CISAC Central Conference Room, 2d floor
Abstract: During the Cold War, doubts over the credibility of the US commitment to defend Western Europe led Great Britain and France to develop their own nuclear capabilities, despite their inclusion under the US "nuclear umbrella". In other instances the US nuclear umbrella appears to have been much more credible. For example, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea did not pursue nuclear weapons, in large part because of their alliances with the US. Why did the US commitment to defend Europe lack sufficient credibility, while its commitment to defend Asia seemed more effective? This paper develops one answer to this puzzle by exploring how the institutional design of nuclear umbrellas may affect its credibility. I posit that nuclear security commitments are more likely to be perceived as credible when they include costly reliability-enhancing provisions, such as greater precision in when alliance obligations apply, issue-linkages, and increased military institutionalization. In the empirical section of the paper, I demonstrate three observable implications of this logic that are consistent with a client state feeling more assured. I show that more precise and institutionalized alliances between a nuclear weapons state and non-nuclear client state are strongly associated with (i) lower defense spending in the client state, (ii) a lower likelihood that a client state will pursue its own nuclear weapon, and (iii) fewer alliance commitments held by the client state. These results have important implications for how policymakers and analysts evaluate the consequences of nuclear policy choices.
About the Speaker: Neil Narang is a Stanton Junior Faculty Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Previously, he served as the Director of the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats (PPNT) Program at the University of California Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)and as a Nonproliferation Policy Fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
CISAC Central Conference Room, 2nd floor
Neil Narang is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara and Director of Research at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC).
Previously, Narang served as a Senior Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship. He is currently an advisor to the Director’s Office of Los Alamos National Laboratory, a faculty affiliate at the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), and Life Member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Narang specializes in international relations, with a focus on issues of international security and conflict management. Specifically, his research explores the role of signaling under uncertainty in situations of bargaining and cooperation, particularly as it applies to two substantive domains: (1) crisis bargaining in both interstate and civil war, and (2) cooperation through nuclear and conventional military alliances. His articles have appeared in the Journal of Politics, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, among others.
He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from UC San Diego and he holds a B.A. in Molecular Cell Biology and Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. He has previously been a fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Browne Center for International Politics, a nonproliferation policy fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and a junior faculty fellow and visiting professor at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.
CISAC Conference Room
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About the Speaker: Richard English is the Wardlaw Professor of Politics in the School of International Relations, and Director of the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), at the University of St Andrews. His research focuses on political violence and terrorism, Irish and British politics and history, and the history and politics of nationalism and the state. His books include Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (which won the 2003 UK Political Studies Association Politics Book of the Year Award),Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland (which won the 2007 Christopher Ewart-Biggs Memorial Prize, and the 2007 Political Studies Association of Ireland Book Prize), and Terrorism: How to Respond (OUP, 2009). His latest book, Modern War: A Very Short Introduction, is published by Oxford University Press. Professor English's current research project is for another OUP book, Does Terrorism Work? A History. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and a Member of the Royal Irish Academy. Richard English is in residence as an International Visitor at the Stanford Humanities Center this April and was nominated by the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI)
About the Topic: Debates on the effectiveness of terrorism have become prominent in recent years, across a spectrum running from declarations that terrorism represents a deeply ineffective means of pursuing political change, to equally assertive arguments that terrorism works all too frequently. In this talk, Richard English reflects on why the question is important, why it has so far proved extremely difficult to answer in persuasive fashion, how we might better frame our reflections on the subject in future, and on what might be gleaned from deep consideration of the emergence, armed struggle, and eventual departure from the stage of one of the world's most sustainedly serious terrorist organizations - the Provisional Irish Republican Army. |
CISAC Conference Room
CISAC Central Conference Room, 2nd floor
CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E209
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
David A. Relman, M.D., is the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in the Departments of Medicine, and of Microbiology and Immunology at Stanford University, and Chief of Infectious Diseases at the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System in Palo Alto, California. He is also Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford, and served as science co-director at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford from 2013-2017. He is currently director of a new Biosecurity Initiative at FSI.
Relman was an early pioneer in the modern study of the human indigenous microbiota. Most recently, his work has focused on human microbial community assembly, and community stability and resilience in the face of disturbance. Ecological theory and predictions are tested in clinical studies with multiple approaches for characterizing the human microbiome. Previous work included the development of molecular methods for identifying novel microbial pathogens, and the subsequent identification of several historically important microbial disease agents. One of his papers was selected as “one of the 50 most important publications of the past century” by the American Society for Microbiology.
Dr. Relman received an S.B. (Biology) from MIT, M.D. from Harvard Medical School, and joined the faculty at Stanford in 1994. He served as vice-chair of the NAS Committee that reviewed the science performed as part of the FBI investigation of the 2001 Anthrax Letters, as a member of the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity, and as President of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. He is currently a member of the Intelligence Community Studies Board and the Committee on Science, Technology and the Law, both at the National Academies of Science. He has received an NIH Pioneer Award, an NIH Transformative Research Award, and was elected a member of the National Academy of Medicine in 2011.
ABOUT THE SPEAKER: Rob Forrest is a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC. He joined CISAC in 2011. His research focuses on the role of particle accelerators in the future nuclear fuel cycle, specifically on the feasibility of Accelerator Driven Systems (ADS) in sub-critical reactor designs and the transmutation of nuclear waste.
CISAC Conference Room
CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C220
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
Siegfried S. Hecker is a professor emeritus (research) in the Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He was co-director of CISAC from 2007-2012. From 1986 to 1997, Dr. Hecker served as the fifth Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Hecker is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction, and nuclear security.
Dr. Hecker’s current research interests include nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, nuclear weapons policy, nuclear security, the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy, and plutonium science. At the end of the Cold War, he has fostered cooperation with the Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials. In June 2016, the Los Alamos Historical Society published two volumes edited by Dr. Hecker. The works, titled Doomed to Cooperate, document the history of Russian-U.S. laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation since 1992.
Dr. Hecker’s research projects at CISAC focus on cooperation with young and senior nuclear professionals in Russia and China to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism worldwide, to avoid a return to a nuclear arms race, and to promote the safe and secure global expansion of nuclear power. He also continues to assess the technical and political challenges of nuclear North Korea and the nuclear aspirations of Iran.
Dr. Hecker joined Los Alamos National Laboratory as graduate research assistant and postdoctoral fellow before returning as technical staff member following a tenure at General Motors Research. He led the laboratory's Materials Science and Technology Division and Center for Materials Science before serving as laboratory director from 1986 through 1997, and senior fellow until July 2005.
Among his professional distinctions, Dr. Hecker is a member of the National Academy of Engineering; foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; fellow of the TMS, or Minerals, Metallurgy and Materials Society; fellow of the American Society for Metals; fellow of the American Physical Society, honorary member of the American Ceramics Society; and fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
His achievements have been recognized with the Presidential Enrico Fermi Award, the 2020 Building Bridges Award from the Pacific Century Institute, the 2018 National Engineering Award from the American Association of Engineering Societies, the 2017 American Nuclear Society Eisenhower Medal, the American Physical Society’s Leo Szilard Prize, the American Nuclear Society's Seaborg Medal, the Department of Energy's E.O. Lawrence Award, the Los Alamos National Laboratory Medal, among other awards including the Alumni Association Gold Medal and the Undergraduate Distinguished Alumni Award from Case Western Reserve University, where he earned his bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees in metallurgy.
CISAC Conference Room
CISAC Central Conference Room, 2nd floor
CISAC Central Conference Room, 2nd floor
Abstract: The start of the 21st century has included multiple demonstrations of national capabilities to disrupt or destroy satellites. Kinetic anti-satellite weapons, in particular, can create debris with long-term consequences for all space actors. The United States relies on satellites for a broad array of civil, scientific, and national security capabilities. There are several possible ways for the U.S. to help build a more secure environment in Earth-orbit, and manage future risks to space systems. This talk will focus on a technical option that can be pursued unilaterally by the U.S.: the use of distributed satellite architectures for certain critical sensing capabilities. This talk will provide some context for space security in 2014, describe existing frameworks for quantifying risk to satellite constellations, and present a framework for analyzing satellite architecture choices for systems like weather and strategic warning satellites.
About the Speaker: Matt Daniels is an engineer at NASA's Ames Research Center, a predoctoral fellow at CISAC, and a Ph.D. candidate in decision and risk analysis at Stanford. He joined CISAC as a predoctoral fellow in September 2012. At Stanford, Matt's research is in dynamic programming models of distributed satellite constellations. His work focuses on developing probabilistic models to assess the viability of constellations of small, networked satellites for scientific and national security missions. At NASA Ames, Matt is an engineer in the Mission Design Center and works with the Office of the Director on international technical collaborations. He has helped create NASA-DARPA partnerships on new space projects and has been a member of NASA delegations to Europe, South America, and the Middle East.
CISAC Central Conference Room, 2nd floor
Dr. Matthew Daniels is a technology and policy leader in Washington and New York. He has held technical, leadership, and strategy roles at the White House, NASA, and Department of Defense. His work focuses on space security, exploration, and technology strategy.
At the White House, Matt led initiatives on space and national security, Lunar exploration, US-India space cooperation, and planetary defense. He has also served as Senior Advisor to the Director of Net Assessment, focusing on space and nuclear security; the DOD's Tech Director for AI, overseeing the DOD's broad AI R&D portfolio; and a senior technical advisor in the office of the NASA Administrator, focusing on deep space exploration and development. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Matt started as an engineer at NASA, received his Ph.D. from Stanford, and was a fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He has twice been a recipient of Department of Defense Distinguished Service medals. For his work on planetary defense, Asteroid 22028 Matthewdaniels, discovered by the Catalina Sky Survey, is named for him.
