Dr. Thomas Fingar is Payne Distinguished Lecturer in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. From May 2005 through December 2008, he served as the first Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and, concurrently, as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

Dr. Fingar served previously as Assistant Secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (2001-2003), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis (1994-2000), Director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-1994), and Chief of the China Division (1986-1989). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including Senior Research Associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control. Dr. Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969 and Ph.D., 1977 both in Political Science).

Ariel (Eli) Levite is a nonresident senior associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment. He is a member of the Israeli Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee on Arms Control and Regional Security and a member of the board of directors of the Fisher Brothers Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies. Prior to joining the Carnegie Endowment, Levite was the Principal Deputy Director General for Policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission. Levite also served as the deputy national security advisor for defense policy and was head of the Bureau of International Security and Arms Control in the Israeli Ministry of Defense. In September 2000, Levite took a two year sabbatical from the Israeli civil service to work as a visiting fellow and project co-leader of the "Discriminate Force" Project as the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. Before his government service, Levite worked for five years as a senior research associate and head of the project on Israeli security at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. Levite has taught courses on security studies and political science at Tel Aviv University, Cornell University, and the University of California, Davis.

In 2006, public reports began to circulate that North Korea was constructing a large new rocket testing and launching center in a rural North-western coastal valley. A Jane's article by Bermudez nicknamed the complex Pongdong-ni and reported on some of the individual facilities. Coming in the aftermath of the 2006 Taepo-dong II launch failure from the existing Musadun-ri launch center on North Korea's East coast, there has been world-wide  speculation and ‘expert' analysis, much of it based on Google Earth images which have not been updated since 2003 (Musadun-ri) and 2006 (Pongdong-ni).  A recent government report that a rocket engine test occured during the summer of 2008 ratcheted up the media rhetoric: meanwhile little has been admitted by North Korea. In our presentation, we will examine the growth of the DPRK's rocket programs using commercial tools and satellite visible and multispectral data previously available only the government intelligence and military analysts.  In our presentation:

1. We will assess and compare the capabilities and completion schedules of Pongdong- ni and  Musadun-ri,
2. Present important new policy issues that are presented by these major facility investments,
3. Show examples of how Open Source Technical Intelligence can provide an improved public understanding of foreign WMD activities independently of government and partisan policy centers.  
4. Comment on last weeks Iranian satellite launch using North Korean developed rockets. 

Lew Franklin is a long-time CISAC Affiliate, joining CISAC in 1992 as a Visiting Scholar after retiring as a TRW vice president, and previously vice president and co-founder of ESL, a defense intelligence company.  Upon retirement he was awarded the CIA's Gold Medal for career-long contributions to foreign weapons assessment and national technical means capabilities.  At CISAC his work focused on technical intelligence related problems, including wmd proliferation, export controls, defense conversion, and especially conversion of retired ICBMs for low-cost space launches.  In 1993, he headed the launch campaign that mated the Stanford Quakesat satellite onto a retired Russian SS-19 Rokot launcher for a successful launch to orbit.  His current research into Open Source Technical Intelligence is in support of the upcoming visit to North Korea led by Lewis and Hecker.

Nick Hansen graduated with a BA in Geography from Syracuse University in 1964.  His career in national intelligence spans 43 years first as an Army imagery analyst, and then in industry with GTE-EDL, ESL/TRW, Tera Research as a cofounder Vice Pres. and then again at ESL (now TRW/Northrop-Grumman) as a Director. Currently he is in an SES position at the Navy's NIOC-Suitland, MD, as an image technology expert associated with Pennsylvania State University.  He has been twice nominated for the NRO's Pioneer award for innovative imagery uses and techniques development and is an expert in foreign weapons systems and test ranges. Currently Nick is supporting John Lewis' North Korea project.

One of the unsolved problems of critical infrastructure protection is the "cascade failure" problem. The 2003 Blackout is an extreme example of how seemingly small failures in a remote part of a major national power grid can cause nearly 100% collapse of the entire system. Over 50 million people were without power. And yet, the electric power grid is considered stable and resilient. I analyze 3 abstract network models of cascade failure and speculate on how such failures might be avoided in critical infrastructures such as power grids, traffic congested highways, and computer networks. The MRS model is based on computer network resiliency, and suggests a prevention strategy based on careful placement of rollback points in the network. The epidemic model is based on network topology, and suggests a prevention strategy based on the network's spectral radius. Finally, my own Kirchhoff network model assumes a network that supports Kirchhoffs' Law of flow in a network, and leads to careful addition of one or more links in order to stabilize the vulnerable network. 

Ted Lewis is currently the Executive Director, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, and Professor of Computer Science at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. He is author of Critical Infrastructure Protection: Defending a Networked Nation, John Wiley & Sons, 2006, and Network Science: Theory and Applications, John Wiley & Sons, 2009.

Syed Ibne Abbas joined the Consulate General of Pakistan, Los Angeles on August 3, 2006. Prior to his present assignment, he served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad as Director General (2004-2006).

He joined the Foreign Service of Pakistan in 1983 and held various diplomatic assignments at the Pakistan Missions abroad: Berne (1989-1992), Geneva (1992-1994), Canberra (1998-2001) and New Delhi (2001-2004). He also worked at the Headquarters as Director and Desk Officer, and served as Deputy Secretary, Prime Minister's Secretariat (1995-1997).

He has represented Pakistan and led delegations on several occasions on bilateral and multilateral fora. He attended the 1997 and 2006 UN General Assembly sessions as a Pakistan delegate. He represented Pakistan at the Conference on Disarmament and attended meetings of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) and Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

He has delivered talks at the Pakistan's premier civil and military training institutions. He holds masters degrees in Political Science and International Relations.

Abstract: Nuclear testing has a special place in the Indian nuclear discourse. India's activism on disarmament issues can be traced back to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's 1954 call for a test ban. In recent times, at three critical junctures: CTBT negotiations (1994-96), the dialogue with the U.S. after the nuclear tests of May 1998 (1998-2000) and the negotiations on the civil nuclear agreement with the U.S. (2005-2008), the testing issue has made a demand for answers on fundamental questions. Gill and Gopalaswamy believe that the debate on the politics and science of nuclear testing in India reflects two larger questions: firstly, in the manner in which India should relate to the wider nonproliferation regime pending nuclear disarmament and secondly what should be the nature and extent of the Indian nuclear deterrent in a world with nuclear weapons? Neither of these questions has been satisfactorily answered and thus it is still an open debate.

There are significant international dimensions to this debate. The first aspect is the fate of the CTBT, which India refused to sign after two and half years of engagement. The second aspect is the perceptions of the credibility of India's deterrent in a fluid strategic landscape. Gill and Gopalaswamy argue that while India has begun to be relatively more engaging with the nonproliferation regime, it is unlikely that New Delhi will ratify the CTBT anytime soon. Rather, engagement with India on fissile material/fuel cycle control and delegitimization of nuclear weapons may turn out to be a more productive use of scarce political capital in New Delhi and elsewhere in the short run. As this engagement develops, the CTBT would be seen less as a step child of the regime from which India was kept apart but more as one among a number of regimes that involve India in a network of mutual restraints, thus improving the prospects for India's participation in a formal, global ban on testing.

On the scientific aspects, Gill and Gopalaswamy argue that a ‘perceptual set' induced by U.S. nuclear history is at the heart of the controversy over the two-stage device tested on May 11, 1998. They believe that in the light of new data made available by Indian scientists, the option of renewed explosive testing should be considered by India only as a demonstration of intent to maintain the credibility of India's deterrent if certain redlines were to be crossed. The fact that India has such redlines in mind would act to induce more responsibility on part of the other nuclear weapon states relevant to India's decisions, thus reducing the probability of renewed testing by India.

Amandeep Singh Gill is a visiting fellow at CISAC. He is a member of the Indian Foreign Service and has served in the Indian Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, the Indian Embassy in Tehran and the High Commission of India in Colombo. At headquarters in New Delhi, he has served twice in the Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division of the Ministry of External Affairs from 1998 to 2001 and again from 2006 to 2008 at critical junctures in India’s nuclear diplomacy. He was a member of the Indian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament during the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. He has also served as an expert on the UN Secretary General’s panels of experts on Small Arms and Light Weapons and on Missiles.

His research priorities include disarmament, arms control and non proliferation, Asian regional security and human security issues.  He is currently working on the interaction of nuclear policies of major states, particularly in Asia.

Before joining the Indian Foreign Service, Amandeep Gill worked as a telecommunications engineer. He retains an abiding interest in the interaction of science, security and politics. He is founder of a non-profit called Farmers First Foundation that seeks to reclaim agriculture for the farmers and demonstrate the viability of integrated agriculture in harmony with nature.

Bharath Gopalaswamy is a postdoctoral associate at Cornell University's Peace Studies Program. He has a PhD in Mechanical Engineering with a specialization in Numerical Acoustics. He has previously worked at the Indian Space Research Organization's High Altitude Test Facilities and the European Aeronautics Defense and Space Company's Astrium GmbH division in Germany.

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Philip Taubman is a consulting professor at CISAC, where is working on a book project about nuclear threats and the joint effort of Sid Drell, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, Bill Perry and George Shultz to reduce nuclear dangers. Before joining CISAC this fall, Mr. Taubman worked at the New York Times as a reporter and editor for nearly 30 years, specializing in national security issues, including intelligence and defense policies and operations. At the Times, Taubman served as a Washington correspondent, Moscow bureau chief, deputy editorial page editor, Washington bureau chief and associate editor.

Taubman also serves as Stanford associate vice president for university affairs, working on special projects for Stanford's president, John Hennessy.

Taubman was a history major at Stanford, Class of 1970, and served as editor-in-chief of the Stanford Daily in 1969. Before joining the New York Times, he worked as a correspondent for Time magazine and was sports editor of Esquire. He was a member of the Stanford Board of Trustees, 1978-1982. He is author of Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of America's Space Espionage. (Simon & Schuster, 2003.) Taubman is married to Felicity Barringer, the national environmental correspondent of the New York Times and a fellow Stanford graduate, Class of 1971.