Abstract: How easily and quickly can states rise in the military domain? Do industrial espionage and in particular cyber-espionage facilitate and accelerate this process? In other words, are there empirical and theoretical reasons to believe that other states can easily imitate U.S. advanced weapon systems and thus erode American military- technological superiority? Drawing from the literature in economic history, economics, management and sociology, we maintain that the dramatic increase in the complexity of military technology that has taken place over the past 150 years has led to a change in the system of production, which in turn has made the imitation and the replication of the performance of military technology more difficult - despite globalization and advances in communications. As a result, developing advanced weapon systems has become significantly more challenging. We test our theory on a set of crucial case studies addressing possible cofounders. The available evidence supports our account. Our findings reassure about the threat of cyber-espionage, the role of globalization in armaments production and rise of China for American military-technological superiority. 

About the Speaker: Dr. Andrea Gilli is a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He holds a PhD in Social and Political Science from the European University Institute (EUI) in Fiesole, and in 2015 he was awarded the European Defence Agency and Egmont Institute’s bi-annual prize for the best dissertation on European defense, security and strategy. Andrea’s research focuses on change in military technology and its implications for international security. At CISAC, he is working on the consequences of the robotics revolutions for American military primacy. In the past, Andrea provided consulting services to both private and public organizations, and worked or was associated with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Preparatory Commission for the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the NATO Defense College, the Royal United Services Institute, the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS-Johns Hopkins University, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies at the Columbia University in New York and the Center for Security Studies at Metropolitan University Prague. Andrea has published articles on suicide terrorism, the diffusion of drone warfare and defense policy more in general in Security Studies, The RUSI Journal, and Washington Post’s Monkey Cage, among others.

Abstract: Russia’s adaptation to the changing character of war has been an object of an ongoing discussion among security experts. Contemporary warfare is being profoundly altered by an increasingly wired world, disruptive technologies, the role of information and social interactions; it aims to impact the state’s entire capacity by exerting political, economic and cultural influence rather than by annihilating the adversary. As put by the Russian General Staff, the 21st century wars are not even declared and nonmilitary tools play an increasing role in achieving objectives of war. Russia’s swift annexation of Crimea, as well as a widespread use of disinformation, cyber attacks, electronic warfare, economic levers, and a spectrum of other means merging military, nonmilitary, asymmetrical and indirect approaches have supposedly manifested a new doctrinal and operational era in the Russian strategy, called ‘hybrid war,’ ‘new generation warfare,’ ‘non-linear war,’ or even ‘ambiguous war,’ among other terms. However, the assessments of Russian strategy lack conceptual clarity and have been accompanied by conflicting narratives, one portraying Russia as a master of strategy that has outmaneuvered the United States in key international security issues, the other claiming that strategic thinking is foreign to the current Russian authorities. This study identifies misconceptions about Russia’s contemporary military strategy, disentangles its theoretical foundations, and examines key patterns in the Russian adaptation to the challenges of modern-day and future conflict.

About the Speaker: Dr. Katarzyna Zysk is an associate professor at the Norwegian Defence University College – the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo, a position she has held since 2007. In the academic year 2016–2017, she is on a sabbatical leave and serves as a visiting scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, and subsequently as a visiting fellow at the University of Oxford. She is also a member of the Hoover Institution’s Arctic Security Initiative and was a research fellow (resident and non-resident) at the US Naval War College – Center for Naval Warfare Studies, where she also cooperated closely with the War Gaming Department. In 2016, she served as an acting dean of the Norwegian Defence University College. Dr. Zysk has an academic background in international relations and international history. Following her PhD thesis on NATO enlargement (2006), her research and publications have focused on various aspects of security and strategic studies, in particular on Russia’s security and defense policies, including military change and modernization of the Russian armed forces, strategic culture, political philosophy, Arctic geopolitics, as well as uses of seapower and maritime security. Currently, she is writing a book about Russia’s military strategy. 

Abstract: Since their conception in the 1950s, thorium reactors have been promoted as a promising technology for nuclear energy generation, though they have not yet been successfully commercialized. Proponents of thorium reactors argue that they are safer, produce less waste, and are proliferation-resistant, compared with uranium-fueled light water reactors used around the world today. The central question guiding this research concerns the final claim. Is the thorium fuel cycle inherently more resistant to nuclear weapons proliferation than the traditional uranium fuel cycle?

Advocates argue that the thorium fuel cycle is less vulnerable to proliferation of nuclear weapons technology because little or no plutonium is produced. Additionally, fissile U-233 is claimed to be “self-protected” by U-232, which is produced with U-233 and decays through Tl-208, emitting highly energetic gamma radiation. But the amount of U-232 generated depends on reactor operation. Furthermore, the U-232 content can be further decreased by conducting chemical separations at the back-end of the fuel cycle.

This presentation will discuss the proliferation risks of the thorium fuel cycle. The potential for generating large stockpiles of isotopically pure U-233 by conducting protactinium separations at the back end of the fuel cycle is examined as a new proliferation pathway that current IAEA safeguards may not be prepared to address.

About the Speaker: Eva C. Uribe is a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC for the 2016-2017 academic year. Her research involves identifying proliferation pathways in the thorium fuel cycle and assessing the potential impact and implications of U-233 stockpile generation on the international nonproliferation regime. Eva received a Ph.D. in Chemistry from the University of California, Berkeley in 2016. Her dissertation research focused on structural analysis of organically-modified porous silica surfaces for the extraction of uranium from aqueous solutions using nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy. In 2011 Eva received a B.S. from Yale University with a double major in Chemistry and Political Science. She served as a Next Generation Safeguards Initiative intern with the Nonproliferation Division at Los Alamos National Laboratory in 2008 and 2009.

Abstract: While impressive strides have been made in detecting physical evidence of nuclear weapons production, there is no consensus on how international relationships combine to motivate or deter policymakers from seeking nuclear weapons. Rather than address a single variable, this study investigates how networks of interstate conflict, alliances, trade, and nuclear cooperation merge to increase or decrease the proliferation likelihood of individual states. Using multiplex networks to study the structure of international relations factors theorized to deter or incentivize nuclear proliferation and open-source data on military alliances, macroeconomic ties, armed conflicts, and nuclear cooperation agreements, we construct a multilayer network model in which states are nodes linked by proliferation-relevant variables. This work shows the first quantitative heterogenous analysis of external proliferation determinants using a network science formalism and opens a new avenue of study of the external proliferation motivators for each state within an international network. Preliminary findings suggest that specific external relations—particularly the existence of armed conflict and the signing of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements—largely explain the decision of states to proliferate or not.

About the Speaker: Bethany L. Goldblum is a member of the research faculty in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. She is the Scientific Director of the Nuclear Science and Security Consortium, a multi-institution initiative established by DOE’s NNSA to support the nation’s nonproliferation mission through cutting-edge research in nuclear security science in collaboration with the national laboratories. Goldblum founded and directs the Nuclear Policy Working Group, an interdisciplinary team of undergraduate and graduate students focused on developing policy solutions to strengthen global nuclear security. She has been involved with the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Boot Camp nearly since its inception, and acted as director of the program since 2013. Goldblum received a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley in 2007.

Abstract: A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that changes in climate are associated with increases in human violence.  I review new and recent evidence on this topic, using data ranging from baseball games in the US to civil war in Africa.  Across disparate settings, warmer-than-average temperatures are shown to cause increases in violence, with effect sizes that are both consistent and large.  Economic theories of conflict appear to explain some of the linkage between climate and conflict, but are not consistent with the data in all settings. Constructive engagement with the political science and security communities will be very helpful in understanding and interpreting these findings.

About the Speaker: Marshall Burke is assistant professor in the Department of Earth System Science, and Center Fellow at the Center on Food Security and the Environment at Stanford University. His research focuses on social and economic impacts of environmental change, and on the economics of rural development in Africa. His work has appeared in both economics and scientific journals, including recent publications in Nature, Science, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, and the Review of Economics and Statistics. He holds a PhD in Agricultural and Resource Economics from UC Berkeley, and a BA in International Relations from Stanford.

This event is at maximum capacity. We thank you for your interest and regret that we cannot accept more registrations.

- This event is part of the Robert G. Wesson Lectures Series -

About the Event: Michael Morell, Former Deputy Director and twice Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, will be interviewed by Amy Zegart, CISAC Co-director and Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Audience members will have an opportunity to ask questions after the interview. 

About the Speaker: Michael Morell, the former Acting Director and Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, is the Wesson Lecturer at the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Center for International Security and Cooperation for 2017. He is one of our nation’s leading national security professionals, with extensive experience in intelligence and foreign policy.  He has been at the center of our nation’s fight against terrorism, its work to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and its efforts to respond to trends that are altering the international landscape—including the Arab Spring, the rise of China, and the cyber threat.  Politico has called Michael the “Bob Gates of his generation.”

During his 33-year career at CIA, Michael served as Deputy Director for over three years, a job in which he managed the Agency’s day-to-day operations, represented the Agency at the White House and Congress, and maintained the Agency’s relationships with intelligence services and foreign leaders around the world.  Michael also served twice as Acting Director, leading CIA when Leon Panetta was named Secretary of Defense and again after David Petraeus left government.

Michael’s senior assignments at CIA also included serving for two years as the Director of Intelligence, the Agency’s top analyst, and for two years as Executive Director, the CIA’s top administrator—managing human resources, the budget, security, and information technology for an agency the size of a Fortune 200 firm.

Michael has been a witness to history on multiple occasions.  He is the only person who was both with President Bush on September 11th, when al-Qaida burst into the American consciousness, and with President Obama on May 1st, when Bin Laden was brought to justice.  Michael played a major role in the Bin Laden operation.

Michael is known inside CIA for his leadership.  He inspired individuals and work units to perform beyond expectations.  He mentored most of the Agency’s current senior leadership team, including a significant number of women and minorities.  When he departed CIA, thousands of officers wrote Michael notes of thanks.

Michael is the recipient of many awards.  He received the Presidential Rank Award for exceptional performance – the nation’s highest honor for civilian service.  He also received the Distinguished Intelligence Medal, CIA’s highest award, for his role in the Bin Laden operation.  Michael is also the recipient of the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, and the Department of Defense Service Medal.    

Today, Michael is involved in a wide range of activities.  He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company; Senior Counselor to Washington’s fastest growing consulting firm, Beacon Global Strategies; and a consultant to a number of private sector entities.  He is the Chairman of the Board of one of those entities – Culpeper National Security Solutions, a subsidiary of DynCorp International.

Much of what Michael does today is tied to national security.  Until recently, he was a senior national security contributor for CBS News.  He is a frequent guest on the Charlie Rose Show discussing national security issues.  He is a Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government; a Senior Fellow at West Point’s Center on Combatting Terrorism; a resident fellow this fall at the Institute of Politics at the University of Chicago, a member of the Aspen Institute’s Homeland Security Group, which advises the Secretary of Homeland Security on national security issues; a member of the Board of Director’s of the Atlantic Council, a member of the Advisory Board to the University of Chicago’s Project on Security and Terrorism, and a member of the Atlantic Council’s advisory group to its study on the future of the Middle East.  He served as a Member of President Obama’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology.

Michael is the author of the New York Times bestseller on CIA’s nearly 20-year fight against al Qa`ida.  The title of the book is “The Great War of Our Time:  An Insider’s Account of the CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism – From al Qaida to ISIS.”  It was published in May 2015.

Michael is a native of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, and he maintains close ties to northeast Ohio.  His father and mother—who taught him hard work, the pursuit of excellence, and humility—were an autoworker and a homemaker.  Michael is a first-generation college student, earning a B.A. summa cum laude in economics from the University of Akron.  He also earned an M.A. in economics from Georgetown University.  

Michael is involved with charities associated with supporting the families of fallen soldiers and intelligence officers.