Recently, post-explosion nuclear forensics, or nuclear attribution, has gained a new spotlight within the scientific and policymaking community working on nuclear weapons. Academics are beginning to ask whether post-explosion forensics might create a replacement for an international nonproliferation regime or at least offer a fallback option to deter states and individuals from selling nuclear materials. This paper examines current attribution technology from unclassified literature and finds the technology to be well developed but not foolproof, such that nuclear attribution currently provides little deterrent value. If current capabilities were publicized more thoroughly, and if the post-explosion process of assessing the evidence were internationalized, states and intermediate actors might be deterred more effectively. This paper also discusses the development of a nuclear fingerprint database; while useful, its impact on deterrence would be minimal.

This article is based on the author's undergraduate honors thesis, completed during 2005-2006 in CISAC's Interschool Honors Program in International Security.

Chapter 4 in Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford 2007), edited by Harold Trinkunas and Jeanne K. Giraldo.

This chapter uses a rational choice approach to examine the political economy of terrorist financing. To date, much of the theoretical literature and almost all government-sponsored reports discuss terrorist organizations as though they are made up of ideologically driven purists who share a uniform commitment to the cause. This assumption is needed to explain how these organizations can both (1) efficiently distribute funds and (2) operate covertly without the checks and balances most organizations require. However, upon closer inspection, one often sees substantial differences in the preferences of key players in terrorist networks. Two selection processes explain why these differences exist, and a principal-agent framework shows how these differences lead to inefficiencies in terrorist financial systems. Terrorist organizations face a trade-offbetween enduring the inefficiency or employing corrective strategies that create vulnerabilities. Governments can undertake specific actions to make this trade-offmore problematic.

The book examines financial and material resources, correctly perceived as the life blood of terrorist operations. Governments have determined that fighting the financial infrastructure of terrorist organizations is the key to their defeat. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, a good deal has been learned about sources and mechanisms used to finance the "new" terrorism, which is religiously motivated and exponentially more deadly than previous generations of terrorist organizations. New policies have been devised to combat the threat and existing policies have been enacted with greater vigor than ever before. Five years into the battle against terrorist financing, it is time to take stock of the emerging literature on terrorist financing, cut through a number of myths that have developed around the issue, and assess the current policy debates.

Through a series of thematic chapters and organizational and regional case studies--examining terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, and regions such as East Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and South East Asia--the authors provide a comprehensive assessment of the state of our knowledge about the nature of terrorism financing, and the evolution and effectiveness of terrorist strategies and government responses. This volume focuses on the preferences of major actors within terrorist networks and government agencies and the domestic and international contexts in which they make decisions and execute their strategies. It argues that both terrorism financing and government responses face problems of coordination, oversight, and information asymmetries that render them vulnerable to disruption.

This book presents a comparative study of Colombian drug-smuggling enterprises, terrorist networks (including al Qaeda), and the law enforcement agencies that seek to dismantle them. Drawing on a wealth of research materials, including interviews with former drug traffickers and other hard-to-reach informants, Michael Kenney explores how drug traffickers, terrorists, and government officials gather, analyze, and apply knowledge and experience.

The analysis reveals that the resilience of the Colombian drug trade and Islamist extremism in wars on drugs and terrorism stems partly from the ability of illicit enterprises to change their activities in response to practical experience and technical information, store this knowledge in practices and procedures, and select and retain routines that produce satisfactory results. Traffickers and terrorists "learn," building skills, improving practices, and becoming increasingly difficult for state authorities to eliminate.

The book concludes by exploring theoretical and policy implications, suggesting that success in wars on drugs and terrorism depends less on fighting illicit networks with government intelligence and more on conquering competency traps--traps that compel policymakers to exploit militarized enforcement strategies repeatedly without questioning whether these programs are capable of producing the intended results.

The author is an assistant professor of political science and public policy at Penn State Harrisburg. He worked on this book as a CISAC fellow in 2004-2005.

We have learned little from the cataclysms of September 11 and Hurricane Katrina. When it comes to catastrophe, America is living on borrowed time--and squandering it.

The truth is, acts of terror cannot always be prevented, and nature continues to show its fury in frighteningly unpredictable ways. Resiliency, argues Flynn, must now become our national motto. With chilling frankness and clarity, Flynn paints an all-too-real scenario of the threats we face within our own borders. A terrorist attack on a tanker carrying liquefied natural gas into Boston Harbor could kill thousands and leave millions more of New Englanders without power or heat. The destruction of a ship with a cargo of oil in Long Beach, California, could bring the West Coast economy to its knees and endanger the surrounding population. But even these alarmingly plausible terrorist scenarios pale in comparison to the potential destruction wrought by a major earthquake or hurricane.

Our growing exposure to man-made and natural perils is largely rooted in our own negligence, as we take for granted the infrastructure handed down to us by earlier generations. Once the envy of the world, this infrastructure is now crumbling. After decades of neglect, our public health system leaves us at the mercy of microbes that could kill millions in the next flu pandemic. Flash flooding could wipe out a fifty-year-old dam north of Phoenix, placing thousands of homes and lives at risk. The next San Francisco earthquake could destroy century-old levees, contaminating the freshwater supply that most of California relies on for survival.

It doesn't have to be this way. The Edge of Disaster tells us what we can do about it, as individuals and as a society. We can--and, Flynn argues, we must--construct a more resilient nation. With the wounds of recent national tragedies still unhealed, the time to act is now. By tackling head-on, eyes open the perils that lie before us, we can remain true to our most important and endearing national trait: our sense of optimism about the future and our conviction that we can change it for the better for ourselves--and our children.

Testimony before the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on "Five- and Ten-Year Homeland Security Goals." In the afternoon session on 30 January 2007, the subcommittee heard from Brian Michael Jenkins, of RAND Corporation; Paul Stockton, of CISAC at Stanford University; James Carafano, of the Heritage Foundation; and Randall Yim, former director of the Homeland Security Institute.

Congress and the Administration have made great progress in securing the Nation since 9/11. Major challenges remain, however, both for responding to the flaws revealed by Hurricane Katrina and--at least as important--anticipating and preparing for the threats to come. We cannot meet those challenges by following the path we are on today.

Four changes will get us on a better path. First, we need to rethink the meaning of homeland security and the priorities within it. Second, we need to recast the division of labor in homeland security, and go much further to capitalize on the advantages that states and localities have over the federal government in securing the Nation. Third, we should build deeper integration within the Department of Homeland Security--through means I will propose today that would produce benefits far beyond the Department. Finally, we need to consider more comprehensive ways to bring risk-based analysis to bear on homeland security decisions, and thereby gain the greatest possible impact from the resources you invest in this constrained fiscal environment.

Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on Jan. 27, 2007, on the situation in Iraq and the Bush administration's strategy. The full committee heard testimony from William Perry, co-director of the Preventive Defense Project at CISAC and former secretary of defense; Ambassador Dennis B. Ross, counselor and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former director for policy planning in the Department of State, and former special Middle East coordinator; and General John M. Keane (retired, U.S. Army), former Army vice chief of staff.

It has become clear to the American public that we need a new way forward in Iraq. In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group (ISG), a bipartisan group formed by the Congress, concluded nine months of study and proposed a new way forward. The ISG proposal recognized that the key actions needed in Iraq must be taken by the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army, and provided the incentives for those actions. The ISG proposal also recognized that the U.S. needed to begin the redeployment of its overstretched ground forces in order to meet its security responsibilities outside of Iraq.

Perhaps, most importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan ISG provided an opportunity for the nation to come together on Iraq. Last week, President Bush announced what he called a 'New Way Forward' in Iraq that does not follow the ISG ecommendations. He has instead chosen a course of action that I believe is not likely to succeed because it is tactical, not strategic; because it does not entail real conditionality for the Iraqi government; and because it will only deepen the divide in the country. So in my testimony today I will explain the differences in the two approaches, and why I believe that the ISG proposals better serve the interests of the United States.

This analysis questions President George W. Bush's reasons for refusing to follow a number of provisions of the U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act.

In his oral bill-signing statement to reporters and members of the public, President Bush praised the bill he was signing. He did not mention his disagreements with Congress on several of the provisions of the bill. However, in a separate written signing statement, he made clear that he, not Congress, conducts foreign policy and therefore has the greater say on what that policy should be. He declared: "Given the Constitution's commitment to the presidency of the authority to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs, the executive branch shall construe such policy statements as advisory." Thus, he concluded, he will not follow some of the provisions of the new statute: "My approval of the Act [by signing it] does not constitute my adoption of the statements of foreign policy in the Act as U.S. foreign policy."