When David Relman learned in April that he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, he was humbled – and a bit surprised. 

Relman is a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor and a professor of medicine and of microbiology & immunology. AAA&S honors exceptional scholars, leaders, artists, and innovators engaged in advancing the public good. 

When he received notification, Relman went to the organization’s web site to check on the discipline area and specialty with which he was affiliated. 

“I looked at the areas and specialties that pertained to my background and expertise (medical sciences, microbiology and immunology, other aspects of the biological sciences), but I could not find my name,” he said. “I thought that maybe the notification was in error.” Then he looked more closely at AAA&S’s letter, and found that his nominators had proposed the “public affairs and public policy section.” 

Arguably that distinction truly reflects Relman’s wide-ranging and serious policy impact in biosecurity, as well as his groundbreaking career work on the nature of the human indigenous microbiota (microbiome). AAA&S’ section of 220 policy luminaries includes former President Barack Obama, former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Indeed, Relman’s extensive knowledge in microbiology and immunology has played key roles on several critical U.S. and international policy fronts – most recently, the pandemic. 

 Boundless curiosity 

“When you consider the history of the academy and its origins in 1780 during the American Revolution by John Adams and John Hancock, it’s really quite awe-inspiring. You’re joining those who follow in that history,” said Relman, who received an S.B. (Biology) from MIT, M.D. from Harvard Medical School, and joined the faculty at Stanford in 1994. 

Relman’s scholarship is characterized by boundless curiosity – he asks the deeper questions about the pandemic, about human-microbial relationships – both beneficial and harmful, and what they portend for humanity and the future of life on Earth. With grace and diligence, he’s explored the assembly, diversity, stability, and resilience of human microbial communities, while collaborating with other scholars and policy makers on issues paramount to humanity. 

“When I step back and think about the pandemic, it’s clear that it is about much more than just the virus, but also about the social, political, and environmental factors that contribute to the emergence and impact of such pathogens,” said Relman, currently director of a Biosecurity and Global Health initiative at FSI. 

Why do pandemics and more localized outbreaks arise, and how do they uniquely manifest themselves, he ponders. 

“What are the factors that underlie these events, and can we anticipate them better? We much consider three categories of factors: One, is the microbes themselves – and microbes evolve and find ways to do new things. The second category is the hosts – humans, plants, and animals. And humans are undertaking new activities as individuals and as populations that tend to make us more vulnerable, such as immune suppressing ourselves to treat cancer and autoimmune disorders and crowding ourselves into megacities. The third is environmental, and that relates to climate change, and our changing use of land, such as deforestation, intrusion into previously isolated habitats, and other factors,” Relman said. 

Intrusion into new habitats, making contact with animal hosts such as bats that harbor potential disease-causing microbes and viruses, and then bringing these potential pathogens into a lab where we manipulate and alter these agents can lead to human error and accidents, not without grave consequence. “The choices we make in an effort to understand the world around us all come with risk,” he said. 

As far as the microbes and viruses go, “transmissibility is the key,” Relman said. The COVID pandemic reinforced this view for him. 

“When you see what happens when a virus can travel around the globe so quickly, transmissibility has to be viewed as the critical attribute. Viruses evolve and can outrun anything that we might throw in their way, even when we’re already prepared. So, we have to be agile, quick, and shrewd, and we desperately need a far better public health system across the globe that can respond and implement needed measures much more quickly.” 

It’s not just drugs and vaccines and science when it comes to tackling a pandemic. “It’s the social factors, the political factors, and the willingness of humans to work together, and trust, respect and believing in each other. We’ve learned the hard way that this is a tall order. Sometimes we really don’t work together very well,” he said. 

Long-view perspectives 

Relman quotes Joshua Lederberg, a Nobel Prize-winning geneticist and Stanford professor on this age-old war between humanity and viruses: 

“The future of humanity and microbes likely will unfold as episodes of a suspense thriller that could be titled, ‘Our Wits Versus Their Genes,’” Lederberg wrote in an essay, “Infectious History,” in 2000. 

That perspective inspires Relman, who considers this suspense thriller with open eyes and an open mind – digging deeply into complex scientific challenges while understanding long-view perspectives. 

“If you step back in time and consider the history of this planet,” he said, “realize the Earth is about 4.6 billion years old. The earliest life forms we know of were microscopic organisms (microbes) that left signs of their presence in rocks at least 3.7 billion years ago. They have had literally billions of years to diversify, adapt, and secure niches – including on and in animals.” 

On the other hand, modern humans (homo sapiens) have been around for only 200,000 years. “So, we’ve basically been here for the last 3 or 4 seconds of a 24-hour period that started with the formation of Earth. Compare this to microbial life, which has been here for more than 19 hours of this 24-hour period, and will be continue to persist and evolve on this planet for far longer than humanity,” Relman said. 

Relman contemplates and studies the intricacies of the human-microbe relationship, and delves into the issue of how do “favorable” relationships become established, whose interests do they serve, and how can they be supported or restored? 

“This is fundamental to my laboratory work. And why do those relationships sometimes go off the rails? What causes an unusual turn of events such as pandemics? And in what ways and for what reasons do humans mess with these storylines and relationships with these microbes? Those are the puzzles and mysteries that intrigue me,” he said. 

Health equity is a major concern for Relman. Pandemics and public health crises invariably result in harsher consequences for underserved populations than more privileged ones. Many of these communities lack ready access to vaccines, treatments and safeguards, and suffer more disproportionate economic and social turmoil. This is true regardless of how a pandemic arises, including and especially those that might arise because of irresponsible or deliberately malevolent human activities. 

“Subsequent generations are going to be looking at how we’ve handled this pandemic across society, especially for the underserved,” Relman said. “We need to, and can do, much better on this front.” 

Relman was a long-time volunteer for the Rock Medicine program organized by the Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, a free health care service provider serving more than 34,000 people who need access to quality medical care. He served as the chief medical officer for the program for more than a decade. In the 1990s he was featured on MTV for his work providing free medical care at concerts through the program. “Don’t get me started on the dangers of mosh pits,” he once said. 

Scientific truth-telling 

A pioneer in his field, Relman’s research paper on bacillary angiomatosis and a method for the discovery of new pathogens was selected as “one of the 50 most important publications of the 

past century” by the American Society for Microbiology. In other research, ecological theory and predictions are tested in clinical studies with multiple approaches for characterizing the human microbiome. His work has led to the development of molecular methods for identifying novel microbial pathogens, and the subsequent identification of several historically important microbial disease agents. He was one of the first to characterize microbial diversity in the human body using modern molecular methods. Relman is also the Chief of Infectious Diseases at the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System in Palo Alto, California, and served as science co-director at CISAC from 2013-2017. 

During the pandemic, scientific knowledge has been expressed in many ways – but political polarization in the U.S. has sometimes worked against crafting sound policy. 

Relman said, “All good scientists know what they’re good at. You need to be very mindful about what you know and what you don’t know. While people are pretty quick to say what they know, they’re not terribly quick to admit what they don’t know. This goes to the issue of ‘lanes’ and the roles of scientists in policy formulation.” 

Many scientists, he added, may think that scientific information alone determines the ultimate public policy. “But it’s only a piece of it. Lots of other factors go into policy, such as social, cultural, political, and economic considerations,” he said. 

National security policy 

Relman served as vice-chair of the National Academy of Sciences Committee that reviewed the science performed as part of the FBI investigation of the 2001 “Anthrax Letters.” He’s also been a member of the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity, and was president of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. He is currently a member of the Intelligence Community Studies Board and the Committee on Emerging Infectious Diseases and 21st Century Health Threats, both at the National Academies of Science, as well as the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and the Defense Science Board at the Pentagon. He received an NIH Pioneer Award, an NIH Transformative Research Award, and was elected a member of the National Academy of Medicine in 2011. 

He also chaired and led the work on the National Academies of Science 2020 report on “Havana syndrome,” cases of unexplained health disorders – aka, “anomalous health incidents” – among U.S. government personnel and their families at overseas embassies. Their findings pointed to a “plausible role of directed, pulsed radiofrequency energy,” though “no hypothesis has been proven, and the circumstances remain unclear.” 

Relman said, “I think that we’re going to be facing challenges like this one, that is, complex poorly-explained health problems at the interface of emerging science and national security, more frequently, and that’s what I’ve told our national leadership.” In the report, the scientists wrote, “We as a nation need to address these specific cases as well as the possibility of future cases with a concerted, coordinated, and comprehensive approach.” 

Megan Palmer, the executive director of the Bio Policy & Leadership Initiatives and Relman’s longtime colleague, said, “David is an exceptional scientist, mentor, colleague and friend. He is deeply thoughtful, especially about the role of science and scientists in society, and he is committed to work with integrity for the service of others. He is compelled to tackle the most difficult problems with great care, and he inspires others to follow suit. I am so grateful for his mentorship; he believes in and brings out the best in people.” 

How has Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine upended the world nuclear order? 

Longtime Carnegie Corporation of New York grantee Siegfried Hecker, one of the world’s foremost nuclear security and policy experts, offers his perspective on how Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is as momentous for nuclear affairs as the dissolution of the Soviet Union in a recent interview with John Mecklin, editor-in-chief of Corporation grantee the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Read the rest at Carnegie Corporation of New York

North Korean officials, including Kim Jong Un, have made several statements in recent months that begin to bring clarity to the country’s evolving nuclear doctrine. Within those statements, there has been a notable emphasis on the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (or, North Korea’s) larger nuclear strategy and the potential for early nuclear use should conflict break out on the Korean Peninsula.

38 North Director Jenny Town recently met with Dr. Siegfried Hecker, Senior Fellow (emeritus) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, to discuss these developments and what they could mean for future North Korean nuclear activities, and potential new security challenges.

Read the rest at 38 North

Eight years ago, I traveled as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security to the Marshall Islands, a remote place in the central Pacific. I was there to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Castle Bravo, the largest and most catastrophic of the 67 nuclear weapons tests that the United States conducted in the Marshalls during the Cold War. Because of a design error that led to a larger-than-expected blast, radioactive fallout from the test—at Bikini Atoll, which had been evacuated—spread over more than 4,000 square miles of the Pacific Ocean and contaminated nearby populated atolls.

Read the rest at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Three months after Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine began, the Russians have failed to achieve their objectives. U.S. officials now expect a war of attrition, with neither side capable of a decisive military breakthrough. How the war will conclude remains unclear.

A FAILING INVASION

On February 24, Russian forces invaded Ukraine from the north, including from Belarus, from the south out of Crimea, and from the east. The multiple axes of attack suggested that the Russian military aimed to quickly capture the capital of Kyiv, depose the democratically-elected government, and occupy perhaps as much as the eastern two-thirds of Ukraine.

The Russians failed. Their forces reached the outskirts of Kyiv but retreated at the end of March. The Russian army’s thrust toward Odesa bogged down around Mykolaiv after three weeks. In May, Russian forces attacking Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city and located just 25 miles from the Russian border, were pushed back, having entered only the city’s outskirts.

The Russian military finally secured control over Mariupol in mid-May, when the last Ukrainian forces surrendered after a valiant resistance. Weeks of indiscriminate Russian shelling and bombing have left Mariupol, a predominately Russian-speaking city where almost half of population was ethnic Russian, absolutely devastated.

Following their retreat from Kyiv and northern Ukraine, Russian forces have concentrated on the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. After six weeks, they have made some progress but at considerable cost against determined Ukrainian defenses.

Military analysts ponder whether the Russian army will soon become a spent force — exhausted by heavy casualties, high equipment losses, poor morale, and weak logistics, and incapable of mounting another major offensive operation. The Kremlin’s decision not to declare a full mobilization makes it difficult for the Russian military to replace combat losses. U.S. officials see Russian President Vladimir Putin stubbornly digging in, discern no negotiating path in the near term, and expect a war of attrition, with the sides slugging it out but neither able to score a convincing victory.

LOOKING FORWARD

Ukraine appears to have already won in one sense: virtually no one believes the Russian military capable of taking Kyiv and occupying one-half to two-thirds of the country. Ukrainians are returning to the capital, and life there has begun to take on an air of normalcy. However the war concludes, an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state will remain on the map of Europe.

Beyond that, things become more difficult to predict. The Kremlin has now focused on taking full control of the Donbas, a substantially downsized goal from its original invasion aims. Moscow may have to further reduce its Donbas objective to full control of Luhansk oblast but not all of Donetsk oblast. Russian forces in southern Ukraine have begun preparing defensive positions.

Ukrainian forces, bolstered by a growing flow of weapons from the West, have carried out successful counterattacks as well as conducting a stout mobile defense. However, transition from defense to a full-scale counteroffensive aimed at driving the Russians out of the territory they have occupied since February 24 would pose a tough challenge. In that case, some of the advantages that favor the defense would accrue to the Russian military.

A military stalemate that could perhaps drag on for many months more thus appears the most likely scenario.

A REAL NEGOTIATION?

A negotiated settlement offers one path to end a war. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appeared ready for compromise on key questions in March, for example, offering to set aside Kyiv’s ambitions of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and accept neutrality. But his Russian counterpart did not take up the possibility to secure a neutral Ukraine and perhaps other gains.

In retrospect, that may turn out to be a missed opportunity for Moscow. Ukrainian attitudes toward negotiation have hardened since March. That reflects growing confidence in the abilities of the Ukrainian military and outrage at Russian war crimes, such as the wanton destruction of Mariupol, and atrocities in places such as Bucha and Borodianka. Public anger almost certainly limits the freedom of maneuver that Zelenskyy might have in considering possible concessions.

While Kyiv in March offered a proposal that suggested a readiness to compromise on Crimea, illegally seized and annexed by Russia in March 2014, Ukrainian officials now insist on full restoration of Ukraine’s borders as of 1991. The West should support that position and reject the Kremlin’s attempt to redraw international borders by force of arms.

Whether Kyiv would sustain that position if the war drags on is unknown. Barring a total collapse of the Russian military (not to be excluded, but unlikely), it is difficult to see how Ukraine can muster the necessary leverage to regain Crimea. A senior Ukrainian official privately said in September 2014 that perhaps Kyiv should let the then-occupied part of Donbas go — “they don’t think like we do” — but he quickly added that no serious Ukrainian official could say that publicly and expect to survive. In a recent private discussion, a Ukrainian politician did not argue for giving up Crimea and Donbas but noted that regaining those territories would bring a liability: the return of three or four million pro-Russian voters, which would prove disruptive for Ukraine’s politics.

How Ukraine resolves this dilemma is a question for the Ukrainian government to decide. Zelenskyy has left the door open for diplomacy. If Moscow changes its approach and moves to a serious negotiation, Zelenskyy will have to weigh the balance of his desire to end the killing of Ukrainians, the imperative of protecting Kyiv’s positions of principle vs. the possible need for compromise, and the potential political blowback if Ukrainians believe a compromise concedes too much to Russia.

Only Zelenskyy and his government can weigh the trade-offs and make that delicate decision. The West should follow Kyiv’s lead in any negotiation, not pressing Ukraine to accept a settlement it does not want and not objecting to a settlement that Kyiv favors and believes meets Ukraine’s interests. Western countries will have to decide what to do about sanctions on Russia; some may wish to maintain sanctions even after a settlement, though the West should be sensitive to sanctions-easing if Kyiv says that is necessary to secure an otherwise acceptable deal.

Of course, this is an academic discussion as long as the Kremlin remains uninterested in serious negotiation.

A TRAGEDY AND A DISASTER

Ukraine did nothing to provoke or justify this war of choice, a choice made by Putin. It is a tragedy for the country, one that has resulted in the death of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians and enormous material damage to infrastructure, homes and apartments, and commercial and industrial facilities. (This could also become a tragedy for countries around the world that depend on Ukrainian food exports that are now blockaded.)

The war has also proven a disaster for Russia: tens of thousands of soldiers killed and wounded, major equipment losses, international isolation, sanctions that are inflicting real economic pain, and a galvanized, reinvigorated, rearming NATO that will soon welcome Finland and Sweden into its ranks. Moreover, NATO could well decide to make the presence of alliance forces on its eastern flank (e.g., in the Baltic states and Poland) permanent rather than rotating. Putin’s war will not succeed in bringing Ukraine closer to Moscow’s orbit; it is instead imbuing a hatred towards Russia in Ukraine that will take decades to overcome.

The war has a clear victim and a clear aggressor. It is in the West’s interest that the Kremlin fail in its attempt to subjugate Ukraine and deny Ukrainians the right to determine their own course. That means continuing to provide the Ukrainians the means to defend their country and drive back the invading Russian army. That also means ratcheting up sanctions to accelerate the havoc coming to the Russian economy due to Putin’s disastrous decisions.

In the end, the desired outcome to this war would see the Ukrainians forcing a Russian withdrawal or, at a minimum, getting Moscow to agree to a negotiated settlement on terms acceptable to Kyiv. Ensuring that Russia’s aggression fails and that Ukraine achieves one of these outcomes should be primary goals for the West.

Originally for Brookings Order from Chaos blog