* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone

Seminar Recordings: https://youtu.be/fwiKw1WIeZo

About the Event: If Russia’s 2020 energy activities have appeared chaotic, there is good reason. The Kremlin has taken actions that appear to upend Western expectations, forged over the past decade, that Moscow uses its oil reserves to generate state revenues, and gas exports for political leverage, malign influence, and elite capture. For years, U.S. and European policymakers braced for what appeared to be an inevitable gas crisis in Europe at the outset of 2020, that would be precipitated by a Russian cutoff of the Ukrainian gas transmission system facilitated by Gazprom’s diversionary pipeline proposals: Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream. Instead, EU regulatory action and U.S. sanctions legislation mitigated the immediate threat of an encore performance of the 2009 Russian gas cutoff of Ukraine. Nevertheless, with the global COVID-19 crisis raging, Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken actions in the energy sector toward Belarus, the Balkan region, Ukraine, global oil producers, and even off the Antarctic coastline that fundamentally challenge the assumptions of the previous decade, and are destined to shape thinking about Russia’s energy challenges to Transatlantic strategic security interests for years to come. 

About the Speaker: Benjamin L. Schmitt, is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow and Project Development Scientist at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, where he focuses on the development of instrumentation and infrastructure for next-generation Antarctic experimental cosmology facilities at the South Pole. From 2015-2019 Benjamin served as European Energy Security Advisor at the U.S. Department of State where he advanced diplomatic engagement vital to the energy and national security interests of the Transatlantic community, with a focus on supporting Ukraine and other nations along NATO’s Eastern Flank facing Russian malign energy activities. Benjamin has been an invited lecturer on European energy security and horizonal energy technologies, most recently with the Harvard Ukraine Research Institute, Harvard Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, and National Defense University. He continues to publish energy security analysis, including with the Atlantic Council, Harvard International Review, and Center for European Policy Analysis. Schmitt regularly provides expert transatlantic security policy commentary for both print and television media, including with the New York Times, Foreign Policy, the Daily Beast, Voice of America, Germany’s Bild Zeitung, and Ukraine’s Kyiv Post. Benjamin is the current Amicus Poloniae Award laureate, a recognition by the Government of the Republic of Poland for outstanding efforts to promote development of cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the United States of America, and has received both Superior and Meritorious Honor Awards from the U.S. Department of State. Before entering government, Schmitt served as a NASA Space Technology Research Fellow while pursuing doctoral research at the University of Pennsylvania, focusing on direct imaging of the Cosmic Microwave Background, for which he received both M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in experimental physics. Schmitt has also previously served as a U.S. Fulbright Research Fellow to the Max-Planck-Institute for Nuclear Physics in Heidelberg, Germany. 

This event is co-sponsored with the Cyber Policy Center and the Center for a New American Security.

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/KaydMdIVtGc

About the Event: The United States is steadily losing ground in the race against China to pioneer the most important technologies of the 21st century. With technology a critical determinant of future military advantage, a key driver of economic prosperity, and a potent tool for the promotion of different models of governance, the stakes could not be higher. To compete, China is leveraging its formidable scale—whether measured in terms of research and development expenditures, data sets, scientists and engineers, venture capital, or the reach of its leading technology companies. The only way for the United States to tip the scale back in its favor is to deepen cooperation with allies. The global diffusion of innovation also places a premium on aligning U.S. and ally efforts to protect technology. Unless coordinated with allies, tougher U.S. investment screening and export control policies will feature major seams that Beijing can exploit.

On early June, join Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) for a unique virtual event that will feature three policy experts advancing concrete ideas for how the United States can enhance cooperation with allies around technology innovation and protection.

This webinar will be on-the-record, and include time for audience Q&A.

About the Speakers: 

Anja Manuel, Stanford Research Affiliate, CNAS Adjunct Senior Fellow, Partner at Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC, and author with Pav Singh of Compete, Contest and Collaborate: How to Win the Technology Race with China.

Daniel Kliman, Senior Fellow and Director, CNAS Asia-Pacific Security Program, and co-author of a recent report, Forging an Alliance Innovation Base.

Martijn Rasser, Senior Fellow, CNAS Technology and National Security Program, and lead researcher on the Technology Alliance Project

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/wV3Jvqri5Ds

About the Event: Throughout America’s atomic history, the president has solely held the power to end the world in minutes. This won’t stop . . . unless we do something. Now. America is one “push of a button” away from nuclear war—a decision that rests solely in the hands of the president. Without waiting for approval from Congress or even the secretary of defense, the president can unleash America’s nuclear arsenal, ending civilization as we know it. For decades, glitches and slipups have threat-ened to trigger nuclear winter: misinformation, false alarms, unstable presidents, and now cyber- attacks. And a new nuclear arms race has begun, threatening us all. From authors William J. Perry, who served as secretary of defense in the Clinton administration and undersecretary of defense for research and engineering in the Carter administration, and Tom Z. Collina, the director of policy at Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation in Washington, DC, The Button recounts the terrifying history of nuclear launch authority, from the faulty 46-cent microchip that nearly caused World War III to President Trump’s tweet about his “much bigger & more powerful” button. Perry and Collina share their firsthand experience on the front lines of the nation’s nuclear history and provide illuminating interviews with former president Bill Clinton, for-mer secretary of defense Jim Mattis, congressman Adam Smith, Nobel Peace Prize winner Beatrice Fihn, senior Obama administration officials, and many others.Written in an accessible and authoritative voice, The Button delivers a powerful condemnation against leaving explosive power this devastating under any one person’s thumb and outlines a prescription for a safer and saner future.

Video preview: https://ploughshares.org/thebutton 
Book purchase: https://www.benbellabooks.com/shop/the-button/ 
Discount code: BUTTON30

About the Authors: 

William J. Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) at Stanford University. He is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute and the Hoover Institution, and serves as director of the Preventive Defense Project. He is an expert in U.S. foreign policy, national security and arms control. He was the co-director of CISAC from 1988 to 1993, during which time he was also a part-time professor at Stanford. He was a part-time lecturer in the Department of Mathematics at Santa Clara University from 1971 to 1977.

Perry was the 19th secretary of defense for the United States, serving from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as deputy secretary of defense (1993-1994) and as under secretary of defense for research and engineering (1977-1981). Dr. Perry currently serves on the Defense Policy Board (DPB). He is on the board of directors of Covant and several emerging high-tech companies. His previous business experience includes serving as a laboratory director for General Telephone and Electronics (1954-1964); founder and president of ESL Inc. (1964-1977); executive vice-president of Hambrecht & Quist Inc. (1981-1985); and founder and chairman of Technology Strategies & Alliances (1985-1993). He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted man in the Army Corps of Engineers, and served in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joined the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenant in the Army Reserves from 1950 to 1955. He was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1997 and the Knight Commander of the British Empire in 1998. Perry has received a number of other awards including the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and 1981), and Outstanding Civilian Service Medals from the Army (1962 and 1997), the Air Force (1997), the Navy (1997), the Defense Intelligence Agency (1977 and 1997), NASA (1981) and the Coast Guard (1997). He received the American Electronic Association's Medal of Achievement (1980), the Eisenhower Award (1996), the Marshall Award (1997), the Forrestal Medal (1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal (1994). The National Academy of Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche Medal in 1996. He has received awards from the enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. He has received decorations from the governments of Albania, Bahrain, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Poland, Slovenia, and Ukraine. He received a BS and MS from Stanford University and a PhD from Pennsylvania State University, all in mathematics.

Tom Z. Collina is Director of Policy at Ploughshares Fund. He is the co-author with William J. Perry of THE BUTTON: The New Nuclear Arms Race and Presidential Power from Truman to Trump, published in June 2020. Tom has thirty years of Washington, DC, experience in nuclear weapons, missile defense, and nonproliferation issues, and has held senior positions at the Arms Control Association, the Institute for Science and International Security, and the Union of Concerned Scientists. He has been directly involved with efforts to end U.S. nuclear testing, limit ineffective anti-missile programs, extend the Nonproliferation Treaty, and secure Senate ratification of the New START Treaty. He has published widely in major magazines and journals and has appeared frequently in the national media, including the New York Times, CNN, and NPR. He has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and regularly briefs congressional staff. Tom has a degree in International Relations from Cornell University and lives in Takoma Park, MD with his wife, three children and dog. When away from the office he does not think about nuclear war.

About the Moderators: 

Rose Gottemoeller is the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Center for Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

Before joining Stanford Gottemoeller was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019, where she helped to drive forward NATO’s adaptation to new security challenges in Europe and in the fight against terrorism.  Prior to NATO, she served for nearly five years as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, advising the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation and political-military affairs. While Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in 2009 and 2010, she was the chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation.

Prior to her government service, she was a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with joint appointments to the Nonproliferation and Russia programs. She served as the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2006 to 2008, and is currently a nonresident fellow in Carnegie's Nuclear Policy Program. She is also a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. 

At Stanford, Gottemoeller will teach and mentor students in the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy program and the CISAC Honors program; contribute to policy research and outreach activities; and convene workshops, seminars and other events relating to her areas of expertise, including nuclear security, Russian relations, the NATO alliance, EU cooperation and non-proliferation.

Colin H. Kahl is co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the inaugural Steven C. Házy Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and a Professor, by courtesy, in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. He is also a Strategic Consultant to the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement.

From October 2014 to January 2017, he was Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President. In that position, he served as a senior advisor to President Obama and Vice President Biden on all matters related to U.S. foreign policy and national security affairs, and represented the Office of the Vice President as a standing member of the National Security Council Deputies’ Committee. From February 2009 to December 2011, Dr. Kahl was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East at the Pentagon. In this capacity, he served as the senior policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel and the Palestinian territories, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and six other countries in the Levant and Persian Gulf region. In June 2011, he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service by Secretary Robert Gates.  

From 2007 to 2017 (when not serving in the U.S. government), Dr. Kahl was an assistant and associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. From 2007 to 2009 and 2012 to 2014, he was also a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), a nonpartisan Washington, DC-based think tank. From 2000 to 2007, he was an assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota. In 2005-2006, Dr. Kahl took leave from the University of Minnesota to serve as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where he worked on issues related to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and responses to failed states. In 1997-1998, he was a National Security Fellow at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. 

Current projects include: research on the geopolitical consequences of COVID-19 and intersecting global trends; an examination of the implications of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning on strategic stability; and theoretical and historical analysis of American grand strategy since 9/11. 

He has published numerous articles on international security and U.S. foreign and defense policy in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Security, the Los Angeles Times, Middle East Policy, the National Interest, the New Republic, the New York Times, Politico, the Washington Post, and the Washington Quarterly, as well as several reports for CNAS. 

His previous research analyzed the causes and consequences of violent civil and ethnic conflict in developing countries, focusing particular attention on the demographic and natural resource dimensions of these conflicts. His book on the subject, States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World, was published by Princeton University Press in 2006, and related articles and chapters have appeared in International Security, the Journal of International Affairs, and various edited volumes. 

Dr. Kahl received his B.A. in political science from the University of Michigan (1993) and his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University (2000).

Livestream: Please click here to join the livestream webinar via Zoom or log-in with webinar ID 944 5730 9104.

About this Event: Why do some governments give foreign militants missiles that can destroy aircraft while giving others only bullets and AK-47s? Why do some governments deploy special operations forces to carry out joint attacks with some insurgent groups, while only giving others basic training on weapons handling? Despite the fact that governments often provide costly - and controversial - forms of support to foreign militant groups, we know little about why some groups receive advanced weapons technology and boots on the ground while others do not. In this presentation, I unpack trends in third-party provision of support through an in-depth examination of the CIA's provision of anti-tank missiles and the Pentagon's deployment of Special Operations Forces to support specific militant groups in the recent Syrian conflict. Drawing from an original dataset of the over 150 Syrian militant brigades that received some form of US support and over 60 interviews with Syrian militants and US and Jordanian government officials, I find that, when militant groups have similar organizational characteristics as the armed forces of their government partners, they are more likely to receive and accept costly forms of support. 

About the Speaker: Melissa Carlson is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at U.C. Berkeley, specializing in international relations, comparative politics, and methodology. She will join CISAC in 2019-2020 as a Middle East Initiative Pre-doctoral Fellow. Broadly, her research examines the dynamics of military partnerships between state governments and foreign militant groups. Melissa's dissertation develops an organizational theory of third-party provision of support: when foreign militant groups and state armed forces share similar organizational characteristics, they are more likely to form joint commands, carry out joint attacks, and provide each other with advanced weapons systems.  Melissa's other research interests focus on factors that influence informal cooperation between states, and on how refugee perceptions of host communities, host governments, and aid organizations influence refugee decision-making. Prior to beginning her PhD at U.C. Berkeley, Melissa worked as Public Information consultant for the International Organization for Migration, Iraq Mission in Jordan and Iraqi Kurdistan. Melissa has a M.A. in Political Science from U.C. Berkeley, and a B.A. in International Relations and Politics, Philosophy, and Economics from Claremont McKenna College.

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/cLeMYCUzXvE

About this Event: This talk will offer an explanation for a contradiction in cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies: similar tools and platforms — indeed, sometimes the same ones — are adopted both for and against security and stability. How can a technology be interesting to ISIS, Facebook, blackmailers, central banks, ransomware developers, philanthropists, offshore casinos, drug cartels, logistics officers, smugglers, and food safety inspectors? I will argue that we can understand some of the present and near future dynamics of cryptocurrencies and blockchain tools through the history of their creation, which stretches back almost fifty years. I will take us through the agendas, goals, and ideologies woven into the development of the technology — from destroying governments, to creating unique digital objects with the provenance of gold ingots, to funding immortality — and discuss how they are playing out in the threats and promises of systems now.

About the Speaker: Finn Brunton is associate professor at New York University’s Department of Media, Culture, and Communication. He is the author of Spam: A Shadow History of the Internet (2013) and Digital Cash: The Unknown History of the Anarchists, Technologists, and Utopians Who Created Cryptocurrency (2019), and co-author of Obfuscation: A User’s Guide for Privacy and Protest (2015) and Communication (2019).”

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/j9S_CKmku00

About this Event:

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Bryan Metzger

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Lobbyists, Public Relations and “Malign Activities”: The JCPOA as a Case Study of Foreign Influence

Abstract: In July 2015, the P5+1 announced the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known colloquially as the “Iran nuclear deal,” an agreement between Iran and the P5+1 to place limits on the Iranian nuclear program. The agreement was controversial not only within American domestic politics, but also in the eyes of American allies in the Middle East that are commonly thought to exercise significant influence over American foreign policy. Using the JCPOA as a case study on foreign influence in American political decision-making, this thesis analyzes the influence strategies of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran from 2013 to 2018 while assessing the efficacy of these strategies. Based on the theoretical literature, I propose four different influence strategies: direct and indirect lobbying, and direct and indirect shaping of the information space. As a result of nearly forty interviews with former government officials, ambassadors, policy advocates, and regional experts, this thesis finds that while foreign influence does not drive US foreign policy, it can act as an important intervening factor, raising or lowering the costs of political decision-making and amplifying existing preferences within the American political system. Thus, this thesis provides a nuanced perspective on foreign influence in American decision-making, showing the real impact that such campaigns can have while eschewing the idea that American policymakers lack agency in important foreign policy matters.

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Andrew Lokay

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: The Repatriation Dilemma: European Countries and Islamic State Foreign Terrorist Fighters

Abstract: This thesis explains differences in European countries’ approaches to the repatriation of Islamic State foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). Following the territorial defeat of the Islamic State, the United States urged European countries to take back their citizens who travelled to Syria and Iraq to join the caliphate. Some have done so, while others have not. This thesis is the first study to analyze the variation in responses to this request and uses an original dataset of FTF repatriation across 16 European countries. I apply a nested analysis research design to evaluate four explanatory variables: a country’s history of jihadist attacks, justice system capability, desire for a better relationship with the United States, and domestic political pressure. I arbitrate among these potential explanations though a medium-N analysis and case studies of the United Kingdom and the Republic of North Macedonia. I suggest that NATO aspirants are more likely to repatriate FTFs. The empirical evidence I collect does not support the other three hypotheses. I also propose that high evidentiary requirements in legal systems present a challenge to FTF repatriation. This thesis advances the literature’s understanding of the responsiveness of U.S. allies and partners to Washington’s demands, and it expands the counterterrorism scholarship to address a novel question regarding a salient and divisive policy debate.

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Adam Elliott

2:50 PM - 3:20 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Keeping Pace: Addressing Life Sciences Dual Use Risk Across U.S. Government Agencies

Abstract: Why do different institutions address the same security challenge in different ways? Global biosecurity governance is ill-equipped to stay apace with advances in biotechnology. While almost all necessary life sciences research incurs the risk for misuse, certain experiments with higher risk to human health if misused are labelled dual use research of concern (DURC). U.S. government policies to guide public funding for DURC experiments attempt to outline lists of experiment types or select agents that constitute DURC. However, experts argue some experiments are definitionally DURC, but they do not fall within the scope of the U.S. policy. This thesis analyzes how the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) approach funding two of these experiment types: gene drives and virus engineering for pandemic preparedness. Tracing each agency’s approach to funding these experiments, as well as their institutional history and culture, leads to several findings. First, when experiment types test the limits of what biosecurity policies are scoped to address, agencies tend to respond in accordance with their mission. However, decisions by agency directors may influence the response as well. Coherent leadership and strategies are critical for preserving the integrity of the scientific enterprise and for protecting humanity from biological threats – including natural, accidental, and deliberate release of biological products that could cause human suffering. By studying the ways different agencies respond when they have to address new biosecurity challenges, governments can better assess the effectiveness of existing biosecurity policies and design future policies in a way that allows society to enjoy the benefits of life sciences advances without undue exposure to risk.

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/sQynE60SFTc

About this Event:

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Sophia Boyer

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: AK-47s, Tanks, and F-16s: Understanding Shifts in Pakistan's Conventional Military Strategy in the post-Cold war era

Abstract: The United States has navigated a complex relationship with Pakistan since the country’s inception in 1947. The behavior of the Pakistan Army has been a central factor in that relationship. This thesis analyzes when, how and why the Pakistan Army has shifted its conventional military strategy in the post-Cold war era. An investigation of the Pakistan Army’s capabilities, doctrines, rhetoric and force distribution suggests that Pakistan shifted its conventional military strategy four times since 1989: a ‘Post-Cold war Strategy’ from 1989-1994, a ‘Defense Minimal strategy’ from 1994-2001, a ‘Two-Front Commitment Strategy’ from 2001-2010, and a ‘Three-Front Commitment Strategy’ from 2010-2019. Based on existing literature and interviews, this thesis argues that external threats, specifically those emanating from India and the U.S., and bureaucratic politics driven by leadership changes have impacted shifts in Pakistan’s conventional military strategy substantially. These findings can inform a calibrated US South Asia policy comprising the management of conventional military balance in nuclear South Asia.

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Samantha Feuer

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: From the Shadows to the Front Page: State Use of Proxies for Cyber Operations.

Abstract: Why do some states delegate cyber operations to proxies while others rely on central commands? This thesis explores state use of cyber proxies in light of principal-agent problems. In particular, this work examines cyber proxies allegedly acting at the behest of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea by considering three variables: cost, skills and specialization, and plausible deniability. The use of case studies and process tracing analyses evaluate their explanatory power in the cyber realm. The data suggest that states may use cyber proxies to differing degrees and with differing motivations depending upon the type of mission or strategic aim, as well as their ability to pose credible threats to misbehaving proxies. Although cyber operations are comparatively “cheap” relative to physical missions - hence their appeal - some evidence suggests that using cyber proxies may provide additional cost savings compared to the use of their central commands for certain missions. States’ need for skills and specializations, not immediately attainable through central commands, may also lead them to use cyber proxies. Based on available evidence, it remains inconclusive whether states’ potential desire for plausible deniability influences their use of cyber proxies. During a period of global uncertainty in which our everyday lives have been forced online, critical infrastructure, the public sector and private industry are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks from adverse actors. As data in this field improves, this thesis hopes to serve as a framework for future researchers to test, with more certainty, the causal links between these explanations and the use of cyber proxies within these four states.

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Elena Crespo

2:50 PM - 3:20 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Blood and Treasure, but Mostly Blood: U.S. Electoral Accountability and the All-Volunteer Force

Abstract: In the wake of the American military’s transition to an all-volunteer force (AVF), scholars and military leaders alike cautioned that the Armed Forces defending the nation would come to disproportionately draw from the least advantaged and least politically powerful populations. Should that be the case, certain communities would pay higher costs of war while others would be relatively untouched, leaving the Executive free to command with little public accountability. This thesis adopts an experimental statistical counterfactual approach to examine the geographic casualty distribution across states during the Iraq War had there been a conscripted force. The data presented suggest that the conventional logic is partially correct: an all-volunteer force is not egalitarian. It disproportionately burdened certain states—predominantly in the South and Midwest—with higher casualty rates than would have a conscripted force. However, many of the states that shouldered the costs of war under an AVF also carry disproportionate political gravity as electoral swing states. These findings suggest that a President who chooses to use force is more likely to face electoral backlash for his or her decisions under an all-volunteer force than under a conscripted force. Ultimately, the thesis proposes that President George W. Bush may have increased the margin of his victory in the 2004 Presidential election and contributed to greater Republican victories in the 2006 Senate election had the Iraq War been fought with a conscripted force that more equally distributed casualties. This finding runs contrary to the popular contention that a conscripted force is inherently more democratic and will lead to better electoral accountability for use of force.

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/vrUV4VtYZsE

About this Event:

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Ben Boston

1:30 PM - 2:15 PM 

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: America in East Africa: Security Partnerships, Aid Dependence, and Diplomatic Leverage

Abstract: Why is the United States able to shape the actions of friendly nations? In this thesis, I offer an answer by examining cases of military invasions by and domestic political liberalization effort of the Kenyan and Ugandan governments since the end of the Cold War. Drawing on academic, journalistic, and participant reporting of each case, including interviews with key American policymakers, I test three theoretical frameworks: balance of interests, dependence, and coercive diplomacy. Through these I attempt to explain American influence over the 1998 Ugandan and Rwandan invasion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the 2011 Kenyan invasion of southern Somalia, the 1991 Kenyan reinstitution of multiparty politics, and the 2005 Ugandan abolition of presidential term limits and reinstitution of multiparty politics. The existing literature on these cases focuses on outcomes broadly, and on African states’ comparative ability to secure agency relative to the wishes of their donors. Taking the United States as my focus, in this comparative case study, I find consistent limits to America’s ability to shape the actions of Kenya and Uganda regarding their core interests; however, clear, sustained application of coercive diplomacy still altered outcomes — especially when it used the leverage offered by dependence. This thesis creates a model of American agency in maximizing leverage over aid-dependent states.

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Eva Frankel

2:15 PM - 2:50 PM

Introductions will start at 1:30pm. Each presentation will be 20 minutes with a 10 minute discussion.

Title: Assessing the Threat of Bioterror from Lone Insiders in Biological Laboratories

Abstract: As the cost of DNA synthesis and sequencing drops and the life sciences advance, the literature suggests that synthesizing and weaponizing pathogens may have become within reach for non-state actors, creating a fundamental shift from a Cold War framework focused on the capabilities of state bioweapons programs to one focused on the threat posed by mass-casualty attacks perpetrated by terrorists. Lone insiders in biological laboratories, who have technical training and access to laboratory equipment, are considered a particular threat. Given the scholarship that suggests lone insiders in biological laboratories pose a significant security threat, why have there been no mass-casualty attacks perpetrated by lone insiders using pathogens? This thesis considers the capabilities of potential malicious actors in biological laboratories to weaponize pathogens, and their motivations to perpetrate mass-casualty attacks. Drawing on bibliometric data from synthetic virology papers, I argue that the historical threshold for capability required to weaponize pathogens is prohibitory to those who are not early adopters or innovators in the field of synthetic virology. Furthermore, I show that the malicious acts historically perpetrated by lone insiders are best characterized as biocrimes rather than bioterrorist acts, and transnational groups have not sought to recruit insiders in biological laboratories. By more fully understanding the threat of bioterrorism posed by lone insiders, policymakers and research institutions can work to ensure laboratory safety and security while promoting open science.

Seminar Recording:   https://youtu.be/FUlEJekANWY

About this event: On March 11, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission issued its final report to the U.S. Congress. Tasked by Congress to "develop a consensus on a strategic approach to defending the United States in cyberspace against cyber attacks of significant consequences," the commission's report identifies over 80 recommendations on U.S. government organization, norms and diplomacy, resilience, private sector collaboration and offensive cyber operations. The Solarium Commission's report is the latest in a growing line of blue-ribbon task force reports aimed at cyber issues, from the Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency convened by CSIS in 2008 to the Obama Administration's National Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity that issued a final report in December 2016. How does the Solarium Commission's report fit into this landscape? Join Stanford experts for a discussion of the Solarium Commission's report and recommendations, an assessment of the cyber policy landscape, and next steps for American cyber policy.

About the speakers: 

Andrew J. Grotto is a William J. Perry International Security Fellow at the Cyber Policy Center and a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. Grotto’s research interests center on the national security and international economic dimensions of America’s global leadership in information technology innovation, and its growing reliance on this innovation for its economic and social life. He is particularly interested in the allocation of responsibility between the government and the private sector for defending against cyber threats, especially as it pertains to critical infrastructure; cyber-enabled information operations as both a threat to, and a tool of statecraft for, liberal democracies; opportunities and constraints facing offensive cyber operations as a tool of statecraft, especially those relating to norms of sovereignty in a digitally connected world; and governance of global trade in information technologies.

Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University.  His research interests relate broadly to policy-related dimensions of cybersecurity and cyberspace, and he is particularly interested in the use of offensive operations in cyberspace as instruments of national policy and in the security dimensions of information warfare and influence operations on national security.  In addition to his positions at Stanford University, he is Chief Scientist, Emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, where he served from 1990 through 2014 as study director of major projects on public policy and information technology, and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar and Senior Fellow in Cybersecurity (not in residence) at the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace Studies in the School for International and Public Affairs at Columbia University; and a member of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. In 2016, he served on President Obama’s Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity. 

Jacquelyn Schneider is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution, a non-resident fellow at the Naval War College, and a senior policy advisor to the Cyberspace Solarium Commission.  Her research focuses on the intersection of technology, national security, and political psychology with a special interest in cybersecurity, unmanned technologies, and Northeast Asia.  Her work has appeared in Security Studies, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Journal of Cybersecurity, and Journal of Strategic Studies and is featured in Cross Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (Oxford University Press, 2019).   In addition to her scholarly publications, she is a frequent contributor to policy outlets,  including The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, CFR, Cipher Brief, Lawfare, War on the Rocks, Washington Post, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, National Interest, H-Diplo, and the Center for a New American Security.  She has a BA from Columbia University, MA from Arizona State University, and PhD from George Washington University.

Dr. Amy Zegart is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies (FSI), professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University, and a contributing editor to The Atlantic. She is also the Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, where she directs the Robert and Marion Oster National Security Affairs Fellows program. From 2013 to 2018, she served as co-director of the Freeman Spogli Institute’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and founder and co-director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Program. She previously served as the chief academic officer of the Hoover Institution.

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/fPTpcgTKAdg

About this Event: Russian decision making, though at times characterized as tactical or perhaps opportunistic, reflects a strategic consensus with a discernible theory of victory. Russian grand strategy reflects more an evolution rather than a revolution in thinking, with continuity prevailing over change. Framed by enduring threat perceptions, the quest for a geopolitical space, and the ever present mismatch between Moscow's desired position in international politics versus its means to attain it. Conversely Russian strategy in conflict reflects considerable adaptation, while still leveraging hard military power, there is a tangible shift towards reasonable sufficiency and emergent strategy over more deliberate approaches.

About the Speaker: Michael Kofman serves as Director of the Russia Studies Program at the CNA Corporation and a Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, D.C. His research focuses on Russia and the former Soviet Union, specializing in the Russian armed forces, Russian military thought, and strategy. Previously he served at the National Defense University as a Program Manager and subject matter expert, advising senior military and government officials on issues in Russia and Eurasia. Mr. Kofman's other affiliations include being a Senior Editor at War on the Rocks, where he regularly authors articles on strategy, the Russian military, Russian decision making, and related foreign policy issues.