Why did the Soviet Union break up, whereas the Russian Federation has so far held together in the face of ostensibly similar secession crises? To what extent is regional separatism a product of economic incentives or local ethnic identity? Few areas of the world display a greater complexity of ethnic relations than the post-Soviet empire, and there are few with greater long-term strategic significance. Drawing on insights from political science, sociology, and anthropology, A Federation Imperiled asks why political elites in some regions in post-Soviet Russia have shown more of a proclivity for separatism from Moscow than others. Focusing on Chechnya, Dagestan, Sakha, Buryatia, Tyva, Pskov, and Primorye, this volume explores political programs articulated by top officials in the regions, local separtist or anti-separtist movements, and disputes between Moscow and the regions over natural resources and external trade. This is the first major comparative study on the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

The Caspian Basin has emerged in recent years as a major focus of international affairs for a combination of political, economic, and geostrategic reasons. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's dissolution in the early 1990s the region's newly independent states were overshadowed by Russia and attracted little Western and U.S. attention. But over the past several years this region has attracted growing attention from Western policymakers and scholars, as well as the media and the private sector. One of the main reasons for this new focus on the Caspian is its sizable energy reserves. In addition to its potential as a significant oil producer, however, it is also the Caspian's geostrategic location, its diverse mix of ethnic groups, and its unsettled intrastate and interstate conflicts that make it both an enticing and challenging region.

In May 1999, CISAC's Project on Ethnic Conflict and Conflict Management in the Former Soviet Union convened an international conference to examine emerging geopolitical issues of the Caspian Basin region. Scholars, policymakers, and energy executives from around the world gathered to examine the sometimes contending interests, both political and economic, focused on the region, and to seek to develop a comprehensive approach for enhancing political and economic development, mitigating and resolving conflicts, and promoting security and stability in the region. Panelists examined conflicting political and economic approaches to the region and explored strategies for energy development that might facilitate regional economic growth and democratization. They also offered diverse views about whether energy development could promote regional cooperation and integration or was likely to exacerbate existing conflicts.

The conference was part of the Project on Ethnic Conflict's ongoing activities in the Caspian region. Project director Gail Lapidus and others at CISAC have been working closely with scholars and policymakers in the region for a number of years on issues of nationalism, conflict resolution, and regional security. One of the project's central goals has been to encourage and facilitate regional cooperation on a broad range of humanitarian, economic, and political issues. In support of that objective, the project has engaged in joint efforts with key political actors in the region in attempts to develop fresh approaches to conflict management and to construct new regional security arrangements.

The Cox Commission of the U.S. Congress was established in June 1998 to investigate concerns over Chinese acquisition of sensitive U.S. missile and space technology in connection with the launching of U.S. civilian satellites using Chinese launchers on Chinese territory. The investigations were broadened in October 1998 to include alleged security problems and possible espionage at the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories. Some conclusions were released in January 1999 by the White House together with the administration's response. The full declassified (redacted) version of the report of the Cox Commission was released on May 25, 1999.

The U.S. Senate's rejection of the CTBT in October 1999 does not free the United States from the Treaty's norm against nuclear-weapon test explosions. Nor does it mean that the Senate will never approve the Treaty. But it does mean that the final U.S. position on the Treaty almost certainly will not be known until after the next U.S. presidential election in November 2000. Moreover, a debate to build domestic and international support for U.S. adherence to the Treaty's norm could help to produce eventual Senate approval.

This article sets out the constraints of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (the “Act”), which generally prohibits active enforcement of civilian laws by the military, and describes the discretion of the military commander to assist civilian law enforcement in protecting America’s information infrastructure against computer-assisted attack. A primary purpose of this article is to help legal advisors to commanders and DoD civilian officials better understand the boundaries of command discretion so that commanders and officials can feel free to exercise proper command discretion to assist law enforcement according to military interests and their professional and personal ethics and ideals. Another primary purpose of the article is to appraise Congress of the Act, its prohibitions, and its application to assist in framing the policy debate about how to constrain or expand the discretion of commanders and other officials to most productively serve the American public.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime was challenged in 1998 by nuclear-weapon tests in India and Pakistan, by medium-range missile tests in those countries and in Iran and North Korea, by Iraq's defiance of UN Security Council resolutions requiring it to complete its disclosure of efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and by the combination of "loose nukes" and economic collapse in Russia. Additional threats to the regime's vitality came in 1999 from the erosion of American relations with both China and Russia that resulted from NATO's 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia--with additional harm to relations with China resulting from U.S. accusations of Chinese nuclear espionage and Taiwan's announcement that it was a state separate from China despite its earlier acceptance of a U.S.-Chinese "one China" agreement. Major threats to the regime also came from the continued stalemate on arms-control treaties in the Russian Duma and the U.S. Senate, from a change in U.S. policy to favor building a national defense against missile attack, and from a Russian decision to develop a new generation of small tactical nuclear weapons for defense against conventional attack.

This paper will discuss the effect some of these developments had on the 1999 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) parties to prepare for review of the NPT in 2000, and speculate about their likely future effect on the regime.

This article addresses two central questions: First, why have Chinese efforts over the last half century to create a modern air force failed? Second, what lessons have the Chinese gleaned from these failures? Based on their findings, the authors conclude that China's air force has moved away from a strategy based on "active defense" and no first strike, adopting along the way Western notions of the role of air power in combat.

The Soviet Union placed a high priority on science and technology and built a huge assembly of research institutes, educational programs, design bureaus, and production enterprises embodying some measure of science and/or technology. This assembly concentrated overwhelmingly on military applications. Approximately three-quarters of this complex was located in Russia, but essential elements of many programs were located in other republics.

Starting in the Gorbachev regime there was a recognition that the economy was deteriorating and that it was necessary to reduce military expenditures and increase the civilian economy. A major element of this has been the attempt to direct a much greater effort toward the development of commercial products and services based upon technologies and skills developed in the military-industrial complex (MIC). This commercialization of Soviet and Russian military technology has been attempted by the Russians both independently, through conversion programs, and in cooperation with foreign partners. The conversion programs have had very limited success. The success of attempts at cooperative commercialization by U.S. companies and Russian enterprises have also been modest, but they illustrate workable models that could be utilized by other cooperative ventures. These cooperative commercialization ventures are the primary subject of this report.

This research is based primarily on the study of several cases of cooperative attempts by U.S. companies and Russian enterprises to commercialize Russian technology. Additional information has been gathered through participation in workshops and conferences including sessions or presentations on technology commercialization. There is no attempt to determine the total amount of such activity, but foreign investment of all types in Russia has been very small. These cases may not be representative of what is going on at many defense enterprises, especially those that do not have foreign partners. They do, however, show models of what can be achieved, as well as some of the problems encountered in technology commercialization.

The decade of the 1990s has seen renewed concerns over nuclear proliferation, both horizontal and vertical. While many in the arms control community focus on numbers, it is control that is the most important factor--the detonation of just one nuclear weapon would be an international catastrophe. Rather than concentrating on numbers, the regime defined herein centers on enhancing the safety and security being provided nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile materials. The proposal in the paper is called the Nuclear Weapons Control Treaty (NWCT) and referred to as New Court. The emphasis is on control rather than disarmament, protection from unintended or unauthorized use rather than elimination. New Court, once in place, would provide an environment in which the necessary audits and accountability for undertaking dramatic reductions in the numbers of weapons and the quantities of weapons-usable materials could be made with much greater confidence than exists today. However, it will be decades (if ever) before the number of nuclear weapons goes to zero. In the meantime, it is paramount that comprehensive safety and security be established and maintained.

There are currently more than a thousand metric tons of civilian fuel cycle plutonium, mostly in spent fuel rods, but hundreds of tons are already separated and in storage. Any of this plutonium could be fashioned into a nuclear explosive. There are no practical approaches for disposing of plutonium in periods of time less than decades. Much of the architecture and technology from New Court can be applied to the development of international monitored storage facilities (IMSF) for civil nuclear material. The paper outlines the five key requirements an international depository must satisfy: national security for the depositors and the host nation; safety and security of the material; transparency of operations; technology transfer to provide uniform global protection; and precise accurate accountability of the quantities and forms of material deposited. The synergism and conflict among the factors is briefly described. The paper also contains annexes on the current status of some key monitoring technologies and a description of an international "stored weapons standard" for protecting weapons-usable fissile material.

The end of the Cold War left the United States in the fortunate position of facing no imminent threat of global war. But it also left the United States in a strategic vacuum, with no organizing principle for its national security. This book proposes a security strategy for the 21st century based on preventing new major threats to U.S. security from emerging.

Informed by the authors' service in the Pentagon during President Clinton's first term, this book identifies six major dangers to U.S. security that have the potential to grow into threats to American interests and values as ominous as the Cold War's nuclear standoff. In chapters that cover chilling dangers ranging from Russia's implosion to the rising power of China, and from proliferation of biological weapons to cyber terrorism, the authors first recount from first hand experience the Pentagon's efforts to define and prevent dangers to U.S. security since the end of the Cold War, and then advance preventive defense strategies for the future. It argues that implementing a Preventive Defense strategy will require a revolution in the way the Pentagon does business -- a revolution that is only beginning.