Despite the increasing centrality of computer software in modern weapons systems, computing remains relatively underrepresented in public debates about weapons policy. For example, in 1991, a software glitch in the Patriot missile defense system killed 28 people, yet physicists remain the most prominent technical critics of this system. This talk suggests that the different patterns of political intervention exhibited by physicists and computer experts cannot be explained by technical relevance. It suggests alternate explanations by examining the processes by which technical judgments are generated and rendered authoritative in the political arena, using insights from science and technology studies. These processes are then illustrated by comparing how computer experts and physicists intervened in political controversy about the feasibility of 'Star Wars', President Ronald Reagan's proposal to develop a missile defense that would render the massive Soviet nuclear arsenal 'impotent and obsolete.' I compare how critical groups of physicists and computer professionals attempted to persuade the public that a perfect missile shield could not be built. This analysis suggests that sharp differences in the two groups' technical frames of analysis, rhetoric, and professional organizations all contributed to the physicists' ability to demonstrate a much higher level of consensus and authority in the political arena.

While U.S. policy is focused on defending against a mass-effect bioterrorism attack, we may be missing a lower-tech threat of much higher probability. The path from the "street chemistry" of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to improvised chemical devices (ICDs) is very short. Whereas the path from IEDs to effectively weaponized, transgenic biological agents is a substantial leap for states and, even more so, for non-state actors. Examining the rising interest in highly portable, easily assembled improvised devices incorporating commercial and research chemicals by non-state actors, principally radical Islamists, this work considers the threat of improvised chemical terrorism within a comprehensive WMD risk framework.

Cellular prion protein (PrPC) is present in the healthy adult brain. It is a presumably essential membrane protein but its cellular function is unclear. Like Ice-9 - the fictitious water allotrope in Kurt Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle, which "taught the atoms a novel way in which to stack, lock and crystallize until the oceans turned to ice" - cellular prion protein can, in a rare event, adopt a pathogenic and 'contagious' shape, PrPSc, which causes mad cow disease or Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). New variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD) is the human malady attributed to eating beef tainted with BSE. In comparison to the UK epidemic (at the peak of which 37,280 cases of BSE were reported in the single year 1992), the emergence of four North American mad cows since May 2003 is minor yet still alarming. This work examines the USDA's response to indigenous BSE as manifested in "The Final Rule" (9 CFR 93-96, Jan 4, 2005) and questions whether current regulations are stringent enough to keep PrPSc out of cattle feed and human food.

Sheila Healy is a CISAC Science Fellow. She is currently analyzing USDA policy addressing Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or mad cow disease. She recently finished a postdoctoral appointment in Stanley Prusiner's laboratory in the Department of Neurology at the University of California, San Francisco. There she studied the molecular and structural requirements for the conversion of cellular prion protein to its pathogenic form, the agent that causes BSE. She holds a doctoral degree in biochemistry and molecular and cellular biology from the University of Arizona.

Visions of missile defense have long centered on missile interceptors or lasers, occasionally included the radar "eyes" of a system, and usually ignored the computer "brains" that must inevitably control a system. This talk will examine the causes and consequences of the relative invisibility of computing in missile defense research and policy, examining three historical episodes: the Army's push to deploy a missile defense from 1957-63, the "Safeguard" and "Sentinel" deployment proposals of the late 1960's, and the "Star Wars" controversy of the 1980's. I argue that the problems of missile defense have been defined and tackled in ways that do not merely reflect technical realities. Rather, assessments of missile defense also reflect the social status of some scientists - and the non-status of others - as experts on missile defense. In particular, this talk will show how the contested status of computing as a profession and as a science has shaped assessments of missile defense, and conclude by considering some implications for today.

The Energy Security Initiative (ESI) is a proposal to increase the benefits offered to countries in good standing with their NPT Obligations, to compensate for all the new supply restrictions and intrusive safeguards requirements imposed on them. The NPT Balance between benefits to signatories and impositions made on them has eroded through more restrictive interpretations of the NPT. The recently implemented Additional Protocol, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the proposals to deny nuclear fuel cycle facilities to countries not yet operating them on the one hand, and the limited supply of low cost nuclear energy available to developing countries on the other hand, demonstrate the need to re-constitute the balance implied in the NPT. It is, in fact, in the self interest of the developed countries, to be able to offer an expanded menu of additional energy benefits to countries whose current scope of available benefits has shrank, while the costs of complying with all new restrictions imposed and proposed has increased. This is the purpose of the ESI, which represents a reinterpretation and expansion of a part of Article IV of the NPT.

This presentation includes a detailed description of what ESI could offer under a new reading of article IV; which countries could qualify as beneficiaries of such program, how much might the total program cost, and how to fund it. A special case dealing with small national enrichment plants in countries such as Iran or Brazil is also considered.

Chaim Braun is a vice president of Altos Management Partners, Inc., and a CISAC science fellow and affiliate. He is a member of the Near-Term Deployment and the Economic Cross-Cut Working Groups of the Department of Energy (DOE) Generation IV Roadmap study. He conducted several nuclear economics-related studies for the DOE Nuclear Energy Office, the Energy Information Administration, the Electric Power Research Institute, the Nuclear Energy Institute, Non-Proliferation Trust International, and others. Braun has worked as a member of Bechtel Power Corporation's Nuclear Management Group, and led studies on power plant performance and economics used to support maintenance services. Braun has worked on a study of safeguarding the Agreed Framework in North Korea, he was the co-leader of a NATO Study of Terrorist Threats to Nuclear Power Plants, led CISAC's Summer Study on Terrorist Threats to Research Reactors, and most recently co-authored an article with CISAC Co-Director Chris Chyba on nuclear proliferation rings. His research project this year is entitled "The Energy Security Initiative and a Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center: Two Enhancement Options for the Current Non-Proliferation Regime."

We describe VEGA, a system for analyzing the vulnerability of an electric power grid to physical attacks by terrorists, and for planning mitigation efforts. VEGA (Vulnerability of Electric Grids Analyzer) consists of a bilevel optimization model and solution algorithm, a graphical user interface and a database. The optimization model implements a Stackelberg game in which (a) a group of terrorists attacks components of a power grid ("the system") so as to maximize the amount of load that must be shed (demand for power that goes unmet), and (b) the system operator minimizes that maximum by controlling the degraded system as best possible. We illustrate the basic model using realistic data and show how it can guide a system-upgrade plan to reduce vulnerability.

Actually, we at NPS are using similar techniques to study the vulnerability to attack of a variety of infrastructure systems. This talk will discuss the common approach, and provide two examples: (a) Finding "weak spots" in the Saudi Arabian crude-oil pipeline system and (b) protecting the Washington, DC subway system from a chemical or biological attack.

Dr. Kevin Wood is professor of operations research at the Naval Postgraduate School. At NPS since 1982, he has taught courses in networks and optimization and has published research on network reliability, mathematical programming and its applications, and on interdiction. His 1993 paper "Deterministic Network Interdiction" spurred renewed interest in applying analytical techniques to network and system interdiction, and has led to a series of papers on these topics, by him and by others. He is currently applying the methodology to critical infrastructure protection in general, and electric power grids in particular: Professor Wood has long-term research support from the Office of Naval Research as well as the Air Force of Scientific Research, and has been a visiting professor at Stanford University, the National Security Agency and the University of Auckland.

Many critiques have been made of the U.S. Intelligence Community's performance in thwarting terrorist attacks (i.e. 9/11) and understanding the proliferation of WMD (i.e. Iraq). Given the reports from the 9/11 and WMD commissions as well as last year's legislation establishing the position of National Intelligence Director, what in fact are the deficiencies of the Intelligence Community and what changes have the best chance of correcting them and preventing future intelligence failures?

This seminar will feature a panel discussion by three experts on intelligence issues. They will focus their comments on the issues, challenges, and potential solutions for improving the U.S. Intelligence Community capabilities to provide timely warning and accurate assessments of future threats. They will then invite comments, questions, and discussion.

Sidney Drell is a professor of theoretical physics (Emeritus) at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. As a physicist and arms control specialist, he has been a leader in providing essential technical advice to the U.S. Government on national security issues. He is an active member of JASON, a group of distinguished scientists, and has served on a number of boards, including the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the President's Science Advisory Committee, and the Non-Proliferation Advisory Panel.

Keith Hansen is a consulting professor of international relations teaching courses on U.S. intelligence and arms control/proliferation. His 35-year government career included seven years on the National Intelligence Council, where he managed numerous national intelligence estimates and other interagency studies on strategic and nuclear issues, and where he served as the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs and Nuclear Proliferation.

Henry Rowen is Director Emeritus of the Asia/Pacific Research Center, professor of public policy and management (emeritus) at Stanford's Graduate School of Business, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense (1989-1991), Chairman of the DCI's National Intelligence Council (1981-1983), President of RAND Corporation (1968-1972), and Assistant Director of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget (1965-1966). Most recently, he was a Member of the President's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.