FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.
Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions.
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Kresge Auditorium, Stanford University
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, 2nd floor, Encina Hall East
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, 2nd floor, Encina Hall East
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, 2nd floor, Encina Hall East
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, 2nd floor, Encina Hall East
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, 2nd floor, Encina Hall East
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
The idea of cooperation between the United States and Russia in the area of missile defense has been popular in Russia since at least the early 1990s. The degree of interest has varied over time, but it has been consistently strong for most of the last decade. Disagreement on missile defenses and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which has been plaguing the U.S.-Russian relationships, actually has helped strengthen the popularity of the idea of cooperation. Just recently, the possibility of U.S.-Russian cooperation in missile defense was mentioned at least twice, in Duma hearings and in comments made by President Vladimir Putin. In both cases it was underscored that despite reservations about U.S. policy on missile defense, Russia is interested in participating in a joint missile defense development effort.
This policy memo, number 316 in the PONARS Policy Memo Series, examines the possibility of cooperation in missile defense in the context of existing U.S.-Russian joint projects. The main result of this analysis is that, although some kind of a joint effort is certainly possible, the area of missile defense is probably one of the least favorable ones for cooperation, because Russia and the United States lack the institutional infrastructure that is necessary to handle any kind of joint missile defense technology program. In addition, the attempts to politicize the issue by presenting it as a sign of a nascent U.S.-Russian partnership will most likely make any successful cooperation impossible.
The history of the October 1969 alert demonstrates that even in this high-politics arena of nuclear diplomacy, presidential orders were actively fought against, sometimes manipulated or ignored, and often honored only in part. Other orders were interpreted and implemented in a more vigorous manner that best suited the organizational interests of the military commanders doing the interpretation. The result was that many important details of the military activities undertaken in October 1969 reflected the operational interests of the military commanders and the goals of lower-level bureaucratic actors as much as the strategic objectives of the president. In this important sense, the nuclear alert was loosely coupled to the president´s orders.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
