In August 1991, the people of Moscow and Leningrad demonstrated to the world that democracy is an idea whose time had come for the Soviet Union. As a result, the Soviet
government received a mandate for political reform. This reform, if successful, will result in a political system that will be very different from any that the people in the Soviet Union have ever known-a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Hand in hand with political reform, the Union and its republics will be attempting sweeping economic reforms. While recognizing how difficult it will be for the Soviet Union to achieve economic reform, it is also important to observe that it is at least conceivable now. A critically important component of economic reform in the Soviet Union is the conversion of their defense industry from a centrally managed monolith to a collection of independent, privately owned enterprises, producing civil products.

Operational arms control can take many forms, and one of the most important is direct military-to-military talks. The 1989 Dangerous Military Activities agreement, in which military officers headed negotiations for the first time, should not be considered the final step in improving U.S.-Soviet military-to-military relations.  It should be seen instead as a major step forward toward a much deeper and wider network of discussions and agreements which reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings and potential incidents between the militaries of the two states.

This conference report contains papers presented September 14-16, 1990, at a symposium at Stanford University, sponsored by the Institute of Far Eastern Studies (IFES) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC).

After eight years of marathon negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union are finally close to concluding a strategic-arms-reduction treaty (START). At the 1990 Washington summit, U.S. president George Bush and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev signed a communique concerning the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. Although the agreement is not the long-awaited START, the two presidents reaffirmed their determination to have the treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of 1990. The marked progress toward nuclear disarmament by the two superpowers has once again caused vast repercussions. While hailing progress, many people show more concern for the implications of the treaty for the future of arms control.

A warning system such as the Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence system (C3I) for the U.S. nuclear forces operates on the basis of various sources of information, among which are signals from sensors. These sensors include, for example, radar receivers and satellites. A fundamental problem in the use of such signals is that the sensors provide only imperfect information. Two kinds of errors are possible: missed signals (Type I errors) and false alerts (Type II errors). Probability is therefore a key concept in the logical treatment of such signals. It is defined, in the Bayesian sense, as a degree of belief in the possibility ofeach event (in this case, attack or no attack, signal or no signal, and action or no action) (Savage 1954). One of the main problems in the use of the Bayesian method is that, because the base of evidence for estimation of these probabilities may be small, the figures may be fuzzy. A first issue is thus how to account, using probabilities, for the primary uncertainties about signals and events. A second issue is how to assess and treat uncertainties about these probabilities (epistemic uncertainties) while preserving probabilistic logic. A third issue is the relevance of these epistemic uncertainties in rational and prudent decision making when the stakes are as high as the possibility of an accidental nuclear attack.

The world is facing truly breathtaking changes, in particular from the socialist countries. The traditional rigidity of communist regimes and the preeminence of the communist parties in these countries are breaking down. Strong voices of nationalism within the Soviet Union are challenging the very integrity of the union itself. Thus, a bipolar world--where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), led by the Soviet Union, represent both .an ideological schism and a superpower confrontation--is no longer the basis or even a dominant force for threatened conflict.

The recognition is growing that such factors as economic strength, abundance of basic resources, productivity, and the health and morale of the population are in many respects stronger bases of national security than are military forces. This recognition conflicts sharply with the concept of national security as defined in the Dictionary of Military Terms (issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff) as "a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations."

In view of all these developments, the realization that military power and national security are not synonymous is becoming more prevalent in the United States.  More attention is focusing on internal threats from deficiencies such as those in education, from erosion of the country's infrastructure, drugs, and problems of the environment. This attention, in turn, has deflected public concern and attention from military issues. The decreased concern not only has diminished the priority given to military preparedness but also, unfortunately, has lessened the concern with arms control.

This paper addresses the steps that the United States should take to insure the continuation of its position of influence and involvement in world commerce and geopolitics in light of the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  The developments are both positive--prodemocracy movements, lessened tensions--and negative, the latter suggesting that there may well be a period in which pent-up ethnic, ideological, and nationalistic pressures could give rise to local conflicts and regional disputes throughout the world, not just in Eastern Europe.

For all the time and frustration that humans expend interacting with computers, it is surprising that more attention is not paid to the impact the computers used by armed forces might have on security and peace. The military, like the rest of us, is dependent on its computers and interacts with them unceasingly, often in critical situations. Never before have our armies been so intimately dependent on their tools, certainly not ones as complex, or as apparently capricious as misapplied computers can be. This paper looks at the ways in which this peculiar human involvement with computer systems requires special attention, most critically in the military context, from policymakers and researchers.

The national security strategy of the United States since World War II has changed frequently during the course of eight administrations and two wars. But it has also had an underlying consistency, driven by three major factors: the Cold War, the United States' position as leader of the Western world, and the economic strength of the United States. In the 1990s, however, U.S. national security strategy is likely to be very different as the Cold War abates, the United States' role with allies evolves from one of dominance to one of senior partnership, and the U.S. economy is stressed by actions to reduce the budget and trade deficits.