Abstract: Against a backdrop of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases of natural origin, fueled by changes in land use and global climate, there is an ongoing revolution in the life sciences with growing empowerment of the individual to decipher, genetically alter, and manufacture living things. In addition to widely-touted potential benefits, these events and developments pose challenges and risks of profound harm to humans and the rest of the planet. Yet, the United States and most other nations have failed to respond with a strategic plan, sustained resources, coherent leadership, critical self-assessment, and accountability. Why is this? A selected history of recent naturally-occurring disease outbreaks and advances in the life sciences that create new risks of potential misuse will be offered, differing perspectives from the science and policy communities described, and some of the efforts to address these challenges summarized. Forward-looking proposals for efforts to mitigate risk in the life sciences will be discussed.

Speaker Bio: David A. Relman, M.D., is the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in Medicine, and Microbiology & Immunology at Stanford University, and Chief of Infectious Diseases at the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System. He is also Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and served as science co-director at the Center for International Security and Cooperation from 2013-2017. He is currently director of a new Biosecurity Initiative at FSI.

Relman identified several historically important and novel microbial disease agents, and was an early pioneer in the modern study of the human indigenous microbiota (microbiome). His lab group currently examines human microbial community assembly, and community stability and resilience.

Among policy-relevant activities, Relman is currently a member of the Intelligence Community Studies Board at the National Academies of Science (NAS), served as vice-chair of the NAS Committee that reviewed the science performed for the FBI 2001 Anthrax Letters investigation, and was a member of the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity. He was elected to the National Academy of Medicine in 2011. 

Abstract: The threat of biological catastrophes-- stemming from natural, accidental or intentional causes-- looms ever larger as populations urbanize, global temperatures rise, and the access to biological weapons spreads. In fact, climate change and the increasing ease with which biological weapons may be obtained represent two significant threats to public health. As these threats materialize, they test nations’ resources, capabilities, and strength. Through an examination of the policy and scientific challenges posed by weaponized biological agents as well as by the growing public health risks stemming from climate change impacts, key gaps in bio-preparedness emerge. Bio-preparedness efforts, nationally and globally, do not currently keep pace with emerging biological risks. Will the scientific and policy communities find common ground to move the global health agenda forward through prevention, detection, and response?

Speaker Bio: Alice Hill is a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.  She previously served at the White House as Special Assistant to President Barack Obama and Senior Director for Resilience Policy on the National Security Council.  Hill led the creation of national policy regarding catastrophic risk, including the impacts of climate change and biological threats.

Hill previously served as Senior Counselor to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  She headed the DHS Biological Leadership group and led development of Department strategies and policies regarding catastrophic biological and chemical incidents, ranging from pandemics to weapons of mass destruction.  Hill also founded and was the first Chair of the Blue Campaign, an internationally recognized anti-human trafficking campaign.

Earlier in her career, Hill has served as a supervising judge on the Los Angeles Superior Court and as chief of the white-collar crime unit in the Los Angeles US Attorney’s Office.

She is a frequent speaker and has been quoted in the NY Times, Washington Post, and Los Angeles Times, among other publications. She has appeared on CBS, NPR, and MSNBC and her commentary has been published in Newsweek, LawFare, The Hill, and other media.  She has received numerous awards and commendations, including the Department of Justice’s highest award for legal accomplishment, Harvard’s Meta-Leader of the Year Award, and the San Fernando Valley Bar’s Judge of the Year.

Abstract: As the orbital space around earth becomes increasingly crowded, there is an increasing need to capture and manipulate objects ranging from satellites and antennas to “uncooperative” space debris. Robots have been proposed as a solution for clearing debris and manipulating objects in space. However, many of the traditional techniques used for robotic grasping and manipulation will not work. Gecko-inspired adhesives are promising technology, as they work in vacuum, at high and low temperatures, and do not require special hand-holds or other fixtures. Tests in microgravity and in the International Space station have shown that “gecko grippers” are a viable option for eliminating space debris in low Earth orbit and for enhancing missions in space.

Speaker Bio: Professor Mark Cutkosky applies analyses, simulations, and experiments to the design and control of robotic hands, tactile sensors, and devices for human/computer interaction. In manufacturing, his work focuses on design tools for rapid prototyping.

Abstract: This presentation will review research from two papers about Bitcoin.  The first paper uses data from the MIT digital currency experiment to shed light on consumer behavior regarding commercial, public and government surveillance. We find that the effect of small incentives may explain the privacy paradox, where people say they care about privacy but are willing to relinquish private data quite easily.  The second paper analyzes empirical evidence about the adoption and usage of Bitcoin, as well as forces that underly Bitcoin pricing.

Speaker Bio: Susan Athey is The Economics of Technology Professor at Stanford Graduate School of Business. She received her bachelor's degree from Duke University and her Ph.D. from Stanford, and she holds an honorary doctorate from Duke University. She previously taught at the economics departments at MIT, Stanford and Harvard.  In 2007, Professor Athey received the John Bates Clark Medal, awarded by the American Economic Association to “that American economist under the age of forty who is adjudged to have made the most significant contribution to economic thought and knowledge.” She was elected to the National Academy of Science in 2012 and to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2008.  Professor Athey’s research focuses on the economics of the internet, online advertising, the news media, marketplace design, virtual currencies and the intersection of computer science, machine learning and economics. She advises governments and businesses on marketplace design and platform economics, notably serving since 2007 as a long-term consultant to Microsoft Corporation in a variety of roles, including consulting chief economist.  

Abstract: The U.S. government continues to struggle with how best to defend the country from cyber attacks. Reacting out in frustration, Senator John McCain wondered aloud if the United States should consider what lessons can be learned from a new cyber defense organization in the United Kingdom called the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC). In this paper, Stuart Russell and Michael Sulmeyer examine the NCSC, its origins, its missions, and its effectiveness. They then consider how certain aspects of the NCSC might map onto the more complicated governance structure around cyber defense in the United States. Despite important differences between the United Kingdom and the United States, they conclude that there is a great deal the United States can adapt from the United Kingdom’s efforts, particularly the NCSC’s ambitious Active Defense agenda. 

Speaker Bio: Dr. Michael Sulmeyer is the Belfer Center's Cyber Security Project Director at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is also a Contributing Editor for the national security blog Lawfare. Before Harvard, he served as the Director for Plans and Operations for Cyber Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There, he worked closely with the Joint Staff and Cyber Command on a variety of efforts to counter malicious cyber activity against U.S. and DoD interests. For this work, he received the Secretary Medal for Exceptional Public Service.

Previously, he worked on arms control and the maintenance of strategic stability between the United States, Russia, and China. As a Marshall Scholar, Sulmeyer received his PhD (DPhil) in Politics from Oxford University, and his dissertation, "Money for Nothing: Understanding the Termination of U.S. Major Defense Acquisition Programs," won the Sir Walter Bagehot Prize for best dissertation in government and public administration. He received his B.A. and J.D. from Stanford University and his M.A. in War Studies from King's College London. In the mid-1990s, he was the System Operator (SysOp) of The Summit BBS in Santa Barbara, California.

Abstract: What is the strategic value of cyber weapons? Even though a growing body of research has addressed the destructive potential of cyber weapons, there remains a large gap in thinking about the strategic utility of these capabilities. The purpose of this paper is to partially fill this gap, by means of assessing under what conditions 'counterforce’ and ‘countervalue’ cyber weapons can be effective. I argue that cyber weapons can provide an ‘extra option’ to leaders. The discussed cases suggest that they can be used both as an important force-multiplier enabler for conventional military assets or as independent capability. Cyber weapons can also be used to achieve a form of psychological ascendancy and can be used effectively with few casualties.

Speaker Bio: Max Smeets is a cybersecurity fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and holds a DPhil in International Relations from the University of Oxford, St. John’s College. Max current book project focuses on the causes underlying cyber proliferation and restraint. The results of this research are valuable for understanding the likely changes in the future prevalence of cyber weapons. It clarifies to what degree this is an ‘inevitable’ development – and if/how it can be stopped.

Max was a College Lecturer in Politics at Keble College, University of Oxford, and Research Affiliate of the Oxford Cyber Studies Programme. He was also a Carnegie Visiting Scholar at Columbia University SIPA and a Doctoral Visiting Scholar at Sciences Po CERI. He holds an undergraduate degree from University College Roosevelt, Utrecht University, and an M.Phil in International Relations from the University of Oxford, Brasenose College.  Max has a diverse professional background, having worked for financial, political, and non-governmental organizations.

Abstract: Sustaining strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China is a long-standing U.S. national security goal. Meeting this goal is growing more challenging due to tectonic geopolitical and technological changes. On the geopolitical side, new dynamics and new uncertainties are created by China’s emergence as an increasingly capable and assertive great power, Russia’s regional revanchism and political operations, and America’s uncertainty about its role in the world amidst its divisive domestic politics. On the technology side, advances in military capabilities for cyberspace, outer space, missile defense, long-range strike, and a range of AI-related areas including autonomous systems and big data analytics, are changing the dynamics of crisis management and conflict escalation. At the extreme, such technological advances could undermine confidence in one or more side's nuclear second-strike capabilities, thereby provoking arms racing in the near-term, and potentially “use or lose” dynamics in the longer-term. After outlining the dimensions of this growing set of challenges, Dr. Miller will offer a number of specific recommendations for U.S. policy, military force posture, and engagement with Russia and China.

Speaker Bio: Dr. James N. Miller is President of Adaptive Strategies, LLC, which provides consulting on strategy development and implementation, international engagement, and technology issues. He is a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab and Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. He serves on the Defense Science Board, for which he recently co-chaired a task force report on cyber deterrence, the Board of Directors for the Atlantic Council, and the Board of Advisors for the Center for a New American Security. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from May 2012 to January 2014, Dr. Miller served as the principal civilian advisor to Secretaries Leon Panetta and Chuck Hagel on strategy, policy, and operations, and as DoD’s Deputy for National Security Council deliberations. He served as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from April 2009 to May 2012, and previously in numerous leadership positions in government, academia, non-profits, and the private sector over a thirty-year career in national security. He received a B.A. degree in economics from Stanford University, and Master’s and Ph.D. degrees from Harvard’s JFK School of Government.  

Abstract: We live in a world where the risks from a changing climate are clear. New research highlights the magnitude of the risks and the benefits of rapid, ambitious action. We also live in a world where the technologies for addressing climate change, for limiting the amount of climate change that occurs and for dealing as effectively as possible with the changes that cannot be avoided, are increasingly mature, affordable, and rich with co-benefits. In many ways and in many places, progress in deploying solutions is dramatic. But worldwide, progress is much slower than it needs to be, if we are to avoid the worst impacts. We need to find a global accelerator pedal for climate solutions. Key enablers include steps to level the economic playing field, government investments to drive down the costs and risks of technology solutions, and novel mechanisms to spur international collaboration.

Speaker Bio: Chris Field is the Perry L. McCarty Director of the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment and Melvin and Joan Lane Professor for Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies. His research focuses on climate change, ranging from work on improving climate models, to prospects for renewable energy systems, to community organizations that can minimize the risk of a tragedy of the commons. Field was the founding director of the Carnegie Institution’s Department of Global Ecology, a position he held from 2002 to 2016. He was co-chair of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change from 2008-2015, where he led the effort on the IPCC Special Report on “Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation”  (2012) and the Working Group II contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (2014) on Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. His widely cited work has earned many recognitions, including election to the US National Academy of Sciences, the Max Planck Research Award, and the Roger Revelle Medal.