First paragraph of the book chapter:

How quickly could individual governments, starting from different levels of nuclear-related expertise and technology, develop a nuclear weapon if they chose to do so? This question—which I will call the “nuclear latency” question—is both exceedingly important and poorly understood. It is important because an accurate understanding of both underlying state capabilities and the time needed to utilize such capabilities is necessary to analyze a wide set of nuclear policy issues: for example, dealing with the Iran nuclear crisis (how quickly could Tehran make a weapon from its stockpile of low–enriched uranium?); understanding the relationship between the spread of civilian nuclear power and the spread of nuclear weapons capability (will new civilian programs make breakout to military programs easier and more likely?); evaluating potential NPT reforms (what would be the effects of lengthening the ninety-day notice in the Article X withdrawal clause?); or assessing the stability of a world without nuclear weapons (could disarmed states rearm in five days, five weeks, five months, or five years?). Despite widespread discussion of these policy issues, however, a set of mirror-image analytic failures has limited our ability to make clear predictions about nuclear latency and proliferation: Political scientists working on these subjects have often failed to examine basic technical factors regarding the nuclear fuel cycle that strongly influence how quickly states can get the bomb; the more technical literature about nuclear latency has similarly often failed to examine the political factors that strongly influence the ability of a government to develop nuclear weapons.

As tensions on the Korean peninsula rise after an international investigation found that North Korea was responsible for the sinking of a South Korean warship, a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Independent Task Force warns that North Korea's continued provocations pose a serious threat to its neighbors and that its nuclear weapons program must be stopped. "The United States must seek to resolve rather than simply manage the challenge posed by a nuclear North Korea," asserts the Task Force.

In its report, U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, the Task Force emphasizes that "despite the difficulty of the challenge, the danger posed by North Korea is sufficiently severe, and the costs of inaction and acquiescence so high, that the United States and its partners must continue to press for denuclearization." The United States cannot risk "the potential spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states, terrorist groups or others-especially in the Middle East."

The Task Force says that the United States also must provide leadership with its regional partners to "coordinate actions designed to contain the spillover effects of possible North Korean instability while insisting that North Korea give up its destabilizing course of action." It recommends that contingency pla nning be prioritized: "Given the uncertainties and associated risks related to North Korea's future, it is necessary and sensible for its neighbors to consider the possibility of volatility in North Korea and plan for its possible effects."

The bipartisan Task Force, chaired by former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea Charles L. "Jack" Pritchard and former commander of UN Command/U.S. Forces Korea John H. Tilelli Jr., and directed by CFR Adjunct Senior Fellow Scott A. Snyder, is comprised of roughly two dozen distinguished experts, including CISAC Co-Director Siegfried Hecker, representing a wide variety of backgrounds. The report commends the U.S.-South Korean partnership and applauds the close alliance coordination following the ship incident. The Task Force urges the passage of the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which it says is good for America and would send a strong message of support for South Korea.

While each member of the Six Party talks-China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States-has its own concerns, "any hope of resolving the North Korean standoff will depend on all parties cooperating with one another and being firm with North Korea." The report emphasizes that "Chinese cooperation is essential to the success of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and to ensuring regional stability."

The report makes several specific recommendations, including calling for the establishment of a dialogue with China about the future of the Korean peninsula, bilateral talks with North Korea regarding missile development, and close consultations with allies South Korea and Japan. The report recommends that the Obama administration prioritize its approach to North Korea in the following order.

• Prevent horizontal proliferation: "The United States and its allies should heighten vigilance against the possibility of a transfer of nuclear weapons technologies or fissile material from North Korea and strengthen the capacity to carry out effective counterproliferation measures."
  
• Stop vertical proliferation: "North Korea's unconstrained efforts to develop a missile delivery capability for its nuclear arsenal would dramatically expand its ability to threaten its neighbors and further complicate prospects for reversing its nuclear program."
  
• Denuclearize: "The debate over nonproliferation versus denuclearization is a false choice; the United States and its partners can and must do both by containing proliferation while also pressing for denuclearization."
  

The Task Force recommends that the United States seek ways to integrate North Korea into the international community, including through cultural and academic exchanges. "The Obama administration should change long-standing U.S. policies blocking North Korea's participation in activities of international financial institutions," notes the report. It also condemns North Korea's abysmal human rights record: "North Korea's shameful human rights situation and failure to meet the needs of its people is a human tragedy that should be addressed by U.S. humanitarian assistance and other measures to improve human rights conditions inside North Korea."

At least 200,000-250,000 people died in the war in Bosnia. "There are three million child soldiers in Africa." "More than 650,000 civilians have been killed as a result of the U.S. occupation of Iraq." "Between 600,000 and 800,000 women are trafficked across borders every year." "Money laundering represents as much as 10 percent of global GDP." "Internet child porn is a $20 billion-a-year industry." These are big, attention-grabbing numbers, frequently used in policy debates and media reporting. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill see only one problem: these numbers are probably false. Their continued use and abuse reflect a much larger and troubling pattern: policymakers and the media naively or deliberately accept highly politicized and questionable statistical claims about activities that are extremely difficult to measure. As a result, we too often become trapped by these mythical numbers, with perverse and counterproductive consequences.

This problem exists in myriad policy realms. But it is particularly pronounced in statistics related to the politically charged realms of global crime and conflict-numbers of people killed in massacres and during genocides, the size of refugee flows, the magnitude of the illicit global trade in drugs and human beings, and so on. In Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts, political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and policy analysts critically examine the murky origins of some of these statistics and trace their remarkable proliferation. They also assess the standard metrics used to evaluate policy effectiveness in combating problems such as terrorist financing, sex trafficking, and the drug trade.