FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.
Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions.
The USAF Weapons School and the B-52H: Integrating Legacy and 5th Generation Platforms in order to Inspire and Transform
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Abstract: Weapons School is the premier USAF tactical school producing advanced air, space and cyberspace leaders/tacticians capable of transforming and inspiring the nation’s joint combat power. The school is constantly pushing the tactical envelope. In contrast, the B-52Hs flying today are 53 years old and slated to remain in active service beyond 2040. They represent the most visible portion of the nuclear triad with a legacy of devastating conventional attacks in Vietnam, Iraq, Bosnia and Afghanistan.
The talk begins with a brief history/mission overview of the Weapons School followed by B-52 capabilities, roles, and missions. Then Lt Col Schendzielos interweaves personal experience to highlight how the USAF’s top warriors prepare for and conduct combat while making sure the B-52H remains a potent force in tomorrow’s fight.
Speaker Bio: Lieutenant Colonel Schendzielos is a CISAC National Defense Fellow, Weapons Instructor, Electronic Warfare Officer, Strategist, and former Orbital Analyst. He recently commanded the 340th Weapons Squadron, the Weapons School’s B-52 squadron. He led a cadre of Weapons Instructors teaching a graduate-level 5 ½ month training and integration course consisting of 427 academic hours, 348 flying hours, 19 sorties, and 1,107 weapons. Lt Col Schendzielos served previously as Director of 13th Air Force Commander’s Action Group; Strategy Division Deputy Director; Weapons and Tactics Flight Commander; Bomb Wing/Operations Group Executive Officer; and Space Control Analyst/Orbital Analyst, deploying three times accumulating over 270 combat flight hours. He graduated Air War College, Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Army Command and General Staff College, Air Command and Staff College, USAF Weapons School, Squadron Officer School and the USAF Academy. He holds a Master of Military Arts and Sciences in Military Space Application, Master of Military Arts and Science in Theater Operations and Bachelor of Science in Political Science.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Kurt Schendzielos
USAF National Defense Fellow, CISAC
Speaker
Conferences
Why We Must Reset the Net Neutrality Dialog
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Barbara van Schewick, a CISAC affiliated faculty member and the director of Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society, warns that the changes to the Open Internet recently set out by the FCC may have dire consequences on investment and on innovation and advocates a deliberate and collaborative process as the FCC sets out to design new net neutrality rules. Read more in this issue of The Atlantic.
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The Nonproliferation Regime and Its Discontents
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Book Notes:
Ever since President Obama made securing nuclear weapons assets a top priority for his global arms control agenda, guarding and disposing of these holdings have become an international security preoccupation. Starting in 2010, multilateral nuclear summits on how to prevent nuclear theft and sabotage have been held every two years – the first in Washington, the second in Seoul, the third in The Hague. Scores of studies have been commissioned and written, and nearly as many workshops (official and unofficial) have been held.
Yet, in all of this, the urgent task of securing and disposing of known nuclear weapons assets has all but sidelined what to do about nuclear weapons-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium that we have lost track of. This is understandable. It also is worrisome.
How likely is it that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could detect even a large amount of MUF in a timely fashion at declared civilian nuclear sites? What of national means of detection? What can we learn from the history of civilian MUF discoveries in Japan and the UK and of military MUF in the United States and South Africa? How well can the IAEA or any existing nuclear material accountancy system track the production of special nuclear material or account for past production?
This volume gives us more than a few answers. Much of the analysis is technical. Most of it, technical or not, is downbeat. The good news is that this is the first dedicated volume on this specialized topic. There is likely to be more of such histories written in the future. How they might read, however, ultimately will depend on how much unnecessary civilian and military material production is curtailed, which is itself a matter worthy of another book.
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The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center