On October 30, 1984, a workshop met at the Stanford Center for International Security and Arms Control to examine near-term prospects for and alternative approaches to strategic defense. This report provides the results of that examination and thus represents the consensus of the signatories on a limited set of high-priority objectives and activities in strategic defense.

An earlier study by the Center gave a critical assessment of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). One of its recommendations was an unspecified, treaty-consistent research and development (R&D) program in antiballistic missile (ABM) defense at "a level not very different from recent amounts." Because such an effort is also proposed herein, the present report may in that one sense be seen as a logical complement to the earlier study. However, not all of the members of this workshop endorse all of the conclusions of that study. Also, the present report is limited to the ABM research and development the United States should be pursuing in the near term (5-10 years).

This study by an eminent scientist, a former U.S. arms control official and a specialist on Soviet defense policy at Stanford, is strongly critical of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as "Star Wars," whether it is viewed as transcending deterrence through a nearly foolproof defense or, as more recently argued, as enhancing deterrence through a partial defense. The authors review the proposed technologies, as well as the countermeasures by which offensive systems could offset defensive systems, and question the technological feasibility and the cost assumptions. They confirm the findings of other reports. But the principal value of this one is in its discussion of the political effects upon the Soviet Union, U.S. allies, and arms control negotiations. Strategic stability would be impaired, it is argued, if in the absence of a major new arms control agreement both sides built up their offensive forces while simultaneously developing their new defense capabilities. The impact upon European and Asian allies would be decoupling, pushing them into new nuclear programs and to questioning American guarantees. One need not agree with the conclusions of this study to recognize its merits. A most useful contribution to what will surely be a growing debate.

--Foreign Affairs

In early 1983, members of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control met to discuss ideas on the establishment of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. center to support cooperative efforts to prevent accidental nuclear war. William Perry (former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) began the discussion by outlining several measures he felt could help to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. Calling attention to the earlier proposals of Senators Gary Hart, Sam Nunn, and Henry Jackson, he endorsed the concept of a joint accidental nuclear war prevention center as a mechanism to support efforts of the two superpowers to prevent or reduce the likelihood of the outbreak of nuclear war. Most notable in this regard was his personal experience of an erroneous warning of a large-scale Soviet missile attack on the U.S., which resulted from a NORAD computer malfunction. Information exchanges and consultation to clarify circumstances surrounding an accident - or the misperceptions that might result from one - could be facilitated by a number of different types of centers that have been suggested. Perry described one possible configuration for such a center, consisting of two stations, jointly staffed and located in Washington and Moscow.

Members of the Stanford Center met again in June 1983 to examine in more detail the issues raised by this idea and similar ones, and possible next steps involved in implementation. This paper reports on research in progress on this subject. In addition to the Perry contribution, much of the conceptual analysis of the missions of a joint center derives from the work of Alexander George on crisis prevention and crisis management.' Those elements of the research covering the technical and 'mechanization' requirements are contributed by Elliott Levinthal and Ted Ralston. Lastly, the suggested negotiating approach derives from the experiences and thinking of Sidney Graybeal, former U.S. Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).

The missile race cannot be ended with one old stroke of the negotiator's pen on a single comprehensive and lasting treaty. I foresee instead a continuing negotiation, a continuing exchange of information on weapon plans and a continuing series of agreements. This article suggests possible structures for such a dialogue, given the division of power over the conduct of foreign policy between the Executive and the Congress.

This article will consider whether the principles of the Geneva Protocol have become so widely accepted that they apply to the United States even though it is not a party. It will analyze the effect of existing reservations to the Protocol, discuss the United States use of tear gases and herbicides in Vietnam in light of its provisions, and recommend that the Protocol be approved by the Senate. This article will first describe the international agreements dealing with poison gas and germ warfare, and the reasons which prevented the United States from becoming a party to them.

When the United States was the only nuclear power in the world, we thought one was too many. Efforts since then to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries have resulted in widespread agreement this year on a nonproliferation treaty. This commentary will describe the background of the treaty, summarize its main provisions, and discuss some questions of interpretation which have arisen.