NOTE: Seminar room changed to Oksenberg Conference Room

Encina Hall, 3rd floor 

This is an APARC-CISAC joint event.

With all eyes on the upcoming Inter-Korean Summit and the planned Kim-Trump Summit, it is important to have a comprehensive understanding of how the North’s nuclear program evolved and the effects of diplomacy and other governmental actions had on its development.

About the speakers:

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Siegfried S. Hecker is a professor emeritus (research) in the Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He was co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) from 2007-2012. From 1986 to 1997, he served as the fifth Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Hecker is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction, and nuclear security.

Hecker’s current research interests include plutonium science, nuclear weapons policy, nuclear security, and the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy. Over the past 25 years, he has fostered cooperation with the Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials.

Hecker’s research projects at CISAC focus on reducing the risks of nuclear terrorism worldwide and the challenges of nuclear India, North Korea, Pakistan, and the nuclear aspirations of Iran. In June 2016, the Los Alamos Historical Society published two volumes edited by Dr. Hecker. The works, titled Doomed to Cooperate, document the history of Russian-U.S. laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation since 1992.

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Robert L. Carlin is a Visiting Scholar at CISAC with a forty-plus year history of working on North Korea issues. From both in and out of government, he has been following North Korea since 1974 and has made numerous trips there.

Carlin served as senior policy advisor at the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) from 2002-2006, leading numerous delegations to the North for talks and observing developments in-country during the long trips that entailed.

From 1989-2002, Carlin was chief of the Northeast Asia Division in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State. During much of that period, he also served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Special Ambassador for talks with North Korea, and took part in all phases of US-DPRK negotiations from 1992-2000. From 1971-1989, Carlin was an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, where he received the Exceptional Analyst Award from the Director of Central Intelligence. 

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Abstract: Must we, should we, possess a Doomsday Machine?  For over half a century there have been two of these in the world: the U.S. and the Russian strategic nuclear systems, tightly coupled together with their respective warning systems, each poised to escalate armed conflict with the other or to preemptively launch a first strike based on strategic or tactical warning that may be a false alarm such as has occurred repeatedly.  Environmental scientists in the last decade have strongly confirmed what was first warned in 1983, that each of these alert systems, aimed as they are at hundreds of targets in or near cities, constitutes a Doomsday Machine.  Firestorms in the burning cities would loft hundreds of millions of tons of smoke and black soot into the global stratosphere--where it would not rain out and would remain for more than a decade--blocking 70% of sunlight, creating ice age conditions on earth and killing all harvest worldwide, starving nearly humans to death.  Neither the Defense Department nor the National Academy of Sciences has ever studied the actual effects, including smoke and resulting famine, to be expected from the existing plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for general nuclear war.  Such a study would almost surely show that China's "minimum deterrence" and no-first-use policy is dramatically less dangerous to the future of humanity, on the way to the more distant goal of universal abolition of nuclear weapons. 

Speaker bio: Daniel Ellsberg is the author of three books: The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner (2017), Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers(2002) Risk, Ambiguity and Decision (2001) and Papers on the War (1971). Ellsberg first specialized in problems of the command and control of nuclear weapons, nuclear war plans, and crisis decision-making in the 1950s. As a high-level defense analyst,Ellsberg participated in developing operational guidance for U.S. nuclear war planning during the Kennedy administration. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Ellsberg has been a lecturer, writer and activist on the dangers of the nuclear era, wrongful U.S. interventions abroad and the urgent need for patriotic whistleblowing. In December 2006, Ellsberg was awarded the 2006 Right Livelihood Award, in Stockholm, Sweden, “. . .  for putting peace and truth first, at considerable personal risk, and dedicating his life to inspiring others to follow his example.” He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard University in 1962.

Abstract: International cooperation has long been founded on the idea that securing a common factual understanding of things in the world is a prerequisite for deciding how to act in concert. However, in recent decades the very possibility of such agreement on the facts has come under attack both empirically, through persistent technical controversies around issues such as climate change and crop biotechnology, and theoretically, from demonstrations that facts and norms are co-produced to build alternate, coexisting worlds. The divergent self-understandings of these worlds, in which epistemic and normative order are interdependent, cannot be bridged by simply insisting on a singular “reality” that must be accepted by all.

In this talk, I use the longue durée case of international biotech regulation to suggest a different basis for long-term cooperation. Using epistemic subsidiarity rather than harmonization as the basis for making progress, I suggest how biotechnology risks might be handled in three regimes of subsidiarity: coexistence, cosmopolitanism, and constitutionalism. The advantages and limits of each regime will be exemplified and reflected upon.

Speaker bio: Sheila Jasanoff is Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the Harvard Kennedy School. A pioneer in her field, she has authored more than 120 articles and chapters and is author or editor of more than 15 books, including The Fifth Branch, Science at the Bar, Designs on Nature, and The Ethics of Invention. Her work explores the role of science and technology in the law, politics, and policy of modern democracies. She founded and directs the STS Program at Harvard; previously, she was founding chair of the STS Department at Cornell. She has held distinguished visiting appointments at leading universities in Europe, Asia, Australia, and the US. Jasanoff served on the AAAS Board of Directors and as President of the Society for Social Studies of Science. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Her honors include a Guggenheim Fellowship, an Ehrenkreuz from the Government of Austria, membership in the Royal Danish Academy, and the Humboldt Foundation’s Reimar-Lüst award. She holds AB, JD, and PhD degrees from Harvard, and honorary doctorates from the Universities of Twente and Liège.

Abstract: In November 1998, ‘mujahideen’ warriors climbed the heights above Kargil in Indian held Kashmir, crossed the Line of Control, and occupied Indian military posts. These ‘mujahideens’ were really Pakistani soldiers clad in civilian garb on a secret mission. This was the beginning of the war in Kargil between two nuclear neighbors (India and Pakistan). This study critically evaluates the relationship between ‘learning’ and risk-prone behavior of Pakistan in the midst of technological maturation. Should we be confident and rely on nuclear deterrence and believe that Kargil-like crisis will never happen again? This talk will explain the story of Kargil from a theoretical lens of nuclear learning, demonstrating how difficult it has been for Pakistan to learn appropriate lessons given the firewalls of convictions, cover-ups, and confirmation biases. 

Speaker bio: Sannia Abdullah is a political scientist. Her doctoral thesis is on nuclear learning in South Asia with special reference to India-Pakistan crisis behavior. She is associated with Quaid-i-Azam University in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies as a permanent faculty member. At CISAC, she is working on her book manuscript focusing on the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear behavior and its deterrence logic. Prior to joining CISAC, she was a visiting research scholar at Cooperative Monitory Center, Sandia National Labs (NM) where her research focuses primarily nonproliferation issues in South Asia. In 2016, she presented her research at Atlantic Council on Pakistan’s pursuit of full spectrum deterrence strategy and posture, conceptual nuances, and implied ramifications and at ISAC-ISSS, Annual Conference, University of Notre Dame. She was invited to deliver lectures at the USAFA on Pakistan’s deterrence stability and maturing force posture. She expressed her academic views at different forums including Pentagon, Lawrence Livermore National Labs, Congressional Budget Office and in some Think Tanks in Washington D.C. She had been a Nonproliferation Fellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), in Monterey and a SWAMOS alumni of Columbia University (2011). Since 2010, Dr. Abdullah has been part of several Track-II dialogues and had an opportunity to learn decision-making trends through her regular participations in Table Top Exercises exploring escalation control and deterrence stability in South Asia.

Abstract: Clay fired bricks are a primary building material used in the rapidly expanding construction sector across South Asia. These bricks are primarily manufactured by small enterprises using inefficient, highly polluting coal-fired kilns. The black carbon and the greenhouse gases emitted by brick kilns across South Asia is comparable to the global radiative forcing of the entire US passenger car fleet. The pollution generated by these brick kilns also affect human health. In Dhaka, Bangladesh brick kilns contribute 40% of the ambient particulate matter during winter and are estimated to result in 5000 adult deaths each year. In addition, the coercive collection of topsoil as part of clay mining undermines agricultural productivity in settings of high poverty and malnutrition.

This talk will discuss why bricks are manufactured in Bangladesh using an approach that is so damaging to the environment and to public health. It will explore combined technical, financial and political strategies to transform the sector.

Speaker bio:  Prof. Luby studied philosophy and earned a Bachelor of Arts summa cum laude from Creighton University. Prof. Luby earned his medical degree from the University of Texas Southwestern Medical School at Dallas and completed his residency in internal medicine at the University of Rochester-Strong Memorial Hospital. He studied epidemiology and preventive medicine at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Prof. Luby's former positions include leading the Epidemiology Unit of the Community Health Sciences Department at the Aga Khan University in Karachi, Pakistan for 5 years and working as a Medical Epidemiologist in the Foodborne and Diarrheal Diseases Branch of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention exploring causes and prevention of diarrheal disease in settings where diarrhea is a leading cause of childhood death.  Immediately prior to his current appointment, Prof. Luby served for 8 years at the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Diseases Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b), where he directed the Centre for Communicable Diseases. Prof. Luby was seconded from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and was the Country Director for CDC in Bangladesh.

During his over 20 years of public health work in low income countries, Prof. Luby frequently encountered political and governance difficulties undermining efforts to improve public health. His work at FSI engages him with a community of scholars who provide ideas and approaches to understand and address these critical barriers.

Abstract: The quotation in the title is taken from the memoirs of Boris Chertok, a leading Soviet missile designer.  In my talk I will examine significant shifts in Soviet thinking about nuclear war and military strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and discuss some of the implications of those shifts for strategic stability in the 1980s.  I will also explore the influence of the McNamara Pentagon on Soviet military strategy and Soviet thinking about deterrence and war-fighting.    

Speaker bio: David Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, a professor of political science, and an FSI senior fellow. He was co-director of CISAC from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has been translated into seven languages. The Chinese translation is due to be published later in 2018. Holloway also wrote The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983) and co-authored The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (1984). He has contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals.

Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986 -- first as a professor of political science and later (in 1996) as a professor of history as well -- Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). Before coming to Stanford, he taught at the University of Lancaster (1967-1970) and the University of Edinburgh (1970-1986). Born in Dublin, Ireland, he received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his PhD in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University.

Abstract: The Berkeley Applied Nuclear Physics Program leads developments of new concepts and technologies to address challenges in fundamental physics, medicine, nuclear security, and safety. Recent progress in radiation detection and imaging combined with advances in computer vision and data processing enable unprecedented capabilities in the detection, mapping, and visualization of radiological and nuclear materials in complex environments. We have developed a new concept called 3-D Scene Data Fusion, which fuses contextual and radiation data to produce 3-D maps of radioactive sources in real-time. We have deployed this capability in unmanned and manned configurations in different locations including evacuated communities and at the Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Fukushima Prefecture. While these technologies are necessary to better respond to accidents now and in the future, we need to ensure that the data provided can be understood by all stakeholders, including communities exposed to the risk of detrimental effects. We have established the Berkeley Institute for Resilient Communities to address this need by combining research, education, and communities in an international, multi-disciplinary, and multi-cultural context. Important components of these activities are the Radwatch and DoseNet programs which provide the basis for our communications. As an example, DoseNet aims at establishing a sustainable multi-sensor high-school network enabling students across the world to learn important concepts in science and engineering and what is normal in our world.

Speaker bio: Dr. Kai Vetter is Professor in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley and Faculty Senior Scientist and Head of the Applied Nuclear Physics program at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. His main research interests are in the development and demonstration of new concepts and technologies in radiation detection to address some of the outstanding challenges in fundamental sciences, nuclear security, and health.

Prof. Vetter is director of Institute for Resilient Communities that was established in 2015 to address the need to better integrate advancements in sciences and technologies with communities through education and outreach locally and globally. He initiated and still leads the Berkeley Radwatch and DoseNet activities with the goal to engage high and middle schools in performing environmental measurements employing fundamental science and engineering concepts and to expand across regions, nations, and cultures.

He has authored and co-authored about 200 publications in peer-reviewed journals and is fellow of the American Physical Society. He received Presidential Citations from the American Nuclear Society twice, for his engagement in Fukushima through measurements and enhancing community resilience.

Abstract: What are the consequences of the emergence of robotics, big data, and artificial intelligence for international politics? Are these new technologies going to promote instability and conflict, as many warn, or are they going to reinforce U.S. military primacy? In particular, will China be able to gain and eventually exploit the unfolding technological revolution - the so-called Second Machine age - or are such concerns exaggerated? The literature in political science and international relations theory has either largely neglected technology and technological innovation, or simply assumed that technology is a substitute for labor that reduces countries' constraints to go to war. Drawing from the scholarship in economics and management, in this article we look at technology in terms of a set complements and nodes-in-the-network. Thus, while technological innovation reduces the prices of some goods or tasks, it simultaneously makes their complementary assets more difficult to procure (through an increase in the demand). The resulting distributional effects, we argue, explain why actors will benefit unevenly from technological change. We test our theoretical insights by looking at seapower in the first and in the emerging second machine age: respectively, the time of the steam engine, steel hulls, quick-firing long-range guns and the telegraph; as well as the unfolding era of neural networks, fast processors and real-time communications. Our preliminary empirical results corroborate our framework, namely that the effects of technological change are much more complex than the literature acknowledges and highlights the challenges countries will have to face in the military realm during the second machine age.

Speaker bios: Andrea Gilli is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Harvard University and a former Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation of Stanford University. Andrea has conducted research for several organizations, including the European Union Institute for Security Studies, RUSI in London and the Office of Net Assessment of the U.S. Department of Defense. He holds a Ph.D. in social and political science from the European University Institute, an MSc from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a B.A. from the University of Turin.

Mauro Gilli is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies of ETH-Zurich (Switzerland). During the academic year 2015-16, he was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Dickey Center for International Understanding of Dartmouth College. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Northwestern University, an MA from SAIS-Johns Hopkins and a B.A. from the University of Turin.

Abstract: Over the past decade, fears about the decline of the United States relative to other countries (especially China) have become a prominent feature of American political discourse. While anxiety about losing power on the world stage has been a recurrent phenomenon in the United States since the 1950s, the present bout of pessimism – combining reactions to the disastrous Iraq War, the 2008 financial crisis, and most recently the rise of Donald Trump – makes this the deepest and most serious crisis of confidence in postwar American history. This project explores the domestic political and strategic consequences of anxiety about lost or eroding national status by combining insights from social theory and social psychology. I use evidence from historical cases of decline (including Spain after 1898, France after 1945 and the United Kingdom after 1945) as well as survey experiments to investigate hypotheses about the heterogenous ways in which different individuals and groups react to relative national decline, and how these responses combine to influence the declining state’s politics and foreign policy. 

Speaker bio: Steven Ward is a Junior Faculty Fellow at CISAC for the year 2017-2018 and an Assistant Professor in the Government Department at Cornell University. He holds an MA in Security Studies and a PhD in Government from Georgetown University. He is the author of Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers (Cambridge University Press, 2017). His work has appeared in Security Studies and International Studies Quarterly.