Abstract: The interactions between biological and cultural processes are critical determinants of human health. Successful public health programs must therefore be based on a synthesis of biological and anthropological research. By disentangling the impacts of behavior and biology on human health, we can update health care objectives and practices. Human movements and shifts in settlements across short and long time scales can result in misallocated health care resources and inefficient response to crises. I develop methods to quantify changing human population sizes and distributions to improve resource allocation in both routine health care settings and crisis response. This ranges from assessing health care system capacity for stable populations to outbreak control through vaccination and rapid response following population-scale disruptions due to natural disasters or political instability. This approach is also valuable in informing predictive mathematical models of human interactions and demographics to provide insight into a broader spectrum of human health issues. Here, I demonstrate these concepts specifically for the transmission and prevention of infectious diseases and access to health care in low-income settings ranging from rural Africa to urban America. 

About the Speaker: Nita Bharti is a Branco Weiss Society in Science fellow with an interdisciplinary background in Biology (PhD) and Anthropology (MA). She is a visiting scholar at Stanford’s Woods Institute of the Environment with a research associate appointment in the Biology Department and Center for Infectious Disease Dynamics at Penn State University. Her research integrates methods across social and natural sciences to identify and solve problems in human health, often in low-income settings. In addition to academic researchers across a wide variety of disciplines, her collaborators frequently include outreach and non-profit organizations as well as local authorities on public health and safety.

Abstract: Technological and social forces are allowing the growth of science outside a professionalized context.  The Internet, mobile devices, and public availability of big data are technological facilitators of “citizen science”, in part through enabling data sharing, analysis, and communication.  These technological changes now allow the entire scientific process, from funding and development of a research agenda, to conduct, analysis and dissemination and application of findings, to take place without the involvement of any science professionals or research-related institutions.  However, most ethical and regulatory frameworks for biomedical science arose from concepts of obligations of professionals and (largely not-for-profit) institutions.  We will discuss current examples of “citizen science” in biology and clinical research, and the ethical and policy implications.

About the Speaker: Mildred Cho is a Professor in the Division of Medical Genetics of the Department of Pediatrics at Stanford University, Associate Director of the Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics, and Director of the Center for Integration of Research on Genetics and Ethics. She received her B.S. in Biology in 1984 from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and her Ph.D. in 1992 from the Stanford University Department of Pharmacology.  Her post-doctoral training was in Health Policy as a Pew Fellow at the Institute for Health Policy Studies at the University of California, San Francisco and at the Palo Alto VA Center for Health Care Evaluation.  She is a member of international and national advisory boards, including for Genome Canada, the March of Dimes, and the Board of Reviewing Editors of Science magazine.  Her current research projects examine ethical and social issues in research on the human genome and microbiome, synthetic biology and genome editing, and the ethics at the intersection of clinical practice and research.  

Abstract: Why do some rebel groups use terrorism as a tactic while others do not? Why some opposition groups engage in terrorism while others do not is of obvious importance both to the study of terrorism more generally, and to policy makers. But most existing studies of terrorism are not well-equipped to answer this question as they lack an appropriate comparison category. This project examines terrorism in the context of civil war to remedy this problem. I argue that terrorism is more likely to be used when it is expected to be most effective, namely against democratic governments and those most reliant on tourism, and when the otherwise prohibitive legitimacy costs of using terrorism are expected to be lowest. I argue that legitimacy costs vary with factors such as government regime type, rebel aims, rebel funding sources, and government targeting of civilians/repression. I also explore prominent alternative arguments, including the notion that terrorism is a weapon of the weak, and that it is caused by competition among groups (outbidding).

About the Speaker: Page Fortna is Chair of the Political Science Department at Columbia University. Her research focuses on terrorism, the durability of peace in the aftermath of both civil and interstate wars, and war termination. She is the author of two books: Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents Choices after Civil War (Princeton University Press, 2008) and Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton University Press, 2004). She has published articles in journals such as World Politics, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, and International Studies Review. She is currently working on a project on terrorism in civil wars. 

Fortna is a member of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. She received the Karl Deutsch Award from the International Studies Association in 2010. She has held fellowships at the Olin Institute at Harvard, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the Hoover Institution. She received her BA from Wesleyan University and her PhD from Harvard University in 1998.

Abstract: Faster evolving technologies, new peer adversaries, and the increased role of non-government entities changes how we think about decisions to develop and adopt new technology. Uncertainties about technology “shelf life,” adversary intentions, and dual uses of technology complicate these decisions. This seminar will discuss the use of mathematical models and optimization methods to provide insight on technology policy issues. These issues include: balancing risk and affordability during technology research and development; timing technology adoption; and understanding adversary responses to new technologies. Examples will be discussed from offensive cyber operations and synthetic biology. We will conclude by discussing implications for how policy analysts and policy makers think about technology and security.

About the Speaker: Philip Keller is a National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fellow at Stanford. He is completing his PhD in Management Science & Engineering. He studies technology policy problems posed by new technologies. His research is highly interdisciplinary, drawing on methods from engineering risk and decision analysis, game theory, and operations research. His professional experience includes conducting studies and analysis for the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security at RAND and the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute. Previous study topics include unmanned aircraft operations; nuclear terrorism; offensive cyber operations; and military force structure. Philip holds a BS in Mathematics and an MS in Defense and Strategic Studies.

Abstract: The large U.S. and Russian stockpiles of weapons plutonium present a sustained risk to global nuclear security. Under a reciprocal disarmament agreement, both nations are obliged to irreversibly dispose of 34 metric tonnes of this material. The current terms of the agreement call for the conversion of plutonium into commercial nuclear fuel and irradiation in civilian reactors, rendering it unattractive for weapons use. Rapid and consistent increase in the projected cost of this approach has rendered it infeasible for the U.S. Proposed alternatives involve underground immobilization of the plutonium in a stable geological formation, yet there exist substantial obstacles to this strategy. There is uncertainty in the ability of a geological repository to safely contain such material for the tens of thousands of years during which it remains a threat to public health. Russia has argued that geological disposal does not represent irreversible disarmament, as the material might be retrieved at a later time. This talk will present an analysis of the political and technical constraints on the geological disposal of weapons plutonium, along with potential paths forward.

About the Speaker: Cameron Tracy is a MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC for 2015-2016. He also holds a postdoctoral appointment in the Department of Geological Sciences in the Stanford School of Earth, Energy & Environmental Sciences.

Cameron’s research at CISAC involves the assessment of strategies for the disposal of fissile materials recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons and analysis of their implications for international arms reduction treaty compliance. He also investigates the structural and chemical behavior of materials, including nuclear fuels and wasteforms, in extreme environments.

Cameron received his Ph.D in Materials Science and Engineering from the University of Michigan in 2015. He holds a M.S. from the University of Michigan and a B.S. from the University of California, Davis. In 2009-2010 he worked as a research assistant at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Abstract: Once limited by concerns about its technological feasibility, affordability and destabilizing potential, today, missile defense is becoming a multinational enterprise deployed on a global scale. The 21st century renaissance of missile defense technology has been powered by the belief that the capability to defend against ballistic missiles will reduce nuclear risks in the post-cold-war era. The assumptions that underpin this conclusion are challenged by a shift in the international security environment – the re-emergence of Russia, a major nuclear power, as a regional threat to the United States and its European allies. Both Cold War and more recent scholarship cannot fully explain contemporary dynamics. I will provide an overview of the current U.S., NATO and Russian missile defense programs and discuss their strategic, operational and technical dimensions. I will explain why we need a new understanding of the relationship between missile defense and nuclear weapons in the current strategic environment.

About the Speaker: Ivanka Barzashka is a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at CISAC. Her research focuses on how ballistic missile defense (BMD) affects nuclear risks in the changing strategic environment. She is concurrently a researcher at the Department of War Studies of King’s College London (KCL). As a visiting scholar at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Barzashka examined options for Bulgarian active participation in NATO’s BMD system, for which she did fieldwork at NATO’s Joint Forces Training Center in Poland. She also assessed technical options for BMD cooperation between NATO and Russia in collaboration with American, European and Russian scientists. Barzashka continued that project at the Centre for Science and Security Studies at KCL, where she developed a physics-based model for assessing BMD effectiveness for policy applications.

- Please note that this Social Science Seminar is held in a Science Seminar time slot - 

Abstract: Many see China as a rival superpower to the U.S. and imagine the country’s rise to be a threat to U.S. leadership in Asia and beyond. Arguing against this zero-sum vision, The China Challenge describes a new paradigm in which the real challenge lies in dissuading China from regional aggression while encouraging the country to contribute to the global order. Christensen shows how nationalism and the threat of domestic instability influence the party’s decisions on issues like maritime sovereignty disputes, global financial management, control of the Internet, cliate change, and policies toward Taiwan and Hong Kong. China’s active cooperation is essential to global governance. If China obstructs international efforts to confront nuclear proliferation, civil conflicts, financial instability, and climate change, those efforts will falter, but even if China merely declines to support such efforts, the problems will grow vastly more complicated.  Given U.S.-China policy since the end of the Cold War, a balanced strategic approach that does not block China’s rise, but rather shapes its choices so as to deter regional aggression and encourage China’s active participation in international initiatives would be a benefit to both nations.

About the Speaker: Thomas J. Christensen is William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton University. From 2006-2008 he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus on China’s foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security. Before arriving at Princeton in 2003, he taught at Cornell University and MIT. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. Professor Christensen has served on the Board of Directors and the Executive Committee of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and as co-editor of the International History and Politics series at Princeton University Press. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Non-Resident Senior Scholar at the Brookings Institution. In 2002 he was presented with a Distinguished Public Service Award by the United States Department of State.

Abstract: Biotechnology is in a transition from artisanal tools and methods to computer-controlled, high-throughput systems that allow research and development at industrial scale. This digitization is also radically reducing technical and economic barriers, empowering a new generation of young designers to do bioengineering on par with major companies but at a fraction of the cost, and prompting a re-think of the entire industry, including business models, intellectual property, ethics and biosecurity. This shift has the potential to disrupt R&D on a global scale. This lecture provides an overview of the issues and opportunities.

About the Speaker: Autodesk Distinguished Researcher Andrew Hessel is spearheading the development of tools and processes that facilitate the computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacture of living creatures and systems. As a 2015-2016 AAAS-Lemelson Invention Ambassador, he also encourages others to explore invention and innovation in biological engineering. Andrew is active in the iGEM and DIYbio (do-it-yourself) communities and frequently works with students and young entrepreneurs to guide their career and business development efforts. He has given hundreds of invited talks on synthetic biology to groups that include hollywood movie producers, the United Nations, and the FBI.

About the Speaker: Dr. Frank Foley is Lecturer in International Relations at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Dr Foley’s research focuses on counterterrorism, human rights, intelligence and police agencies, particularly in Britain, France and the United States. He is the author of Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past (Cambridge University Press, 2013). He has published articles in Security Studies, the Review of International Studies, and the European Journal of Criminal Research and Policy. Dr Foley holds a PhD in Political Science from the European University Institute in Florence. He has been the Zukerman post-doctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), and recipient of a “Terrorism Research Award” from the US National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Dr Foley has briefed governments and security practitioners on his research findings, including British and French counterterrorist officials and Department of Defense staff at the Pentagon in Washington DC. He comments for a variety of national and international media, including BBC News, France 24 and Voice of America.

Abstract: In fragile states, regimes must cultivate military forces strong enough to ward off external threats, but loyal enough to resist launching a coup. This requires that leader distinguish the loyal from the untrustworthy, a particularly challenging exercise in post-conflict settings with weak institutions. In this study, I explore how Congolese soldiers operating in North Kivu, the largest operational theater in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the epicenter of one of the most violent conflicts in Africa, solve this crucial task. I argue that leaders use non-payment as a form of trial and tribulation that reveals commitment by driving non-loyal soldiers to defect and loyal soldiers to weather challenging times. Non-payments creates a dual-pronged screening process because unpaid soldiers engage in unit-managed extortion and violence against civilians, which is used to both test and generate loyalty. To detail and assess this argument, I couple thick description based on 100 open-ended qualitative interviews with a fine-grained quantitative analysis of 350 members of the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo. This analysis provides a novel explanation for how leaders overcome classic screening dilemmas in ways that ultimately drives violence against civilians. 

His work has been supported by the United States Institute for Peace, Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab, and Texas A&M Center for Conflict and Development, among others. Grant is a 2015-2016 Mellon/ACLS Dissertation Completion Fellow and Resident Fellow at the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation.