Security concerns at the Olympics have dominated headlines over the past month after private contractor G4S failed to recruit the number of guards it had promised. The British government responded by deploying military personnel, and now there are more British troops guarding the streets of London than in Afghanistan.

Martha Crenshaw, a senior fellow at the FSI and CISAC, explains what kinds of threats exist at the Games, the challenges of securing such a large event and whether the failure by G4S will make the Olympics an easier or more attractive target.

What motivates terrorists?

Terrorists want to make a political statement. So you have to ask, "What kind of political statement would attacking the Olympics be?" Al-Qaida could regard the Olympics the way they regard the United Nations. They attacked U.N. headquarters in Iraq and a U.N. agency in Algiers. They regard the U.N. as a tool of the oppressor. That said, they don't talk about the Olympics the way they do about the U.S. – the great Satan, etc. And Muslim countries are competing in the Olympics. Of course they oppose many of the regimes of those countries, like Saudi Arabia.

But I'm not aware of any specific threat to the Olympics or chatter about the Olympics.

Is al-Qaida the only terrorist group to be concerned about?

People will be concerned about Hezbollah now because of the series of foiled attacks against Israel and the successful attack in Bulgaria. Hezbollah and al-Qaida have global reach. But when we talk about al-Qaida, we can't forget the groups affiliated with the main organization: al-Qaida in Iraq and al-Qaida in Yemen, for example. There's also the Pakistani Taliban and other al-Qaida linked groups there.

What kinds of terrorist attacks are of most concern?

We've tended to think, and I stress think, that al-Qaida wants spectaculars. In terms of their attacks in general, targets have often been public transportation. Think of Madrid and London. They're also fond of multiple targets at once, and as regards the U.S., it seems they're still focused on airplanes. We could be dead wrong and they could do something that's totally different but this is the pattern. 

It could be that they'd like a big explosion in the middle of Trafalgar Square, but it wouldn't have to be during the Olympics. There are crowds in Trafalgar Square all the time.  However, if Britain were the target, terrorists might think it's particularly embarrassing and spectacular to attack during the Olympics because it would heighten the fear factor.  On the other hand, it's easier to mount an attack when there is not the high level of Olympics security.

Has there always been a great fear of attacks at Olympics?

The hostage taking in Munich in 1972 (of Israeli athletes) and then the bombing in Atlanta in 1996 have made us afraid that something would happen at the Olympics because it's so prominent.

A recent study concludes that security has been effective. But we don't really know that entirely. We don't know what the terrorists are thinking. We don't know whether they looked at all of the security precautions and said, "This is going to take a lot of work and we will probably fail because security is so good. Let's do something else."

Is London exceptional, because of its size or politics?

From the point of view of this year's Olympics, London could be as much of a target as the Olympics themselves.  But Britain was attacked in 2005 because of their involvement in the war in Iraq, now over. I'm not sure if that changes Britain's vulnerability. We're in the realm of speculation because we don't really know how the adversary is thinking about this. So there is a risk in London but if I were in London I'd be more afraid of a traffic jam.

What does the failure by G4S to provide enough guards say about using private contractors to protect public safety?

Outsourcing security is widespread. A lot of people who were with the military in Iraq and are in Afghanistan are contractors. Everybody contracts out security these days.

But, the question deserves to be looked at. Is it a good idea to rely on these private firms? Would it be a good idea even if all of their people showed up? Are their guards reliable, are they trustworthy, or do they pose a security problem? Have they all been properly vetted to ensure they haven't been infiltrated by al-Qaida and don't include people who are mentally unstable? It raises a lot of questions about who provides security against terrorism for very large international events.

Does the use of military personnel at the last minute create vulnerabilities?

It's possible to imagine that some very determined and nefarious groups would look at this situation and say it's not really going to win us much fame and glory to go shooting a bunch of private security guards, but now the military is a target by being deployed on the streets of London. If someone wanted to attack them, they might think here is the opportunity.

But this switch also means that anybody who decided now that they wanted to target the military or the Olympics won’t have much time to plan. Typically, not always but typically, attacks that cause large numbers of casualties and a lot of destruction have been elaborately planned for a long time – even the lone wolf types like Anders Breivik in Norway or the recent attack in Colorado. Individuals or groups plan in advance and work to get the weapons and explosives, which is not easy. So even if somebody got the idea of doing something it wouldn't be so simple in this short time to come up with a plan and acquire the right materials.

How hard is it to guard a place like London, as well as the Olympics?

It's hard to protect lots of people in a big city. There are lots of crowds, lots of movement. It's not as though you can extend a perimeter; it's a moving target all the time. The Olympics might be a target, London has been a target, so the combination of the two could cancel each other out but I'm sure security officials are worried.

Yet, at this point, if I were the British government dealing with the fallout of the security firm's lack of preparedness, I'd much rather rely on soldiers who have been vetted and have experience than security officers who were quickly brought together.

Brooke Donald is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry has been awarded a William J. Perry Fellowship in International Security at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), where he will continue to address emerging security challenges facing the United States.

Ambassador Eikenberry has an ambitious agenda for the coming academic year, which includes teaching and mentoring students, public speaking and working closely with former Secretary of Defense William Perry. He also will take part in activities at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), such as the new China and the World research initiative.

“It’s a lifetime honor to receive the Perry Fellowship,” says Eikenberry. “I can’t think of an American in modern times who has better exemplified inspirational commitment to public service than Dr. William Perry. And I can’t think of a better institute of higher learning to be associated with than Stanford University.”

Ambassador Eikenberry has been at Stanford since September 2011 as the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer and is an affiliated faculty member for CISAC, APARC and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), as well as research affiliate at the Europe Center – all policy research centers within Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies.

Before coming to Stanford, Ambassador Eikenberry led the civilian surge directed by President Obama from 2009 to 2011 in an effort to reverse the momentum gained by insurgents, and set the conditions for a transition to Afghanistan sovereignty. He retired from his 35-year military career in April 2009 with the rank of U.S. Army Lieutenant General after posts including commander and staff officer with mechanized, light, airborne and ranger infantry units in the United States, as well as Korea, Italy and as the Commander of the American-led Coalition Forces from 2005-2007.

"Karl Eikenberry's record of public service amply demonstrates his unique qualities, not only as a leader of the American military at a challenging time, but as a strategic thinker and an insightful diplomat,” says CISAC Co-Director Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar. “He has a rare understanding of the profound challenges facing our world, and has been a tremendous asset to CISAC and Stanford.”

Ambassador Eikenberry’s research areas include U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region; China’s evolving security strategy; the United States and NATO; the future of the U.S. military; Washington’s policies in Central and South Asia; and assessing the risks of military intervention.

The fellowship was established to honor Perry, the 19^th U.S. secretary of defense and former CISAC co-director, and to recognize his leadership in the cause of peace. Perry is co-director of the Preventive Defense Project and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Initiative at CISAC and is an expert on U.S. foreign policy, national security and arms control. Perry Fellows spend a year at CISAC conducting policy-relevant research on international security issues. They join other distinguished scientists, social and political scientists and engineers who work together on problems that cannot be solved within a single field of study.

Ambassador Eikenberry is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, has master’s degrees from Harvard University in East Asian Studies and Stanford University in Political Science, and was a National Security Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. He earned an Interpreter’s Certificate in Mandarin Chinese from the British Foreign Commonwealth Office while studying at the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense Chinese Language School in Hong Kong, and has an Advanced Degree in Chinese History from Nanjing University in the People’s Republic of China.

Karl Eikenberry has spent the better part of the last 40 years in uniform, and much of it in combat zones. Then as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, he continued a mission of service to his country.

Now he's offering his thoughts on the future of the military, and even turning a critical eye on the institution he has long served.

But, he told an audience during his second Payne Lecture, hosted by Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, "We must not confuse dissent for disloyalty."

Eikenberry, who left the Army in 2009 when he became ambassador, said he has been disturbed in recent years by how political leaders have been using the military and by what he characterized as the military's outsized role in determining national security and foreign policy.

"These are problems that have to be acknowledged and debated publicly for the good of the nation and, I believe, our Armed Forces," he said during the May 3 lecture.

He said the dissolution of the draft after the Vietnam War led to the creation of an incredibly competent and capable military, but one that elected officials are more willing to deploy.

Drafted vs. voluntary armed forces

"Question No. 1," Eikenberry asked the audience, "If we had a conscript Armed Forces in 2003 and that conscript Armed Forces then are the sons and daughters, drafted, of constituents of our members of Congress, I want you to raise your hand if you think in 2003 we would have invaded Iraq."

Eikenberry questioned, as well, whether Congress would have held hearings – which it hasn't done – into the killings of Americans and allied servicemen by Afghan soldiers and police if the victims had been draftees rather than enlistees.

After only a few hands went up, Eikenberry said, "When you see those results, is there something wrong with the system?"

The former lieutenant general, who did not endorse a draft, urged a debate on ownership of the military: Does it belong to the American people or politicians?

He warned that the separation between soldiers and civilians – in daily life on bases, for example – also leads to ignorance of how the other lives. The separation can mean less judiciousness by lawmakers when determining whether to send service members into war, he said.

He also criticized the lack of oversight of the military by Congress and the media.

"I witnessed this up close and personal in Afghanistan when I transitioned from general to the top diplomat," he said. "Formerly treated with great deference by members of Congress, both I and my embassy team were now constantly on the witness stand."

He said lawmakers were right to challenge them: "We're spending a good deal of taxpayers' money."

He said as a member of the military, he never experienced that kind of scrutiny, as lawmakers are reluctant to be seen as less than fully supportive of troops.

"But by not subjecting the military to the same rigorous standards of scrutiny, they were applying a double standard and I don't think they were doing their complete jobs," he said.

He also said the media have failed to provide critical analysis of military engagements because of relentless pressure to file stories and fear they'll lose authoritative sources if they question actions.

Eikenberry spoke about responsibility and accountability within the military itself, as well.

Regarding the second Iraq war, he said the failure to anticipate the post-invasion environment was a massive failure of military command and planning, not just civilian.

"The costs of this failure have been enormous," he said. "And yet, there has been no accounting."

The 'strategic corporal'

He also talked about the "strategic corporal," a term coined by then-Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak in 1999. The strategic corporal refers to the serviceman whose missteps, wittingly or unwittingly, can have a strategic impact on the outcome of a military campaign.

He said in World War II there were no strategic corporals, only strategic commanders. A corporal's missteps would likely not affect military advancement in a battle.

"In the 21st century, however, in an era of instantaneous global communications and decentralized combat fought across very complex political, ethnic and religious mosaics, the strategic corporal does decidedly exist," he said, mentioning Abu Ghraib, the recent Koran burnings and the suspected murder of 17 Afghan civilians by an Army soldier.

"When the president of the United States has to apologize frequently for the misdeeds of members of our Armed Forces on the global stage as he's had to do in recent months, I have to say, I don't think that he or the American people are being well served," Eikenberry said.

He said in those cases of misdeeds, the mission may be too risky or the strategy not well planned out, and policy should possibly be reconsidered.

As the war in Afghanistan winds down and the military's mission is refocused, Eikenberry said the biggest security threat to the U.S. is a faltering economy. He echoed the sentiments of former Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, who said in 2010 that he considered the country's growing debt to be its No. 1 security threat.

"With a broken economy, our country cannot make the foundational investments in education, research and development, and infrastructure that are absolutely essential to sustaining a strong defense," Eikenberry said.

Eikenberry said retirement and health care costs in the Defense Department also are ballooning.

Eikenberry said it is important to keep our research and development lead, invest in education, ensure we have systems in place to defend U.S. borders against terrorism and invest more in alliances and partnerships as the world becomes more multi-polar.

He also said the military needs to know what it's after.

"With the end of the Afghan and Iraq conflicts, and our current fiscal crisis, our military leaders and our civilian leaders, they need to better define threats and they must be ready to address today and tomorrow these threats," he said.