International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Abstract:

This critical review of the new political science literature on the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation consists of four parts. The first section briefly presents what we know about which states developed nuclear weapons and which states started but abandoned weapons development programs. I highlight the problems that result from uncertainty about the accuracy and completeness of the data. The second and third sections review the literature on the spread of the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons. We still lack robust knowledge about the relationship between the development of civilian nuclear power programs and nuclear weapons acquisition. The next two sections review the literature on the demand for nuclear weapons. Comparative case studies and statistical studies have improved our understanding of the diversity of motives for weapons development and restraints, but serious gaps in our knowledge remain. The sixth section outlines alternative theories about the potential impact of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on nuclear weapons programs decisions. Finally, I lay out a future research agenda to address the weaknesses in our current understanding of the causes of nuclear proliferation

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Annual Review of Political Science
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Scott D. Sagan
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The Obama administration has argued that its efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US defense policy and work toward “a world free of nuclear weapons” will encourage other governments to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and support global nuclear disarmament. Does the evidence support this assertion? This essay describes the changes in US nuclear weapons and disarmament policies initiated by the Obama administration and outlines four potential pathways through which the United States might influence other governments' policies: by reducing nuclear threat perceptions, by changing global beliefs about what constitutes “responsible” nuclear behavior, by impacting domestic debates about disarmament in foreign capitals, and by creating new diplomatic negotiation dynamics.

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The Nonproliferation Review
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Scott D. Sagan
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"Ultimately, progress toward our goals in dealing with North Korea depends not so much on the weight of the force we bring to bear—sanctions, UN resolutions—but on how well we understand the North Korean regime and its views of domestic and foreign policy challenges.  If we fail to grasp that North Koreans believe they have their own national interests, then we fall into the trap of thinking we can force them, sweet talk them, or bribe them into doing what we want" says CISAC's Robert Carlin.

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"Alexander Betts is one of a handful of scholars who have mastered the complex field of Global Migration Governance. This large and impressive volume covers the topic from every conceivable angle, and it gets the difficult mix of empirical analysis and policy recommendation right. As the global conversation about migration governance continues over the coming years, this work will remain the standard reference."--Randall Hansen, Research Chair in Political Science, University of Toronto 

"An invaluable contribution to migration research and studies of global governance more broadly. Drawing on useful concepts derived from International Relations, the excellent contributions draw a picture of a multilayered, fragmented and yet quite encompassing set of formal and informal governance arrangements that mirror the diversity of challenges associated with global population flows."--Sandra Lavenex, Professor of International Politics, University of Lucerne 

Unlike many other trans-boundary policy areas, international migration lacks coherent global governance. There is no United Nations migration organization and states have signed relatively few multilateral treaties on migration. Instead sovereign states generally decide their own immigration policies. However, given the growing politicization of migration and the recognition that states cannot always address migration in isolation from one another, a debate has emerged about what type of international institutions and cooperation are required to meet the challenges of international migration. Until now, though, that emerging debate on global migration governance has lacked a clear analytical understanding of what global migration governance actually is, the politics underlying it, and the basis on which we can make claims about what 'better' migration governance might look like.

In order to address this gap, Global Migration Governance brings together a group of the world's leading experts to consider the global governance of different aspects of migration. The chapters offer an accessible introduction to the global governance of low-skilled labor migration, high-skilled labor migration, irregular migration, lifestyle migration, international travel, refugees, internally displaced persons, human trafficking and smuggling, diaspora, remittances, and root causes. Each of the chapters explores the three same broad questions: What, institutionally, is the global governance of migration in that area? Why, politically, does that type of governance exist? How, normatively , can we ground claims about the type of global governance that should exist in that area? Collectively, the chapters enhance our understanding of the international politics of migration and set out a vision for international cooperation on migration. 

Contents: 

  1. "Introduction: Global Migration Governance", Alexander Betts 
  2. "Low-Skilled Labour Migration", Christiane Kuptsch and Philip Martin 
  3. "High-Skilled Labour Migration", Alexander Betts and Lucie Cerna 
  4. "Irregular Migration", Franck Duvell 
  5. "International Travel", Rey Koslowski 
  6. "Lifestyle Migration", Caroline Oliver 
  7. "Environmental Migration", Jane McAdam 
  8. "UNHCR and the Global Governance of Refugees", Gil Loescher and James Milner 
  9. "Internally Displaced Persons", Khalid Koser 
  10. "Human Trafficking and Smuggling", Susan Martin and Amber Callaway 
  11. "Remittances", Anna Lindley 
  12. "Diasporas", Alan Gamlen 
  13. "Root Causes", Stephen Castles and Nicholas Van Hear 
  14. "Conclusion", Alexander Betts
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Oxford University Press
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Alexander Betts
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0199600457
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Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates’ January 6 announcement of major budget and program changes at the Pentagon was a watershed: it canceled several multi-billion dollar weapons programs, redirected $100 billion from old programs to new ones, and laid the groundwork for reducing the active-duty size of America’s ground forces after a draw-down in Afghanistan. But in light of the rumors that Gates will step down sometime this year, his remarks soon after the announcement also helped to consolidate one particular aspect of his reformist legacy: managing our nation’s vast military weapons budget.

Gates has navigated the Byzantine relationships that weave throughout the government and the private sector, including his own office, the military services, the Congress, and the defense industry. Over the last four years, he has personally assumed control of  the Pentagon’s resource allocation process. His legacy will be an instructive playbook for several reasons.

First, accountability for the development and production of major programs stops with the Secretary; delegation does not means abdication. Gates has earned similar plaudits elsewhere: he took personal responsibility for the earliest and most public crisis of his first year, the unacceptable conditions at Walter Reed. As steward of the nation’s defense budget, he has been equally unflagging. When he lost faith in the Joint Strike Fighter’s program management, he dismissed the officer in charge and replaced him with a hard-charging 3-star general to signal the seriousness of attention with which weapons costs and performance must be treated. This, in stark contrast to business-as-usual at the Pentagon, where civilian subordinates negotiate with the military services, with the Secretary investing personal resources in only a handful of the most publicly-contentious programs.

Second, timing matters, and Gates uses timing for a crucial purpose: to promote transparency and a public dialogue about his decisions. He puts distance between his Pentagon announcements and the annual roll-out of the President’s budget request.  Although his changes will be reflected in the President’s budget, these pre-announcements allow him and the military to initiate a conversation about military spending early, and before the President’s name is affixed to it. His adroit sensitivity to timing does the nation a real service, allowing us to focus on and debate how we equip our armed forces independent of the vast competing priorities on the political agenda. 

These two lessons have led to a critical third: the importance of a constructive and open relationship with Congress. Congress has not and will not go along with every Gates proposal. But Gates realized early on that working with Congress on the often vexing troubles associated with our nation’s military-industrial complex carries far more advantages than drawbacks. His ability to generate consensus on controversial program decisions, such as halting production of the F-22 and canceling the development of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, were against-the-odds triumphs over pork-barrel politics. 

Every Secretary of Defense faces a similar budgetary conundrum as Secretary Gates currently does—the need to control defense spending while maintaining a first-rate and adaptable force—but the record of cutting unnecessary programs is mixed at best. Though Dick Cheney won praise for canceling the Navy’s egregiously over-cost A-12 stealth aircraft, his attempt to terminate the Marine Corps’s V-22 Osprey stalled in Congress. Even the A-12 kill was a pyrrhic victory, as his decision sparked such intense litigation that the legal dispute over the aircraft’s cancelation persists to this day, 20 years later. Indeed, the Supreme Court heard one aspect of the case this week. 

Donald Rumsfeld took full advantage of rising defense budgets to direct investments in the critical areas of space, missile defense, ISR, but transformation in theory became addition in practice. The defense budget needn’t have been cut as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan raged, but the Pentagon was too slow to adapt to actual war-fighting needs. Rumsfeld successfully canceled the Army’s overweight artillery system known as Crusader, but his relationship with Congress, even Republicans, was often strained, and his personal oversight of hundreds of billions of dollars in over-cost and under-performing weapons was episodic at best. 

All the technology and weapons programs in the world will not win a war: only an expertly trained military with top leadership can do that. But Secretary Gates will leave a legacy of vigilance over our nation’s weapons of war. His successor would do well to emulate it.

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China's President Hu Jintao conducted a high-profile visit to the United States in late January 2011, during which he discussed economics, security, and climate change with President Barack Obama. Speaking with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Thomas Fingar stressed the importance of Washington and Beijing finding common ground for cooperation on crucial global issues.
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President Barack Obama and President Hu Jintao of China begin their working dinner in the Old Family Dining Room of the White House, Jan. 18, 2011. | Official White House photo by Pete Souza
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Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Riqiang Wu Nuclear Security Fellow at CISAC and PhD Student at Tsinghua University, China Speaker
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Abstract
I will begin this talk with a short discussion of the function of warning in the US national security community, and the analytic methodology used by US intelligence agencies (in 1941 and since) to address the problem of warning. I will then present a formal model for crisis warning consisting of a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) intended to assist an intelligence analyst in deciding when to issue an alert to a foreign policy principal decision maker such as the President. The lead time demanded by the principal is a key element in the model. I will spend the remainder of the talk illustrating this warning model in the context of the brewing crisis in the Pacific from July to December 1941, and present results from test runs of the model using historical raw intelligence data from that period. While a probabilistic approach to warning is not a new idea, this research addresses three outstanding issues left unresolved from past efforts to develop such an approach:

  1. The need to process multiple dependent signals in a manner that is combinatorially feasible;
  2. Incorporation of the time dimension in which intelligence data is received into the inference, and the effect of dynamics on a warning decision where a finite horizon is imposed;
  3. Consideration of the fact that the analyst serves as an advisor to the principal decision maker but is not completely aware of the principal’s preference set.

Together with my thesis advisor, Prof Elisabeth Pate-Cornell, I am currently writing a paper that covers the presented material, and I hope to incorporate feedback from this presentation into the paper. Because the paper is currently a work in progress, I am not distributing it at this time.


David Blum attends Stanford University, where he is a 3rd year Ph.D. student in the Department of Management Science & Engineering as well as a U.S. Department of Defense SMART Scholar. He is currently developing a probabilistic model of national security crises, with the goal of improving crisis early warning. His interests also include targeting in counter-terrorism, signatures of WMD proliferation, and models of decisions made by adversarial actors as games with incomplete information. He is a graduate intern in the Counter-Proliferation Operations-Intelligence Support program at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Between 2004 and 2008 David worked at the U.S. Department of Defense as an operations research analyst. He deployed twice to Iraq, in 2007 and 2008, where,  as member of Multi-National Corps Iraq, he provided direct analytic support to conventional and special operations units. He received his Master's degree from MIT in political science, concentrating in security studies, and his Bachelor's degree from Columbia University in history and physics.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

David Blum Predoctoral Fellow, CISAC Speaker
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Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Francis Gavin Director, Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security & Law Speaker University of Texas at Austin
Mira Rapp-Hooper PhD Student Speaker Columbia University
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