Abstract: In the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama had a very specific agenda to revise and update the U.S. nuclear posture. However, there were many elements in his program which later disappeared, or which were modified by the time his Nuclear Posture Review came out in April 2010. Over the course of the 18-month review process, the option to implement a no-first use policy and the idea of an unconditional negative security assurance were both examined. A no-first use policy would mean that the U.S. would never use nuclear weapons first, only in response to a nuclear attack by its opponents; an unconditional negative security assurance would mean that the U.S. would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. Both of these policies could have significantly reduced the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. posture, and they could have also limited the number of adversaries and contingencies that nuclear weapons need to cover. Although these goals were in line with President Obama’s nuclear agenda, the administration decided to adopt a careful alternative in both cases. My paper investigates why President Obama agreed to these alternatives, and the strategic implications of these policies.

About the Speaker: Dr. Anna Péczeli is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. She is also a research fellow at the Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies (National University of Public Service – Budapest, Hungary), where she is currently on sabbatical leave. Previously she was an assistant lecturer at Corvinus University of Budapest, an adjunct fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, a visiting research fellow at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, and a visiting Fulbright fellow at the Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC. Dr. Péczeli earned a Ph.D. degree in International Relations from Corvinus University of Budapest, her research focused on the Obama administration’s nuclear strategy – the review of nuclear guidance, and the extent to which the legacies of the Cold War still define U.S. nuclear planning.

Dr. Péczeli is a member of the G7 Berlin Group – International Coalition for CBRN Security Culture; the European Defence and Security Network (sponsored by the European Parliament); the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI); the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium; and chair of the Executive Board of the International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) group.

Abstract: We all know that we face cyberrisks everyday, from destructive attacks on our critical infrastructure to the theft of intellectual property. Yet countries and companies are woefully behind in making the investments necessary to secure themselves and withstand potential attacks. How should we move forward? Given the range of cyberthreats facing the United States and its allies and partners we should focus on (1) securing our most important missions and operations and (2) on planning for the certainty of some technological disruption. The talk begins by presenting a series of assumptions about the limits and opportunities for security planners in mitigating risks (cyber and otherwise), and then outlines strategic recommendations for governments and companies to improve their cybersecuity posture. It explores elements of effective cyber strategy; the role of leaders in managing cybersecurity across large organizations; the future of public-private partnerships for collective defense and contingency response; and the dark but necessary nature of resiliency planning. 

About the Speaker: Jonathan Reiber is currently Senior Fellow at the University of California at Berkeley's Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity. A writer, speaker, and security researcher, Mr. Reiber held a number of senior advisory positions in the Obama Administration within the U.S. Department of Defense. He was also the principal author of the U.S. Department of Defense Cyber Strategy (2015).

From January 2013 to September 2015, he served as Chief Strategy Officer for Cyber Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. As Chief Strategy Officer, he advised the Pentagon leadership and led strategic initiatives across the cyber policy portfolio, to include strategic planning; key international, interagency, and industry partnerships; and strategic communications. In addition to serving as Chief Strategy Officer, he was also the Executive Secretary of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Cyber Deterrence.

Earlier in the Obama Administration, Mr. Reiber served as Special Assistant and Speechwriter to the United States' Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Ashton B. Carter, and previously as Special Assistant to the United States' Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr. James N. Miller. In both positions he focused on strategy, Middle East security, Asia-Pacific security, cyber policy, and public communications.

From 2007 to 2009, Mr. Reiber was Research Manager at Ergo, a consulting and intelligence firm focusing on emerging markets. At Ergo he coordinated scenario planning exercises and deep-dive geopolitical analysis, advising Fortune 500 companies and other organizations on the political and social affairs of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Earlier in his career he served with the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan, as a policy advisor to the Episcopal Church of the United States, and as a Thomas J. Watson Fellow in South Africa, Italy, India, Turkey and Cyprus, where he studied the role of religion in political and social change.

Mr. Reiber is a graduate of Middlebury College, where he studied Religion, and The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, where he focused his studies on international security and U.S. diplomatic history and served as Editor-in-Chief of The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs.

At Berkeley Mr. Reiber focuses his writing and research on human resilience, national contingency planning, and cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific region. He regularly advises companies and governments on cybersecurity, strategy, and geopolitical risk. 

- This talk is co-sponsored by the Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies (SEED) -

Abstract: Financial markets expose individuals to the broader economy. Does participation in financial markets also lead citizens to re-evaluate the costs of conflict, their views on politics and even their voting decisions? Prior to the 2015 Israeli elections, we randomly assigned financial assets from Israeli and Palestinian companies to likely voters and gave them incentives to actively trade for up to seven weeks. Exposure to financial markets systematically shifted vote choices and increased support for peace initiatives. We delineate the mechanisms for this change and show that financial market exposure led to learning and reevaluation of the economic costs of conflict.

Abstract:   There is a state of high anxiety about this year's election being "hacked" or "rigged". The media began speculating about the possibility when emails were stolen from the Democratic National Committee and, later, Hillary Clinton's campaign chairman, allegedly by state-sponsored hackers. Additionally, Donald Trump has been predicting that the election will be "rigged", worrying many of his supporters. New voter ID requirements have been imposed in many states in response to allegations of "voter fraud", but voting rights advocates worry that these requirements will disenfranchise many voters. In this talk, I will attempt a rational evaluation of election security risks and propose what we should do to address them.

About the Speaker: David L. Dill is the Donald E. Knuth Professor in the School of Engineering and Professor of Computer Science at Stanford University, where he has been on the faculty for 29 years. He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has been working on policy issues in voting technology since 2003. He is the founder of VerifiedVoting.org, whose mission is to safeguard elections in the digital age, and continues to serve as a board director in that organization.  He was a principle investigator in the National Science Foundation's "ACCURATE" voting tresearch center center from 2006 to 2011. In 2004, he received the Electronic Frontier Foundation's "Pioneer Award" for spearheading and nurturing the popular movement for integrity and transparency in modern elections."

Abstract: New defense technologies raise complex questions about states’ abilities to project force, consequences for civilian casualties, and reactions by foreign leaders and publics. Yet many technologies become normalized and legitimated, whereas others are banned. This paper seeks to account for the failure of strong anti-submarine norms to emerge after World War I, in the process legitimizing submarines as a weapon in World War II and beyond. In the First World War, Germany’s submarine commerce warfare was a major point of contention between the great powers, which sought to strategically deploy and manipulate rules and norms of warfare in response to this new technology. However, despite widespread condemnation of Germany’s “barbaric” practices and calls by Great Britain to abolish the weapon entirely, postwar conferences failed to prohibit or effectively regulate submarine warfare. Rather, the submarine has become an accepted defense technology. I argue that Germany demonstrated the utility of submarines as an offensive weapon and the limits of applying existing rules to their use during the war, with consequences for norm creation and cooperation after the war. The paper suggests lessons for current policy debates, as well as insights into the political processes behind the development of norms of war.

About the Speaker: Dr. Jennifer L. Erickson is a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. She is also an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Boston College (on sabbatical in 2016-2017). Her current research project deals with new defense technologies and the creation of laws and norms of war, examining cases on World War I, nuclear weapons after World War II, and new weapons in the contemporary era. Her book, Dangerous Trade: Conventional Arms Exports, Human Rights, and International Reputation (Columbia UP 2015), explains states’ commitment to and compliance with new humanitarian arms trade norms, articulated in the UN Arms Trade Treaty and related multilateral initiatives. She has additional ongoing research projects dealing with sanctions and arms embargoes.

Abstract: DNA synthesis providers form the primary biosecurity safety net for the synthetic biology industry. Twist’s silicon-based DNA synthesis platform allows for synthesis of 2-3 orders of magnitude more DNA in the same footprint as traditional methods. This poses a challenge to existing labor-intensive biosecurity screening practices as recommended by US government guidance. Can the technical and regulatory environments adapt to lower the cost and increase throughput of screening while maintaining or even improving detection accuracy? This talk will provide an overview of current best practices, review technical gaps in existing regulatory guidance and suggest possible improvements to help continue to power the rapid scientific and economic development of synthetic biology.

About the Speaker: James Diggans leads the Bioinformatics and Biosecurity group at Twist Bioscience, a DNA synthesis company based in San Francisco, CA. The group develops algorithms and predictive models and builds large-scale distributed computing systems supporting Twist’s next generation synthesis technology, including biosecurity and export control screening systems. He currently represents Twist’s membership to the International Gene Synthesis Consortium and to the US Department of Commerce/BIS Materials Technical Advisory Committee.

Dr. Diggans received his PhD from George Mason University and previously led the computational biology group at MITRE, designing software-defined biosensors and battlefield chem/bio sensor fusion systems. He has also worked in molecular diagnostics spending five years building and validating machine learning algorithms for cancer detection from tissue biopsy. 

Abstract: The term "natural disasters" diminishes the key role that the human context plays in turning a natural event into a disaster. In this talk, I present scientific insights into the physical processes governing the onset and evolution of extreme events and discuss how this improved understanding the challenges and opportunities that these present for decision-makers and communities at risk. More specifically, I will focus on three disasters of special current relevance, ice-sheet disintegration, coastal risk and injection-induced seismicity. The common denominator of what at first glance might seem like disparate systems is multiphase flow. The dynamic interactions between multiple solid and fluid phases, such as ice and melt-water; vegetation and waves; rocks and wastewater; give rise to drastic nonlinearities that govern abrupt changes in system behavior reflected in extreme events.

Abstract: Current technologies and practices have created large stores of medical data, including electronic medical records, genomic data, and mobile-health measurements.  There is great promise for discovery and implementation of more efficient and effective health care, but there are also tensions between the sharing of data and the ability to make assurances about security and privacy to patients and study participants.  I will discuss these challenges in the setting of genomic research and medical record data mining.  In many cases, social mechanisms are likely to be the more reliable safeguards than technical mechanisms for privacy, security, and obfuscation.

About the Speaker: Russ Biagio Altman is a professor of bioengineering, genetics, medicine, and biomedical data science (and of computer science, by courtesy) and past chairman of the Bioengineering Department at Stanford University. His primary research interests are in the application of computing and informatics technologies to problems relevant to medicine. He is particularly interested in methods for understanding drug action at molecular, cellular, organism and population levels.  His lab studies how human genetic variation impacts drug response (e.g. http://www.pharmgkb.org/). Other work focuses on the analysis of biological molecules to understand the actions, interactions and adverse events of drugs (http://feature.stanford.edu/).  He helps lead an FDA-supported Center of Excellence in Regulatory Science & Innovation (https://pharm.ucsf.edu/cersi). Dr. Altman holds an A.B. from Harvard College, and M.D. from Stanford Medical School, and a Ph.D. in Medical Information Sciences from Stanford. He received the U.S. Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers and a National Science Foundation CAREER Award. He is a fellow of the American College of Physicians (ACP), the American College of Medical Informatics (ACMI), the American Institute of Medical and Biological Engineering (AIMBE), and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). He is a member of the National Academy of Medicine (formerly the Institute of Medicine, IOM) of the National Academies.  He is a past-President, founding board member, and a Fellow of the International Society for Computational Biology (ISCB), and a past-President of the American Society for Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics (ASCPT).  He has chaired the Science Board advising the FDA Commissioner, currently serves on the NIH Director’s Advisory Committee, and is Co-Chair of the IOM Drug Forum.  He is an organizer of the annual Pacific Symposium on Biocomputing (http://psb.stanford.edu/), and a founder of Personalis, Inc.  Dr. Altman is board certified in Internal Medicine and in Clinical Informatics. He received the Stanford Medical School graduate teaching award in 2000, and mentorship award in 2014.

Abstract: In the 1970s, soaring oil prices provided huge revenues to oil producing Arab countries, which, together with private Arab companies and individuals, invested billions of dollars in the U.S. economy. The influx of Arab petodollars drew mixed reactions from Americans. Some feared that wealthy Arabs were “buying up America” and gaining control over the nation’s political, economic, educational, and cultural institutions. Others welcomed Arab investment as a boon to the U.S. economy and to global stability. Petrodollars also played a key role in Arab American history. Demeaning portrayals of oil-rich Arabs in media and government discourse—reaching a crescendo in the FBI’s “Abscam” sting operations of 1978-1980—goaded Arab Americans to adopt more organized methods of combating anti-Arab stereotypes. Salim Yaqub draws on his new book, Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s, to explore the complex legacy of Arab petrodollars in American life.

About the Speaker: Salim Yaqub is Professor of History at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and Director of UCSB’s Center for Cold War Studies and International History. He is the author of Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (University of North Carolina, 2004) and of several articles and book chapters on the history of U.S. foreign relations, the international politics of the Middle East, and Arab American political activism. His second book, Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s, was published by Cornell University Press in September 2016.

Abstract: Deterrence is one of the most central concepts in international relations scholarship. Countries can dissuade changes to the status quo, according to the logic of deterrence, by threatening an opponent with pain (deterrence by punishment) or by reducing the probability that an opponent will achieve its aims (deterrence by denial). In the realm of international security, most deterrence theorists assume that states need military capabilities to deter by punishment or denial. Deterrence works, based on this line of thinking, because states can use military power to destroy cities, bomb critical military targets, or blunt land invasions. It is also possible, however, to punish an adversary without invoking destruction militarily. Yet deterrence through non-military means remains poorly understood in international relations. This project develops a theory to identify the conditions under which countries can deter opponents without using threats of military force. I explore the implications of this theory in one particular context: the development of dual-use nuclear technology. Having the capability to build nuclear weapons — a condition known as “nuclear latency” — may provide countries with deterrence benefits that we normally associate with having a nuclear arsenal. When states achieve nuclear latency, they (implicitly) threaten to develop nuclear weapons at some point in the future. The threat here is to pursue a policy that others would find undesirable, not to physically destroy things of value on another state’s territory, as in traditional deterrence theory. Does this kind of threat discourage others from meddling in a country’s affairs? This study presents the results of an analysis designed to identify the effects of nuclear latency (and nuclear arsenals) on the onset of international conflict from 1945 to 2000, drawing on a new dataset of sensitive dual-use nuclear plants in 32 countries.

About the Speaker: Matthew Fuhrmann is an associate professor of political science and Ray A. Rothrock `77 Fellow at Texas A&M University. He was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow in 2016 by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. He is the author of Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Cornell University Press, 2012) and the coauthor of Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2016). His work has been published or is forthcoming in peer-reviewed journals such as American Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, and Journal of Politics. He has also written opinion pieces for The Atlantic (online), The Christian Science Monitor, Slate, and USA Today. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. You can follow him on Twitter @mcfuhrmann.