a M.Sc. in Information Systems from the University of Zurich, Switzerland.

In his dissertation, Andreas examined the historical, organizational, and institutional developments of software vulnerability and exploit markets as they are shaped by the perennial controversy on vulnerability disclosure. His qualitative, empirical research on emerging technologies and governance is informed by Science and Technology Studies and Institutional Theory.

Abstract: To what extent will multipolar institution building undermine the US-led international order? Recent Chinese initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and similar efforts by Russia and even Venezuela, might be seen as attempts to build alternatives to American hegemony. We suggest that we can learn from past rival hierarchies to understand contemporary politics. Some scholars highlight international hierarchy, in which a dominant state exerts a limited degree of political control over one or more subordinate states. We contend that certain patterns of international cooperation and conflict between dominant states cannot be fully understood without reference to their rival hierarchies. We identify three distinct mechanisms through which one hierarchy can influence the internal workings of a second hierarchy: competitive shaming, outbidding, and inter-hierarchy cooperation.

We illustrate the plausibility of our argument by exploring the politics of nuclear technology sharing by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. We show that Soviet competitive shaming of the United States was a major motivation for the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. In response, the Soviet Union attempted to outbid the United States with its own technology sharing program. Ultimately, Moscow and Washington cooperated in founding the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The paper is co-authored with Nicholas Miller, Frank Stanton Assistant Professor of Nuclear Security and Policy at Brown University.

About the Speaker: Jeff D. Colgan is the Richard Holbrooke Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.  His research focuses on two main areas: (1) the causes of war and (2) global energy politics. His book, Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War, was published in 2013 by Cambridge University Press. An article that previews the book's argument won the Robert O. Keohane award for the best article published in International Organization (Oct 2010) by an untenured scholar. He has published other articles in International Organization, World Politics, International Security and elsewhere.

Abstract: The conventional wisdom about current space dynamics paints a picture of a rising China, a resurgent Russia, and a drifting United States. It also argues that international governance mechanisms in space are failing and not worth U.S. efforts to repair. Thus, it suggests that nationalist and protectionist responses are the best policy directions for the United States. This presentation posits that both arguments are wrong. First, it makes the case that as 21st century space power shifts toward the commercial sector, the United States is well suited to compete with its rivals through innovation, international engagement, and network-building in space. Such efforts are more likely to succeed under emerging conditions in space than traditional, state-led efforts. Second, it argues that the possible breakdown of international space governance mechanisms poses a serious threat to American interests and will require the attention of both the U.S. government and the expanding commercial space sector.  

About the Speaker: James Clay Moltz holds a joint appointment as a professor in the Department of National Security Affairs (NSA) and in the Space Systems Academic Group at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. He also serves as the NSA Department’s Associate Chairman for Research and directs the DTRA-funded Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, based at NPS. He is the author of the recent books Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space (Columbia University Press, 2014), Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks (Columbia University Press, 2012), and The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests (Stanford University Press, 2008 and 2011 editions). Prof. Moltz holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley and an M.A. and B.A. (with Distinction) from Stanford University. He has served as an advisor to the NASA-Ames Research Center and to the U.S. Department of Energy and has provided expert testimony on space issues before the U.S. Congress. His commentary on space topics has appeared in such periodicals as Aviation Week and Space Technology, Nature, and the New York Times.  At NPS, his honors include the 2015 Carl E. and Jesse W. Menneken Award for Excellence in Scientific Research and Sustained Contribution to the Navy and the Defense Department and the 2010 Richard W. Hamming Award for Interdisciplinary Achievement.