How does democracy influence terrorism? Some scholars argue that lack of representation in autocracy motivates terrorism; others claim that individual liberty in democracy permits it. This thesis explores the debate by using Chile as a case study to examine how democracy influences terrorist organizational processes. It traces how variations in levels of representation and individual liberty in Chile between 1965 and 1995 influenced terrorist strategic capacity, or the ability of groups to think and act towards long-term survival and success. Analyzing the five observable features of strategic capacity - mission, hierarchy, membership, tactics, and violence level - reveals that democratic characteristics positively influence some dimensions and constrain others. High-functioning democracy and highly repressive autocracy are unlikely to experience violence, due to the high constraints that each places on different features of strategic capacity. However, democracies with weak representation and autocracies with some individual liberty allow strategic capacity to strengthen, making violence more likely.

A confluence of events has presented the Russian Federation and the United States with an unusual opportunity to transform their relationship.

The unfortunate reality is that trust is at an exceedingly low level between the elites and publics of both nations. Building that trust requires a leap of faith that they can work together on the most difficult issues. The determination to drive such trust-building on a vexing issue was behind the decision of senior Americans and Russians brought together by the EastWest Institute in 2007 to explore if collaboration was possible on the issue of Iran's ballistic missile and nuclear program. Following a tough yet civil private debate in Moscow, the participants - including on the American side General (ret.) James L. Jones, Ambassador Henry Crumpton, and General (ret.) Lance Lord, and a senior Russian delegation led by Presidential Representative Ambassador Anatoly Safonov - agreed that EWI should convene leading scientists from both states to take up the Iran issue and make it the subject of the fi rst JTA - Joint Threat Assessment. It would be an attempt to see if the top scientists and experts of the two states could agree on the nature of the threat posed by Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile program. Our debate in Moscow demonstrated that there was no easy agreement on Iran's intentions. A great cloud of ‘smoke' hung over the policy communities of both nations - a mixing of emotions and unsubstantiated reports with facts and policies. There was no dialogue. Instead the issue generated independent monologues fraught with suspicion and distrust. The decision to move forward with a JTA was a risky one. There was no assurance that it could be done.

Indeed, most outside experts told us that the task was impossible. Relations between Russia and the United States had deteriorated to a nadir not seen in decades. Among the major causes for the severe decline were the rushed ballistic missile defense agreements between the United States and Poland and between the United States and the Czech Republic to deploy assets in these European countries to counter a potential Iranian nuclear and missile threat. The United States government viewed this as a defensive move. Was Iran developing a capacity to hit Europe? How long would it take? The Russian government countered that the ballistic missile defense deployment near its borders was surely directed against Russia - an offensive move. Russian leaders and experts dismissed the idea that Iran currently possessed an offensive ballistic missile program capable of striking Europe. The sixteen Americans and Russians who sat around that Track 2 table back in 2007 in Moscow could have stopped at that impasse - but they did not. They agreed that the heart of the issue did not start with either the United States or with Russia but rather with the need to decipher the threat - what were Iran's technical capabilities? Could the two sides analyze and come to an agreement on the nature of the threat through a joint threat assessment?

Russia and the United States have been in dispute over the timeframe involved for Iran to acquire nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, on the means needed to prevent that from happening, and - in the worst case that it cannot be prevented - the military operational responses available to both sides to defend against Iran's potential use of nuclear armed missiles. It was agreed that only after capabilities are ascertained can productive political conversations about motives and policy responses follow. Therein lay the mandate for the two teams of scientists, who worked independently and in a series of joint meetings that more often than not lasted well into the night.

Though the Iranian nuclear program has been the subject of detailed forensic public analyses, much less detailed attention has been paid, in public at least, to the Iranian missile program. Claims and counterclaims abound and defy easy understanding by the non-specialist. This report aims to fi ll that gap by providing a detailed examination of Iranian nuclear and missile capabilities. When might Iran be capable of deploying nuclear warheads? Assuming that Iran can develop that capability, would the proposed missile defenses be able intercept Iranian missiles? What are the possibilities of U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area? These are the vital questions that this report examines and makes its assessments.

Civil war is very common in the developing world, with harmful welfare effects when it occurs. Many fear that the devastation wrought by violent conflict destroys social capital, impedes economic development, and leads to the recurrence of violence (Paul Collier et al. 2003).

In response, donors are injecting large amounts of aid into post-conflict countries. A significant share of this assistance is spent on "community driven reconstruction" (CDR) programs, which support the establishment of new local institutions in order to promote social reconciliation. Whether this assistance has this effect is, however, largely unknown. Can brief, foreign-funded efforts to build local institutions in fact have positive effects on local patterns of cooperation? We address this question using a randomized field experiment to evaluate the impact of a CDR project in northern Liberia. The project was funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) and implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC).

Findings suggest that post-conflict development aid can have a measureable impact on social cohesion. In future work, we hope to use the survey data to uncover the mechanisms that account for this main finding.

Russia has the world’s largest stocks of weapon-usable fissile materials. Most of this material is a legacy of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the United States each created nuclear industries sized to produce tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. Significant quantities of weapon-grade material also are present on the civilian side of nuclear complex, in storage, or being transferred from one facility to another, or used for research and other purposes. Providing security for all this material will continue to be a major task for Russia for decades.

Introduction
The next decade will bring increased demands for improving the security and accountability of nuclear weapons and material, for reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles, and for strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. As states consider options for addressing these challenges they will need to consider how technology can help in the implementation of new approaches. Nuclear arms reduction treaties are likely to involve only the U.S. and Russia in the immediate future.

However, as nuclear stockpiles are reduced to low numbers, all states with nuclear weapons will likely be brought into the process. In the context of Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, states without nuclear weapons will require a high level of confidence that nuclear reductions are taking place. Therefore all states have a stake in understanding and developing options for verification and transparency.

In the 1990's there were significant efforts to develop technical approaches to the next generation of nuclear arms control. Many of these efforts involved collaboration between U.S. and Russian nuclear laboratories. In addition there have been numerous academic studies of monitoring nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. Although much work remains, these past accomplishments provide a strong basis for moving forward.

This workshop brought together a small group of technical experts from Russia, France, the United Kingdom and the United States to review past and ongoing work, to exchange information about technical approaches to verification of nuclear arms reductions, and to consider areas for international technical cooperation. Technical experts from China also planned to participate, but last-minute administrative difficulties prevented their attendance.

This Summary provides a flavor of the discussions during the workshop, including key observations and ideas for next steps. It does not follow the order of the workshop agenda, nor does it represent a consensus view of participants. More information about the workshop and copies of presentations are available.