In the recent past the issue of covert trade in nuclear material gained public prominence when it was erroneously claimed by British intelligence sources that the former Government of Iraq under Saddam Hussein had tried to obtain uranium from Niger. The far reaching consequences of such assessments for society were clearly demonstrated by U.S. President George W. Bush in his speech on January 28, 2003, using this incorrect information as one of the reasons why terrorists and countries belonging to the "Axis of Evil" posed a potential nuclear threat. In view of the occurrence of such significant errors even in the intelligence community, it is not surprising that information in the media on the topic of illicit trafficking of nuclear material is frequently flawed by errors.

In order to avoid the pitfalls of evaluating important security-related decisions from questionable sources of information, this paper discusses only the most reliable currently available data on illicit trafficking of weapons-usable nuclear material, contained in the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources.

Abstract

In his “Star Wars” speech, President Ronald Reagan asked the “scientific community” to develop missile defense technologies that would render the massive Soviet nuclear arsenal “impotent and obsolete.” This paper compares the voices of two communities, physics and computing, who attempted to reply to Reagan's proposal as scientists. While physicists framed Star Wars in terms of simple systems which were subject to fundamental physical laws, computer professionals framed the proposal in terms of complex systems and patterns of production. When disputes within each of these communities erupted into the public sphere, physicists were able to find a measure of consensus around an authoritative discourse of natural laws, while the computing professionals' discourse remained fragmented between theory and practice, never achieving the same level of closure. These disputes struck at the heart of professional identities, even as they raised the question of what forms of expertise could speak to a public policy culture that expects certainty from its scientists.

Foreword by George P. Shultz

At the dawn of the nuclear age, Albert Einstein remarked, "Everything has changed but our way of thinking." 

He was right for a time, but the devastating consequences of the use of a nuclear weapon did create a pattern of thinking that, with whatever flaws, served us well for
half a century or so. Containment through deterrent capability worked. But the Cold War powers also realized that prevention was essential and that energetic efforts should
be made to arrest the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I well remember preparations for my first meeting as secretary of state with Soviet foreign minister Gromyko in September 1982. I had assumed office in July. The temperature of the Cold War was frigid, the atmosphere confrontational, and I was counseled to act accordingly. I said,
"OK, but there must be something we can do to identify a mutual interest."

There were to be two meetings, held about a week apart. I got the president's authorization to suggest, at the end of the first meeting, a few topics on which we might
try to work collaboratively. Nuclear nonproliferation was one of them. Toward the end of the second meeting, Gromyko replied to my suggestions, expressing a willingness
to make open and joint efforts to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons. So, even at the height of the Cold War, we were hard at work on our way of thinking.

The subject took high priority on Ronald Reagan's agenda. He thought that "mutual assured destruction" was not only MAD but also was an essentially immoral way to keep the peace. He said repeatedly, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." His aim was to abolish nuclear weapons. However elusive that goal may have been, he did start the ball rolling toward reduction in the Soviet and U.S. arsenals. But he worried, prophetically, about rogue states obtaining even one of these awesome weapons. 

Clearly, the end of the Cold War has drastically reduced the threat of nuclear holocaust. But the world remains a dangerous place in different ways. In a world of terrorist threats and rogues that call themselves states yet behave outside the bounds of civilized norms, we are once again called upon to examine our concepts. That is what this
book is about, and no intellectual task is more urgent or more relevant to current operational issues.

Sid Drell and Jim Goodby have between them vast experience in the area of nuclear weapons and have long been active voices in the nuclear debate. In this volume, they put their key recommendations right up front, in their introduction. That is appropriate. The reader knows at the outset where the authors are going. All of their conclusions have deep merit and the weight of careful argument and factual development. Some will be the subject of debate. That debate, in turn, is one of the important purposes of this book.

Having had the privilege of reading this work in earlier manuscript form and discussing its subject at length with the authors, I value this book because of its essence: the careful development of a framework for thinking about nuclear weapons in times punctuated by terrorist threats. 

All the elements are here: a relevant history, including an illuminating chart on page 6 on the time pattern of state acquisition of nuclear weapons; a virtual inventory of pre-
ventive actions; a searching examination of the circumstances when preemptive military action may be necessary; the problems of intelligence and monitoring; a new look at ballistic missile defenses; the importance of the U.S. example (as in testing); and ideas about what Russia and the United States can do with their special responsibilities. The authors develop the necessary interplay of strength and diplomacy as they address current problems. Work your way through the issues that are presented in settings in various countries. You will find, as I have, that the analytic framework will help you develop your own ideas of how to address critical problems.

Now is a time that cries out for new concepts, often using old principles, about how the world works. If he were still around, Einstein might well be challenging us once again to examine "our way of thinking." And in doing so, he would surely find in Drell and Goodby worthy partners as they address the gravest danger.

George P. Shultz September 2003

Table of Contents

Preface

Acknowledgments

Introduction: The Nuclear Danger

Chapter I: From the Past to the Present

Chapter II: Looking Forward

Chapter III: Denial Policies

Chapter IV: Defining Diplomacy's Task

Chapter V: Achieving Rollback: The Instruments of Diplomacy

Chapter VI: Applying Recommended Policies to Specific Cases

Chapter VII: Conclusion

About the Authors

In The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, professors Waltz and Sagan resume their well-known dialogue concerning nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear war. Kenneth Waltz, Senior Research Scholar in the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, expands on his argument that "more may be better," contending that new nuclear states will use their acquired nuclear capabilities to deter threats and preserve peace. Scott Sagan, the leading proponent of organizational theories in international politics, continues to make the counterpoint that "more will be worse": novice nuclear states lack adequate organizational controls over their new weapons, resulting in a higher risk of either deliberate of accidental nuclear war. Treating issues from the ’long peace’ between the United States and Soviet Union made possible by the nuclear balance of the Cold War to more modern topics such as global terrorism, missile defense, and the Indian-Pakistani conflict, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed is an invaluable addition to any international relations course.

This paper discusses three questions:

1. Could terrorists or others steal nuclear fuel from research rectors, to make either a nuclear weapon or a "dirty bomb," a radiological dispersal device?
2. Could terrorists attack a research reactor with conventional explosives, for example with a truck loaded with such explosives, in order to disperse radioactivity from the fuel of the reactor to an area downwind of the reactor?
3. How do power reactors compare with research reactors as targets of terrorist attacks?

The answer to the first two questions is a qualified yes. In the comparison called for in the third question, the low-enriched uranium in power reactors is unsuitable for making nuclear weapons, without major reprocessing. However, the highly enriched uranium burned in many research reactors around the world is suitable for making nuclear weapons, if enough of it is available. Both power reactors and research reactors could be targets for terrorists trying to attack a reactor with a truck bomb, for the purpose of dispersing radioactive material, or trying to steal such material for the purpose of making a dirty bomb. The variations from reactor to reactor, in both attractiveness to terrorists and protection of the facility, are widespread.

Humans often defy rational-choice theory by cooperating in simple dilemma games, a paradox that has been explained by theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism and indirect reciprocity (reputation). Fehr and Gächter claim that human cooperation remains an evolutionary puzzle because people will cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people whom they may not meet again, and without any gain in reputation ('strong reciprocity') - that is, when existing theories do not seem to apply. However, we argue that those theories are rejected for the wrong reasons and that the paradox may therefore be imaginary. This has implications for whether punishment is crucial to promoting cooperation.