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What can possibly explain the transformation that sometimes happens from non-violent civilian to combatant to criminal? Pulitzer Prize winning author and CISAC affiliate Richard Rhodes tackled this bedeviling question head-on in a recent lecture for Stanford's Ethics & War series, co-sponsored by the Center for International Security and Cooperation. Drawing heavily upon the work of Lonnie H. Athens, a Seton Hall University criminology professor, about whom Rhodes wrote a 1999 book entitled Why They Kill: The Discoveries of a Maverick Criminologist, Rhodes argued that all violent criminals go through a process that Athens called "violentization." The first stage, "brutalization," consists of witnessing abusive or violent behavior, often at a young age, and receiving encouragement to act in a similar way to resolve disputes. In the second stage, "belligerency," the individual takes stock of what has happened, examines his or her situation, and decides to begin to move to the third stage: using serious violence, if provoked, as a means of protection.

In Rhodes' view, this process is essentially identical to the training a military recruit undergoes. Both, he says, go through a period of re-socialization during which even lethal violence become acceptable, expected, and rewarded. Military recruits are "deliberately and systematically rebuked, scorned and punished for civilian behavior  and coached and rewarded for military behavior including the controlled use of violence," he observes. "Violent domination, personal horrification and violent coaching are fundamental to basic military training." There is, however, a fundamental difference. The violent criminal moves on to a fourth stage, "virulence," in which the individual becomes willing to commit serious violence without provocation and embraces the sense of confidence and power created by the successful completion of these acts. The soldier, by contrast, is constrained within the third stage of violentization by the rule of law, by ethics, by codes of honor, and "implicitly," says Rhodes, "support from military leaders up the chain of command," who "are expected to limit their demands of violent action to appropriately defensive campaigns."

Within these constraints, the limitations of violence are clear. Self-defense is justifiable, and by extension so is the killing of an enemy combatant. Even the strategic bombing during World War II (and presumably more recently) can be justified with such arguments, Rhodes argues, "although that logic grew increasingly thin as the bombing expanded from military targets to military industrial targets and finally to the homes and neighborhoods of enemy civilians."

What, then, to make of My Lai, in which American soldiers killed babies and children, the Einsatzgruppen, who shot hundreds of thousands of innocent Jews with horrific efficiency, or the heinous war crimes committed in conflicts around the world? In these cases, the perpetrators have found themselves moving into virulence. The constraints that circumscribed their violent actions have broken down. Authorities in the chain of command either overlooked or ignored the need to enforce the limitations required to prevent criminal violence. In the eyes of the perpetrators, and in some cases those making the direct orders, the enemy became an omnipotent and ubiquitous presence, and the power that came with committing lethal violence was overwhelming. The line between self-defense and murder became so attenuated that it was essentially meaningless. Virtually the only possible outcome: unrestrained lethal violence.

Rhodes argues that the need to understand this dynamic has become increasingly urgent. The nuclear deterrent has largely foreclosed the prospect of conventional war, and "modern combat has strained the traditional limitations of violence on war to the breaking point and beyond." Modern weapons make it possible to do more lethal violence than the old days of single-shot rifles and hand grenades, he says, and the line between combatants and civilians can become difficult to define.

The quandary now is how to ensure that the process of violentization among members of the military does not extend to the fourth category. Even Heinrich Himmler, commander of the Einsatzgruppen, understood this on some level. He was horrified, Rhodes says, that members of his elite fighting squad had become such enthusiastic killers that they would take it upon themselves to find and shoot Jews. Others, in other wartime situations, unable to deal with the consequences of their actions as they meandered toward that fourth stage, killed themselves, suffered serious psychological problems, or committed acts of violence back at home. Now we are seeing similar consequences among the men and women who are forced to draw distinctions every day between civilian and enemy combatants. Indeed, he says, only the ethical and legal limitations put on soldiers, and enforced by their superiors in the chain of command, can protect them from becoming malevolently violent. Failing to maintain these restrictions has dire consequences. As Rhodes and many others before him have said, "as we sow, so shall we reap."