Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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CISAC's Sig Hecker talks to one of India's most respected newspapers, The Hindu, about why he admires India's nuclear energy program. India's world-class nuclear researchers can still learn many lessons from the Fukushima nuclear crisis, particularly in fostering a culture of safety. The world's largest democracy must demonstrate to its citizens that nuclear power is safe and sustainable in order to pursue its ambitious energy program.

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The undergound tunnel being built to connect the Fast-Breeder Nuclear Reactor to the sea, at the Kalpakkam Nuclear Complex, India, January 2013. | IAEA
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Thomas Fingar spoke with Federal News Radio about his thoughts on insider threats in the U.S. government. Fingar said that the best approach is a risk management approach, instead of trying to protect all information. This approach allows for analysts to continue doing their work, while limiting the threat posed by contractors, government officials, and other individuals who do not need comprehensive access to government data to conduct their work effectively. 

Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
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Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Affiliated Scholar at The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)
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Thomas Fingar is an affiliate at the The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow from 2010 through 2015 and the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford in 2009.

From 2005 through 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94), and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969 and Ph.D., 1977 both in political science). His most recent books are From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from Intelligence Reform (Stanford University Press, 2021), Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011), The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform, editor (Stanford University Press, 2016), Uneasy Partnerships: China and Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (Stanford, 2017), and Fateful Decisions: Choices that will Shape China’s Future, co-edited with Jean Oi (Stanford, 2020). His most recent article is, "The Role of Intelligence in Countering Illicit Nuclear-Related Procurement,” in Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, William C. Potter, and Leonard S Spector, eds., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology (Cambridge, 2018)."

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Thomas Fingar Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow, FSI Speaker
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This paper reflects on the credibility of nuclear risk assessment in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima meltdowns. In democratic states, policymaking around nuclear energy has long been premised on an understanding that experts can objectively and accurately calculate the probability of catastrophic accidents. Yet the Fukushima disaster lends credence to the substantial body of social science research that suggests such calculations are fundamentally unworkable. Nevertheless, the credibility of these assessments appears to have survived the disaster, just as it has resisted the evidence of previous nuclear accidents. This paper looks at why. It argues that public narratives of the Fukushima disaster invariably frame it in ways that allow risk-assessment experts to “disown” it. It concludes that although these narratives are both rhetorically compelling and highly consequential to the governance of nuclear power, they are not entirely credible.

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CISAC's Karl Eikenberry talks to UCtv about the future of the American all-volunteer military force and the situation in Afghanistan, through the lens of his own experiences as a soldier and diplomat. 

Eikenberry commanded coalition forces in Afghanistan and served as U.S. Ambassador from 2009-2011.

Karl Eikenberry William J. Perry Fellow in International Security Speaker CISAC
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ABOUT THE TOPIC: The use of unmanned aerial vehicles, also known as drones, as a counterterrorism tool has become the subject of considerable debate. Proponents point to drones as both effective for disrupting terrorist networks and compatible with international legal commitments. Critics assert that attacks create more terrorists than they kill while also violating international law. Both defenders and detractors have increasingly sought to make their case in the public sphere with the intent of swaying public support. This research studies the marketplace of ideas on the question of drones with an eye towards explaining 1) the type of arguments—i.e., whether or not drones are compatible with international law or are militarily effective—that resonate most with the public; and 2) the source of those ideas, whether international organizations, non-governmental organizations, or the government. In doing so, it fills a gap in a literature that has typically focused on sources of public support for initially going to war rather than attitudes toward states’ actual conduct and wielding of violence in the midst of armed conflict.

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Sarah Kreps Assistant Professor Speaker the Department of Government, Cornell University
Priya Satia Associate Professor of British History, Department of History, Stanford University Commentator
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Terrorism expert and CISAC Zukerman Fellow Thomas Hegghammer provided testimony to the House subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

The hearing, titled "Global al-Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges," focused on the future of al-Qaeda and related jihadi terrorist groups. A written statement and full video of the hearing are available online. 

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ABOUT THE TOPIC: Social scientists have been working hard to understand the circumstances and strategies that improve the chances of favorable human rights outcomes.  Their findings are consistent with the view that the long-term prospects for human rights are good.  Despite this, the activities of the human rights movement seem only marginally related to the forces producing rights improvements, and in some circumstances may even be counterproductive.

Dr. Snyder will also briefly reflect on his work over the years, including his 2012 book of collected essays, Power and Progress in International Relations.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER: Jack Snyder is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. His books include Power and Progress: International Politics in Transition (Routledge 2012); Religion and International Relations Theory (Columbia 2011); Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (MIT Press, 2005), co-authored with Edward D. Mansfield; From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (Norton 2000); Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Cornell 1991); and Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention, co-editor with Barbara Walter (Columbia 1999). His articles on such topics as democratization and war, imperial overstretch, war crimes tribunals versus amnesties as strategies for preventing atrocities, and international relations theory after September 11 have appeared in The American Political Science Review, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Organization, International Security, and World Politics. His commentaries on current public issues such as the promotion of democracy abroad have appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post, The International Herald Tribune, and on National Public Radio. A Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Snyder received a B.A. in government from Harvard University in 1973, the Certificate of Columbia’s Russian Institute in 1978, and a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia in 1981.

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Jack Snyder Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations Speaker the Department of Political Science, Columbia University
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A new report by McAfee Labs has traced years of cyberattacks on South Korean and U.S. military systems to one common hacker group. The group responsible, called "Operation Troy," launched a massive cyberattack against South Korean banks, government and news websites, and early-on, some U.S. government websites. The group also tried to steal national security information. 

Junio comments that the most important lesson from these attacks is that low-capability cyber actors can cause major damage; they do not need Stuxnet-level skills to achieve their goals. Operation Troy was willing to wait patiently for users to make security mistakes; bureaucracy and poor law enforcement ensure that the activity can lay low for years without being detected. 

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In an amicus brief written in defense of computer expert and hacker Andrew Auernheimer, Jennifer Granick and Jonathan Mayer argue that independent security testing of websites strengthen user privacy. Auernheimer, known online as weev, was convicted of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) by acquiring AT&T's private user information without permission through a privacy flaw in AT&T's website.

Granick and Mayer claim that Auernheimer used the same techniques as legally-operating security and privacy research firms, and that this independent testing can expose security and privacy flaws that businesses would otherwise not disclose publicly. 

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