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Abstract: Supercomputing impacts everybody, everywhere, every day. The simulation capabilities have allowed advanced medicine, energy, aviation and manufacturing. Supercomputers allow us to explore fields such as global climate change, as well as tackle problems for which experiments are impractical, hazardous or prohibitively expensive. The Department of Energy is a leader in supercomputers as part of their national security mission. With the demise of underground testing, supercomputers are a key resource used to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. This talk will explore the buildup to our current petaflop systems and the challenges to obtaining exascale systems in the future.

About the speaker: As Acting Associate Director for Computation at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Trish Damkroger leads the 1,000-employee workforce behind the Laboratory’s high performance computing efforts. The Computation team develops and deploys an integrated computing environment for petascale analytics and simulations such as understanding global climate warming, clean energy creation, biodefense, and nonproliferation. LLNL’s computing ecosystem includes high performance computers, scientific visualization facilities, high performance storage systems, network connectivity, multiresolution data analysis, mathematical models, scalable numerical algorithms, computer applications, and necessary services to enable LLNL mission goals and scientific discovery through simulation.

Abstract: Nuclear war and climate change present the two most serious threats to global security since World War II. This talk shows that nuclear weapons research and climate science were historically connected in deep, sometimes intimate ways. Each developed its own knowledge infrastructure, including people, technical systems, and organizations, with surprising parallels and frequent exchanges across the classified/civilian divide. From the 1940s on, nuclear weapons research and climate science both relied heavily on computer models, used related physics and numerical methods, and shared human as well as technical resources. Radiocarbon from nuclear weapons tests contributed to understanding of the global carbon cycle, while fallout monitoring networks produced critical knowledge about the stratosphere. In the 1980s, the potential for “nuclear winter” — a war-induced climatic catastrophe — became a major political issue, but the groundwork for this concern had been laid long before.

This interplay not only continued, but became even more significant after the Cold War’s end, when the weapons labs’ expertise, equipment, and observing systems were partially repurposed. Several US national laboratories now play essential roles in climate and Earth system science. Among these roles are the Program on Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison, based at Livermore and responsible for the important Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP), a major unifying force in climate modeling for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessments. The cyberinfrastructure underlying CMIP and similar projects must address mounting challenges related to data access controls, software support, and the security of huge data collections, while their institutional and human bases depend on ongoing national support. Crafting effective climate policy, I argue, will require understanding and rethinking the dynamics of these knowledge infrastructures for the present, rapidly evolving context.

About the Speaker: Paul Edwards is a Professor in the School of Information (SI) and the Dept. of History at the University of Michigan. SI is an interdisciplinary professional school focused on bringing people, information, and technology together in more valuable ways.

His research explores the history, politics, and cultural aspects of computers, information infrastructures, and global climate science. His current research focuses on knowledge infrastructures for the Anthropocene.

Dr. Edwards is co-editor (with Geoffrey C. Bowker) of the Infrastructures book series (MIT Press), and he serves on the editorial boards of Big Data & Society: Critical Interdisciplinary Inquiries and Information & Culture: A Journal of History. His most recent book is A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming (MIT Press, 2010).

Abstract:  In recent decades, social scientists have begun to employ the rigorous research methods that used to be the province of the natural sciences. This evidence-based approach has revolutionized how academic work is judged, how policies are created and evaluated and, now, how war is viewed. At the forefront of this movement, the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) has developed a large body of evidence on conflict that enables a new perspective on the causes and effects of violence. Information and War presents a new framework to understand the conflicts that have prevailed since World War II and the kind in which the US was so recently embroiled: asymmetric contests where a greater power struggles to contain an insurgency.

About the Speakers: Dr. Joseph Felter joined CISAC as a senior research scholar in September 2011.

Felter retired from the US Army as a Colonel following a career as a Special Forces and foreign area officer with distinguished service in a variety of special operations and diplomatic assignments. He has conducted foreign internal defense and security assistance missions across East and Southeast Asia and has participated in combat deployments to Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Prior to arriving at CISAC, he led the International Security and Assistance Force, Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) in Afghanistan reporting directly to Gen. Stanley McChrystal and Gen. David Petraeus and advising them on counterinsurgency strategy. Felter held leadership positions in the US Army Rangers and Special Forces and directed the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point from 2005-2008. He is Co-Director of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

He has published many scholarly articles on the topic of  counterinsurgency and has focused on the study of how to address the root causes of terrorism and political violence. Some highlights include: “Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict” with Benjamin Crost and Patrick Johnston (American Economic Review), "Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq," with Eli Berman and Jacob N. Shapiro (Journal of Political Economy), and "Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines," with Eli Berman, Michael Callen, and Jacob N. Shapiro (Journal of Conflict Resolution).

Felter holds a BS from West Point, an MPA from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and a PhD in Political Science from Stanford University.

Dr. Jacob N. Shapiro is Associate Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and co-directs the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. His active research projects study political violence, economic and political development in conflict zones, security policy, and urban conflict. He is author of The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations. His research has been published or is forthcoming in broad range of academic and policy journals including American Journal of Political Science, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Organization, International Security, Journal of Political Economy, and World Politics as well as a number of edited volumes. Shapiro is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, an Associate Editor of World Politics, a Faculty Fellow of the Association for Analytic Learning about Islam and Muslim Societies (AALIMS), a Research Fellow at the Center for Economic Research in Pakistan (CERP), and served in the U.S. Navy and Naval Reserve. Ph.D. Political Science, M.A. Economics, Stanford University. B.A. Political Science, University of Michigan.

Abstract: In 2004, al-Qaeda’s security chief smuggled 42 handwritten pages out of Iran, where he was confined under a loose form of house arrest. The notes written by Sayf al-Adl were each folded into a bundle the size of a cigarette, and they included two seminal documents: a history of ISIS Godfather Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's original engagement with al-Qaeda in 2000, and a high-level plan to re-establish the Caliphate between 2013 and 2016. 

Abstract: Biotechnology is rapidly diffusing globally. Efficient methods for reading, writing, and editing genetic information, producing genetic diversity, and selecting for traits are becoming widely available. New communities of practice are gaining the power to act on timescales and geographies that fall outside current systems of oversight. Governments and scientific communities alike are struggling to respond appropriately.

Recent controversies have brought these issues to light: “gain-of-function” research may risk causing the very pandemics it aims to help mitigate; the development of “gene drives” may drastically alter ecosystems; and crowd-funded “CRISPR kits” are giving decentralized communities access to powerful new tools. Meanwhile, a series of accidents at the nation’s premier biological labs, and recent struggles in responses to Ebola and Zika are raising concerns about the capacity to respond to biological threats regardless of their cause – accidental, deliberate or naturally occurring. The lack of mechanisms to assess the benefits and risks of advances in biotechnology has prompted reactive and blunt policy solutions including scientific and government-lead research moratoriums.

This presentation will review recent developments and discuss improved strategies for preparing for emerging biological risks. It will highlight key needs and opportunities in leadership, oversight and learning to mature our institutions to tackle long-term governance challenges.

About the Speaker: Dr. Megan J. Palmer is a Senior Research Scholar and William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. She leads a research program focused on risk governance in biotechnology and other emerging technologies. Dr. Palmer is also an investigator of the multi-university Synthetic Biology Engineering Research Center (Synberc), where for the last 5 years she served as Deputy Director of its policy-related research program, and led projects in safety and security, property rights, and community organization and governance. She was previously a research scientist at the California Center for Quantitative Bioscience at UC Berkeley, and an affiliate of Lawrence Berkeley National Labs.

Dr. Palmer has created and led many programs aimed at developing and promoting best practices and policies for the responsible development of biotechnology. She founded and serves as Executive Director of the Synthetic Biology Leadership Excellence Accelerator Program (LEAP), an international fellowship program in responsible biotechnology leadership. She also leads programs in safety and responsible innovation for the international Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition. Dr. Palmer advises a diversity of organizations on their approach to policy issues in biotechnology, including serving on the board of the synthetic biology program of the Joint Genomics Institute (JGI)

Dr. Palmer holds a Ph.D. in Biological Engineering from MIT, and was a postdoctoral scholar in the Bioengineering Department at Stanford University, when she first became a CISAC affiliate. She received a B.Sc.E. in Engineering Chemistry from Queen’s University, Canada.

Abstract: The disclosure of software vulnerabilities has stirred controversy for decades among security researchers and software vendors, and more recently governments. Despite increasing interdependency of software and systems (e.g., the Internet of Things) and resulting complexity in vulnerability disclosure and coordination, no unified norms have yet emerged.

This talk addresses the development of norms that (attempt to) govern the disclosure of software security flaws in relation to structural changes of the software industry and the Internet. This includes new forms of private, but monetarily rewarded disclosure on markets and through bug bounty programs, as well as government efforts to prohibit proliferation of knowledge and technology through export controls. Recently, governments acknowledged the withholding of vulnerability information on the grounds of national security and law enforcement needs, trading off against the need for defensive security of civilian computers and networks.

The talk outlines pressing policy issues and connects them to recent developments (e.g., Apple vs. FBI). It concludes by making the case for why norms on vulnerability disclosure are an essential component in shaping cybersecurity governance.

About the Speaker: Andreas Kuehn is a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Science and Technology at Syracuse University. He joined CISAC as a Zukerman Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow in October 2014. Prior, he was a visiting graduate student at Cornell University’s Department of Science & Technology Studies. He holds a M.Sc. in Information Systems from the University of Zurich, Switzerland.

In his dissertation, Andreas examined the historical, organizational, and institutional developments of software vulnerability and exploit markets as they are shaped by the perennial controversy on vulnerability disclosure. His qualitative, empirical research on emerging technologies and governance is informed by Science and Technology Studies and Institutional Theory.

Abstract: Industry, medical centers, academics and patient advocates have come together to create common standards for the representation and exchange of genomics information for both research and clinical use in The Global Alliance for Genomics and Health. Now GA4GH involves hundreds of organizations and individuals worldwide. The open source projects of our Data Working Group welcome participation by all individuals and organizations.

About the Speaker: David Haussler develops new statistical and algorithmic methods to explore the molecular function, evolution, and disease process in the human genome, integrating comparative and high-throughput genomics data to study gene structure, function, and regulation. As a collaborator on the international Human Genome Project, his team posted the first publicly available computational assembly of the human genome sequence. His team subsequently developed the UCSC Genome Browser, a web-based tool that is used extensively in biomedical research. He built the CGHub database to hold NCI’s cancer genome data, co-founded the Genome 10K project so science can learn from other vertebrate genomes, co-founded the Treehouse Childhood Cancer Project to enable international comparison of childhood cancer genomes, and is a co-founder of the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH), a coalition of the top research, health care, and disease advocacy organizations.

Haussler is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a fellow of AAAS and AAAI. He has won a number of awards, including the 2014 Dan David Prize, 2011 Weldon Memorial prize for application of mathematics and statistics to biology, 2009 ASHG Curt Stern Award in Human Genetics, and the 2008 Senior Scientist Accomplishment Award from the International Society for Computational Biology, the 2006 Dickson Prize for Science from Carnegie Mellon University, and the 2003 ACM/AAAI Allen Newell Award in Artificial Intelligence.

Abstract:  Institutions like LLNL are part of an enterprise established in the mid-twentieth century to enable teams of scientists and engineers to deliver technological capabilities to address challenges to U.S. national security.  The steadily increasing pace of technological change, the reduced proportion of U.S. government funding invested in research and development relative to private sector investments, and the accelerating resources and programs for research globally have dramatically changed the context for this enterprise. Operational practices established to meet the national security needs of the last century must be updated to ensure that the national security science and technology enterprise can continue to deliver high quality capabilities to meet future threats and innovation to enhance U.S. national and economic security. Possible approaches for updating research careers and the structure of institutions include revamping policies for domestic and international partnerships, more effectively managing dual use technologies, and updating enterprise elements to draw on cutting-edge developments in academia and industry.

About the Speaker:  Patricia Falcone is the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, and Chief Technology Officer, of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). From 2009 to 2015, she served in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, including as the presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs.  Earlier she worked at the Sandia National Laboratories in Livermore, CA.  She earned a Ph.D. working in the High Temperature Gasdynamics Laboratory in Stanford’s mechanical engineering department.