International Development

FSI researchers consider international development from a variety of angles. They analyze ideas such as how public action and good governance are cornerstones of economic prosperity in Mexico and how investments in high school education will improve China’s economy.

They are looking at novel technological interventions to improve rural livelihoods, like the development implications of solar power-generated crop growing in Northern Benin.

FSI academics also assess which political processes yield better access to public services, particularly in developing countries. With a focus on health care, researchers have studied the political incentives to embrace UNICEF’s child survival efforts and how a well-run anti-alcohol policy in Russia affected mortality rates.

FSI’s work on international development also includes training the next generation of leaders through pre- and post-doctoral fellowships as well as the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program.

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Abstract:  Russia is the country that has the largest amount of weapon-usable fissile materials in its disposal, most of which has been produced during the cold war. In the years following the end of the cold war. Russia has undertaken significant effort to downsize its nuclear complex, leading to its serious transformation. This transformation, however, left the basic structure of the nuclear industry, most of the production facilities and most of the fissile material intact. Substantial amounts of weapon-usable fissile materials are still in storage, moved from one facility to another, or used for research and other purposes, creating security risks. Although the dangers associated with continuing presence of weapon material are generally acknowledged, the task of reducing this danger, by either eliminating the material or removing it from circulation and consolidating in a mall number of safe and secure storage sites, has proven difficult. The talk analyses the progress that Russia has made so far in consolidating its weapon-usable materials and describes the challenges that it is facing in further advancing this goal.

Pavel Podvig is a researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. In 2008-09, Podvig is CISAC's acting associate director for research. Before coming to Stanford in 2004, he worked at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), which was the first independent research organization in Russia dedicated to analysis of technical issues related to arms control and disarmament. In Moscow, Podvig was the leader of a major research project and the editor of the book Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (MIT Press, 2001). In recognition of his work in Russia, the American Physical Society awarded Podvig the Leo Szilard Lectureship Award of 2008 (with Anatoli Diakov). From 2000 to 2004, Podvig worked with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, and earlier with the Security Studies Program at MIT. His current research focuses on the Russian strategic forces and nuclear weapons complex, as well as technical and political aspects of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, missile defense, and U.S.-Russian arms control process.

Podvig received his degree in physics from MIPT and his PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Since 2001, Podvig has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. He is a member of the APS Committee on International Freedom of Scientists and is serving as the Chair of the Committee in 2008. 

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

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Pavel Podvig is an independent analyst based in Geneva, where he runs his research project, "Russian Nuclear Forces." He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and a researcher with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. Pavel Podvig started his work on arms control at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), which was the first independent research organization in Russia dedicated to analysis of technical issues of disarmament and nonproliferation. Pavel Podvig led the Center for Arms Control Studies project that produced the book, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (MIT Press, 2001). In recognition of his work in Russia, the American Physical Society awarded Podvig the Leo Szilard Lectureship Award of 2008 (with Anatoli Diakov). Podvig worked with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, the Security Studies Program at MIT, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His current research focuses on the Russian strategic forces and nuclear weapons complex, as well as technical and political aspects of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, missile defense, and U.S.-Russian arms control process. Pavel Podvig is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. He has a  physics degree from MIPT and PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

For a list of publications, please visit http://russianforces.org/podvig/.

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Pavel Podvig Acting Co-Director for Research and Research Associate, CISAC Speaker
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Ward Wilson is an award-winning scholar living in Trenton, NJ. He has written, studied and read extensively about nuclear weapons issues for more than twenty-five years. After training as a historian at the American University in Washington, DC with a special emphasis on philosophy, he was a Fellow at the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation in 1981 where he wrote about nuclear weapons issues. He has been published in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dissent, the Chicago Tribune, Nonproliferation Review and International Security (among others). His work has been described as "some of the most original and exacting thinking being done about nuclear weapons today." In 2007 he published a ground-breaking study of the bombing of Hiroshima in International Security titled "The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima." The distinguished physicists Freeman Dyson has said that the article "effectively demolishes the generally-accepted myth that the atomic bombings brought World War II to an end." Wilson argues that "Much of what has been written about nuclear weapons is conceptually muddled. A great deal of work is necessary to intellectually recast the field." He advocates an approach rooted in the work of William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein that emphasizes examining the usefulness of nuclear weapons. "The only important question is ‘Are nuclear weapons useful?' If the answer is no, why keep them?" Wilson writes regularly at www.rethinkingnuclearweapons.org.

Barton Bernstein began his current position as Professor of History at Stanford University in 1965, after receiving his Ph.D. in History from Harvard University in 1964. At Stanford, he has served as the director of the History Honors Program, the International Relations program, and the International Policy Studies program. Prof. Bernstein is a member of the American Historical Association, the Conference on Peace Research in History, and has served on the Editorial Advisory Committee for the Nuclear Age Series at Stanford University. He has been awarded numerous grants and research positions, including the National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship and the Lawrence-Livermore Grant. Prof. Bernstein was a CISAC fellow during the 1985-86 academic year.  Many of Prof. Bernstein's publications and articles have received national acclaim. He co-edited, with Don Kennedy, a series in Modern American History. A beloved professor and prolific author, Prof. Bernstein's research interests include U.S. foreign policy, modern U.S. political history, and science and technology policy. His talk "Why did Japan Surrender in World War II" addresses and challenges false or outdated conceptions of Japan's role in WWII.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Ward Wilson Independent Nuclear Weapons Scholar, Trenton, NJ Speaker
Barton J. Bernstein Professor of History, Stanford University Commentator
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Abstract:  Given that even minor changes to our nuclear weapons posture have been rejected as too risky, it is surprising that the baseline risk of our current strategy had not been estimated prior to my March 2008 paper. Even though that paper uses a simplified model which only lower bounds the risk, it is estimated to be thousands of times greater than that associated with a nuclear power plant near your home. The advantages of bringing quantitative risk analysis to bear on this problem will be discussed and next steps proposed.

Martin E. Hellman is Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University and a member of the National Academy of Engineering. While best known for his invention with Diffie and Merkle of public key cryptography, he also has a strong concern for averting nuclear war. With Anatoly Gromyko, he co-edited "Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking," a book which appeared in English and in Russian late in 1987 calling for a long-term process to eliminate the nuclear threat.

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CISAC Affiliated Faculty Member
Professor (Emeritus) of Electrical Engineering
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Martin E. Hellman is professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford, a recipient (joint with Whit Diffie) of the million dollar ACM Turing Award, a member of the National Academy of Engineering, and an inductee of the National Inventors Hall of Fame. He became a CISAC affiliated faculty member in October 2012.

Hellman is best known for his invention, with Whitfield Diffie and Ralph Merkle, of public key cryptography. In addition to many other uses, this technology forms the basis for secure transactions and cybersecurity on the Internet. He also has been a long-time contributor to the computer privacy debate, starting with the issue of DES key size in 1975 and continuing with service (1994-96) on the National Research Council's Committee to Study National Cryptographic Policy, whose main recommendations were implemented soon afterward.

Prof. Hellman also has a deep interest in the ethics of technological development. With Prof. Anatoly Gromyko of Moscow, he co-edited Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking, a book published simultaneously in Russian and English in 1987 during the rapid change in Soviet-American relations (available as a free, 2.6 MB PDF download). In 1986, he and his wife of fifty years published, A New Map for Relationships: Creating True Love at Home & Peace on the Planet, a book that provides a “unified field theory” for successful relationships by illuminating the connections between nuclear war, conventional war, interpersonal war, and war within our own psyches (available as a free, 1.2 MB PDF download).
 
His current research is devoted to bringing a risk-informed framework to nuclear deterrence and critically examining the assumptions that underlie our national security.

Prof. Hellman was at IBM's Watson Research Center from 1968-69 and an assistant professor of EE at MIT from 1969-71. Returning to Stanford in 1971, he served on the regular faculty until becoming Professor Emeritus in 1996. He has authored over seventy technical papers, six US patents and a number of foreign equivalents.

More information on Professor Hellman is available on his EE Department website. His publications, many  of which can be downloaded in PDF, are on the publications page of that site.
Martin Hellman Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University Speaker
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Abstract:  In 2003, General John Gordon, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and former Deputy Director of the CIA asked his staff to do an end-to-end evaluation of U.S. biodefense posture.  As a result, Homeland Security Staff, directed by Dr. Kenneth Bernard, Special Assistant to the President, did a government-wide review of national preparedness and response to a bioterrorist attack.   The resulting assessment led in 2004 to the combined Homeland Security Presidential Directive #10 and National Security Presidetial Directive #17:  "Biodefense for the 21st Century."  Dr. Bernard will discuss the process and outcome of this policy that remains the U.S. national strategy for preventing and responding to a bioterrorist event. Accomplishments, outcomes and remaining gaps will be detailed, along with budget and policy implications for the next administration. 

Admiral Kenneth Bernard was appointed by President Bush to be Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense on the Homeland Security Council (HSC) in November 2002. Dr. Bernard chaired the Whitehouse Biodefense Policy Coordinating committee and drafted Decision Directives for President Bush on both "Biodefense for the 21st Century" and Agricultural Bioterrorism, and he was the White House point person on Project Bioshield - a $5.6 billion congressional bill that is speeding development and procurement of new countermeasures against biological, chemical and radiological terrorist threats.

In January 2001, Dr. Bernard was assigned by the U.S. Surgeon General to the office of Senator Bill Frist to work on international health issues of priority concern to both the Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).   After September 11, however, he was called back to HHS to create the position of Special Adviser for National Security, Intelligence and Defense for the Department of Health and Human Services. From August 1998 to January 2001, he served on President Clinton's National Security Council (NSC) staff as Special Adviser to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Prior to joining the NSC, Dr. Bernard served as the International Health Attaché and senior representative of the U.S. Secretary of Health at the U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva, Switzerland (1994-1998). From 1984-1989, he held positions as the Associate Director for Medical and Scientific Affairs in the Office of International Health, HHS, and as International Health Policy Adviser to the Director of the U.S. Peace Corps. He retired from the USPHS as a Rear Admiral.

He received his AB degree from the University of California, Berkeley in 1971, an M.D. from the University of California, Davis in 1975, and the DTM&H degree from the University of London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in 1977.  He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Dr. Kenneth Bernard former Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, Homeland Security Council Speaker
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Ariel (Eli) Levite is a nonresident senior associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment. He is a member of the Israeli Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee on Arms Control and Regional Security and a member of the board of directors of the Fisher Brothers Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies. Prior to joining the Carnegie Endowment, Levite was the Principal Deputy Director General for Policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission. Levite also served as the deputy national security advisor for defense policy and was head of the Bureau of International Security and Arms Control in the Israeli Ministry of Defense. In September 2000, Levite took a two year sabbatical from the Israeli civil service to work as a visiting fellow and project co-leader of the "Discriminate Force" Project as the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. Before his government service, Levite worked for five years as a senior research associate and head of the project on Israeli security at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. Levite has taught courses on security studies and political science at Tel Aviv University, Cornell University, and the University of California, Davis.

Steven Kull, director of WorldPublicOpinion.org and the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA). He directs the PIPA/Knowledge Networks poll of the US public, plays a central role in the BBC World Service Poll of global opinion and the polls of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and is the principal investigator of a major study of social support of anti-American terrorist groups in Islamic countries. He regularly appears in the US and international media, providing analysis of public opinion, and gives briefings to the US Congress, the State Department, NATO, the United Nations and the European Commission. His articles have appeared in Political Science Quarterly, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion Quarterly, Harpers, The Washington Post and other publications. His most recent book, co-authored with I.M. Destler, is Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism (Brookings). He is a faculty member of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the World Association of Public Opinion Research.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Ariel Levite Nonresident Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment Speaker
Steven Kull Director, Program on International Policy Attitudes and WorldPublicOpinion.org Speaker
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Jacob N. Shapiro is Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. His primary research interests are the organizational aspects of terrorism, insurgency, and security policy. Shapiro's ongoing projects study the balance between secrecy and openness in counterterrorism, the causes of militant recruitment in Islamic countries, and the relationship between public goods provision and insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. His research has been published in International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Foreign Policy, Military Operations Research, and a number of edited volumes. Shapiro is a Harmony Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy. Professor Shapiro served as a Naval Reserve officer with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Warfare Development Command. On active duty he served at Special Boat Team 20 and onboard the USS Arthur W. Radford (DD-968). Ph.D. Political Science, M.A. Economics, Stanford University. B.A. Political Science, University of Michigan.

Lieutenant Colonel David Ottignon is a national security affairs fellow for 2008-2009 at the Hoover Institution. LTCOL Ottignon represents the U.S. Marine Corps. Ottignon graduated from Ithaca College and was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1987 as a combat engineer. He participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines, and most recently, in Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2007 to 2008. Other previous assignments include service in the U.S. Pacific Command, Assistant Professor of Military Science at the University of Rochester and Commanding Officer, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion, 2d Marine Division. He has earned his MBA from the Simon School, University of Rochester and a Masters in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. His research at Hoover will focus on current and future national security issues. Ottignon is on the select list for promotion to Colonel. 

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Jacob Shapiro Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University Speaker
Lieutenant Colonel David Ottignon National Security Affairs Fellow, Hoover Institution Commentator
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Dara Kay Cohen, the 2008-09 Zukerman Fellow, is a Ph.D. candidate in Stanford's Department of Political Science, the Teaching Assistant for CISAC's Honors Program and a 2008-09 Peace Scholar Dissertation Fellow at the United States Institute for Peace. Her dissertation, "Explaining Sexual Violence During Civil War," studies how rape was used during civil wars between 1980-99. She has completed seven months of fieldwork in Sierra Leone and East Timor, where she interviewed more than 200 ex-combatants and noncombatants. She is a 2007-2008 recipient of the National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant.  

Dara's previous research focused on the politics of homeland security, and the escalation of international military crises. Her research has appeared in the Stanford Law Review and International Security. Dara graduated with honors with an A.B. in Political Science and Philosophy from Brown University in 2001, and served as a paralegal in the Outstanding Scholars Program in the Counterterrorism Section of the U.S. Department of Justice from 2001-2003. 

Benedetta Faedi is a Graduate Fellow at the Michelle Clayman Institute for Gender Research, Stanford University, and a doctoral candidate at Stanford Law School. Her work focuses on sexual violence against women in Haiti and their active involvement in armed violence. She earned her LL.B. from the University of Rome "La Sapienza," (Summa Cum Laude), a M.A. in Political Science from the University of Florence, and an LL.M. from the London School of Economics and Political Science. 

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Dara K. Cohen Predoctoral Fellow, CISAC; Peace Scholar, United States Institute of Peace; PhD Candidate, Political Science, Stanford University Speaker
Benedetta Faedi Graduate Fellow, Michelle Clayman Institute for Gender Research, Stanford University; Ph.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School Commentator
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David Holloway
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The ongoing crisis in Georgia has catapulted relations with Russia to a top place on the foreign-policy agenda. It has presented the United States-and the West more generally-with important policy decisions, and it has brought to a head a debate that has been taking place for many years about how to deal with Russia. One side in that debate believes that post-Communist Russia has taken the wrong path of development and should therefore be isolated and punished; the other advocates a continuing search for cooperation with Russia on a range of important issues such as nuclear disarmament, global warming, energy, and Iran's nuclear ambitions. The crisis in Georgia has clearly strengthened those who want to isolate Russia; it is not so clear, however, that that would be a wise policy.

It now seems unlikely that anyone will benefit from the war in Georgia. Georgia has been humiliated and its prospects for economic and political development have been seriously set back. Russia has acted brutally as a great power bullying a small neighbor, and its relations with other states will suffer as a result (the speedy signing of the U.S.-Polish agreement on missile defense is an indication of that). The strong rhetoric coming from Washington cannot hide the U.S. failure to prevent Russia's intervention in Georgia and its inability to come directly to the aid of a state that looks to it for support.

The Georgian crisis requires a reassessment of U.S. policy toward Russia. To put that in context, consider the enormous upheaval Russia has gone through in the past twenty years. The Soviet Union was dissolved at the end of 1991, creating fifteen new states where previously there had been one. This geopolitical transformation, which took place with far less loss of life than many feared, was for Russians a severe blow to their sense of national pride, and it left some simmering disputes, especially in the Caucasus, not only in Georgia but also within Russia (Chechnya), as well as in neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan.

At home, too, Russia has been transformed. The 1990s were a period of political freedom in Russia, but they also brought economic collapse and social turmoil, with widespread deprivation and great anxiety about the future. When the former KGB officer Vladimir Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin as president in 2000, he adopted the goal of restoring the power of the Russian state. He tamed the oligarchs and increased state control over the economy. He also curbed the mass media and repressed political opposition. Russia today is far from being the democracy that many people hoped for ten or fifteen years ago, but it is also far from being a reincarnation of the Soviet Union. It now has a capitalist economy, and there is much greater freedom than in Soviet times.

Putin has been a popular leader, thanks in large measure to the economic turnaround that has taken place since he became president. The economy has grown steadily, at rates of 6-7 percent a year, and much of the population has benefited-even if the benefits have been very unequally distributed. The rising price of oil helps to account for this growth, but economic reforms put in place by Yeltsin and Putin have played their role too. Economic growth has allowed Russia to reassert its regional interests and its status as a great power.

Many Americans have been greatly disappointed by Russia's development over the past twenty years: Why, they ask, has Russia not become a democratic state? And why has it become so antagonistic to the United States-opposing the deployment of missile defenses in Europe, for example, and now sending its troops into Georgia?

Russians, too, are disillusioned by recent history, but for different reasons. Many Russians are willing to give Putin some credit not only for raising living standards but also for introducing a degree of stability into political life. According to the same polls, however, they are also profoundly unhappy about the level of corruption, the arbitrary behavior of law-enforcement agencies, and the failure of the government to provide services in an efficient and effective manner.

Russians' disillusionment springs also from a sense that they have not been treated fairly by the rest of the world. The current Russian leadership feels, rightly or wrongly, that Russia's interests have been ignored by the United States for the past fifteen years, and that feeling appears to be widely shared by the Russian public. There is a standard litany of complaints about the way in which the West is said to have taken advantage of Russia's weakness: NATO enlargement; NATO intervention in Kosovo and the recognition of Kosovo's independence; U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty; support for the "color" revolutions in Georgia (Rose) and Ukraine (Orange). Russian leaders see this as geopolitical encirclement by countries that speak of partnership but ignore Russia's interests.

Early last year Putin launched a harsh attack on American policy for failing to take Russia's interests into account. His goal was to recalibrate the U.S.-Russian relationship in a way that would give Russia a greater voice in international politics. Russia's improved economic performance, as well as U.S. difficulties in Iraq, made it seem an opportune time for Russia to return to what it regards as its proper place in the world.

This is the context in which Russia has acted in Georgia. It has made it perfectly clear for some time that it did not want to see Georgia join NATO. After the recognition of Kosovo's independence early this year, Russia stepped up its control over the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia President Mikheil Saakashvili's reckless decision to use military force to try to seize Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, gave Russia the pretext to introduce more troops into Georgia (in addition to those it already had in South Ossetia and Abkhazia).

If Russia had not responded with military force, its claims to a more assertive role in international politics would have lost credibility. But Russia has not only expelled Georgian troops from South Ossetia; it has also sent its forces into the rest of Georgia to destroy Georgia's war-making potential. This has led to widespreaed uncertainty about Russia's ultimate goals in Georgia, and indeed in the former Soviet Union more generally.

For all its recent assertiveness, Russia is weak internally and restricted in its options abroad. Its domestic problems are severe: its economy is too dependent on the energy sector; the inadequate health system needs to be rebuilt; failing infrastructure requires heavy investment; the population is declining rapidly as a result of the low birth rate and low life expectancy. The list of domestic problems is long and impressive, and the political class knows that Russia needs to deal with them if it is to secure its status as a great power. Russia today is not the Soviet Union, either ideologically or in terms of military strength, but it does retain the capacity to create difficulties by mobilizing Russian minorities living outside Russia or by manipulating oil and gas supplies to U.S. allies.

In dealing with the aftermath of the Georgian crisis, the United States should pursue three goals. The first is to help Georgia recover economically and politically from the war and also to play whatever role it can in creating conditions that will allow Georgia to become a stable and prosperous democracy. That will inevitably involve working through international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union to try to resolve the complex conflicts that exist in the Caucasus. It will also involve engaging with Russia, which has interests of its own as well as a powerful position in the region.

The second is to provide reassurance to other former Soviet republics and satellites (the Baltic states and Poland, for example) that their position as independent states is secure. That is most easily done for those states that are already members of the European Union and of NATO. The most delicate case is that of Ukraine. A secure and prosperous Ukraine is extremely important for the West (as well as for Ukrainians of course), but Russia may have some leverage there through the large Russian-speaking population in the eastern part of the country. The West should focus on the economic and political integration of Ukraine into Europe rather than on its admission to NATO.

The third is to seek cooperation with Russia in such areas as the reduction of nuclear weapons, curbing the rise of Iranian power and influence, defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan, and tackling the issues of energy supply and global warming. These three goals may appear to be in tension, but they are to some degree complementary. A deep antagonism between the United States and Russia is not likely to further American interests; nor is it likely to help either Georgia or Ukraine.

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