Stanford University

Governance

FSI's research on the origins, character and consequences of government institutions spans continents and academic disciplines. The institute’s senior fellows and their colleagues across Stanford examine the principles of public administration and implementation. Their work focuses on how maternal health care is delivered in rural China, how public action can create wealth and eliminate poverty, and why U.S. immigration reform keeps stalling. 

FSI’s work includes comparative studies of how institutions help resolve policy and societal issues. Scholars aim to clearly define and make sense of the rule of law, examining how it is invoked and applied around the world. 

FSI researchers also investigate government services – trying to understand and measure how they work, whom they serve and how good they are. They assess energy services aimed at helping the poorest people around the world and explore public opinion on torture policies. The Children in Crisis project addresses how child health interventions interact with political reform. Specific research on governance, organizations and security capitalizes on FSI's longstanding interests and looks at how governance and organizational issues affect a nation’s ability to address security and international cooperation.

State shaming often ineffective

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When a state is “shamed” by outsiders for perceived injustices, it often proves counterproductive, resulting in worse behavior and civil rights violations, a Stanford researcher has found.

Rochelle Terman, a political scientist and postdoctoral fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), recently spoke about how countries criticized by outsiders on issues like human rights typically respond -- and it's contrary to conventional wisdom. Terman has published findings, “The Relational Politics of Shame: Evidence from the Universal Periodic Review,” on this topic in the Review of International Organizations. She discussed her research in the interview below:

What does your research show about state "shaming"?

Shaming is a ubiquitous strategy to promote international human rights. A key contention in the literature on international norms is that transnational advocacy networks can pressure states into adopting international norms by shaming them – condemning violations and urging reform. The idea is that shaming undermines a state’s legitimacy, which then incentivizes elites into complying with international norms.

In contrast, my work shows that shaming can be counterproductive, encouraging leaders in the target state to persist or “double down” on violations. That is because shaming is seen as illegitimate foreign intervention that threatens a state’s sovereignty and independence.  When viewed in this light, leaders are rewarded for standing up to such pressure and defending the nation against perceived domination. Meanwhile, leaders who “give in” have their political legitimacy undermined at home. The result is that violations tend to persist or even exacerbate.

When and where does it work better to directly confront a country’s leadership about such injustices?

At least two factors moderate the effects of international shaming. The first is the degree to which the norm being promoted is shared between the “shamer” and the target. For instance, the West may shame Uganda or Nigeria for violating LGBT rights. But if Uganda and Nigeria do not accept the “LGBT rights” norm, and refuse to accept that homophobia constitutes bad behavior, then shaming will fail. In this case, it is more likely that shaming will be viewed as illegitimate meddling by foreign powers, and will be met with indignation and defiance.

Second, shaming is quintessentially a relational process. Insofar as it is successful, shaming persuades actors to voluntary change their behavior in order to maintain valued social relationships. In the absence of such relationship, shaming will fail. This is especially so when pressure emanates from a current or historical geopolitical adversary. In this later scenario, not only will shaming fail to work, it will likely provoke defensive hostility and defiance, having a counterproductive effect.

Combing these insights, we can say that shaming is most likely to work under two conditions: when the target is a strong ally, and the norm is shared.

What are some well-known cases where "shaming" backfired?

The main example I use in my forthcoming paper is on the infamous “anti-homosexuality bill” in Uganda. When Uganda introduced the legislation in 2009 (which in some versions applied capital punishment to offenders) it provoked harsh condemnation among its foreign allies, especially in the West. Western donor countries even suspended aid in attempt to push Yoweri Musaveni’s government to abandon the bill. According to conventional accounts, the onslaught of foreign shaming, coupled with the threat of aid cuts and other material sanctions, should have worked best in the Uganda case.

And yet what we saw was the opposite. The wave of international attention provoked an outraged and defiant reaction among the Ugandan population, turning the bill into a symbol of national sovereignty and self-determination in the face of abusive Western bullying. This reaction energized Ugandan elites to champion the bill in order to reap the political rewards at home. Indeed, the bill was the first to pass unanimously in the Ugandan legislature since the end of military rule in 1999. Museveni – who by all accounts preferred a more moderate solution to the crisis – was backed into a corner.

A Foreign Policy story quoted Ugandan journalist Andrew Mwenda as saying, “the mere fact that Obama threatened Museveni publicly is the very reason he chose to go ahead and sign the bill.” And Museveni did so in a particularly defiant fashion, “with the full witness of the international media to demonstrate Uganda’s independence in the face of Western pressure and provocation.”

Uganda anti-homosexuality law was finally quashed by its constitutional court, which ruled the act invalid because it was not passed with the required quorum. By dismissing the law on procedural grounds, Museveni – widely thought to have control over the court – was able to kill the legislation “without appearing to cave in to foreign pressure.” But by that time, defiance had already transformed Uganda’s normative order, entrenching homophobia into its national identity.

Does this 'doubling down' effect vary in domestic or international contexts?

Probably. States with a significant populist contingent, for instance, are especially hostile to international pressure, especially when it emanates from a historical adversary, like a former colonial power. Ironically, democracies may also be more susceptible to defiance, because elites are more beholden to their constituents, and thus are less able to “give in” to foreign pressure without undermining their own political power. 

The international context matters a great deal as well. States are more likely to resist certain norms if they have allies who feel the same way. For instance, we see significant polarization around LGBT rights at the international level, with most states in Africa and the Muslim world voting against resolutions that push LGBT rights forward. South Africa – originally a pioneer for LGBT rights – has changed its position following criticism from its regional neighbors. 

Does elite reaction drive this response to state "shaming?"

To be quite honest, this is a question I’m still exploring and I don’t have a very clear answer. My hunch at the moment is no. The “defiant” reaction occurs mainly at the level of public audiences, which then incentives elites to violate norms for political gain.  These audiences can be at either the domestic or international level. For instance, if domestic constituents are indignant by foreign shaming, elites are incentivized to “double down,” or at least remain silent, lest they undermine their own political legitimacy.

That said, elites can also strategize and manipulate these expected public reactions for their own political purposes. For instance, if Vladimir Putin knows that the Russian public will grow indignant following Western shaming, he might strategically promote a law that he knows will provoke such a reaction in order to benefit from the ensuing conflict. This is what likely occurred with Russia’s “anti-gay propaganda” law, which (unsurprisingly) provoked harsh condemnation from the West and probably bolstered Putin’s domestic popularity.

Any other important points to highlight?

One important point I’d like to highlight is the long-term effects of defiance. In an effort to resist international pressure, states take action that, in the long term, work to internalize oppositional norms in their national identity. In this way, shaming actually produces deviance, not the other way around.

Follow CISAC at @StanfordCISAC and  www.facebook.com/StanfordCISAC

MEDIA CONTACTS:

Rochelle Terman, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 721-1378, rterman@stanford.edu,

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

 
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Protestors march to the United Nations building during International Human Rights Day in 2012 in New York City. Activists then called for immediate action by the UN and world governments to pressure China to loosen its control over Tibet -- a form of "state shaming," as examined by CISAC fellow Rochelle Terman in her research.
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Bits and pieces: Liberal democracy in the digital era

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The event is a joint sponsorship between CISAC, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the European Security Initiative (in The Europe Center) and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies (CREEES).

About the Event: Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Bernard and Susan Liautaud Distinguished Visiting Fellow, FSI, Visiting Scholar at CISAC, and former President of Republic of Estonia (2006 - 2016), will be interviewed by Michael McFaul, Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), FSI Senior Fellow, Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Professor of Political Science. Audience members will have an opportunity to ask questions after the interview. 

About the Guest Speaker: Toomas Hendrik Ilves was born to an Estonian family living in Stockholm, Sweden. He was educated in the United States, receiving a degree from Columbia University in 1976 and a master's degree in psychology from the University of Pennsylvania in 1978.

In 1984 he moved to Munich, Germany, to work at the office of Radio Free Europe, first as a researcher and foreign policy analyst and later as the head of the Estonian Desk.

From 1993 to 1996 Ilves served in Washington as the ambassador of the Republic of Estonia to the United States and Canada. During this time, he launched the Tiger Leap Initiative to computerize and connect all Estonian schools online with Education Minister Jaak Aaviksoo. He then served as minister of foreign affairs from 1996 to 1998. After a brief period as chairman of the North Atlantic Institute in 1998, he was again appointed minister of foreign affairs, serving until 2002.

From 2002 to 2004, Ilves was a member of the Estonian Parliament and in 2004 he was elected a member of the European Parliament, where he was vice-president of the Foreign Affairs Committee. As a MEP, he initiated the Baltic Sea Strategy that was later implemented as official regional policy of the European Union.

Ilves was elected president of the Republic of Estonia in 2006. He was re-elected for a second term in office in 2011.

During his presidency, Ilves has been appointed to serve in several high positions in the field of ICT in the European Union. He served as chairman of the EU Task Force on eHealth from 2011 to 2012 and was chairman of the European Cloud Partnership Steering Board at the invitation of the European Commission from 2012 to 2014. In 2013 he chaired the High-Level Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Governance Mechanisms convened by ICANN. From 2014 to 2015 Ilves was the co-chair of the advisory panel of the World Bank's World Development Report 2016 "Digital Dividends" and was also the chair of World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on Cyber Security beginning in June 2014.

Starting from 2016, Ilves co-chaired The World Economic Forum working group The Global Futures Council on Blockchain Technology. In 2017 he joined Stanford University as a Bernard and Susan Liautaud Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

President Ilves has published many essays and articles in Estonian and English on numerous topics ranging from Estonian language, history, and literature to global foreign and security policy and cyber security. His books include essay collections in Estonian, Finnish, Latvian, Hungarian, and Russian.

His international awards and honorary degrees include Knight of Freedom Award by the Casimir Pulaski Foundation (2016), the Aspen Prague Award by the Aspen Institute (2015), the Freedom Award by the Atlantic Council (2014) and the NDI Democracy Award by the National Democratic Institute (2013). His Honorary Degrees include an Honorary Degree from St. Olaf College, US (2014), an Honorary Degree from the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland (2010), and an Honorary Degree from Tbilisi University, Georgia (2007).

 

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Encina Hall, 2nd floor

Republic of Estonia, Stanford University
Panel Discussions
Directors' Seminar Series

Insider threats often ignored

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Whether it’s WikiLeaks and CIA documents or nuclear thieves, the danger from insiders in high-security organizations is escalating in our Internet age.

But many threats from within go unrecognized or misunderstood, according to Stanford professor Scott Sagan, who co-edited a new book Insider Threats with Matthew Bunn, a professor of practice at Harvard University. Their work analyzes the challenges that high-security organizations face in protecting themselves from employees who might betray them. Sagan, a core faculty member in Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and Bunn recently participated in an online discussion of the book’s key arguments. They will hold a talk and book signing at 3:30 p.m. on May 16 in the CISAC Central Conference Room.

Sagan and Bunn wrote, “Perhaps the most striking lesson we learned in working with scholars and officials who have dealt with this problem was the sheer scale of the red flags – from explicit statements of support for Osama bin Laden to behavior leading other staff to fear for their lives – that organizations are able to ignore.”

They found that organizations tend to have biases that cause them to downplay insider threats. In particular, organizations with high-security needs face significant risks from trusted employees with access to sensitive information, facilities, and materials. 

The researchers highlight "worst practices" from these past mistakes, suggesting lessons and insights that could improve the security situations at many workplaces. Amy Zegart, co-director of CISAC, has a chapter in Insider Threats that provides a detailed account of the organizational dysfunction that allowed Nidal Hasan to carry out his massacre at Fort Hood.

Other chapters include the following topics and authors:

  • An analysis of the similar problems that led Bruce Ivins, who probably carried out the anthrax attacks in 2001, to continue to have access to deadly pathogens (by Jessica Stern, then of Harvard and now at Boston University, and Ron Schouten, of Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School);
  • An analysis of the rapid rise and subsequent fall of “green-on-blue” attacks in Afghanistan – that is, Afghan soldiers and police officers attacking Americans there to help them (by Austin Long of Columbia University); and 
  • An assessment of how casinos and pharmaceutical plants, with a profit incentive to protect against insiders, cope with the problem (by Bunn and Kathryn Glynn, then of IBM Global Business Services and now at the National Nuclear Security Administration). 

Another chapter examines the potential terrorist use of nuclear insiders, offering new data that shows that jihadist writings and postings contain only a modest emphasis on possible nuclear plots, and essentially no mention of the possibility of using nuclear insiders. However, the authors warn this is no reason for complacency – insiders have been largely responsible for past nuclear theft incidents.

MEDIA CONTACTS

Scott Sagan, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-2715, ssagan@stanford.edu

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

 

 

 

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CISAC's Scott Sagan writes in a new book that organizations tend to ignore the many red flags typically associated with insider threats.
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Empires and Occupations: Global Dynamics of the Illiberal Wartime State, 1914-18

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- This event is co-sponsored by Stanford Global Studies, The Europe Center, and the History Department - 

Abstract: By 1914, exploiting colonies was a well-established practice of even the most ‘liberal’ empires. Treating areas of Europe like colonies was not, except on the more remote peripheries. However, when the Central Powers occupied substantial parts of Europe during World War One, they applied harsh economic regimes while the British and French intensified the use of their empires. This paper will consider the comparisons – and the links - between these two forms of exploitation. It will suggest that both became ‘laboratories of autarky’ for kinds of economic regime (especially with regard to manpower) that were still not possible domestically for the nation-states fighting the war. The argument will be general but focus empirically on French North Africa and German-occupied France and Belgium. 

About the Speaker: John Horne is Leverhulme Visiting Professor at Oxford University (2016-17) and Emeritus Fellow and former Professor of Modern European History at Trinity College Dublin, where he founded the Centre for War Studies. He is a Fellow of the Royal Irish Academy and a board member of the Research Centre at the Historial de la Grande Guerre, Péronne (France). He is the author and editor of a number of books and over ninety chapters and articles, many relating to the history of the Great War. Among his latest publications are (ed.) A Companion to World War One (Oxford, Blackwell-Wiley, 2010); (ed.) Vers la guerre totale: le tournant de 1914-1915 (Paris, Tallandier, 2010); and with Robert Gerwarth (ed.) War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War (Oxford University Press, 2012). He is currently working on a history of the French experiences of the First World War.

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

John Horne Leverhulme Visiting Professor Oxford University Oxford University and Trinity College Dublin
Seminars

A visit to Russia's secret nuclear labs

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Published in the journal Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, this column by Seigfried Hecker below is based on content in his 2016 book, Doomed to Cooperate: How American and Russian Scientists Joined Forces to Avert Some of the Greatest Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers:

On February 23, 1992, less than two months after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, I landed on the tarmac in Sarov, a city the government had removed from maps to keep secret its status as a nuclear weapons center. I was then director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and­­ accompanied by two senior scientists from my own lab plus three colleagues from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The six of us were about to walk through the birthplace of the Soviet nuclear bomb, the technological and intellectual powerhouse behind the sophisticated arsenal that had been pointed at our country for the previous 40 years.

Shockingly, after an hour-long flight from Moscow, we stepped out of the Aeroflot turboprop into the open arms of our Russian hosts: Yuli Borisovich Khariton, the scientific leader of the Soviet nuclear program, and other senior lab staff who had waited in the chilly wind to welcome us. Just as remarkable was the fact that this wasn’t the first time we met our Russian counterparts. Two weeks earlier, directors of the Russian nuclear weapons labs, VNIIEF in Sarov and VNIITF in Snezhinsk, had for the first time in history set foot in our labs in Livermore and Los Alamos. This exchange of visits a quarter century ago marked a new turn in relations between the world’s two nuclear weapons superpowers.

The road to Sarov

Our first meeting on Russian soil would have been deemed improbable just a few months earlier. The encounter on the Sarov tarmac grew out of both persistence by determined individuals and larger historical forces. As the Soviet Union scrambled to adjust domestic and international policy in the face of mounting economic and social challenges in the late 1980s, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev reached across the political divide to US President Ronald Reagan to take steps toward nuclear disarmament. One such step was the Joint Verification Experiment of 1988, in which the Soviet Union and the United States asked their nuclear weapons scientists to conduct parallel nuclear-explosion yield measurements at testing grounds in Nevada and Semipalatinsk, located in what is now Kazakhstan. The experiment helped overcome a stumbling block related to verification procedures needed to ratify the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). The 1988 nuclear tests enabled the two sides to sign a new ratification protocol in Geneva in June 1990, and the TTBT entered into force in December 1990.

As history would have it, an unintended outcome of the TTBT ratification effort proved to be the most momentous. Viktor Mikhailov, head of the Soviet team that took part in the Joint Verification Experiment and later Russian minister of atomic energy, was right when he said that “the main result of the Joint Verification Experiment was not the development of procedures and extent of nuclear test monitoring of the joint development of technical verification means, but the chance for interpersonal communications with the American nuclear physicists.”

Indeed, it was working side by side at each other’s test sites that gave rise to deep-rooted affinity and built trust. Over the years, we had only caught glimpses of our Soviet nuclear scientist counterparts at a few international conferences where they disguised their institutional affiliations, saying they were part of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. It was through months of collaboration at our test sites that the contours of their true home institutions—the nuclear weapons labs VNIIEF and VNIITF—began to emerge. As we would discover eventually, these Soviet labs were remarkably similar to our own. We realized that in addition to nuclear weapons work, they were conducting outstanding fundamental science. We became consumed with curiosity to learn more about it first-hand. The Russians were curious about our work as well.

We were all interested in cooperation, but the Russians even more so because they sensed before we did just how dramatically the Soviet Union was changing. Lev D. Ryabev, who headed the atomic ministry at the time, told me years later that Russian nuclear weapons scientists were so eager to work with their American counterparts because “we arrived in the nuclear century all in one boat—movement by any one will affect everyone. We were doomed to work together.”

It was during a 1990 trip to Moscow by Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore lab scientists for technical discussions supporting the Geneva test ban talks that Mikhailov extended an impromptu invitation to visit the USSR’s secret nuclear city Sarov (then called Arzamas-16) for the first time.

The American scientists returned with specific proposals from the VNIIEF director and his senior scientists for collaboration with the US labs, along with an invitation to Lawrence Livermore Director John Nuckolls and me to visit the secret Russian cities.

Convinced by my Los Alamos colleagues that this was a great opportunity to collaborate scientifically in important areas of research, I tried a number of avenues in Washington to get approval for exploring potential cooperation. I got little traction until the second half of 1991, after the Soviet Union had begun to disintegrate. As it did so, President George H.W. Bush became concerned that brain drain from the Soviet nuclear complex could lead to the spread of knowledge about how to build these weapons of mass destruction.

Driven by that concern, US Energy Secretary James D. Watkins approved my request for the laboratory directors’ exchange visits, and two months after Gorbachev’s formal dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, we entered the surreal world of the Soviet Los Alamos.

A tradition worth sustaining 

Our visits to Sarov and Snezhinsk shattered our Cold War preconceptions of the Soviet nuclear program. We were particularly impressed by the depth of scientific talent. Although they lacked modern computers and electronics, their computational achievements were remarkable, and their experimental facilities were innovative and functional. We found the scientists’ dedication to their mission deeply patriotic, and their attention to nuclear weapons safety reassuring. During our briefings and tours, Russian scientists described leading-edge research in the fundamental science that underpinned their nuclear weapons program. The visits convinced me that our US nuclear labs should collaborate with their Russian counterparts, not only to help solve immediate problems like proliferation and loose nukes, but also because in doing so we would benefit scientifically.

Our Russian colleagues were prepared with proposals for cooperation in a surprisingly broad range of areas. During a daylong session in Chief Weapon Designer Boris Litvinov’s office in Snezhinsk, watched by portraits of Lenin and Igor Kurchatov, one of the fathers of the Soviet Bomb, we hammered out a protocol for cooperation that we would take back to our governments. We came up with a long list problems we wanted to work on together. It included enhancing the security and safety of nuclear weapons during reduction and dismantlement; preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons knowledge; promoting the conversion and diversification of nuclear facilities; preventing non-nuclear states and terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons; developing joint mechanisms for emergency response; enhancing the safety of nuclear arsenals; preventing unauthorized use of remaining weapons; and promoting protection and cleanup of the environment at nuclear weapons facilities.

It turned out that we scientists were far ahead of what the US government was prepared to authorize at the time. We heard that when members of the National Security Council staff, which coordinated interagency government issues with Russia, received a copy of the protocol, they declared it did not exist and threw it in the waste paper basket. However, Nuckolls and I presented the protocol to Watkins and received approval to proceed, though only in fundamental science cooperation.

By May 1992, even though the US Energy and State Departments had only agreed to general principles, the former had provided us with the necessary financial support and the latter with the required permissions for travel to Russia. Just as importantly, we had defined what we wanted to do first in the collaboration we called lab-to-lab. We planned for joint experiments in high-energy-density physics and conferences on computer modeling and simulation.

In spite of the initial US government concerns, we would eventually end up cooperating in almost all the areas outlined in the initial protocol. A spirit of collaboration prevailed for nearly a quarter century, and was essential to successfully mitigating the dangers resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, that cooperation has all but come to an end during the past few years as relations between Moscow and Washington have soured. But the benefits of future cooperation are potentially enormous, as a new report from the Nuclear Threat Initiative makes clear. The US and Russian governments, as well as the two countries’ scientists, should seize any opportunities that arise to rekindle nuclear cooperation.

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This picture shows the 1992 visit of U.S. nuclear weapon labs directors to the Russian nuclear weapons institutes in Sarov and Snezhinsk. On the left, in a white sweater is the Russian physicist Alexander Pavlovsky. Next to him is "Russia’s Oppenheimer" Yuly Khariton, almost 88 at that time. The second and third persons on the right are Sig Hecker, director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and John Nuckolls, director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Courtesy of Siegfried Hecker
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Insider Threats

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High-security organizations around the world face devastating threats from insiders—trusted employees with access to sensitive information, facilities, and materials. From Edward Snowden to the Fort Hood shooter to the theft of nuclear materials, the threat from insiders is on the front page and at the top of the policy agenda. Insider Threats offers detailed case studies of insider disasters across a range of different types of institutions, from biological research laboratories, to nuclear power plants, to the U.S. Army. Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan outline cognitive and organizational biases that lead organizations to downplay the insider threat, and they synthesize "worst practices" from these past mistakes, offering lessons that will be valuable for any organization with high security and a lot to lose.

Insider threats pose dangers to anyone who handles information that is secret or proprietary, material that is highly valuable or hazardous, people who must be protected, or facilities that might be sabotaged. This is the first book to offer in-depth case studies across a range of industries and contexts, allowing entities such as nuclear facilities and casinos to learn from each other. It also offers an unprecedented analysis of terrorist thinking about using insiders to get fissile material or sabotage nuclear facilities.

Contributors:

  • Matthew Bunn, Harvard University
  • Andreas Hoelstad Dæhli, Oslo
  • Kathryn M. Glynn, IBM Global Business Services 
  • Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Oslo
  • Austin Long, Columbia University
  • Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University
  • Ronald Schouten, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School 
  • Jessica Stern, Harvard University
  • Amy B. Zegart, Stanford University
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Hidden Risks: global supply chains, public health and global governance

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About the Event: Despite much current talk about “America First,” the United States has a vital interest in global health that is rooted in both practical necessity and humanitarian traditions.  There is growing recognition of the complex problem of direct and indirect threats to the health and security of U.S. populations and people around the globe related to the state of health in all countries, the risk of disease spread into this country, the reality of emerging or resurging infections, most recently Ebola, Zika or a pandemic flu, and the growing possibility that biological agents might be deliberately used to do harm.  Perhaps less well-recognized are the significant health and safety risks posed by the growing number of products that flow across borders. In our increasingly globalized world, the benefits of a global marketplace can be seen in greater choice for consumers and new opportunities for business and innovation, but it has also created many new challenges for product oversight and protection of complex supply chains. Harmful products result from poor quality manufacturing, production, and distribution, contamination, and even from intentional adulteration, fraud and counterfeiting. Success in protecting the public now depends on reaching beyond our borders, and working effectively with regulatory authorities, industry, and intergovernmental and international organizations to build a global product safety net for consumers and patients around the world.  

About the Speaker: Dr. Hamburg is an internationally recognized leader in public health and medicine. As Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Medicine, the health arm of the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, Dr. Hamburg serves as senior advisor on international matters and is the liaison with other Academies of Medicine around the world. She is also President-elect of the American Association for the Advancement of Science

Dr. Hamburg earned her A.B. from Harvard College, her M.D. from Harvard Medical School and completed her medical residency at Weill Cornell Medical Center. Following completion of her formal medical training, Dr. Hamburg went to Washington to explore the world of health policy. She soon took on the role of Assistant Director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) of the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

In 1991, Dr. Hamburg was named Commissioner of the New York City Department of health. During her six-year tenure there, she implemented rigorous public health initiatives that tackled the city’s most pressing crises head-on — including improved services for women and children, an internationally recognized tuberculosis control program, a needle-exchange program to combat HIV transmission, and the nation’s first public health bio-terrorism preparedness program.       

In 1997, President Clinton named Dr. Hamburg Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the lead policy position in the Department. She later became founding Vice President for Biological Programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a foundation dedicated to reducing the threat to public safety from nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

In 2009, President Obama nominated Dr. Hamburg for the post of FDA Commissioner. In that role, Dr. Hamburg emphasized the critical need for innovation in meeting medical care and public health needs. As Commissioner, she provided leadership on many groundbreaking activities, including: new authority to regulate tobacco products; implementation of the Food Safety Modernization Act designed to transform food safety to a preventive system rather than simply responding when outbreaks occur; and modernization of the system for the evaluation and approval of medical products. Dr. Hamburg also worked hard to reposition FDA as an agency prepared for the challenges of globalization and was very active in efforts to establish new mechanisms for global governance of regulatory systems, including enhanced communication, collaboration and regulatory harmonization.

Dr. Hamburg currently sits on a number of Boards, including for the Commonwealth Fund, the Simons Foundation, the Parker Institute for Cancer Immunotherapy,  the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, the Urban Institute, and the American Museum of Natural History. She is also a member of the Harvard University Global Advisory Council, the Harvard Medical School Board of Fellows, the World Dementia Council and the Global Health Scientific Advisory Committee for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Dr Hamburg formerly served on the Boards of the Rockefeller Foundation, the Rockefeller University, the Nathan Cummings Foundation, Conservation International and Henry Schein Inc. Dr. Hamburg is an elected member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Academy of Medicine, and a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the American College of Physicians. She is the recipient of multiple honorary degrees and numerous awards.

 

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Encina Hall, 2nd floor

Margaret A. Hamburg Foreign Secretary National Academy of Medicine
Seminars
Directors' Seminar Series

Challenges and Perspectives for NATO in the 21st Century

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About the Event: NATO is entering today the 4th phase of its history and must adapt to changes in today’s security environment in order to remain relevant. NATO’s ability to adapt will ultimately redefine NATO’s place in the world.  General Mercier will discuss challenges facing NATO faces such as maintaining the unity between members in the Alliance, addressing potential crises in Eastern Europe, reopening dialogue with Russia, and addressing instability on NATO-member borders.

About the Speaker: General Denis Mercier is the North Atlantic Council as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation. Prior to this assignment, he served as the French Air Force Chief of Staff from 2012-2015.

He graduated with a Master’s of Science from the French Air Force Academy in 1981, qualifying as a fighter pilot in 1983. He has more than 3000 flying hours including 182 hours in combat missions. Gen. Mercier commanded the 1/12 "Cambrésis" Fighter Squadron, a founding unit of the NATO Tiger association. He participated in numerous other NATO exercises and operations, including Operation Deny Flight over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994, "Strong Resolve” in 1998, and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo.

From 1999 to 2002, Gen. Mercier was deputy head of the combined joint task force deputy branch at Regional Headquarters where he contributed to the development of the Combined Joint Task Force concept. He was a member of the combined analysis team for exercise "Allied Effort '01" and an evaluator of the CJTF HQ for Exercise "Strong Resolve '02". He also acted as liaison officer for the Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic stationed in Norfolk, VA.

He later served as the commander of Reims Air force base, integrating Mirage F1CR squadrons with ISAF in Afghanistan. From 2004 to 2008 he served as the head of the plans division at the French Air Force headquarters and was nominated as a flag officer in 2007. He then commanded the French Air Force Academy in Salon-de-Provence. As senior military advisor for the Minister of Defence from 2010-2012, Gen. Mercier prepared and participated in all NATO ministerial meetings, summits in Lisbon and Chicago, and was special advisor to Operation Unified Protector over Libya.

Among other awards, Gen. Mercier has been awarded the rank of Grand Officier of the French Legion of Honor and, among other distinctions, an officer of the National Order of Merit.

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Hecker: Open dialogue with North Korea

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Jaemin Jung, a writer for the South Korean publication known as “SisaIn,” recently interviewed CISAC's Siegfried Hecker on the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons:

Jung: In your recent op-ed piece in The New York Times, you said talking to North Korea is the best option for the Trump administration. Do you still believe so even when the current North Korean regime repeatedly declared to the world that it would never give up its nuclear program as a nuclear power state?

Hecker: Well, I still believe that talking directly, someone from the Trump administration to North Korea, is essential today. However, what I mean by talking is talk to the regime to make sure that we do not have a nuclear catastrophe. The main reason for talking is to eliminate a potential nuclear confrontation. The issue of whether or not North Korea should have nuclear weapons or will ever give up nuclear weapons has to be a much longer-term issue. The immediate issue, I believe, is that we have a nuclear crisis on our hands now, and we must talk in order to make sure that such a confrontation does not happen. So, that’s the reason for talking.

Jung: In other words, direct talk is essential to avoid any misunderstanding or miscalculation on the part of North Korea?

Hecker: Precisely. The reason for direct talking is to make sure there be no such misunderstanding, potential accidents, or potential escalations to the nuclear arena. Making sure that does not happen, that is the reason for talking now.

Jung: Does it mean that after you build trust from such talking, you then move on to real agenda such as denuclearization?

Hecker: Yes. So, what I recommend is not only talking but also listening. I think it’s important for the new administration to listen to what the Kim Jong Un regime has to say.  By listening we could learn enough to understand how to forge better negotiations, or the long term issue of getting rid of nuclear weapons.

Jung: Regarding the now suspended nuclear talks, many people blame the North for breaking its nuclear agreements with the U.S. or cheating repeatedly. In other words, whether we can trust North Korea is a big issue here. What is your take?

Hecker: Well, we don’t have a relationship that provides the underpinning or foundation for trust: trust by America about North Korea or trust by North Korea about the United States.  When it comes to negotiations, an agreement could be signed pretty quickly but trust can take years and years to develop. So, as you look back, North Korea has indeed violated many of the agreements that they signed. In some cases, we can say that it was to develop a hedge in case the United States dropped out of the agreement. For example, in the Agreed Framework signed in 1994, the United States did not follow its end as quickly and as fully as it promised to do. North Koreans developed a hedge. They cheated by developing an enriched uranium program. Over the years, the Agreed Framework may have been able to build trust by building two modern light water reactors there. But the Bush administration did not trust North Korea and killed the agreement. Now, 15 years later, there is still no trust. It would have to be developed. I think this would take at least a decade.

Jung: In that respect, trust is something not only North Korea but the United States should care about, right?

Hecker: That should be one of the main objectives of whatever next round of negotiations are.

Jung: In your article, you suggested direct talks between the US and North Korea instead of a multilateral talks like the 6-party talks.  In the past, the US tried many times talking directly with the North in Geneva or other places, but failed. Why now?

Hecker: The Geneva talks in 1994 were successful. They led to the Agreed Framework. The main reason that I proposed direct talks between the U.S. and North Korea now is, as I mentioned in the beginning, to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. We have to better understand what North Korea’s nuclear intentions are. What do they expect to get from their nuclear weapons, what are their nuclear policies, what do they have in place to avoid nuclear accidents, what do they have in place to make certain their nuclear weapons are safe and secure? Those kinds of discussions cannot be held in a multilateral forum. The only country that has the opportunity to have those kind of talks with North Korea is the United States. So, talk to avoid a nuclear catastrophe should be bilateral. Eventually negotiations have to include South Korea, they have to include China, and the 6-Party Talks members Japan and Russia should be involved. So, negotiations will have to be multilateral affair. However, to get to the point of meaningful negotiations, to avoid nuclear catastrophe, there should be bilateral talks. The sooner, the better.

Jung: Can you specify what you mean by ‘nuclear catastrophe’?

Hecker: What I’m concerned about is that in the past 10 years North Korea has developed, as best we know because nobody knows for sure, a really threatening nuclear arsenal, perhaps having enough nuclear material of 20-25 nuclear weapons. They continue to try and make those weapons more sophisticated and to be able to mount them on missiles. So, with that level of nuclear firepower, the reason that I worry about nuclear catastrophe is that one could have an accident, there is concern about security and safety of their nuclear weapons, there could be miscalculation on the part of the regime, there could be confrontation and escalation of military activities that could lead to nuclear use. Any use of nuclear devices of any sort on the Korean peninsula is what I call nuclear catastrophe. Today the most important part is to avoid the use or detonation of nuclear device on the Korean peninsula. That has to be the first objective of the Trump administration.

Jung: If the direct talks with the North go well, you said Trump should send a presidential envoy to Pyongyang.  Don’t you think Trump must get North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization before sending such an envoy?

Hecker: That approach misunderstands what my concerns are. My most immediate concerns are to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. The issue of denuclearization comes down the road. In other words, it’s a longer-term issue. The concerns I have about the use of nuclear weapons are so great that they require talks now without preconditions. Any future negotiations, of course, must be aimed at eventual denuclearization of North Korea. However, in my opinion, that’s much of a long-term issue. It will not happen over the next few years. I am not talking about negotiations now. I’m talking about talking, talking to avoid a nuclear catastrophe.

Jung: Do you prefer the U.S. talking with North Korea about it in formal or informal setting?

Hecker: I am saying at this point a presidential envoy should bring up the topic in a quiet, informal setting, but it has to have the imprimatur of the Trump administration.

Jung: In op-ed, you said the nuclear clock keeps ticking, and every six to seven weeks, the North may be able to add another nuclear weapon to its arsenal. Is the nuclear bomb based on plutonium only, or does it include uranium-based bomb, too?

Hecker: My estimate is not based on plutonium alone. It’s based on both plutonium and highly enriched uranium.  North Korea cannot produce more than one bomb’s worth of plutonium per year. With highly enriched uranium we have great uncertainties. We simply do not know enough about highly enriched uranium program. My best estimates are perhaps as many as six nuclear weapons out of highly enriched uranium per year.  So, it’s possible that North Korea could make 6-8 nuclear weapons per year. But let me stress the fact again that’s my best estimate, and we don’t know for certain. It’s important to realize that the nuclear crisis is here now. We don’t need to wait until North K. can reach mainland U.S. with a nuclear-tipped missile.

Jung: So, how many nuclear weapons do you think North Korea has now?

Hecker: Again, all we can do is estimate, and my own estimate is North Korea may have enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium for perhaps 20-25 nuclear weapons as of the end of 2016.

Jung: Some experts believe freeze on North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, not denuclearization, is the best realistic option at this point to break the long stalled nuclear talks.  What do you think?

Hecker: I’ve been promoting for the last eight years or so that we proceed in the following manner: First, halt the program, then roll it back, and then eventually eliminate it. To me, freeze is the same as halt. So, the most important part is to stop the problem from getting worse. However, there are many aspects to what we call halt or freeze. I stated it in the following manner - I call it “Three Nos.” We would like North Korea to make no more bombs (that means, no more plutonium or highly enriched uranium), no better bombs (no more nuclear tests or long-range missile test), and no export of bombs or nuclear material. So, that would be the essence of a freeze or halt.)

Jung: I see many North Korea experts agree with your proposal as a realistic option to break the current bottleneck in the nuclear talks. Did you get any reaction from the U.S. government?

Hecker: Well, I wish the American government had supported that eight years ago, because then we’d be in a much better position today. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons we didn’t get there, and now we have to deal with the way things are. Now, the Trump administration comes in, and its challenge is to avoid a nuclear detonation on the Korean peninsula. That’s the challenge, and because of that, it’s a completely different challenge than the Obama administration or the Bush administration faced, and the Trump administration must address that challenge differently.

Jung: So, what is your advice to the Trump administration?

Hecker: At this point, talk to the North Koreans to prevent any sort of potential nuclear catastrophe, and then try to listen to the North Koreans. And make sure they understand our strong commitment to our allies, South Korea and Japan, and that we care about human rights in North Korea, and we are committed to the eventual denuclearization of North Korea. Finally, it will be to North Korea’s advantage to get back to serious negotiations to eventually denuclearize the Korean peninsula. That’s my advice. 

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People watch a television screen showing a breaking news on North Korea's long-range rocket launch at Seoul Station on Feb. 7, 2016 in Seoul, South Korea. CISAC's Siegfried Hecker urges direct talks between the U.S. and North Korea to resolve an increasingly dangerous situation in the latter country.
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Collaboration counts in cryptography

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When governments and scholars work together on data security, society benefits from better safeguards and protections, a U.S. intelligence expert said Wednesday.

The difficulty is keeping up with technology and societal trends, Admiral Bobby R. Inman said at the Center for International Security and Cooperation's annual Drell Lecture for 2017. His talk was titled, “The Challenges of Providing Data Security.”

Inman, whose U.S. Navy career spanned 31 years, served as the director of the National Security Agency, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and held other influential positions in the U.S. intelligence community. After retiring from the Navy, Inman worked on start-ups in the private sector, in higher education, and as chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. He is currently the Lyndon B. Johnson Centennial Chair in National Policy at the University of Texas, Austin.

'9/11 changed everything'

During his talk, Inman recounted the early days of cryptography and the dialogue between government officials like himself and scholars at universities such as Stanford and UC Berkeley. Cryptography or cryptology is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of third parties typically known as adversaries.

Inman was a key driver behind establishing the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in 1978. The purpose of the “FISA” court was to oversee requests for surveillance warrants against foreign spies inside the United States by federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

Today, technology has overwhelmed many issues regarding how the government tracks the communications of foreign entities, Inman said. And events have ushered in a different orientation on what type of information and from whom is sought by U.S. intelligence. “9/11 changed everything,” he added.

After 9/11, U.S. intelligence began to focus on foreign individuals in addition to the traditional foreign state actors, Inman said. He pointed out the value of such data collection, as penetrating small groups with human agents is extraordinarily difficult and dangerous.

“The only way you’re likely to get a lead on them (terrorists or narcotic traffickers) is through their communications,” he said.

The Internet, especially social media, has exploded in usage and made data security efforts even more complex, Inman said. “A vastly different world.” As a result, serious privacy, commercial usages and intellectual property issues need to be resolved more than ever. He noted that the rule of law is important to follow when the governmnt or other entities collect and examine communications data.

Inman is particularly worried about how “basic issues of ethics and morality” have eroded in society, which results in people scheming to sell private data for profit that puts others at risk. Another issue involves how to prevent terrorist groups from preying upon mentally weak people and recruiting them over the Internet.

A key reason Inman was invited to be the Drell speaker this year was his connection to Martin Hellman and Whitfield Diffie, two pioneering cryptographers from CISAC who drew Inman’s attention in the mid-1970s when they wrote a groundbreaking paper in their field of study. The three later established long-running friendships that produced strong cryptography frameworks.

Inman said, “We were privileged to start the dialogue. That’s where you begin to solve problems,” as fears and misperceptions can be resolved through discussions and openness. “I think what we need is a repeat of pulling together people” from academia and government to deal with today’s security threats. “We need to assess where we are.”

His concern is who would convene such a dialogue. “We’re in a pretty bumpy time, nationally,” said Inman, who urges a neutral party to be such a convener. On broader security fronts, Inman said he is most apprehensive about a possible nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India.

Legacy of Drell

The event included a tribute to Sidney Drell, who passed away last December at the age of 90. Drell co-founded CISAC, and jointly directed it from 1983 to 1989. The Drell Lecture, which is named after him, is an annual public event sponsored by CISAC. By tradition, the lecturer addresses a current and critical national or international security issue that has important scientific or technical dimensions.

In her opening remarks, Amy Zegart, co-director of CISAC, described Drell as a “true giant in the field of theoretical physics” who devoted his life’s work to reducing the threat of nuclear catastrophe. One trademarks of the Drell lecture was that its namesake had the opportunity to ask the first question of the speaker. “He had a unique way of asking penetrating questions" with gentle decency and fairness, she added.

CISAC’s William Perry, also on hand to discuss Drell’s legacy, said, “Sid Drell was truly a man for all seasons” who excelled in various fields of academic and policy. Perry first met Drell 55 years ago when he was beginning his own career in nuclear arms control. “Sid’s deep interest in arms control led to him teaming up with John Lewis” to launch CISAC, he noted.

“He was an extraordinary man,” Perry said, “and we shall never see his like again.”

Drell was a fan of classical music, especially the St. Lawrence String Quartet, a chamber music group whose music was piped in to the Bechtel Conference Room before the event began.

Follow CISAC at @StanfordCISAC and  www.facebook.com/StanfordCISAC

MEDIA CONTACTS

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

 

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