Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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At 90, William J. Perry has seen a lot in this world.

Maybe, in fact, too much. When it comes to nuclear warfare and annihilation, few people alive have contemplated such tragic outcomes quite like Perry, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), a former U.S. secretary of defense, and one of the world’s top nuclear weapons experts.

Perry, who becomes a nonagenarian on Oct. 11, has been called America’s “nuclear conscience.” He has sometimes referred to himself as a “prophet of doom,” and certainly not in a congratulatory sense, but more as a scientist on a mission. A brilliant mathematician who's worked with nearly every administration since Eisenhower, Perry's been up-close to nuclear weapons and near-miss crises for the last several decades.

Today, Perry is devoted to education on the subject of nuclear weapons – he understands exactly how much horror they would wreak on humanity and beyond.

And while no one would call Perry a crusader type (he is pragmatic, modest and private), there’s no doubt he’s on an energetic crusade for a nuclear-free world. Reaching young minds – those who will inherit the leadership of this world – is his calculus in the formula of world peace.

So, Perry reaches out in ways that resonant with youth. Last year created a series of virtual lectures, "Living at the Nuclear Brink," known as a MOOC, or massive open online course. His new online course, "The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism," launches Oct. 17.  

“Nuclear weapons may seem like 20th century history, but the choices we make about these weapons in the 21st century will decide your future in truly fundamental ways,” Perry wrote in the earlier course's introduction.

Conversations with conscience

An engineer and policy maker, Perry has academic affiliations that range widely across the Stanford campus. He is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus), a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He's always in demand for a panel discussion or speaker event.

On Nov. 1, he's the featured subject of a CISAC event, "A Conversation with William J. Perry: Assessing Nuclear Risk in a New Era." That talk will include a Perry discussion with CISAC co-director Amy Zegart and another panel discussion, led by CISAC co-director Rod Ewing, with scholars Siegfried Hecker, David Holloway and Scott Sagan.

Perry's been known to participate in “Ask Me Anything” chats on Reddit, a place popular with youth. He connects with all types of audiences, conveying in direct encounters the exact nature of the nuclear dangers now facing civilization, and what can be done to reduce those dangers. This mission to educate led him to write a memoir, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink, all the while giving countless media interviews and delivering major speeches before major think tanks, nongovernmental organizations and policymakers.

One core Perry message is that U.S. foreign policies do not reflect the existing danger of nuclear threats -- the reason is that this risk isn’t widely recognized across society. And young people need to understand this dynamic that creates a distorted, too complacent view of a very real nuclear weapons problem throughout the world.

Perry, with the help of both his daughter, Robin Perry, his son, David Perry, granddaughter, Lisa Perry, and grandson Patrick Allen, established the William J. Perry Project, which informs the public about the role of nuclear weapons in today's world, while urging the elimination of these weapons.

It’s a family on a mission, and the Perrys believe the only way to avoid nuclear war is by directly contemplating the scenario in a personal, direct sense through learning and education.

"We're really just out there trying to reach a generation that isn't engaged on this issue right now," said Lisa Perry in an article on the Perry Project web site. She is the digital media manager for the project. "It's something we learned in history class. There was no conversation about what's happening now."

As her grandfather explained, "The dangers will never go away as long as we have nuclear weapons. But we should take every action to lower the dangers, and I think it can be done."

Early entrepreneurship days

Perry was born in Vandergrift, Pennsylvania, in 1927, the year that Charles Lindbergh completed the first solo flight across the Atlantic.

As a child, Perry fell in love with math. Math for him represented analytical discipline and the beauty of overcoming challenge. By solving math problems, one can master not only numerical problems, but other seemingly all-too difficult challenges. The key, as Perry discovered, was breaking down the larger problem into smaller parts. This evolved complexity into simplicity, which is more easily understood. Perry went on to cultivate this problem-solving mindset the rest of his life.

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Perry saw the world as a young man – he left college at 18 to enlist in the U.S. Army, serving in the army of occupation of Japan. There he witnessed firsthand the devastating aftermath of the conventional and nuclear bombings in Japan. Those experiences in Japan shaped his perspectives forever on issues like arms control and national security.

After his military service, Perry received his B.S. (1949) and M.A. (1950) degrees from Stanford, and a Ph.D. in mathematics from Pennsylvania State University in 1957. He chose a career in defense electronics, and became one of the Silicon Valley’s early entrepreneurs, founding a company that pioneered digital technologies to analyze the Soviet nuclear missile arsenal. And so, he was often asked to counsel the federal government on national security.

In October 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis, Perry received an urgent request from the U.S. government to help analyze U-2 photos of the Soviet installation of nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba. Perry later recollected that he thought the world could end during that crisis, and that those days might well be his last.

From 1977 to 1981 during the Carter administration, Perry served as the Pentagon’s undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, where he oversaw weapon systems and research. After leaving the Pentagon in 1981 to work in the private sector, Perry became a Stanford engineering professor and a co-director of the Preventive Defense Project at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).

He was the co-director of CISAC from 1988 to 1993. Today, he is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor emeritus at Stanford, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering. He is also a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

In 1994, President Bill Clinton tapped Perry to become the 19th U.S. Secretary of Defense. However, it was not so easy for the White House to recruit him.

Perry treasured his privacy so much that he originally turned down the job of defense secretary. Only when Clinton and Al Gore assured him that his family’s privacy could be maintained, he finally accepted the offer. With the Cold War having ended a fear years earlier, he found it would become a historic time to serve as America’s defense secretary.

Years later he recalled standing with his Russian and Ukrainian counterparts as their teams destroyed missile silos in the former Soviet Union. By the end of the 1980s, Perry thought the world had survived the horrific prospect of nuclear annihilation – and that it was behind everyone, left in the ashes of the Cold War.

Not so fast. Welcome to 2017.

Beyond doomsday

Today, Perry believes, the world is arguably more dangerous than ever before. His view is supported by The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, which announced in January 2017 that the Doomsday clock now stands at two-and-a-half minutes to midnight, suggesting that existential threats now pose a greater danger to humanity than they have at any time since the height of the Cold War.

In fact, in 2016, Perry warned that the Doomsday clock should stand at five minutes to midnight for nuclear war – but only one minute to midnight for the threat of nuclear terrorism. He said during that press conference that the clock now issued a “more dangerous, more ominous forecast than two thirds of the years during the Cold War.”

As a result, Perry’s profile has risen higher than ever as the world confronts increasingly unsettling nuclear threats like a war between the U.S. and North Korea, reckless nuclear rhetoric by state leaders, and the possibility that terrorists may use nukes.

On North Korea in particular, Perry has urged a return to deterrence on the part of the United States:

“The threat to use nuclear weapons has always been tied to deterrence or extended deterrence; historical U.S. policy is that the use of nuclear weapons would only be in response to the first use of nuclear weapons against the United States or an ally covered by our extended deterrence,” he said in a statement.

With North Korea, Perry notes that the U.S. should not make empty threats, because empty threats weaken America’s credibility and reduce the ability to actually take strong action. “As Theodore Roosevelt said, ‘Speak softly but carry a big stick,’” he said.

During the early Cold War, he said, when the Soviets used “shrill” language, U.S. presidents like Eisenhower merely responded in tempered, moderate tones. “Just as in those tense times, today’s crisis also calls for measured language,” Perry said.

On top of this, Perry said the U.S. and Russians seem to be “sleepwalking into this new nuclear arms race,” and that while a new Cold War and arms race may look different than the prior one in U.S.-Soviet history, they are both dangerous and “totally unnecessary.”

Whether on the North Korean peninsula or elsewhere, a miscalculation could be catastrophic, Perry warns. That’s one reason he joined other former "Cold Warriors" like George Schulz, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn to write an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in 2007. They argued that the goal of U.S. nuclear policy should be not merely the reduction and control of atomic arms, but the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons everywhere.

What type of world does Perry dream about in his brightest visions? One without nuclear weapons. He believes collective humanity must “delegitimize” nuclear war as an acceptable risk of modern civilization. A safer world, one that requires great purpose, persistence, and patience to make a reality, is possible, if people understand the threats and take action to reduce them, Perry has said.

“This global threat requires unified global action,” Perry wrote in July 2017 in support of a new United Nations treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons.

Education and knowledge – that’s how Perry believes humanity can safely evolve past its nuclear phase.

MEDIA CONTACT:

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

 

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William J. Perry talks with Stanford students in 2013. Perry, who turns 90 on Oct. 11, has been called America’s “nuclear conscience." The Stanford professor emeritus has led a decades-long educational effort to teach people, especially the young, about nuclear dangers. | Courtesy of CISAC
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Sarah Shirazyan is a leading expert in technology law and policy, misinformation, and responsible AI development. She is a Lecturer in Law at Stanford Law School, where she teaches a course on combating misinformation online. She also serves as a Director and Head of Meta's GenAI Product Policy work, overseeing the development and implementation of company-wide policies governing the responsible use of generative AI technologies. In this role, Dr. Shirazyan advises product and engineering teams to ensure trust, safety, and ethical innovation across Meta's platforms. Previously, she led the company’s efforts to inform its misinformation and algorithmic ranking policies through engaging with experts across the globe.

Prior to joining tech industry, Dr. Shirazyan held multiple posts with leading international organizations—she was a data protection consultant for the Council of Europe; served as human right lawyer for the European Court of Human Rights; worked on nuclear security issues at the U.N.; and handled international drug cartel investigation cases at INTERPOL.

From 2017-2020, she designed and ran Interpol-Stanford Policy Lab at Stanford Law. From 2017-2018, Dr. Shirazyan was a Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC. Her research was funded by the MacArthur Foundation. She received her Doctor of Juridical Sciences Degree from Stanford Law School. Her dissertation empirically analyzes the effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s response to WMD terrorism. For her outstanding research, teaching and community service, Stanford named Ms. Shirazyan as one of the recipients of the Gerald J. Lieberman Award.

Her work has been published in Journal for National Security Law and Policy, Lawfare, Just Security, Stanford Journal of Online Trust and Safety, Arms Control Today, and Project on Nuclear Issues by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

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Colin Kahl, a top national security expert and veteran White House advisor, has been named to a new senior fellowship at Stanford.

Starting in January 2018, Kahl will be the inaugural Steven C. Házy Senior Fellow, an endowed faculty chair at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He will be affiliated with the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). 

Kahl most recently was an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. From 2014 to 2017, he was deputy assistant to the U.S. president and national security advisor to the vice president. In that position, he served as a senior advisor to President Obama and Vice President Biden on all matters related to U.S. foreign policy and national security affairs, and represented the Office of the Vice President as a standing member of the National Security Council Deputies’ Committee. 

Michael McFaul, director of FSI, said, “Professor Colin Kahl is a terrific hire for FSI and Stanford University as a whole. Very few scholars in the United States have both deep scholarly interests and credentials as well as experience and expertise in policymaking. Colin is that rare professor who truly bridges the gap between theory and policy. We are very lucky to have him at Stanford. "

Amy Zegart, co-director at CISAC, said, “Colin Kahl is a tremendous addition to CISAC in every way – a distinguished scholar and educator who has served in senior policy positions at one of the most challenging junctures in U.S. foreign policy. His wide-ranging work spans nuclear risk reduction, U.S. grand strategy, and Middle Eastern politics, and promises to enhance and enrich nearly everything we do at CISAC.”

Kahl said his Stanford plans include conducting research on a range of contemporary international security challenges, including writing a book examining American grand strategy in the Middle East after 9/11. He is also doing research on the implications of emerging technologies for strategic stability and nuclear rivalry. 

For Kahl, joining Stanford is both an intellectual opportunity and a homecoming of sorts.

“Stanford is one of the top universities in world,” Kahl wrote in an email, “with a diverse faculty in the social sciences and natural sciences working at the cutting edge of international affairs and national security. I can think of no better intellectual community to be part of. I also grew up in the Bay Area, so this is a great opportunity to come home.”

National, global security

Many of the issues dominating national security conversations over the past few decades continue to matter today, Kahl said.

“These include nuclear proliferation, threats from international terrorist organizations and other transnational actors, and the competition between the United States and rising global and regional powers,” he said.

Kahl noted that in a “globalized, hyper-connected world,” other critical issues are becoming increasingly important. This includes climate change and environmental sustainability, and the social, economic, and security implications of the digital revolution. It is time to for a scholarly examination of cyber, big data, robotics, A.I., autonomous systems, 3-D printing, and synthetic biology, for example.

“No university in the world is better positioned to help policy makers understand these challenges and craft creative solutions than Stanford,” he added.

From February 2009 to December 2011, Kahl was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East at the Pentagon. In this capacity, he served as the senior policy advisor to the U.S. defense secretary for Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and six other countries in the Levant and Persian Gulf region.

In June 2011, Kahl was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service by Defense Secretary Robert Gates. In 2007-2009 and 2012-2014, he was a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, a nonpartisan Washington, DC-based think tank.

Publications, research

Kahl wrote the 2006 book, States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World, and has published articles in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Security, the Los Angeles Times, Middle East Policy, the New Republic, the New York Times, Politico, and the Washington Post, for example.

He has analyzed the causes and consequences of violent civil and ethnic conflict in developing countries, as well as U.S. intervention practices in those conflicts, with a particular focus on the Middle East.

From 2000 to 2007, Kahl was an assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota. In 2005-2006, he served as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he worked on issues related to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and responses to failed states.

Kahl received his bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of Michigan in 1993, and his doctorate in political science from Columbia University in 2000.

Donor background

The gift for the position was made by Christine and Steven F. Hazy in honor of their son, Steven C. Hazy, who was a CISAC honors student and is now a vice president at Aviation Capital Group, one of the largest commercial aircraft leasing firms in the world. A leader in the aviation industry, Steven F. is the founder of two Los Angeles-based air leasing companies.  In addition to many civic leadership roles in Los Angeles and Washington DC, Christine is a current Stanford trustee and former co-chair of The Stanford Challenge. 

It was CISAC core faculty member Scott D. Sagan's engaging and productive mentorship of their son that inspired the family to establish the new senior fellowship. Steven received his bachelor’s degree from Stanford in International Relations in 2004 and his MBA from the Stanford Graduate School of Business in 2011. Steven serves on the FSI Council.

MEDIA CONTACTS:

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

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Colin Kahl, second from the right, talks with President Barack Obama, far left, Vice President Joe Biden, second from the left, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, middle, and National Security Advisor Susan Rice, far right. | Courtesty of Colin Kahl
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Abstract: Against a backdrop of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases of natural origin, fueled by changes in land use and global climate, there is an ongoing revolution in the life sciences with growing empowerment of the individual to decipher, genetically alter, and manufacture living things. In addition to widely-touted potential benefits, these events and developments pose challenges and risks of profound harm to humans and the rest of the planet. Yet, the United States and most other nations have failed to respond with a strategic plan, sustained resources, coherent leadership, critical self-assessment, and accountability. Why is this? A selected history of recent naturally-occurring disease outbreaks and advances in the life sciences that create new risks of potential misuse will be offered, differing perspectives from the science and policy communities described, and some of the efforts to address these challenges summarized. Forward-looking proposals for efforts to mitigate risk in the life sciences will be discussed.

Speaker Bio: David A. Relman, M.D., is the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in Medicine, and Microbiology & Immunology at Stanford University, and Chief of Infectious Diseases at the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System. He is also Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and served as science co-director at the Center for International Security and Cooperation from 2013-2017. He is currently director of a new Biosecurity Initiative at FSI.

Relman identified several historically important and novel microbial disease agents, and was an early pioneer in the modern study of the human indigenous microbiota (microbiome). His lab group currently examines human microbial community assembly, and community stability and resilience.

Among policy-relevant activities, Relman is currently a member of the Intelligence Community Studies Board at the National Academies of Science (NAS), served as vice-chair of the NAS Committee that reviewed the science performed for the FBI 2001 Anthrax Letters investigation, and was a member of the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity. He was elected to the National Academy of Medicine in 2011. 

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Encina Hall, E209
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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David A. Relman, M.D., is the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in the Departments of Medicine, and of Microbiology and Immunology at Stanford University, and Chief of Infectious Diseases at the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System in Palo Alto, California. He is also Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford, and served as science co-director at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford from 2013-2017. He is currently director of a new Biosecurity Initiative at FSI.

Relman was an early pioneer in the modern study of the human indigenous microbiota. Most recently, his work has focused on human microbial community assembly, and community stability and resilience in the face of disturbance. Ecological theory and predictions are tested in clinical studies with multiple approaches for characterizing the human microbiome. Previous work included the development of molecular methods for identifying novel microbial pathogens, and the subsequent identification of several historically important microbial disease agents. One of his papers was selected as “one of the 50 most important publications of the past century” by the American Society for Microbiology.

Dr. Relman received an S.B. (Biology) from MIT, M.D. from Harvard Medical School, and joined the faculty at Stanford in 1994. He served as vice-chair of the NAS Committee that reviewed the science performed as part of the FBI investigation of the 2001 Anthrax Letters, as a member of the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity, and as President of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. He is currently a member of the Intelligence Community Studies Board and the Committee on Science, Technology and the Law, both at the National Academies of Science. He has received an NIH Pioneer Award, an NIH Transformative Research Award, and was elected a member of the National Academy of Medicine in 2011.

Stanford Health Policy Affiliate
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Department of Medicine; CISAC, Stanford University
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Abstract: This presentation will review research from two papers about Bitcoin.  The first paper uses data from the MIT digital currency experiment to shed light on consumer behavior regarding commercial, public and government surveillance. We find that the effect of small incentives may explain the privacy paradox, where people say they care about privacy but are willing to relinquish private data quite easily.  The second paper analyzes empirical evidence about the adoption and usage of Bitcoin, as well as forces that underly Bitcoin pricing.

Speaker Bio: Susan Athey is The Economics of Technology Professor at Stanford Graduate School of Business. She received her bachelor's degree from Duke University and her Ph.D. from Stanford, and she holds an honorary doctorate from Duke University. She previously taught at the economics departments at MIT, Stanford and Harvard.  In 2007, Professor Athey received the John Bates Clark Medal, awarded by the American Economic Association to “that American economist under the age of forty who is adjudged to have made the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge.” She was elected to the National Academy of Science in 2012 and to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2008.  Professor Athey’s research focuses on the economics of the internet, online advertising, the news media, marketplace design, virtual currencies and the intersection of computer science, machine learning and economics. She advises governments and businesses on marketplace design and platform economics, notably serving since 2007 as a long-term consultant to Microsoft Corporation in a variety of roles, including consulting chief economist.  

Susan Athey Graduate School of Business, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
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CISAC senior research scholar Herb Lin writes in this Washington Post op-ed about the Equifax hacking and how to prevent such future incidents. He urges Congress "to go beyond proposed legislation on free freezing of credit reports to require that individual reports be frozen by default, 'thaw-able' only with the individual’s consent."

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Abstract: This talk examines the history of environmental data systems in the context of the Trump administration’s assault on environmental science. Tracking and understanding environmental change requires “long data,” i.e. consistent, reliable sampling over long periods of time. Weather observations can become climate data, for example — but only if carefully curated and adjusted to account for changes in instrumentation and data analysis methods. Environmental knowledge institutions therefore depend on an ongoing “truce” among scientific and political actors. Climate denialism and deregulatory movements seek to destabilize this truce. In recent months, with the installation of climate change deniers and non-scientist ideologues as leaders of American knowledge institutions, wholesale dismantling of some environmental data systems has begun. These developments threaten the continuity of “long data” vital to tracking climate change and other environmental disruptions with significant consequences for both domestic and international security.
 
Speaker bio: Paul N. Edwards is William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at Stanford University (from July 2017) and Professor of Information at the University of Michigan. He writes and teaches about the history, politics, and culture of information infrastructures. Edwards is the author of A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming (MIT Press, 2010) and The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (MIT Press, 1996), and co-editor of Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance (MIT Press, 2001), as well as numerous articles.

 

William J. Perry Fellow in International Security Stanford University
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Abstract: Sustaining strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China is a long-standing U.S. national security goal. Meeting this goal is growing more challenging due to tectonic geopolitical and technological changes. On the geopolitical side, new dynamics and new uncertainties are created by China’s emergence as an increasingly capable and assertive great power, Russia’s regional revanchism and political operations, and America’s uncertainty about its role in the world amidst its divisive domestic politics. On the technology side, advances in military capabilities for cyberspace, outer space, missile defense, long-range strike, and a range of AI-related areas including autonomous systems and big data analytics, are changing the dynamics of crisis management and conflict escalation. At the extreme, such technological advances could undermine confidence in one or more side's nuclear second-strike capabilities, thereby provoking arms racing in the near-term, and potentially “use or lose” dynamics in the longer-term. After outlining the dimensions of this growing set of challenges, Dr. Miller will offer a number of specific recommendations for U.S. policy, military force posture, and engagement with Russia and China.

Speaker Bio: Dr. James N. Miller is President of Adaptive Strategies, LLC, which provides consulting on strategy development and implementation, international engagement, and technology issues. He is a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab and Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. He serves on the Defense Science Board, for which he recently co-chaired a task force report on cyber deterrence, the Board of Directors for the Atlantic Council, and the Board of Advisors for the Center for a New American Security. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from May 2012 to January 2014, Dr. Miller served as the principal civilian advisor to Secretaries Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel on strategy, policy, and operations, and as DoD’s Deputy for National Security Council deliberations. He served as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from April 2009 to May 2012, and previously in numerous leadership positions in government, academia, non-profits, and the private sector over a thirty-year career in national security. He received a B.A. degree in economics from Stanford University, and Master’s and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard’s JFK School of Government.  

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616 Serra Street

Stanford, CA 94305

James N. Miller Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (former)
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In a Q&A with Elisabeth Eaves at The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, CISAC's Siegfried Hecker explains how the latest North Korean nuclear test is different, what North Korea's capabilities are now and how the U.S. could respond.

With North Korea testing missiles at a steady pace, the Bulletin has been checking in regularly with Siegfried S. Hecker, the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory who has visited North Korean nuclear facilities multiple times. We talked to him again after last Sunday, when, as many Americans enjoyed the Labor Day long weekend, Pyongyang conducted a powerful underground nuclear test, its sixth ever and first in a year. The device detonated may or may not have been a hydrogen bomb, but we do know it was significantly more powerful than any nuclear weapon North Korea has tested before. In this interview, Hecker weighs in on what this means, what the North is capable of, and how to get out of the dangerous game of nuclear brinksmanship now embroiling Northeast Asia and the United States.

BAS: To the general public, there has been so much nuclear news out of North Korea lately that this one might sound like “just another test.” So please put it in context for us: What was different about North Korea’s September 3rd nuclear test? How did it differ in magnitude from previous tests, and what does that tell us?

SH: The destructive power of North Korea’s previous five nuclear tests had progressed to about 25 kilotons, roughly the same as the bomb dropped on Nagasaki in 1945. This test was greater than 100 kilotons; that’s a big deal. It indicates they have progressed considerably beyond primitive fission-bomb technologies.

BAS: Was this one really a hydrogen bomb, and how would we know?

SH: The size of the blast was consistent with a hydrogen bomb—that is, a fusion-based bomb. However, it could also have been a large “boosted” fission bomb, in which the hydrogen isotopes deuterium and tritium were used to enhance the fission yield. If any telltale radioactive debris leaked from the underground test site, that could help us differentiate, but so far none has been found. So we can’t be certain.

BAS: What would it mean if it was a hydrogen bomb? Would that be a game changer?

SH: No, I don’t see a hydrogen bomb as a game changer. The North has been steadily enhancing its nuclear weapons in that direction. It was only a matter of time before it got there—although, if this one was a small, modern, two-stage hydrogen bomb, then I am surprised it got there so quickly. For years, I have followed the country’s steady progress on producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the fuels for fission bombs. And I concluded some time ago that it also has the ability to produce tritium, which is necessary for a boosted fission bomb or a hydrogen bomb.

BAS: But hydrogen bombs are a thousand times more powerful than fission bombs. Doesn’t that change the military threat?

SH: True, hydrogen bombs can be a thousand times more powerful. In fact, there is no theoretical limit to their destructive power. However, what is much more important is whether any nuclear bomb—fission or a fusion—can be made sufficiently small and light to mount on a missile, as well as robust enough to survive the missile’s launch, flight and atmospheric re-entry. Even a fission bomb of 25 kilotons delivered to Seoul or Los Angeles would cause horrific damage. So sure, a hydrogen bomb with very high destructive power would be worse, and have the advantage of being deliverable on a much-less-accurate missile, but the damage from a fission bomb would already be unacceptable.

BAS: Does the latest test change the political dynamics?

SH: Yes, it does. Washington was already suffering from its preoccupation with keeping North Korea from developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) instead of dealing with the nuclear crisis that already threatened Northeast Asia. President Trump seemed to have made ICBMs his red line, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-un blasted right past that in July and August. If you add the specter of a hydrogen bomb, that creates an enormous dilemma for the Trump administration in terms of how to assure the American public it will be protected. In Pyongyang, meanwhile, they surely must see being able to field hydrogen bombs as leveling the playing field. A hydrogen bomb would put them in the elite company of the so-called P-5 states, the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France. It would increase Pyongyang’s leverage should it ever come back to the negotiating table.

BAS: When we spoke in August, you said that Pyongyang’s ability to reach the continental United States with a nuclear-tipped missile was still some years away. Has last Sunday’s nuclear test changed your view?

SH: Well, they got closer with this test, as they do with each missile and nuclear test. They may still be a few years away, but they are very competent at climbing a learning curve and making rapid progress. Besides, they are determined. Continued progress with either boosted fission bombs or hydrogen bombs—through more nuclear testing—will make it possible to fit the bombs on an ICBM. However, they still need to do a lot of work to get their weapons to survive the extreme launch, flight, and re-entry conditions.

BAS: Have North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests done any actual physical harm to the United States or other countries?

SH: It certainly is confusing for the general public to hear about all these missile tests—flying toward Guam or over Japan. It is important to stress that these are tests of rocket technologies in which the rockets carry surrogates, not explosives or nuclear bombs, so there is no damage.

The nuclear tests, such as the sixth one last weekend, are enormously powerful, but the destruction is contained underground in a mountain. We must keep in mind that the United States conducted 1,054 nuclear tests between 1945 and 1992, when we stopped. Until 1963, more than 200 of them were detonated in the atmosphere, causing radioactive fallout. The Soviets, by the way, conducted 715 tests over roughly the same time frame, and the Chinese 45. All six North Korean nuclear tests have been underground and well-contained. The possibility of radioactive leakage from these tests, however, is one of China’s greatest concerns since the test site is close to the border.

BAS: Several hours before the test, the North Korean official news agency KCNA posted photos of Kim Jong-un inspecting what it called a two-stage thermonuclear bomb. Do you believe that is what was tested?

SH: The images undoubtedly showed a model rather than the real device, but it had features generally consistent with a two-stage thermonuclear device, that is, a modern hydrogen bomb. The photos showed Kim inspecting the model in front of a schematic of the Hwasong-14 ICBM re-entry vehicle, and next to a mockup of its nose cone. The model appeared to have dimensions that would allow it to be mounted inside the ICBM. Clearly, that’s what the North Koreans would like us to believe, that they have mastered the ability to deliver a thermonuclear-tipped missile to the US mainland. However, we have no way of knowing if the device tested was of this design. The model could quite easily be constructed based on drawings of two-stage thermonuclear bombs available on the Internet. Nevertheless, I have learned not to underestimate the North Korean nuclear specialists.

BAS: Does the time interval between this nuclear test and North Korea’s last nuclear test tell us anything about technological progress they may be making?

SH: North Korea has been very methodical and deliberate about nuclear testing. The fact that it conducted six tests over such an extended period, beginning in October 2006, gave its nuclear scientists a chance to learn a lot between tests. I believe North Korea learned much more from its tests than did India or Pakistan, which conducted almost all of their six respective tests over a short time period with little chance to learn from one to the next. However, there was another reason for the slow, deliberate pace: North Korea lacked sufficient fissile materials, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium, until quite recently. The regime must also have weighed the likelihood of adverse actions from China, but as this last test shows, it was determined to proceed regardless of Chinese and international reaction.

BAS: The news coverage sometimes implies that Kim Jong-un, who took power in 2011 after his father and grandfather before him, is especially impatient and determined to develop a threatening nuclear arsenal. Do you see it that way?

SH: Not necessarily. North Korea has been making deliberate, steady progress on nuclear and missile advances since at least 2009, when all serious dialogue with Pyongyang ended. Progress, particularly on the missile front, has accelerated since Kim Jong-un took the reins at the end of 2011, but the foundations for the nuclear and missile programs were already built. It does appear that Kim Jong-un has brought a more effective, hands-on management style to move the programs forward.

BAS: In photos the KCNA released last weekend, one of the men alongside Kim Jong-un appears to be Ri Hong-sop, head of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute. A Reuters news report, which identifies Ri in an earlier photo, says you met with him during your visits to Yongbyon. Is that so, and what can you tell us about him?

SH: Dr. Ri Hong-sop was director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center during my first visit in January 2004. I was impressed with his technical competency as well as his honest and direct answers to my technical questions during the tour, in which he gave our Stanford team remarkable access to the Yongbyon plutonium facilities. In a fascinating exchange about the intricacies of plutonium metallurgy, he even allowed me to hold a sample of recently produced plutonium—in a sealed glass jar—to convince me it really was plutonium.

BAS: Was that the only time you met with Ri?

SH: No, we met during several of my seven visits to North Korea, although by the fourth visit in 2007, he was no longer director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Center. I was told he had moved to Pyongyang to advise the General Department of Atomic Energy. When I asked about him during my last visit in November 2010, my host told me somewhat sarcastically that my government wouldn’t let me meet him because the latest UN sanctions had put him on a blacklist. Much of what we know about the North Korean nuclear complex comes from discussions we had with technical professionals in Yongbyon. So much for the benefits of sanctions: They didn’t slow down the North’s progress on its nuclear program, but eliminated one of the few windows we had into it.

BAS: An official KCNA statement quoted Kim Jong-un as saying, “all components of the H-bomb were homemade … thus enabling the country to produce powerful nuclear weapons as many as it wants.” You have previously said that North Korea has only limited inventories of fissile materials, the fuel required for bomb making. Do you still consider that to be the case? How many bombs could it make now?

SH: North Korea cannot produce “as many as it wants,” although it is making progress on both fusion and fission fuels. It appears to have produced lithium deuteride, which can be used to produce the tritium fuel for hydrogen bombs, but likely has only small inventories of tritium for boosted fission devices. And it still has relatively small inventories of fissile materials for the fission bombs that are required to trigger the fusion device.

Although they do involve great uncertainty, I believe my previous estimates still hold: By the end of 2016, North Korea had enough bomb fuel—roughly 20 to 40 kilograms of plutonium and 200 to 450 kilograms of highly enriched uranium—to make 20 to 25 nuclear weapons, with an annual production capacity of six to seven bombs’ worth. If they continue to test and develop more sophisticated hydrogen bombs that could use less fissile material, we’ll have to revise that upwards. However, I don’t concur with the leaked intelligence estimate that they have up to 60 nuclear weapons now.

BAS: The KCNA statement also touted North Korea’s ability to launch a “super-powerful EMP attack” against the United States. EMP is short for electromagnetic pulse. Could you explain what an EMP attack is, and whether this is a credible threat?

SH: The idea of an EMP attack would be to detonate a nuclear weapon tens of miles above Earth’s surface with the goal of knocking out the US power grid and causing other electrical disruptions.

I don’t see this as something the United States needs to worry about now. First, North Korea has a lot of work to do to develop the right nuclear device for an intense EMP weapon. Second, how would an EMP attack help Pyongyang achieve its objective of deterring the United States? If Pyongyang used such a weapon against the United States, Washington would consider that an act of war, which would likely lead to the end of the Kim Jong-un regime.

What the EMP comment does show, however, is how closely the North Koreans follow the American press, which has published reports by some American alarmists wringing their hands about this threat. The North Koreans were even clever enough to have researchers from Pyongyang’s Kim Chaek University of Technology write a short brief about EMP, with the conclusion that it represents an important “strike” method.

BAS: Could the comment by American UN Ambassador Nikki Haley that North Korea is “begging for war” hold any truth—that is, might Kim Jong-un see some benefit in getting to the point of actual military conflict? I know he’s probably a pretty rational actor, but leaders have been known to think they might benefit from war.

SH: I don’t think so. Kim Jong-un’s only hope of survival is to avoid war. He apparently believes that in order to survive, he has to be able to threaten the United States not only with ICBMs, but with ICBMs tipped with hydrogen bombs.

BAS: You’ve previously argued that the Trump administration must talk directly to North Korea as the next step in resolving the nuclear crisis. But both Haley and Trump have said the “time for talking is over.” So now what?

SH: I’m afraid the Trump administration is compounding the mistakes of past US administrations with such comments, along with threats of “fire and fury.” This rhetoric will make it all the more difficult for Washington to take the necessary steps to avoid a nuclear confrontation with North Korea. We need to face reality—the way we got into this situation is that we haven’t talked seriously since 2009.

BAS: “Talks” can mean different things to different people. Should the US negotiate? Or accept a nuclear-armed North Korea? Does talking constitute “appeasement,” as Trump accused South Korean President Moon Jae-in of pursuing?

SH: The US administration should dispatch a small team to talk to Kim Jong-un to establish mechanisms to avoid misunderstandings, miscalculations, or misinterpretations that could quickly send us over the cliff into nuclear war. The talks would not be a reward or a concession to Pyongyang, nor should they be construed as signaling acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Such talks are not meant to appease Pyongyang as they would not offer any rewards. They could, however, deliver the message that while Washington fully intends to defend itself and its allies from any attack with a devastating retaliatory response, it does not otherwise intend to attack the North or pursue regime change. I realize that talking so soon after North Korea made such a major nuclear weapons advance may make it look like the US administration blinked first. But I consider that much less dangerous than stumbling into a nuclear war, which could happen if we pursue other actions being considered by the administration.

These talks would not be negotiations—not yet. Rather, they are a necessary step toward re-establishing critical lines of communication to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. Negotiations on denuclearization might follow, but that would require a much longer time frame and coordination with China, Russia, and US allies

 

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Abstract: The United States is (belatedly) waking up to the risk that adversaries will use social media and botnets to influence U.S. elections. However, we have only begun to analyze how adversaries might conduct information operations in the United States to help advance other political goals, especially during intense crises or escalating cyber conflicts.  Strategies to counter such information operations in the U.S. homeland do not exist. To help begin filling that gap, this presentation examines the risk that adversaries will combine cyberattacks on the power grid with disinformation campaigns, tailored to maximize the disruptive effect of blackouts and gain leverage over U.S. leaders for conflict resolution. The presentation also proposes how the electric industry can build on its expertise for “unity of messaging” in hurricane-induced outages, and partner with government agencies to meet the very different (and vastly more difficult) challenges of countering information warfare.  

Speaker Bio: Paul Stockton is the Managing Director of Sonecon LLC, an economic and security advisory firm in Washington, DC.  Before joining Sonecon, Dr. Stockton served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs from May 2009 until January 2013.  In that position, he helped lead the Department’s response to Superstorm Sandy and other disasters. Dr. Stockton also guided Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection policies and programs. Dr. Stockton was twice awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, DOD's highest civilian award. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University and a BA from Dartmouth College.  He is the author of Superstorm Sandy: Implications for Designing a Post-Cyber Attack Power Restoration System and numerous other publications on cybersecurity and infrastructure resilience. 

Paul Stockton Managing Director Sonecon
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