Work on ethnic and nationalist violence has emerged from two largely non-intersecting literatures: studies of ethnic conflict and studies of political violence. Only recently have the former begun to attend to the dynamics of violence and the latter to the dynamics of ethnicization. Since the emergent literature on ethnic violence is not structured by clearly defined theoretical oppositions, we organize our review by broad similarities of methodological approach: (a) Inductive work at various levels of aggregation seeks to identify the patterns, mechanisms, and recurrent processes implicated in ethnic violence. (b) Theory-driven work employs models of rational actions drawn from international relations theory, game theory, and general rational action theory. (c) Culturalist work highlights the discursive, symbolic and ritualistic aspects of ethnic violence. We conclude with a plea for the disaggregated analysis of the heterogenous phenomena we too caually lump together as "ethnic violence."

In the 1990s, global concern over illicit trafficking in nuclear material to terrorists and nation-states has intensified. Two major changes are responsible: the evident new intent of terrorists to wound or kill thousands of civilians and the availability of inadequately protected "loose" nuclear materials in Russia and the newly independent former Soviet republics. These changes have made more likely attempts to acquire weapons-usable nuclear materials for terrorist use or for sale to state sponsors of terrorism. As a result, many efforts are being made to strengthen national and international standards for protection of nuclear material from theft and sabotage. One problem with current efforts is that national stnadards now vary widely. Although the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) mandates that non-nuclear weapon parties accept the safeguards requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for their nuclear activities, the relevant international standards for physical protection are mostly advisory.

This paper examines how well future U.S. national and theater missile defense systems will have to perform to meet reasonable defense objectives as a function of the level of the threat. Deploying a thin U.S. national missile defense today is premature because the threat is not readily apparent, the United States can deter most threats, and the United States has some conventional counterforce options against a developing state's nascent ICBM arsenal.

However, if, or when, intercontinental ballistic missile threats appear, a defense with 100 interceptors deployed at one or two sites around the continental United States should be able to to intercept between 10 and 20 apparent warheads, assuming NMD systems can detect and track warheads with a probabilty above 0.99 and that NMD interceptors have a single-shot probability of kill (SSPK) against warheads between 0.35-0.65. Theater-range ballistic missiles present a greater near-term threat. The current THAAD program may provide an effective upper-tier defense, but only if it can achieve detection and tracking probabilities in the range 0.96-0.98 and interceptor SSPKs in the range 0.4-0.65 for threats with between 100-200 apparent warheads. Larger threats will require even higher technical performance.

Similarly, the current NTW program will require the same detection and tracking probability, but with interceptor SSPKs in the range of 0.55-0.80 to deal with the size of the threat.

Moreover, for these defenses to be truly useful, they must be accompanied by an equally effective lower tier, e.g., using PAC-3 terminal defenses. The main challenge for upper- and lower-tier defenses is responsive threats that use countermeasures such as decoys and chemical or biological submunitions. Airborne boost-phase theater missile defenses are relatively robust with respect to these countermeasures and they pose relatively little threat to the nuclear forces of the five major nuclear powers. Hence, more emphasis should be placed on such systems in current U.S. missile defense plans.

This report is a product of the Catastrophic Terrorism Study Group, a nine-month long collaboration of faculty from Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, and the University of Virginia. The Group involves experts on national security, terrorism, intelligence, law enforcement, constitutional law, technologies of catastrophic terrorism and defenses against them, and government organization and management.

The Group is co-chaired by Ashton B. Carter and John M. Deutch, and the project director is Philip D. Zelikow. Organized by the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project, the work of the Study Group is part of the Kennedy School of Government's "Visions of Governance for the Twenty-First Century" project, directed by Dean Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Elaine Kamarck.

While the danger of catastrophic terrorism is new and grave, there is much that the United States can do to prevent it and to mitigate its consequences if it occurs. The objective of the Catastrophic Terrorism Study Group is to suggest program and policy changes that can be taken by the U.S. government in the near term, including the reallocation of agency responsibilities, to prepare the nation better for the emerging threat of catastrophic terrorism.

Gail Lapidus of Stanford University assesses the factors leading to Moscow's decision in December 1994 to use military force to crush Chechnya's resistance to the authority of the Russian leadership. Exhaustively researched and documented, Lapidus's study traces the evolution of the secessionist struggle through six stages. At the heart of the conflict, she says, was the Chechens' growing desire for sovereignty and territorial integrity sparked by Mikhail Gorbachev's political liberalization initiatives and further fueled by the establishment of a number of new states after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Lapidus also considers the role of Western governments and international institutions first in preventing the outbreak of hostilities and then in mitigating and, finally, terminating the conflict. She concludes that when the behavior of a major power is at issue, the potential for outside intervention is limited, which in turn raises a host of troubling questions about the prospects for future internal conflict resolution.

The MacArthur Consortium workshop "Slaughter of the Innocents: Understanding Political Killing" focused on mobilization for large-scale killing and genocide. How does such violence become possible? Rather than concentrating on effect and prescription, participants devoted their attention to diagnosis and causal understanding. The workshop had three main areas of investigation:

1. the historical sociology of mobilization for large-scale killing,
   
2. the phenomenology of genocide, and
   
3. the role of memory in such mobilization.
   

In exploring a topic that has become highly problematic and pressing in the context of civil wars, the workshop addressed changing institutions of violence and issues of identity. The workshop aimed to raise as many questions as it answered, as well as to set an agenda for future interdisciplinary understanding.

If high-performance computing (HPC) export control policy is to be effective, three basic premises must hold:

This study applies and extends the methodology established in Building on the Basics [1]. Its objective has been to study trends in HPC technologies and their application to problems of national security importance to answer two principal questions:

· Do the basic premises continue to be satisfied as the 20th century draws to a close?

· In what range of performance levels might an export-licensing threshold be set so that the basic premises are satisfied?

The study concludes that export controls on HPC hardware are still viable, although much weaker than in the past. In particular, while applications of national security interest abound, it is increasingly difficult to identify applications that strongly satisfy all three basic premises, i.e. are of extreme national security importance and would likely be effectively pursued by countries of national security concern and would be severely retarded without levels of computing performance that could be effectively controlled.

From the preface:

"Events in recent years have caused heightened concern about the security of weapons-usable nuclear material. The possibility of illicit trafficking in, or seizure of, such material, leading to nuclear terrorism, is a worry for all states and their citizens. And given the relatively small quantities required, material obtained in one part of the world could be made into a weapon in another and threaten lives in a third. It is truly a global problem.

Since the beginning of the nuclear era, the physical protection of fissile material has been a responsibility of the individual states possessing the material. These states have different organizational approaches for providing physical protection; and while cognizant of recommended general standards, they tend to follow their own practices, shaped by custom, costs, and threat perception. Moreover, the existence of military as well as civil programs in some states adds another dimension
to the physical protection issue.

Because physical protection is a sovereign matter and not part of an international regime (except for transit of civil material across borders), there has been less attention in much of the world community to the issues of physical protection than to the other elements of nuclear safeguards and controls. (An important exception to this situation is the effort being made to assist the states of the former Soviet Union in the disposition of their weapons-usable nuclear materials.) The lack of a general dialog about a problem of growing concern motivated us to hold a three-day workshop at Stanford University to develop a better understanding of some of the important underlying questions and issues, and to undertake a comparative examination of states' approaches to physical protection. We were pleased to have knowledgeable participants from a number of the countries and regions where physical protection of fissile materials is, or will become, a day-to-day matter.

The results of the workshop are reported in these Proceedings. It is our hope that this work will stimulate further analysis and discussion, and lead to greater interest in international standards, cooperation, and supporting programs.

James E. Goodby
1996-1997 Payne Distinguished Lecturer
Stanford University

Ronald F. Lehman II
Director of the Center for Global Security Research
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

William C. Potter
Director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies"

Proceedings of a conference, "Preventing Deadly Conflict: Strategies and Institutions," held in Moscow Aug. 14-16, 1996," that was a joint undertaking of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Institute of Universal History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University.

Dr. Lapidus, who co-edited the report, wrote the conclusion, "Lessons from the Russian Experience."