This chapter deals with the prospects for the expansion of the current Pakistani nuclear power program, and the dangers to national safety and security such expansion entails due to rapid expansion, and the potential military or terrorist attacks against future nuclear power plants. In terms of organization, this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part, including the front two sections, summarizes the current status of the Pakistani nuclear power program, and the prospects for its expansion. The second part deals with the nuclear safety risks that the expansion of the Pakistani nuclear power program might entail, and the security risks related to military or terrorist attacks against nuclear power stations. A detailed conclusions section completes the presentation.

It is concluded here that Pakistan has maintained its currently small nuclear power program in a safe mode, though plant performance records are mediocre, given the limited integration of Pakistani plants into the global nuclear industry. That Pakistan provides many of the requisite plant maintenance and upgrade capabilities from its own resources attests to the potential for improved operations if Pakistan’s nonproliferation position could be resolved. Future expansion of the Pakistani program on the scale projected by the government depends on changes 278 in Pakistan’s nonproliferation stance that might be related to resolution of the proposed U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. A similar agreement between Pakistan and China, if possible, might allow significant expansion of the Pakistani nuclear program. It is further concluded here that rapid expansion of the installed nuclear capacity might strain the regulatory agencies‘ capability to supervise safe construction and operation of the prospective new nuclear power stations. Fastrate capacity growth might strain Pakistan’s ability to train adequate numbers of station operating staffs, support infrastructure, and regulatory manpower. The combined effects of the above could lead to safety problems related to plant operations and supervision by poorly trained personnel with potentially severe consequences.

We make the point here that the overall security situation in Pakistan is unstable, with large numbers of terrorist groups allowed to operate within the country, with an armed insurrection ongoing in Balochistan, and with the government’s loss of control of several provinces to the Taliban and other Islamic and Arabic terror organizations. This generally unstable security situation is not conducive to stable long-term expansion of nuclear power capacity. An immediate problem may be the difficulty of security screening of all prospective nuclear stations and infrastructure employees, with the distinct possibility of terror supporters gaining access to power stations and providing insider support to putative terrorist attacks. Large multiunit nuclear power stations that likely will be constructed if the nuclear expansion plan is implemented would become vulnerable to terrorist attacks or attempted takeovers all supported by potential inside collaborators. Terrorist attacks against nuclear power stations could 279 be motivated by three factors:

1. the desire to obtain radioactive or fissile materials for the construction of radioactivity dispersion devices or nuclear weapons;
   
2. the intent to create significant damage to the station, nearby population, the environment, and the country as a whole as revenge for some government actions inimical to terrorist interests; or
   
3. the desire to force the government to accede to some terrorists demands and modify its policies accordingly.

In similar fashion, military action against nuclear power stations can not be ruled out, motivated possibly by the intent to change or reverse government decisions and policies to respond to military demands. Since the military already controls security at all nuclear facilities in Pakistan, military takeover of future nuclear power stations is that much simplified. We conclude here that installing large multiunit nuclear power stations is in the economic interest of any country, like Pakistan, projecting large scale nuclear capacity growth. However, given the less than stable situation in Pakistan such stations are vulnerable to future security threats against the government. Both economic and security trade-offs should be evaluated when considering large scale nuclear capacity expansion in Pakistan’s situation.

This book, completed just before Pakistani President Musharraf imposed a state of emergency in November 2007, reflects research that the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center commissioned over the last 2 years. It tries to characterize specific nuclear problems that the ruling Pakistani government faces with the aim of establishing a base line set of challenges for remedial action. Its point of departure is to consider what nuclear challenges Pakistan will face if moderate forces remain in control of the government and no hot war breaks out against India.

Scholars of international relations usually argue that democracies are better able to signal their foreign policy intentions than nondemocracies, in part because democracies have an advantage in generating audience costs that make backing down in international crises costly to the leader. This article argues that the conventional hypothesis underestimates the extent to which nondemocratic leaders can be held accountable domestically, allowing them to generate audience costs. First, I identify three factors contributing to audience costs: whether domestic political groups can and will coordinate to punish the leader; whether the audience views backing down negatively; and whether outsiders can observe the possibility of domestic sanctions for backing down. The logic predicts that democracies should have no audience costs advantage over autocracies when elites can solve their coordination dilemma, and the possibility of coordination is observable to foreign decision makers. Empirical tests show that democracies do not in fact have a significant signaling advantage over most autocracies. This finding has important implications for understanding the relationship between regime type and international relations.

Over the past seven years, public debate and political commentary on North Korea’s nuclear program have pitted one mode of negotiations (bilateral) against another (multilateral).  That debate obscured important lessons from the past and impeded diplomatic progress.  The purpose of this paper is not to revisit the debate between the various approaches but rather to analyze the diplomacy as it has actually unfolded.

The Iran-United States Tribunal has recently celebrated its 25th anniversary. Although it has resolved all of the cases brought by private claimants, it is still likely to be many more years before the Tribunal is able to complete the remaining government-to-government cases on its docket. There are multiple reasons why so much time will be required: the pending cases are extremely complex, the governments brief them slowly, and the Tribunal's decision-making process itself is slow. There does not for the foreseeable future appear to be an alternative to continued litigation, because the prospects of a global settlement of the remaining claims before the Tribunal are remote. The parties face challenges in developing reasonable assessments of the legal and economic costs and benefits of settlement. Beyond this, the strained political relations between the United States and Iran would make even a legally and economically rationale settlement extremely difficult to achieve. The challenge facing the Tribunal in the remaining years of its existence, in which the Iran and United States are the only parties before it, is to continue to decide cases in a principled fashion on the basis of the law and the facts, and to resist the temptation to reach compromise decisions in the interests of political expediency.

These days, it's rare to pick up a newspaper and not see a story related to intelligence. From the investigations of the 9/11 commission, to accusations of illegal wiretapping, to debates on whether it's acceptable to torture prisoners for information, intelligence—both accurate and not—is driving domestic and foreign policy. And yet, in part because of its inherently secretive nature, intelligence has received very little scholarly study. Into this void comes Reforming Intelligence, a timely collection of case studies written by intelligence experts, and sponsored by the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School, that collectively outline the best practices for intelligence services in the United States and other democratic states.

Reforming Intelligence suggests that intelligence is best conceptualized as a subfield of civil-military relations, and is best compared through institutions. The authors examine intelligence practices in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, as well as such developing democracies as Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, and Russia. While there is much more data related to established democracies, there are lessons to be learned from states that have created (or re-created) intelligence institutions in the contemporary political climate. In the end, reading about the successes of Brazil and Taiwan, the failures of Argentina and Russia, and the ongoing reforms in the United States yields a handful of hard truths. In the murky world of intelligence, that's an unqualified achievement.

The terrible wake-up call of 9/11 brought homeland security and homeland defense into full focus for a nation ill-prepared for the threat of transnational terrorism. Our nation has done much to meet that threat, yet much more still needs to be done. Balancing security concerns against those of individual liberties, ensuring parallel commitments to law enforcement and defense remain complementary but distinct, are just two of the issues of concern. In this spirit, the U.S. Army War College’s Center for Strategic Leadership partnered with The George Washington University, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Heritage Foundation to conduct the first annual Homeland Defense/Homeland Security conference. The conference was an ambitious endeavor, designed to draw on a cross-section of experience from the partner institutions, their supporters, and their audiences in addressing the issues at hand. This volume is a reflection of those discussions.

A distinguished panel including psychological scientists, political scientists, and psychiatrists – Arie W. Kruglanski, Martha Crenshaw, Jerrold M. Post, and Jeff Victoroff – assesses the impact of different metaphorical framings (warfare, law enforcement, epidemiology, and prejudice reduction) on the worldwide effort to combat and prevent terrorism. The authors show that the metaphorical “war on terrorism” that has dominated post-9/11 thinking about national security and foreign policy is highly limited, blinding political leaders and other key decision makers to different possibilities both for containing the worldwide spread of terrorist ideologies and also for preventing terrorism by alleviating the social problems giving rise to it. The report includes an editorial by Louise Richardson, Harvard University, who underscores the importance of not reducing counterterrorism to simplistic metaphors that hamper our ability to face inherently complex political and security issues.

On July 5, 2005, President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed an agreement pledging their governments to actions designed to culminate in a formal nuclear cooperation agreement that would end a three-decade U.S. nuclear embargo against India. Although the formal agreement has not yet received final approval from Congress, concerns about the consequences of the agreement, particularly its possible adverse effect on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the worldwide nonproliferation regime, have made the agreement controversial. This article traces the events that led to the Bush-Singh meeting, explicates the current situation, examines the arguments for and against the proposed agreement, and makes some preliminary judgments regarding the agreement's effects on the nonproliferation regime. The failure to prevent India's 1998 nuclear tests with the threat of sanctions (because the Indians calculated that long-term U.S. resolve was not sustainable) set in motion a chain of events that would ultimately end the nuclear embargo. However, the conditions for a better U.S.-India nuclear agreement--from a nonproliferation perspective--will inevitably arise if the current proposed agreement is not adopted.