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This event is restricted to current Stanford students, faculty, staff and visiting scholars. 
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Abstract: Machines are increasingly helping us with cognitive tasks in addition to physical labor. Like the industrial revolution, this transition in how we use machines will have major impacts on the security of states and the character of armed conflict. How should we think about this transition? What issues should we prepare for? I will parse several broad areas where AI applications may affect elements of national power, and highlight issues we can already see emerging for national security leaders.
 
Speaker Bio: Dr. Matthew Daniels works for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and NASA. His principal areas of focus include U.S. space programs, deep space exploration, and artificial intelligence. Previously he was an engineer at NASA, where he worked on spacecraft designs and special projects for the director of NASA Ames in Mountain View, CA. Matt received his Ph.D. and M.S. degrees in engineering from Stanford and a B.A. in physics from Cornell, was a fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and is an adjunct professor at Georgetown.
 

William J. Perry Conference Room

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

616 Serra Street

Stanford, CA 94305

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Affiliate
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Dr. Matthew Daniels is a technology and policy leader in Washington and New York. He has held technical, leadership, and strategy roles at the White House, NASA, and Department of Defense. His work focuses on space security, exploration, and technology strategy.

At the White House, Matt led initiatives on space and national security, Lunar exploration, US-India space cooperation, and planetary defense. He has also served as Senior Advisor to the Director of Net Assessment, focusing on space and nuclear security; the DOD's Tech Director for AI, overseeing the DOD's broad AI R&D portfolio; and a senior technical advisor in the office of the NASA Administrator, focusing on deep space exploration and development. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Matt started as an engineer at NASA, received his Ph.D. from Stanford, and was a fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He has twice been a recipient of Department of Defense Distinguished Service medals. For his work on planetary defense, Asteroid 22028 Matthewdaniels, discovered by the Catalina Sky Survey, is named for him. 

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Advisor Department of Defense and NASA
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Abstract: This talk examines the history of environmental data systems in the context of the Trump administration’s assault on environmental science. Tracking and understanding environmental change requires “long data,” i.e. consistent, reliable sampling over long periods of time. Weather observations can become climate data, for example — but only if carefully curated and adjusted to account for changes in instrumentation and data analysis methods. Environmental knowledge institutions therefore depend on an ongoing “truce” among scientific and political actors. Climate denialism and deregulatory movements seek to destabilize this truce. In recent months, with the installation of climate change deniers and non-scientist ideologues as leaders of American knowledge institutions, wholesale dismantling of some environmental data systems has begun. These developments threaten the continuity of “long data” vital to tracking climate change and other environmental disruptions with significant consequences for both domestic and international security.
 
Speaker bio: Paul N. Edwards is William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at Stanford University (from July 2017) and Professor of Information at the University of Michigan. He writes and teaches about the history, politics, and culture of information infrastructures. Edwards is the author of A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming (MIT Press, 2010) and The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (MIT Press, 1996), and co-editor of Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance (MIT Press, 2001), as well as numerous articles.

 

William J. Perry Fellow in International Security Stanford University
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Abstract: What is the strategic value of cyber weapons? Even though a growing body of research has addressed the destructive potential of cyber weapons, there remains a large gap in thinking about the strategic utility of these capabilities. The purpose of this paper is to partially fill this gap, by means of assessing under what conditions 'counterforce’ and ‘countervalue’ cyber weapons can be effective. I argue that cyber weapons can provide an ‘extra option’ to leaders. The discussed cases suggest that they can be used both as an important force-multiplier enabler for conventional military assets or as independent capability. Cyber weapons can also be used to achieve a form of psychological ascendancy and can be used effectively with few casualties.

Speaker Bio: Max Smeets is a cybersecurity fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and holds a DPhil in International Relations from the University of Oxford, St. John’s College. Max current book project focuses on the causes underlying cyber proliferation and restraint. The results of this research are valuable for understanding the likely changes in the future prevalence of cyber weapons. It clarifies to what degree this is an ‘inevitable’ development – and if/how it can be stopped.

Max was a College Lecturer in Politics at Keble College, University of Oxford, and Research Affiliate of the Oxford Cyber Studies Programme. He was also a Carnegie Visiting Scholar at Columbia University SIPA and a Doctoral Visiting Scholar at Sciences Po CERI. He holds an undergraduate degree from University College Roosevelt, Utrecht University, and an M.Phil in International Relations from the University of Oxford, Brasenose College.  Max has a diverse professional background, having worked for financial, political, and non-governmental organizations.

 

 

 

William J. Perry Conference Room

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

616 Serra Street

Stanford, CA 94305

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Max Smeets is the Co-Director of Virtual Routes, and serves as Managing Editor of Binding Hook. He also holds research positions at ETH Zurich, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. Max is the author of Ransom War: How Cyber Crime Became a Threat to National Security and No Shortcuts: Why States Struggle to Develop a Military Cyber Force.

Max received a BA in Economics, Politics and Statistics from University College Roosevelt, Utrecht University and an MPhil (Brasenose College) and DPhil (St. John’s College) in International Relations from the University of Oxford.

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Cybersecurity Fellow CISAC
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Abstract: Sustaining strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China is a long-standing U.S. national security goal. Meeting this goal is growing more challenging due to tectonic geopolitical and technological changes. On the geopolitical side, new dynamics and new uncertainties are created by China’s emergence as an increasingly capable and assertive great power, Russia’s regional revanchism and political operations, and America’s uncertainty about its role in the world amidst its divisive domestic politics. On the technology side, advances in military capabilities for cyberspace, outer space, missile defense, long-range strike, and a range of AI-related areas including autonomous systems and big data analytics, are changing the dynamics of crisis management and conflict escalation. At the extreme, such technological advances could undermine confidence in one or more side's nuclear second-strike capabilities, thereby provoking arms racing in the near-term, and potentially “use or lose” dynamics in the longer-term. After outlining the dimensions of this growing set of challenges, Dr. Miller will offer a number of specific recommendations for U.S. policy, military force posture, and engagement with Russia and China.

Speaker Bio: Dr. James N. Miller is President of Adaptive Strategies, LLC, which provides consulting on strategy development and implementation, international engagement, and technology issues. He is a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab and Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. He serves on the Defense Science Board, for which he recently co-chaired a task force report on cyber deterrence, the Board of Directors for the Atlantic Council, and the Board of Advisors for the Center for a New American Security. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from May 2012 to January 2014, Dr. Miller served as the principal civilian advisor to Secretaries Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel on strategy, policy, and operations, and as DoD’s Deputy for National Security Council deliberations. He served as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from April 2009 to May 2012, and previously in numerous leadership positions in government, academia, non-profits, and the private sector over a thirty-year career in national security. He received a B.A. degree in economics from Stanford University, and Master’s and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard’s JFK School of Government.  

William J. Perry Conference Room

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

616 Serra Street

Stanford, CA 94305

James N. Miller Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (former)
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Abstract: We live in a world where the risks from a changing climate are clear. New research highlights the magnitude of the risks and the benefits of rapid, ambitious action. We also live in a world where the technologies for addressing climate change, for limiting the amount of climate change that occurs and for dealing as effectively as possible with the changes that cannot be avoided, are increasingly mature, affordable, and rich with co-benefits. In many ways and in many places, progress in deploying solutions is dramatic. But worldwide, progress is much slower than it needs to be, if we are to avoid the worst impacts. We need to find a global accelerator pedal for climate solutions. Key enablers include steps to level the economic playing field, government investments to drive down the costs and risks of technology solutions, and novel mechanisms to spur international collaboration.

Speaker Bio: Chris Field is the Perry L. McCarty Director of the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment and Melvin and Joan Lane Professor for Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies. His research focuses on climate change, ranging from work on improving climate models, to prospects for renewable energy systems, to community organizations that can minimize the risk of a tragedy of the commons. Field was the founding director of the Carnegie Institution’s Department of Global Ecology, a position he held from 2002 to 2016. He was co-chair of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change from 2008-2015, where he led the effort on the IPCC Special Report on “Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation”  (2012) and the Working Group II contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (2014) on Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. His widely cited work has earned many recognitions, including election to the US National Academy of Sciences, the Max Planck Research Award, and the Roger Revelle Medal.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

616 Serra Street

Stanford, CA 94305

Chris Field Professor for Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University
Seminars
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Abstract: The United States is (belatedly) waking up to the risk that adversaries will use social media and botnets to influence U.S. elections. However, we have only begun to analyze how adversaries might conduct information operations in the United States to help advance other political goals, especially during intense crises or escalating cyber conflicts.  Strategies to counter such information operations in the U.S. homeland do not exist. To help begin filling that gap, this presentation examines the risk that adversaries will combine cyberattacks on the power grid with disinformation campaigns, tailored to maximize the disruptive effect of blackouts and gain leverage over U.S. leaders for conflict resolution. The presentation also proposes how the electric industry can build on its expertise for “unity of messaging” in hurricane-induced outages, and partner with government agencies to meet the very different (and vastly more difficult) challenges of countering information warfare.  

Speaker Bio: Paul Stockton is the Managing Director of Sonecon LLC, an economic and security advisory firm in Washington, DC.  Before joining Sonecon, Dr. Stockton served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs from May 2009 until January 2013.  In that position, he helped lead the Department’s response to Superstorm Sandy and other disasters. Dr. Stockton also guided Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection policies and programs. Dr. Stockton was twice awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, DOD's highest civilian award. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University and a BA from Dartmouth College.  He is the author of Superstorm Sandy: Implications for Designing a Post-Cyber Attack Power Restoration System and numerous other publications on cybersecurity and infrastructure resilience. 

Paul Stockton Managing Director Sonecon
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Abstract: Continuing social concerns over nuclear energy technologies still limit the application of long-term solutions to nuclear waste management in most countries. These concerns result from a lack of public trust in the scientific basis used in the decision-making approach to waste disposal, particularly the siting of a geologic repository.  Also, nuclear waste issues have become intertwined with the discussion of the future of nuclear energy. Moreover, setting aside the technical uncertainties about the long-term behavior of the waste materials under extended geologic disposal conditions, a scientific dilemma exists about how to deal with the preferences of future generations that will have to safely manage the waste. This stalemate situation has motivated an effort to frame the discussion from a different and interdisciplinary perspective.

An innovative approach to nuclear waste management called ENTRUST is proposed. The approach consists of an analytical framework for the holistic assessment of nuclear waste management strategies and policies where the primary focus is on building and maintaining public trust. Based on a careful use of quantitative information for technical issues, ENTRUST seeks to support a participative and deliberative analysis of the policy and narratives on strategies for nuclear waste management and disposal.

Speaker Bio: François Diaz-Maurin is a Nuclear Security Visiting Scholar at CISAC (2017-2019) and a European Commission’s Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow (2017-2020).

François’ research at CISAC deals with the issue of the long-term management of nuclear waste produced at commercial power plants in a context of uncertain transitions and persisting social concerns over nuclear energy technologies. His interdisciplinary research seeks to merge quantitative and qualitative methods for the holistic study of nuclear waste management systems and policies.

In this talk, François will be presenting the preliminary results of his 3-year research project entitled “Building Trust in Nuclear Waste Management through Participatory Quantitative Story Telling (ENTRUST)”. The project will contribute to CISAC’s “Reset of U.S. Nuclear Waste Management Policy” science-policy initiative.

François received both B.S. (2004, with distinction) and M.S. (2007, with distinction) degrees in civil engineering from the University of Rennes 1, France, and a Ph.D. degree in environmental science and technology (2013, summa cum laude) from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain. Before joining academia, François spent four years as an engineer in the design of nuclear energy technologies in Paris, France (2007-2008) and in Boston, MA (2009-2010) for AREVA Inc. North America and AREVA Federal Services LLC.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

616 Serra Street

Stanford, CA 94305

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François Diaz-Maurin is the editor for nuclear affairs at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Previously, Diaz-Maurin was a MacArthur Foundation Nuclear Security Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, and a European Commission’s Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow. He has been a scientific advisor to members of the European Parliament on nuclear issues, and he is a founding member of the Emerging Leaders in Environmental and Energy Policy network (ELEEP) of the Atlantic Council, Washington D.C. and the Ecologic Institute, Berlin.

Prior to joining academia, Diaz-Maurin spent four years as a research engineer in the nuclear industry in Paris, France and Boston, MA. There, he worked on the safety design of new reactors and of a treatment plant to vitrify Hanford’s tank waste from WWII and Cold War nuclear weapons production.

Diaz-Maurin received multi-disciplinary training in civil engineering (B.Sc./M.Sc., University of Rennes 1, 2004/2007, both with distinction), environmental and sustainability sciences (Ph.D., Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2013, summa cum laude and “Extraordinary Ph.D.” Award), and nuclear materials, geochemistry of radionuclides and nuclear security (postdoctoral training, Stanford University, 2017–2019).

Diaz-Maurin reads, writes, and speaks French, English, Spanish, and Catalan. Outside the office, he is a classical music lover and an amateur cellist.

He is based in Barcelona, Spain.

Affiliate
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Nuclear Security Visiting Scholar CISAC
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Abstract: As a potential measure of mitigating the contribution of fossil fuel emissions to global warming, carbon dioxide (CO2) capture and storage (CCS) entails capturing CO2 from from large industrial sources, compressing it to a dense supercritical form (scCO2), injecting it deep into suitable reservoirs, and storing it permanently. After 20+ years of research on CCS, including various applied studies involving pilot and demonstration projects, many stakeholders believe that the world is now ready to move from demonstration to industrial-scale implementation. Yet many hurdles remain, ranging from mostly technical nature to economic and public perception issues. This talk provides a broad overview of the decades of research on CO2 and discusses what has been learned versus what challenges remain. The presentation also elaborates on California as an interesting example for the complicated road to deployment at scale, as ambitious climate goals and generous carbon credits should provide for project economics to work, yet no California CCS project has materialized to date.

Speaker Bio: Jens Birkholzer is an internationally recognized expert in subsurface energy applications and environmental impact assessment. He is a Senior Scientist at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL, Berkeley Lab) in Berkeley, California, and currently serves as the Director for the Energy Geosciences Division (EGD) at LBNL. He received his Ph.D. in water resources, hydrology, and soil science from Aachen University of Technology in Germany in 1994. Jens joined LBNL in 1994, left for a management position in his native Germany in 1999, and eventually returned to LBNL in 2001. He has over 400 scientific publications, about 125 of which are in peer-reviewed journals, in addition to numerous research reports. He serves as the Associate Editor of the International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control (IJGGC) and is also on the Board of Editorial Policy Advisors for the Journal of Geomechanics for Energy and Environment (GETE). Jens leads the international DECOVALEX Project as its Chairman, is a Fellow of the Geological Society of America, and serves as a Senior Fellow of the California Council on Science and Technology.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

616 Serra Street

Stanford, CA 94305

Jens Birkholzer Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Seminars
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Abstract: Why do moderate majorities often fail to coordinate opposition to extremist minorities? This paper offers an explanation for the microfoundations of moderate mobilization in the face of extremist minorities using the case of Islamist extremism in Indonesia. In particular, I show that moderates and extremists face asymmetric costs in the decision to voice their true preferences resulting in a coordination dilemma for moderates, which I call the “Moderates’ Dilemma.” An original survey experiment and observational data of participant behavior during two additional surveys demonstrate that moderates hide anti-violent views for fear of reputation costs and that these effects vary by individuals’ sensitivity to reputation costs and degree of uncertainty of others’ attitudes. These findings suggest that over 16 million Indonesians may be hiding moderate preferences and have significant implications for countering violent extremism policies globally. 

Speaker Bio: Kerry Ann Carter Persen is a Carnegie Predoctoral Fellow at CISAC for the 2017-2018 academic year and a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. Her research focuses on the impact of violent extremism on political behavior in the Islamic World.

In her dissertation, she develops a theory of the microfoundations of moderate mobilization against extremist groups using the case of Islamist extremism in Indonesia.  Employing fieldwork, survey data, and observational data, she shows that moderates and extremists face asymmetric costs in the decision to voice their private preferences publicly. This asymmetry results in a failure of moderates to act collectively in line with their individual beliefs, a coordination dilemma called the “Moderates Dilemma.”
 
Kerry’s research has been supported by the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Institute for Peace, the Horowitz Foundation, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), and the Vice Provost for Graduate Education at Stanford University, among others.
 
Prior to graduate school, Kerry spent a Fulbright year in Indonesia and worked at the U.S-Indonesia Society in Washington, D.C. She graduated summa cum laude from Bowdoin College with a double major in Government and Economics.
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Dr. Kerry Ann Carter Persen is an expert in the intersection of technology and societal concerns, particularly countering violent extremism, dual use and emerging technologies, and misinformation. She currently works on Stripe’s Public Policy team and is a Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project. 

Previously, Kerry has worked on the Global Policy team at Meta on AR/VR technologies and data privacy issues, at the Institute for the Future on misinformation and as a political consultant at RiceHadleyGates LLC, a strategic consulting firm led by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. She has also been a Fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, a Minerva Fellow at the U.S. Institute for Peace, a Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs at Georgetown University, and a Fulbright Fellow in Indonesia.

Kerry received her Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University, where her research was supported by the National Science Foundation, the Horowitz Foundation, and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), among others. She graduated summa cum laude from Bowdoin College with a double major in Government and Economics.

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Predoctoral Fellow CISAC
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Abstract: Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly improving. The opportunities are tremendous, but so are the risks. Existing and soon-to-exist capabilities pose several plausible extreme governance challenges. These include massive labor displacement, extreme inequality, an oligopolistic global market structure, reinforced authoritarianism, shifts and volatility in national power, and strategic instability. Further, there is no apparent ceiling to AI capabilities, experts envision that superhuman capabilities in strategic domains will be achieved in the coming four decades, and radical surprise breakthroughs are possible. Such achievements would likely transform wealth, power, and world order, though global politics will in turn crucially shape how AI is developed and deployed. The consequences are plausibly of a magnitude and on a timescale to dwarf other global concerns, leaders of governments and firms are asking for policy guidance, and yet scholarly attention to the AI revolution remains negligible. Research is thus urgently needed on the AI governance problem: the problem of devising global norms, policies, and institutions to best ensure the beneficial development and use of advanced AI.

This problem can be broken into three complementary research clusters:

  1. The technical landscape: What are the trends and possibilities in AI capabilities? What are their likely consequences? What are the externalities from AI, and how can they best be addressed?
  2. AI politics: Who are the relevant actors, what are their interests, and what can they do? What is the nature of the conflict and cooperation challenges that they are likely to face? How can they overcome dangerous conflictual dynamics, in particular an international arms race?
  3. AI governance: Given our understanding of the technical landscape and AI politics, what options are available to us for global governance of AI and what should we work towards?

 

Work on the AI governance problem must draw on the full body of social science and policy expertise. Solutions are needed by an unknown, but plausibly impending, deadline.

Speaker Bio: Allan Dafoe is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University and a Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. His research seeks to understand the causes of world peace and stability. Specifically, his research has examined the causes of the liberal peace, and the role of reputation and honor as motives for war. He develops methodological tools and approaches to enable more transparent, credible causal inference. Allan is beginning research on the international politics of transformative artificial intelligence.

William J. Perry Conference Room

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

616 Serra Street

Stanford, CA 94305

Allan Dafoe Assistant Professor of Political Science Yale University
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