Shapiro presents research he conducted with David A. Siegel, a student in Stanford's Graduate School of Business:

A review of international terrorist activity reveals a recurring pattern of financially strapped operatives working for terrorist organizations that seem to have plenty of money. This observation is hard to square with traditional accounts of terrorist financial and logistical systems, accounts that stress the efficiency with which terrorist financial networks distribute funds while operating through a variety of covert channels. In order to explain the observed inefficiencies, we present a hierarchical model of terror organizations in which leaders must delegate financial and logistical tasks to middlemen for security reasons; however, these middlemen do not always share their leaders' interests. In particular, the temptation always exists to skim funds from any financial transaction. To counteract this problem, leaders can threaten to punish the middlemen. Because logisticians in international terrorist organizations are often geographically separated from leaders, and because they can defect to the government if threatened, violence is rarely the effective threat it is for localized groups such as the IRA. Therefore leaders must rely on more prosaic strategies to solve this agency problem; we focus on leaders' ability to remove middlemen from the network, denying them the rewards of future participation. We find that when the middlemen are sufficiently greedy, and when the organization suffers from a sufficiently strong budget constraint, that leaders will choose not to fund attacks in equilibrium because the costs of skimming are too great. Further, we show there can be important non-linearities in terrorists' response to government counter-terrorism. Specifically, we find that given constrained funding for terrorists, government efforts will yield few results until they reach a certain threshold, at which point cooperation between leaders and middlemen in terrorist groups breaks down leading to a dramatic drop in the probability of terrorist success.

Robert O. Keohane (PhD., Harvard University), James B. Duke Professor of Political Science, has taught at Swarthmore College, Stanford University, Brandeis University, and Harvard University where he was Stanfield Professor of International Peace.

He is the author of After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984), for which he was awarded the second annual Grawemeyer Award in 1989 for Ideas Improving World Order. He is editor or co-editor of, and contributor to, eleven other books, most recently, Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge 2003), with J.L. Holzgrefe. Between 1974 and 1980 he was editor of the journal, International Organization. He was president of the International Studies Association, 1988-89, and of the American Political Science Association, 1999-2000. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and has held a Guggenheim Fellowship and fellowships at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and the National Humanities Center. He is on leave from Duke this year, conducting research at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

Page Fortna is an assistant professor in the Political Science Department at Columbia University. Her research focuses on the durability of peace in the aftermath of both civil and interstate wars. She is the author of Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton University Press, 2004), and has published articles in World Politics, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, International Studies Review, and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. She is currently working on a project evaluating the effectiveness of peacekeeping in civil wars, as well as a project on long-term historical trends in war termination.

During the 2004-2005 academic year, she is a fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. She has also been a visiting fellow at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, MA (2002-2003). Before coming to Columbia, Fortna was a pre-doctoral and then a post-doctoral fellow at CISAC. Her graduate work was done in the Government Department at Harvard University (Ph.D. 1998). Before graduate school, she worked at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a think tank in Washington DC. She is a graduate of Wesleyan University.

Alexander H. Montgomery is a joint International Security Program/Managing the Atom Project Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and a Political Science PhD candidate at Stanford University. He has a BA in Physics from the University of Chicago, an MA in Energy and Resources from the University of California, Berkeley, and an MA in Sociology from Stanford University. He has worked as a research associate in high energy physics on the BaBar experiment at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and as a graduate research assistant at the Center for International Security Affairs at Los Alamos National Laboratory. His research interests include political organizations, weapons of mass disruption and destruction, social studies of technology, and interstate social relations. His dissertation asks the question, "What US post-Cold War counterproliferation strategies towards potential nuclear states have been successful and why?"

Major Reid Sawyer, a career military intelligence officer, is an instructor of political science at the United States Military Academy. As an intelligence officer, Major Sawyer served in counternarcotics and special operations assignments. Major Sawyer earned his undergraduate degree from the United States Military Academy and holds a master's degree from Columbia University. Major Sawyer has lectured on terrorism to various groups and is currently working on a research project for the Institute of National Security Studies on the efficacy of counterterrorism measures. Major Sawyer is the current director of terrorism studies at West Point.

On November 15, 2005, the Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) is required by law to submit a recommendation to the parliament on how Canada should manage its spent nuclear reactor fuel. NWMO, which came into existence on November 15, 2002, is undertaking a creative and iterative process engaging the technical, political, and public communities in arriving at their recommendation. As an integral part of the process, NWMO established an assessment team to develop an analytical framework and a systematic method for evaluating and comparing options. Isaacs, one of two non-Canadian members of the team, will describe the ongoing work with emphasis on the multi-attribute utility analysis that was developed to evaluate the options against a range of technical, economic, and social issues.

Tom Isaacs directs the policy and planning activities of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. He is a member of advisory committees for Oregon State University and Texas A&M University nuclear engineering departments.

Isaacs was a member of the National Research Council committee that produced "One Step at a Time: The Staged Development of Geologic Repositories for High-Level Radioactive Waste," and was a member of the NRC Committee on Building a Long-Term Environmental Quality Research and Development Program in the U.S. Department of Energy.

He was chairman of the Expert Group on Nuclear Education and Training, a 17-nation evaluation sponsored by the Nuclear Energy Agency in Paris. He served on the DOE Science Advisory Committee for Environmental Management. He was a member of the "Blue-Ribbon Panel" on the Future of University Nuclear Engineering Programs and University Research and Training Reactors for the Department of Energy.

Previously, Isaacs was the Executive Director of the advisory committee to the Secretary of Energy and the White House which made recommendations on the need for nuclear regulatory reform in the DOE. He also held several management positions in the High-Level Radioactive Waste Program of the DOE, including Director of Strategic Planning and International Programs, Director of Policy and External Relations, and Deputy Director of the Office of Geologic Repositories. He managed the multi-attribute utility analysis that underpinned the selection of Yucca Mountain as the U.S. repository site.

Isaacs also managed the international technical cooperative program with several European nations and Canada. He was the lead U.S. delegate to the Nuclear Energy Agency's Radioactive Waste Management Committee in Paris and represented the Department with the National Academy of Sciences.

Earlier, Isaacs was Deputy Director of the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security with responsibility for national policy formulation and technical leadership in federal actions to minimize prospects of nuclear proliferation, including establishing the program of technical assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency for safeguarding nuclear facilities worldwide. He began his career with the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission where he helped oversee the design of the reactor core of the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF).

Isaacs graduated with a BS degree in chemical engineering from the University of Pennsylvania, and was a member of the Tau Beta Pi National Engineering Honor Society. He received an MS in engineering and applied physics from Harvard University.