This article analyses whether the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provides legal authority for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to gain more information and more intrusive inspections to assure that non-nuclear-weapons States (NNWS) have joined the NPT are not attempting to make nuclear weapons in violation of that Treaty.

Executive Summary

This paper considers the emerging structure of the international security system after the end of the Cold War. It describes the changes that have taken place in world politics with the end of the bipolar confrontation, and the new threats and challenges that face the international community in the post-Cold War era. It discusses the implications that this new international system has for European security and, in particular, for the security of one of the newly independent states-Ukraine. The role of international organizations, in particular the United Nations, in countering new threats to global security is examined, and a number of recommendations proposed for reforming the UN to meet these challenges more effectively.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact has left Central and Eastern Europe in a security vacuum. Regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), however important, are unlikely to fill this vacuum and become an effective security structure for the new Europe. The further expansion of NATO may well have an adverse effect on the domestic political process in Russia. As a temporary measure, a "neutral area" could be created for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the security of which could be guaranteed by NATO and Russia.

As for Ukraine, it finds itself at the crossroads of regional politics, with influential domestic groups of both pro-Western and pro-Russian orientation. Its membership in NATO in the near future is neither likely nor desirable, and may have a negative effect on European security. However, the security of Ukraine, and in particular its relationship with Russia, is a very important factor for European stability and for relations between Russia and the West.

In this new global situation, the UN could become an effective center for global security. To adequately perform this function, the organization needs profound reform. This reform could include three main stages: strengthening the UN's role as a forum of discussion, creating a center for diplomatic coordination and conflict prevention, and creating a mechanism for implementing the UN's decisions. In the distant future, the UN may assume responsibility for administering the nuclear weapons remaining after global nuclear disarmament.

Other steps in the reform process may require altering the UN Charter, including expanding the Security Council to 20-21 members, with new members such as Germany and Japan (among other new regional leaders) taking the permanent seats; and revising the right of veto of the permanent five and possibly replacing it with a consensus or a majority vote mechanism.

The UN peacekeeping operation is another domain that requires close examination and restructuring. The organization should be primarily concerned with conflict prevention. Peace enforcement operations should take place only by decision of the Security Council, and member states should provide more support, financial and other, and be encouraged to contribute troops.

In the area of economy and development, the UN should take the leading role through creation of a UN Development Council. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) could perform the role of a coordinating body for other international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization and the World Bank.

It is no exaggeration to say that arms control has undergone a revolution in the past decade. In the forty years since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended World War II and began the nuclear age, governments, organizations, and individuals have worked to reduce the threat of wars between great powers employing weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, chemical, and biological. Some progress was made during this period; the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 were the more notable achievements. But progress was always slow, frustrating, and tentative, with no assurance that the whole fabric might not be undone by an increase in superpower tension or by domestic forces in either the United States or USSR hostile to the very concept of arms control.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, global economic competition has come to play an increasingly important role in defining national security and the shape of the future world order. As international conflict shifts from military to economic competitiveness, many nations are now hoping to extract economic advantage from their investments in defense research and production. This volume brings together papers on several key aspects of defense commercialization and attempts to bridge the divide between research on conversion efforts in the United States and studies of transition in post-Communist economies.

This reader provides a well-rounded view of the conflicting debates and trends that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The authors have brought together Soviet documents and commentary as well as outstanding Western analyses dealing with developments in Soviet politics, economy, society, culture and foreign policy from 1985 through 1991.

This report addresses the question of deterring nuclear attacks by regional adversaries against the United States, U.S. forces overseas, or U.S. allies. Because emerging nuclear states will have small arsenals at first, regional nuclear threats will be made primarily for three political purposes, to: (1) deter the U.S. from intervening in a regional conflict, (2) intimidate U.S. regional allies; and/or (3) ensure the survival of their state or regime. Effective U.S. deterrent strategies vary depending on the purpose behind the nuclear threat. A U.S. strategy of "escalation dominance" should credibly deter nuclear threats against the U.S. homeland or U.S. forces overseas when the adversary's objective is to prevent U.S. intervention. A U.S. strategy of extended deterrence based on escalation dominance, backed up by theater defenses, should prevent U.S. regional allies from being intimidated by an adversary's nuclear threats. For the third threat, which is the most difficult to deter, U.S. strategy should shift away from retaliatory deterrence to highly effective damage limitation (i.e., counterforce capabilities backed up by effective defenses).