International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Abstract: Many see China as a rival superpower to the U.S. and imagine the country’s rise to be a threat to U.S. leadership in Asia and beyond. Arguing against this zero-sum vision, The China Challenge describes a new paradigm in which the real challenge lies in dissuading China from regional aggression while encouraging the country to contribute to the global order. Christensen shows how nationalism and the threat of domestic instability influence the party’s decisions on issues like maritime sovereignty disputes, global financial management, control of the Internet, cliate change, and policies toward Taiwan and Hong Kong. China’s active cooperation is essential to global governance. If China obstructs international efforts to confront nuclear proliferation, civil conflicts, financial instability, and climate change, those efforts will falter, but even if China merely declines to support such efforts, the problems will grow vastly more complicated.  Given U.S.-China policy since the end of the Cold War, a balanced strategic approach that does not block China’s rise, but rather shapes its choices so as to deter regional aggression and encourage China’s active participation in international initiatives would be a benefit to both nations.

 

About the Speaker: Thomas J. Christensen is William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton University. From 2006-2008 he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus on China’s foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security. Before arriving at Princeton in 2003, he taught at Cornell University and MIT. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. Professor Christensen has served on the Board of Directors and the Executive Committee of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and as co-editor of the International History and Politics series at Princeton University Press. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Non-Resident Senior Scholar at the Brookings Institution. In 2002 he was presented with a Distinguished Public Service Award by the United States Department of State.

Thomas J. Christensen Professor of World Politics Speaker Princeton University
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Abstract: Iran under Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi undertook one of the most ambitious nuclear programs of any non-nuclear weapon state in the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the 1970s. Despite the Shah’s Cold War alliance with the United States, the emerging global nonproliferation order became a zone of contestation in U.S.-Iran relations. This paper is a condensed version of chapter two of this dissertation, covering U.S.-Iran nuclear cooperation agreements under the Nixon and Ford administrations, which explores the Shah's struggle to obtain Western nuclear technology, the ultimately unsuccessful U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, and the United States' efforts to use these negotiations to redefine the Nonproliferation Treaty. 

About the Speaker: Farzan Sabet is Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and holds a Swiss National Science Foundation Doctoral Mobility Fellowship for the 2015-2016 academic year. He is a doctoral candidate in international history at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, researching the Iranian nuclear program under Mohammad-Reza Shah Pahlavi and its evolving relationship with the global nonproliferation regime during the 1970s. His dissertation is based on multi-archival research in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada and combines diplomatic history with nonproliferation studies. He is affiliated with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP)

Farzan is also a co-founder and managing editor at IranPolitik.com, which focuses on key issues in Iranian foreign policy and domestic politics today. His work on Iranian politics has appeared in The Washington Post's "Monkey Cage" blog, The Atlantic, and War on the Rocks, among other outlets. 
Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow CISAC, Stanford University
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Abstract: Numerous polls show that U.S. public approval of Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has declined significantly since 1945. Scholars and pundits have suggested that this is a sign of the emergence of a “nuclear taboo.”  Such polls, however, do not force respondents to contemplate the tradeoff the U.S. government believed it faced in 1945: choosing between the use of nuclear weapons and a ground invasion of Japan to end the Pacific War. This paper reports on survey experiments recreating that kind of a tradeoff in a hypothetical war with Iran. In order to avoid a ground assault on Tehran that was predicted to kill 20,000 American soldiers, 60% of the U.S. public approved of an atomic attack on an Iranian city that would kill 100,000 civilians and 60% approved of an atomic attack that would kill 2,000,000 civilians. Sixty-seven percent preferred a conventional bombing attack that was estimated to kill 100,000 Iranian civilians. Moreover, the prospect of killing more noncombatants appeared to trigger beliefs in retribution and complicity, as a way of justifying the decisions. Our findings suggest that U.S. public support for the principle of noncombatant immunity is shallow. 

About the Speaker: Scott D. Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, the Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education, and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. He also serves as Project Chair for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Initiative on New Dilemmas in Ethics, Technology, and War and as Senior Advisor for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Global Nuclear Future Initiative. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University. From 1984 to 1985, he served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. Sagan has also served as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Sandia National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000) with Peter R. Lavoy and James L. Wirtz; the editor of Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford University Press, 2009); and co-editor of a two-volume special issue of Daedalus, On the Global Nuclear Future (Fall 2009 and Winter 2010), with Steven E. Miller. Sagan’s recent publications include “A Call for Global Nuclear Disarmament” in Nature (July 2012); “Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons” with Daryl G. Press and Benjamin A. Valentino in the American Political Science Review (February 2013); and, with Matthew Bunn, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences occasional paper, “A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past Mistakes” (2014).

Sagan was the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015 and the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award in 2013. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009. 

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The Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
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Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of DaedalusEthics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).

In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.     

Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Abstract: From the Trent Affair of 1861, to Yasser Arafat’s speech at the United Nations in 1974, to Syrian opposition lobbying today, acts of insurgent diplomacy have defined some of the most memorable and important events in international politics. International diplomacy is a ubiquitous feature of insurgent politics because it is intrinsically linked to how groups pursue third-party political and military support. However, although war-time diplomacy is central to insurgent politics, scholars still cannot explain the substantial and puzzling variation in insurgent diplomatic strategies over time. The fact is that rebel groups can choose to engage with different types of actors, solicit different types of assistance, and have a diverse set of political-military objectives motivating their diplomatic strategies abroad. This article examines the varying grand strategies of insurgent diplomacy, and more specifically, when and why rebel groups focus their diplomatic attention on certain international actors over others. This framework is then applied to the international diplomacy of the Iraqi Kurdish liberation movement from 1958 to 1990.

 

About the Speaker: Morgan L. Kaplan is a CISAC Predoctoral Fellow for 2015-2016. He is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago.

Kaplan’s dissertation examines the strategic use of international diplomacy by insurgent groups to solicit help from third-party actors. The primary empirical focus of his research is on the Iraqi Kurdish and Palestinian national movements from the 1960s to 1990s. In addition to his work on insurgent diplomacy, he also studies the politics of intra-insurgent competition and cooperation in multi-party civil wars.

His research has been supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Project on Middle East Political Science, and the Nicholson Center for British Studies, among others. He has conducted field work in Iraqi Kurdistan, Israel/Palestine, Jordan, and the United Kingdom. He holds a B.A. in International Affairs from the George Washington University, and an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. 

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In the wake of the recent historic meeting of the leaders of China and Taiwan, the Stanford News Service asked two of the university's Asia experts about the aftermath of that meeting and its possible effects on political relations between the two countries, the military situation and Taiwan's Jan. 16 presidential and parliamentary elections.

The first presidential meeting between the leaders of the communist mainland and the democratic island, split by civil war in 1949, was held in early November on neutral territory in Singapore.

Kharis Templeman is the Taiwan Democracy program manager at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He recently wrote about why Taiwan's defense spending has fallen as China's has risen. Thomas Fingar is a distinguished fellow at Stanford's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He served as the chairman of the National Intelligence Council and in other key positions in Washington. 

Do you anticipate any lasting effects from the face-to-face meeting of Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou?

Thomas Fingar: At a minimum, the meeting appears intended by both sides to validate and lock in the much-improved cross-Taiwan Strait relationship that has evolved over the past several years.

Kharis Templeman: I do think the Ma-Xi meeting itself will have one lasting legacy: it has created a precedent for treating the directly elected president of the Republic of China as an equal and as the rightful representative of Taiwanese interests in cross-strait relations. From now on, leaders in Beijing are going to have a hard time arguing that a non-KMT (the Kuomintang, Taiwan's governing party,) president is illegitimate, as they did during the [former Taiwanese president] Chen Shui-Bian era, or to continue to insist on referring to Taiwan’s leaders as provincial-level officials. So, the next president will come into office somewhat strengthened by that precedent.   

Will the meeting have any effect on the January elections in Taiwan?

Templeman: I don’t think it will make much, if any, difference. Taiwanese public opinion is deeply divided about Ma Ying-Jeou’s meeting with Xi. Ma himself remains quite unpopular, the economy is barely growing, and the KMT presidential candidate remains at least 20 points behind in the polls. There’s little indication that this meeting has shaken up what has been a large and steady lead for DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) presidential candidate Tsai Ing-Wen, and I would be shocked if she didn’t win a comfortable victory in January.

Fingar: Probably not. Beijing seems to have learned that its past attempts to influence elections on Taiwan have been ineffectual or counterproductive, and the meeting is unlikely to change minds or votes on the island. 

How might the elections affect military spending on either sides, or China's aggressive island-building for military bases?

Fingar: The meeting will not have any effect on military spending or the building of artificial islands in the South China Sea, but Beijing may have hoped that agreeing to meet with Ma to demonstrate how "good" the relationship is might persuade Washington not to approve another round of arms sales to Taiwan.  Regardless of who wins the election on Taiwan, the next administration is likely to seek another round of U.S. arms sales in order to prove that it has the support of the United States.

Templeman: The meeting will have no impact on the security balance in the region. Ma reportedly raised the issue of PRC (People's Republic of China) missiles within easy range of Taiwan, but Xi claimed, implausibly, that they were not targeted at Taiwan, and that was the end of it. The broader trends are unchanged: the PRC’s military budget is growing annually by double-digit rates while Taiwan’s remains essentially flat. The consequence is that the PRC’s capacity to take coercive measures against Taiwan continues to expand, even as cross-strait cooperation has been improved and institutionalized.

Dan Stober is at the Stanford News Service.

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Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Singapore on Nov. 7, 2015.
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U.S. Senator John McCain told a select group of Stanford undergraduate students that technological innovation had created both unparalleled opportunities for the United States as well as new national security risks, during a visit to Silicon Valley this week.

“This has changed the world,” Senator McCain told the students as he held up his smart phone.

“This is the biggest change in our ability to inform and educate than any invention since the printing press.”

However, McCain told students that he believed the United States needed to develop a clearer policy for responding to cyber attacks from foreign nations.

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“You’ve got to accept a fundamental premise, that cyber attacks are an act of war…but that doesn’t mean you’re going to war in a conventional fashion,” he said.

“The people who are doing these cyber attacks have to realize that the costs will be higher than the benefits of the attack. Everybody has to know that there will be a price to pay for it.”

McCain called on the students, who included several computer science majors, to step up and defend the United States in cyber space.

“I would call on the people here to help us develop defensive capabilities, and frankly, offensive capabilities,” McCain said.

In the wide-ranging conversation, McCain fielded questions from students and shared his views on the conflict in Syria, the Iran nuclear deal, Russia’s imperial ambitions and the pullout of U.S. troops from Afghanistan.

“I study international security, and I feel that his dedication to national security and to veterans have been fundamental, and it was an honor to meet him and hear him talk about these issues,” said Chelsea Green.

The forty students who met with McCain were selected for their special interest in international affairs and politics, and included representatives from the Center for International Security and Cooperation’s honors program, Hoover Institution National Security Mentees and Stanford in Government student group.

International relations major Kayla Bonstrom said she was excited to meet the Senator from her home state of Arizona.

“He was very easy to talk to,” she said.

Bonstrom said McCain’s casual style, which included the occasional joke, helped put the students at ease.

“It was nice to see him in a different setting.”

Mathematical and computation science major Varun Gupta said he was touched by the empathy McCain showed when he shared his experiences visiting refugee camps in war zones.

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“It was really great to see the more human side.”

Other students were also impressed by McCain’s sincerity.

“He seems to sincerely believe in all of his views,” said Alexa Andaya, a political science major.

“You can tell when he says something he’s genuine about it.”

Matt Nussbaum, another political science major, said that while he disagreed with many of McCain’s hawkish positions on national security, he welcomed the opportunity to hear the opinions of such a seasoned veteran of foreign policy.

“A lot of times, we’re looking at the academic side of things, and I think that’s very interesting, but Senator McCain and other policy makers use the theory to create policy, so it’s useful to see what they think, how they think and why they think that way,” Nussbaum said.

McCain ended his talk by urging the students to get more involved in politics, whether they were “Democrat or Republican, libertarian or vegetarian.”

He told them that he believed the next presidential election was going to be the most important decision point for the country since 1980, when Republican Ronald Regan defeated Democratic incumbent Jimmy Carter.

“Pick the cause that you want to support, pick the candidate you want to support, and be engaged,” he said.

“It’s your future. You’re the ones that are going to live with the person that you choose to be president of the United States.”

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The article examines the impact of the summit between President Obama and President Xi on future cybersecurity relations between the two countries, and the changing nature of cyber cooperation and confrontation.

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Herbert Lin
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Abstract: The nuclear negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran moved the International Atomic Energy Agency to the center of public attention. Based on multi-archival research and oral history interviews, this talk will look into the early history of the IAEA’s nuclear inspectorate. The foundations of today’s safeguards system were laid in the mid-1950s, when a group of twelve nations negotiated the Statute of the IAEA. In the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union abandoned its formerly critical stance on nuclear safeguards. Following the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) comprehensive safeguards were introduced. The control of diversion was at the heart of the IAEA’s early safeguards system, while it neglected other aspects of the proliferation problem, such as the distribution of dual-use technology and related knowledge, or the development of clandestine nuclear programs. It was not lack of knowledge or imagination, but the complex technical, political, and legal background that was the reason for this limitation.

About the Speaker: Elisabeth Roehrlich is a senior researcher and project director at the University of Vienna’s Department of Contemporary History, and a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington D.C. She received her PhD. in History from the University of Tuebingen, Germany, and held fellowships at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, the German Historical Institute in Washington D.C., and Monash South Africa. Her research focuses on the history of international relations and the evolution of the global nuclear order. She is the author of a prize-winning book about the former Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky (Kreisky’s Außenpolitik, Vienna University Press, 2009), and her work on the IAEA has been published or is forthcoming in journals such the IAEA Bulletin and the Journal of Cold War Studies. Roehrlich has been awarded funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), and the Austrian Central Bank to support her research on the IAEA.

The International Atomic Energy Agency and Nuclear Safeguards, 1953-1971
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Elisabeth Roehrlich Director IAEA History Research Project, University of Vienna
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Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in the United States last week for his first state visit. Maintaining a busy schedule, Xi met with President Obama at the White House, technology leaders in Seattle and the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

In Washington, Xi and Obama agreed to create a common vision toward a climate agreement at the Paris summit ‘COP21’ later this year and further establish shared norms in the area of cyberspace, according to a report from the White House.

Two Stanford scholars offer their analysis of Xi’s visit in a Q&A. Thomas Fingar discusses outcomes from the Chinese leader’s summit with Obama. Recently returning from Beijing, Karl Eikenberry offers his views on the media and reactions that occurred in China during the week preceding Xi’s visit.


Q&A: Thomas Fingar

Thomas Fingar is a China expert and a distinguished fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is a former deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and previously served as the director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific in the U.S. Department of State.


Coming out of the meeting, where do China and the United States stand on climate change?

China and the United States have declared a willingness to work together on climate change, further than in the past. At their meeting, Xi and Obama agreed to build upon agreements announced last November that proclaim a common vision for the upcoming Paris meeting on climate change. Taken together, these statements mark a dramatic reversal of the antagonism between China and the United States at the 2009 talks in Copenhagen. It sends a strong signal that China and the United States are prepared to cooperate.

Moreover, other countries should no longer fear that their own efforts will be negated by disagreement between the two largest producers of greenhouse gases. They can no longer excuse their own inaction by claims that any potential international agreement on climate change would be vetoed by either China or the United States. The message is — it’s time to get serious.

Was there any progress on cybersecurity issues?

Obama and Xi committed to mitigate malicious cyber activity from their national territory and to refrain from targeting critical infrastructure in peacetime. The former is more significant than the latter. But of course the proof of significance will be how—and how quickly—it is implemented.

However, what is worth noting is the restraint on cyber targeting of infrastructure declared by the United States and China. The two leaders agreed to bring that arena within the purview of the United Nations. It’s a step toward the establishment of an international control regime for cyberspace. Such a regime is badly needed and would be a concrete example of how the two countries can work bilaterally, and multilaterally, to update the global order and address 21st century challenges.

Would you say Xi's trip was a success?

We won’t know how important any of the agreements from Xi’s visit are until we see how they are implemented. Rather than carp about the failure to adopt detailed and binding commitments, however, we should recognize and applaud the fact that the state of U.S.-China relations is less fraught and more future-focused than pessimists maintain.

This is an excerpt of a larger piece written by Thomas Fingar.


Q&A: Karl Eikenberry

Karl Eikenberry is the director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative and a distinguished fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Eikenberry is a former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and, among other positions, served as defense attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing.


How do the Chinese view Xi’s visit?

Chinese state media coverage was intense – far greater than had appeared in the United States Every detail of Xi’s itinerary and exhaustive analyses of the issues likely to be discussed between the two presidents dominated the news. Interestingly, the state media reporting tended to emphasize the hosting arrangements, supportive of President Xi’s desire to place China within the Asia-Pacific Region and globally on an equal footing with the United States.

Whereas U.S. Government leaders hope for specific security and economic agreements – so-called “deliverables” – with China during this visit, Xi and his team place more of a premium on being accorded respect. The Chinese media is an arm of the communist party, and reinforces the party’s goals in its reporting of major issues.

How important do Chinese leaders and the people consider the visit?

I was asked during an interview with Chinese television if this visit was as significant as that of Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the United States in 1979. That event had great historical meaning as it signaled Deng’s commitment to “open up” China after decades of relative isolation. President Xi’s visit can’t be compared with Deng’s in a historical sense. And yet, China has come along way since 1979.

When Deng visited the United States, China was a poor country. Now China is approaching middle-income country status and its GDP is the second largest in the world. President Xi was feted in Seattle this week by the captains of America’s IT industry and accompanied by China’s own IT captains. I expect Deng never could have imagined such a development even in his most optimistic moments.

China’s rapid growth over the past 35 years has been enabled by that country’s integration into the global economic and financial markets, and by an extended period of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States, in turn, has played a decisive role in ensuring these favorable conditions have existed.

Almost everyone I met during my recent Beijing trip expressed concern that Sino-American relations are becoming more punctuated by disputes, such as over maritime and cyber issues. China’s leaders and its people recognize that their country faces a daunting array of political, economic, and security problems that will be difficult to solve if world trade and stability in the Asia-Pacific region are disrupted, likely developments if the United States and China should ever enter into a period of confrontation. So I think that most Chinese are hoping that President Xi’s visit can help put U.S.-China relations on a more positive trajectory.

How would you critique Chinese media coverage of Xi’s visit?

I would give it mixed reviews. In terms of thoroughness, I give it good marks. Frankly, the average Chinese citizen – at least in urban areas – knows far more about this event than the average American citizen. On the other hand, China state media has a strong tendency to downplay America’s concerns about China’s policies – this is worrisome.

For example, I watched China Central Television (CCTV)’s coverage of National Security Advisor Susan Rice’s Sept. 21 speech on U.S.-China relations. The report showed all of the positive parts of Rice’s speech, but very few of her criticisms. This leads the Chinese people to have unrealistic expectations about Sino-American relations, and worse, to entirely blame the United States when inevitable setbacks occur.

There is also a bit of irony worth mentioning. President Xi agreed to provide answers to questions submitted by The Wall Street Journal. The questions were published in that newspaper on the eve of Xi’s trip. The next morning, I was watching CCTV and listened as a presenter read Xi’s answers verbatim. But I was perplexed, because I thought The Wall Street Journal’s website, like several other western publications, was blocked due to its tendency to occasionally restrict print news that the communist party deems unfit to print. I tried to connect online to The Wall Street Journal and quickly discovered the site was indeed blocked. CCTV, apparently, had not gotten the word.  

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China's President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Barack Obama arrive for a joint news conference at the White House on Sept. 25, 2015.
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Abstract: Do states plan their grand strategies, or does grand strategy emerge in an ad hoc fashion as individual foreign policy decisions accumulate over time? The existing literature rests on the assumption, which has yet to be examined empirically, that grand strategies form according to an emergence model of grand strategy formation. This project tests that assumption by developing an original planning model and testing it on a “least-likely” case: the U.S. response to China’s rise after 9/11. This is a period in which the planning capacity of the Executive was severely taxed by the simultaneous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. If, during that time, the U.S. formulated and enacted a long-term, integrated, and holistic (“grand”) plan in response to China’s rise, significant doubt would be cast on the assumed emergence model. Contrary to the expectations of the emergence model, this research finds that the U.S. developed a long-term military-diplomatic strategy in response to China’s rise, and that this strategy was substantially enacted as planned. This finding suggests that long-term plans govern U.S. behavior far more than is assumed in the scholarly literature. It also challenges the common belief among policy commentators that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq distracted the U.S. from attending to China’s rise. The findings of this research were not, however, wholly positive. Foreign economic policy and nuclear strategy were not fully integrated with the military-diplomatic strategy, indicating the existence of some serious stove-pipes in U.S. planning processes.

About the Speaker: Dr. Nina Silove is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. Her research focuses on grand strategy, strategic planning, and U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. She holds a DPhil (PhD) in International Relations from the University of Oxford and a degree in law with first class honors from the University of Technology, Sydney, where she also received the Alumni Association Achievement Award for Contribution to the University. Previously, Dr. Silove was a Research Fellow in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, a visiting Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney, and the Tutor for International Politics in Diplomatic Studies at the University of Oxford.

 

Stanton Nuclear Security and Social Science Postdoctoral Fellow CISAC
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