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Russia watchers in the West cannot be surprised that Vladimir Putin is on his way back to the Russian presidency. Dmitri Medvedev was always his protégé, and there was no doubt that major decisions could not be made without his approval. This includes signing the New START arms control treaty, cooperating with NATO in Afghanistan and supporting U.N. sanctions on Iran — all of which should provide reassurance that Putin’s return won’t undo the most important accomplishments of the U.S.-Russia “reset.”

Yet the relationship with the West will inevitably change. For one thing, Putin can have nothing like the rapport his protégé developed with President Obama, which was built upon the two leaders’ shared backgrounds as lawyers, their easy adoption of new technologies, and their fundamentally modern worldviews.

The Bilateral Presidential Commission which Obama and Medvedev created and charged with advancing U.S.-Russia cooperation on everything from counterterrorism to health care may suffer. The relationship as a whole is not adequately institutionalized, and depends on the personal attention of Russian officials who will likely avoid taking action without clear direction from Putin, or who may be removed altogether during the transition.

Putin’s return to the presidency will also provide fodder for Western critics bent on portraying Obama and the reset as a failure, or dismissing Putin’s Russia as merely a retread of the Soviet Union.

These critics are wrong — today’s Russia bears little resemblance to what Ronald Reagan dubbed an “evil empire” — but Putin has been far more tolerant of Soviet nostalgia than his junior partner, and his next term will surely bring a new litany of quotations about Soviet accomplishments and Russia’s glorious destiny that will turn stomachs in the West.

Although he has spent his entire career within the apparatus of state power, including two decades in the state security services, Putin is at heart a C.E.O., with a businessman’s appreciation for the bottom line. Western companies already doing business in Russia can expect continuity in their dealings with the state, and it will remain in Russia’s interest to open doors to new business with Europe and the United States. The next key milestone for expanding commercial ties will be Russia’s planned accession to the World Trade Organization, which could come as soon as December.

At home, Putin faces a looming budget crisis. As the population ages and oil and gas output plateaus the government will be unable to continue paying pensions, meeting the growing demand for medical care, or investing in dilapidated infrastructure throughout the country’s increasingly depopulated regions.

This means that while Putin will seek to preserve Russia’s current economic model, which is based on resource extraction and export, he will be forced to assimilate many of his protégé’s ideas for modernizing Russia’s research and manufacturing sectors. Medvedev’s signature initiative, the Skolkovo “city of innovation,” will likely receive continuing support from the Kremlin, although it will have little long-term impact without a thorough nationwide crackdown on corruption and red tape.

Putin’s restored power will be strongly felt in Russia’s immediate neighborhood, which he has called Moscow’s “sphere of privileged interests.” Even though Kiev has renewed Russia’s lease on the Black Sea Fleet’s Sevastopol base through 2042 and reversed nearly all of the previous government’s anti-Russian language and culture policies, Ukraine is unlikely to win a reprieve from high Russian gas prices. Putin will also continue to press Ukraine to join the Russia-dominated customs union in which Kazakhstan and Belarus already participate. He may also take advantage of Belarus’s deepening economic isolation and unrest to oust President Aleksandr Lukashenko in favor of a more reliable Kremlin ally.

Putin and Medvedev have been equally uncompromising toward Georgia. Both are openly contemptuous of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, and it is unlikely that any progress on relations can occur until Georgia’s presidential transition in 2013.

Putin has good reason to continue backing NATO operations in Afghanistan to help stem the flow of drugs, weapons and Islamism into Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Russia itself. Moreover, as China extends its economic hegemony into Central Asia, he may find America to be a welcome ally.

Putin appreciates the advantages of pragmatic partnerships and will seek to preserve the influence of traditional groupings like the U.N. Security Council and the G-8 while at the same time promoting alternatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Brics.

The succession from Putin to Medvedev and back again was decided behind closed doors, and the formal transition of power is likely to take place with similar discipline. This should offer the West and the wider world some reassurance. Putin’s return to the presidency is far from the democratic ideal, but it is not the end of “reset.” Many ordinary Russians support him because he represents stability and continuity of the status quo and, for now, that is mostly good for Russia’s relations with the West.

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Karl Eikenberry has a unique perspective on the U.S. war in Afghanistan. The former ambassador to Kabul, his 35-year career in the army includes an 18-month tour as commander of the U.S.-led coalition forces in the country. As the conflict hit the 10-year mark, Eikenberry discussed President Obama’s Afghanistan strategy, the challenge of working with Pakistan, and the problem of overpromising.

We are coming up on 10 years in Afghanistan. What’s your snapshot of where we are now and where Afghanistan is going?

We're on the right path. The president has adopted a strategy that by the end of 2014 – if it’s well implemented – will have us in a position, and have the Afghans in a position, where the Afghans will be fully responsible for providing their own security.

It's going to require that the Afghan army and the Afghan police continue to develop sufficient capabilities so that by 2014 they have the right numbers and the right quality to allow our military forces to step back into a supporting role. It's going to require that the Afghan government continues to make improvements in terms of its accountability and its responsiveness to its people. And third, it's going to require that Pakistan make more efforts to attack the sanctuaries that Afghan Taliban currently enjoys there.

That doesn't mean we’ll be at a point where the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan ends. We'll continue to provide security assistance to the Afghan national security forces beyond 2014. We will continue to have a robust diplomatic mission at the end of 2014. I would expect that we'll still have a substantial foreign assistance program to Afghanistan – not at the level it is right now, but still substantial by global standards, and we’ll still, I expect, remain very diplomatically engaged in that part of the world.

So you've laid out three things: capacity building, governance, and Pakistan. Can we accomplish all three?

I think we have a reasonable possibility for success. I would not put probability against that. We know how to do capacity building especially with security forces, and I'd say over the last decade, we’ve made some important gains in knowing how to do that. It takes time, it takes resources, and it takes patience. The second thing – "good governance" – that's harder.

Ultimately, you can only have success in the first category of capacity building if you have success in the second category because all those institutions have to rest upon a foundation of what the people might say is reasonable, good governance, something that they’re willing to voluntarily support. That's more problematic.

The third category, Pakistan, is even more problematic. Their support of the Afghan Taliban is still seen by some elements within the state of Pakistan as being in their national security interest.

Are there things you think the U.S. policy makers have learned in Afghanistan that can be applied elsewhere?

I do. If you look in any of the domains we’re working in in Afghanistan – security assistance, rule of law, education and health – there are good lessons we've learned over time. Americans are extraordinarily adaptive. We’re creative. One of our good characteristics is that we frequently pull back from an enterprise, sum up lessons learned, be self critical, and continue to improve.

Another lesson learned coming out of Afghanistan may be the need to get a better understanding of what’s realistic in terms of setting goals and objectives. When we went into Afghanistan it’s fair to say that all of us – the international community, the Americans, the Afghans – did not fully understand the level of effort that would be needed to achieve some of the goals and objectives that we initially set for ourselves. 

I think if we could roll the clock back and go back in time, one of the lessons is that we might have tried to under promise more and then over deliver. When we went in in 2001 and 2002 we had talked about infrastructure that would be developed, how fast institutions would be built, how fast representative democracy might be able to take hold.

I think historians will look back and say they didn't really understand the complexities and the problems, they didn’t fully understand just how difficult this might all be.

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Nuclear energy is politically sensitive. For its proponents, nuclear energy is clean and highly efficient and indeed is the only alternative to fossil fuels in providing a base supply of electricity. For its opponents, nuclear energy is nothing but trouble, a symbol of war and weaponry par excellence, and one that creates environmental problems for mankind today and in the future. What is remarkable in this highly emotional debate is the general division between developed and developing countries. Asian and Gulf states are more active than many in other continents in expanding or developing their nuclear energy capacities. China is leading this expansion with 27 reactors under construction now.

Nuclear development in China highlights a series of objectives many developing countries try to balance – energy and economy, energy and development, energy and environment, energy and security, and the need for both clean energy and adequate and reliable energy supplies. It tells a counterintuitive story about Chinese politics – a single-party authoritarian political system with an extremely fragmented institutional structure in nuclear energy policy making, implementation and regulation and with highly competitive market forces in play. It provides a cautionary tale about the Chinese as well as global nuclear future. This paper discusses the challenges of nuclear energy development, using China as an example. It asks who drives it, what technology is selected and adopted, how human capital is developed, what the rules of the games are, and more importantly, which institutions are responsible for issuing licenses, regulating standards, and overseeing the compliance, and what forms of regulation do they use. At the core of these questions is if and how countries can ensure safe, secure and sustainable nuclear development.


Speaker Biography:

Dr. Xu Yi-chong is a research professor of politics and public policy at Griffith University. Before joining Griffith University in January 2007, Xu was professor of political science at St Francis Xavier University in Nova Scotia, Canada. She is author of The Politics of Nuclear Energy in China (2010); Electricity Reform in China, India and Russia: The World Bank Template and the Politics of Power (2004); Powering China: Reforming the electric power industry in China (2002); co-author of Inside the World Bank: Exploding the Myth of the Monolithic Bank (with Patrick Weller 2009) and The Governance of World Trade: International Civil Servants and the GATT/WTO, (with Patrick Weller 2004); and editor of Nuclear Energy Development in Asia (2011) and The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds (2010). All these projects were supported by the research grants from either Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) or Australian Research Council.

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The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University is pleased to welcome Karl Eikenberry as the 2011 Payne Distinguished Lecturer. 

Eikenberry comes to Stanford from the U.S. State Department, where he served between May 2009 and July 2011 as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. In that role, he led the civilian surge directed by President Obama to reverse insurgent momentum and set the conditions for transition to full Afghan sovereignty. Earlier, he had a 35-year career in the U.S. Army, retiring in April 2009 with the rank of lieutenant general.

“I am delighted that he has joined us,” says Coit D. Blacker, FSI’s director and the Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies. “Karl Eikenberry’s international reputation, vast experience, and on-the-ground understanding of military strategy, diplomacy, and the policy decision-making process will be an enormous contribution to FSI and Stanford and are deeply consistent with the goals of the Payne Lectureship.”

Eikenberry is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, and has master’s degrees from Harvard University in East Asian Studies and from Stanford University in Political Science. He was also a National Security Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and he earned an Interpreter’s Certificate in Mandarin Chinese from the British Foreign Commonwealth Office while studying at the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense Chinese Language School in Hong Kong. He has an Advanced Degree in Chinese History from Nanjing University in the People’s Republic of China.

"Karl Eikenberry first came to Stanford as a graduate student in the Political Science Department in the mid-1990s, and we are extraordinarily happy to have him back," says Stephen D. Krasner, deputy director at FSI and Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations. "He has an exceptional, actually unique, set of experiences and talents that will greatly enrich the intellectual community at FSI and throughout the university."

Eikenberry's work in Afghanistan includes an 18-month tour as commander of the U.S.-led coalition forces. He has also served in various strategy, policy, and political-military positions, including deputy chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military committee in Brussels, and director for strategic planning and policy for U.S. Pacific Command.

His military operational posts included service as commander and staff officer with mechanized, light, airborne, and ranger infantry units in the continental United States, Hawaii, Korea, and Italy. His military awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished and Superior Service Medals, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Ranger Tab, Combat and Expert Infantryman badges, and master parachutist wings.

Eikenberry has also published numerous articles on U.S. military training, tactics, and strategy, on Chinese ancient military history, and on Asia-Pacific security issues. He was previously the president of the Foreign Area Officers Association and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

At Stanford, Eikenberry will also be an affiliated faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL).

He will deliver this year's inaugural Payne Distinguished Lecture on Oct. 3 at the Cemex Auditorium at the Knight Management Center. The public address will be given in conjunction with a private, two-day conference that will bring to Stanford an international group of political scientists, economists, lawyers, policy-makers, and military experts to examine from a comparative perspective problems of violence, organized crime, and governance in Mexico.

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Ten years after the terrorist attacks, five leading experts weigh in on the state of the jihadist movement, U.S. intelligence, and the cost of safety.

Martha Crenshaw It depends on what we mean by safer. If we're asking how likely it is that we'll experience an attack of the magnitude of 9/11, I don't that it's likely. Our awareness of the possibility is so much greater. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the attack, is in custody. Other major players are dead or under arrest. Osama Bin Laden is gone. The drone strikes in Pakistan have been very effective. However, we're not entirely safe from the threat of terrorism against U.S. interests and citizens abroad. We're still vulnerable in many ways. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are still threats. They've inherited anti-Americanism from the original Al-Qaeda, and while Al-Qaeda central is weakened, these affiliated groups will likely become stronger because of the power vacuum that's left in the jihadist movement. These different factions could unite. Al Qaeda itself was a merger of different national movements. This could happen again -- they could reconstitute themselves into a very powerful organization.

Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar We are safer -- up to a point. In 2003 I wrote that there was little reason to think we were safer than we were on Sept. 11, 2001, and that in order to improve our security we would need to invest in meaningful long-term changes rather than focusing on quick fixes. Much has changed today. American attacks have been devastating to al-Qaeda, showing how 9/11 was perhaps a tactical success for the group but almost certainly a strategic miscalculation. Americans have forged alliances with countries throughout the world, sharing financial intelligence and pooling efforts to disrupt terrorist mobility. Many communities have made important strides in safeguarding airports and chemical plants. Federal lawmakers enacted landmark, bipartisan food safety legislation to bolster the safety of the food supply, and doctors working with public health authorities have enhanced their capacity to respond to infections and biosecurity threats such as the H1N1 virus. Meanwhile, pressing issues like cyber-security and emergency preparedness are starting to receive much-needed attention.

But Americans continue to face profound challenges, too. We must work to enhance the infrastructure that protects our public health, cyber-security, and emergency response.  The Sept. 11 attacks starkly show the need to reconcile security goals with laws and constitutional principles. Policy makers and the public must focus attention on strengthening the economic and social foundations supporting America’s long-term position in the world. At the same time, the nation must remain determined, creative, and vigilant in confronting the continuing threats posed by non-state actors and failed states.

Karl Eikenberry If we talk about the defense of the homeland, we are clearly safer against the international terrorist threat. Our level of awareness is much higher. We were asleep when we got hit. And the systems that we've established, I think have made us safer. Now, that's very specifically against the terrorist threat. Is the United States of America stronger on a relative basis than on 9/11/2001 -- are we a stronger nation? I think the answer is no. I think that our economic strength has declined. And I think there's been a degree of militarization of our foreign policy over the last decade that’s made us less attractive globally.

Thomas Fingar We are safer with respect to the danger of a major terrorist attack than we were 10 years ago but not with respect to other risks that endanger more of our citizens and are more likely to occur. We have spent billions of dollars to detect, prevent, and respond to terrorist threats from abroad and we have reduced the already low probability of death or injury from terrorist attacks to even lower levels. These gains have had a high opportunity cost because achieving them was at the expense of efforts to reduce other dangers. Far more Americans continue to die from inadequate hospital procedures, unsafe food, drunk drivers, and other well-known dangers than have died in terrorist attacks. We will not be much safer until we address these and similar problems, repair and replace our aging infrastructure, and do more to prepare for the more severe weather that will result from climate change. 

Amy Zegart Osama bin Laden is dead. Yet 10 years after 9/11, it would be dangerous and wrong to think that the terrorist threat is behind us. Violent Islamist extremism comes from many places, not just the 50 to 100 core al Qaeda fighters holed up along the Af/Pak border. The years 2009 and 2010 have seen a spike in plots against the U.S. homeland. Nearly all of them have come from radicalized homegrown terrorists or “franchise” groups with loose and murky ties to the core al Qaeda organization.

In addition, WMD terrorism remains a haunting future possibility. And the FBI has not made the leap from crime fighting to intelligence. FBI analysts, whose work is vital to connect dots and protect lives, are still treated like second class citizens -- labeled “support staff” alongside janitors and secretaries, and relegated to middle and lower rungs of the bureaucracy. So long as FBI analysts are treated like second-class citizens, Americans will get second-class security. These three factors -- diversification of the terrorist threat, the potential to combine destructive motives with devastating weapons, and the FBI's continued weaknesses -- suggest that the future may not be any safer than the past.

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After 9/11, the administration of US President George W Bush initiated the era of the global war on terror. For many, this was a misguided response to terror attacks. But before the decade was over, US forces invaded two countries and are now fighting shadow wars in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan, while an air war continues in Libya. Pentagon commands cover the entire planet, and US military assistance programmes are active in almost every country.

 Wars reorder politics and values. They remake that which is taken to be true and right. They render the world unrecognisable from what it was when the balloon went up. That is why epochs of world history are so often marked off by the dates of wars. How should we understand the era of 9/11? In what historical timeline does it belong?

It is useful to begin by recalling some of what seemed true on September 10, 2001. The US enjoyed the unquestioned global supremacy of the "unipolar moment". The "end of history" beckoned, in which liberal democracy and free markets promised peace and prosperity everywhere for all time. The West and its international organisations managed the world, ultimately for the general good. Globalisation was bringing people closer together.

Today, each of these verities lies broken. The failure to understand the 1990s and the significance of the end of the Cold War has left us unable to understand what has been happening in the decade since 9/11.

Renewed global military commitments have hastened an inevitable US decline. The unrestrained power of finance capital is wrecking economies and societies across the Western world. Europe lies prostrate, bereft of anything approaching serious leadership, mired in the divisive politics of austerity and racist, anti-immigrant populism. The great international institutions have sat on the sidelines of the crises roiling the world. The communications technologies that were supposed to lead to mutual understanding instead assist revolts and terrorism, rioters and financial speculators, when they are not being used by states to spy on their own citizens, or by corporations to increase the number of consumer products people desire.

How is it that the received wisdom about the nature of world politics was so badly wrong? What did we fail to see and why?

The great conceit that blinds us is the idea that the powerful make history just as they please. We are particularly prone to this error when thinking about international politics. Assisted by opinion columnists and think tank gurus, we tend to view the world from the perspective of decision makers in the great powers. What should the West do about Libya? How should the US respond to state failure in Yemen or the Iranian bomb? What should the G-20 do about the debt crisis?


'Like cowboys at the rodeo'

In the domestic politics of our own countries, it is easy for us to see that politicians are like cowboys at the rodeo: hanging on for dear life before a force of nature tramples them underfoot. The "bull" that throws them could be a long-simmering social crisis, a downturn of the business cycle, or some series of events over which no one exercises control. The skill of the politician determines how long they can hang on, but we are left in little doubt as to where the real power lies.

We are forced to confront the underlying social structures, historical legacies, and economic relations that determine our fates. Human agency, too, has its say, but it is not only that of the great leaders that matter. Ordinary people and the social and political movements they create can drive events and force the "policymakers" to respond. But fate usually works against human purposes. Rarely do either the powerful or those who resist them achieve quite what they intended.

A wonderful example of the impoverished vocabulary with which we think about international politics is the idea that "Reagan won the Cold War". The vast apparatus that is a modern state is reduced to its leader - "Thatcher", "Gorbachev". Agency, the power to shape events, rests firmly in the hands of this leader, who is located in the global North. A range of violent struggles, fought almost entirely in the global South, are subsumed under one term which denies there was even a war at all. Most of all, a tidy end - 1989 - is imagined in which, needless to say, the good guys won.

Epoch-defining dates like 1989 or 9/11 invoke various imagined histories and geographies. But too often the dates with which we order world politics are curiously Eurocentric. It is European exploration, the French revolution, a Congress in Vienna, and German invasions, for example, which mark out the globe's historical eras: 1492, 1789, 1815, 1914, 1939.

We are thus singularly unable to grasp the global histories and social relations that delivered us to 9/11. Within the conventional terms of analysis of international relations, it is almost impossible to see the great social, political and economic struggles between the global North and South that have driven modern world politics. European imperialism and the prodigious efforts to incorporate ever more peoples and places, ever more domains of life, into the capitalist world system lie at the origins of these global histories.

It is crucial to underscore that imperialism, capitalism and the modern world they together did not simply emanate from Europe. They were joint productions with the non-European world, albeit amid unequal power relations. Imperialism requires collaborators, while capital needs labour. The first factories were not built in England, but in the Caribbean, producing sugar with African slaves.

The World Wars gutted European imperial power and unleashed struggles for independence across the global South, led almost everywhere by the anti-imperialist left. For over forty years revolutionaries and insurgents, death squads and soldiers, carried on a deadly combat.

 

The fall of the left

The global significance of 1989, broadly speaking, was the defeat in both the North and the South of the political left, of those political movements that sought to replace, contain, or redirect the expansive energies of capital in accordance with humane values.

During the Cold War, Western powers had to maintain social welfare systems at home lest communism begin to look attractive. The Soviets, meanwhile, tried and failed to demonstrate that they too could produce washing machines, refrigerators and other consumer items. With the collapse of the USSR, neoliberalism was unleashed and could begin in earnest to do away with welfare states in the West. "Shock therapy" was delivered to the former Soviet bloc countries, while the debt crisis was used to control many economies in the global South. No longer did the West have to secure Third World allies with lavish aid.

The defeat of the left produced two outcomes which have defined the last twenty years and will continue to make history over the next twenty.

The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of the dire social consequences of unrestrained capitalism. The grievances, the injustices, the poverty, the anger, the continued reduction of everything human to the bottom line, to something that can be bought or sold, all this remained, even intensified. But now it was not the left that would make political lemonade out of these lemons, but the right; not communists, but religious fundamentalists, both Christian and Islamic. This is where the Tea Party belongs, feeding on the misdirected resentments of those devastated by unregulated capitalism.

The second outcome of 1989 is a dramatic increase in the political power of capital. Across the Western world, but most especially in the US, politicians are in hock to Big Money, while corporate media fundamentally shapes political debate.


Blinkered worldview

The problem with this, as Karl Marx would have told us, is that while capitalists know what is in the interest of their specific business, they are unable to cooperate for the good of the system as a whole. To maintain a capitalist society of a kind anyone would want to live in requires tremendous public investment and infrastructure; a neutral, professional and active civil service; and a strong framework of effective, lawful regulation.

Few capitalists want to pay taxes for all this, or subject their industries to significant regulation. Give capitalists as a class too much political power, and they will enfeeble government with their special interests, lobbyists, and kept politicians. The consequence is the drama currently on display: the self-destruction of the West and its economies. It is plainly obvious that Western societies are in dire need of modernisation, investment, and strategies for growth and employment. But the political forces that might fight for these have long since been vanquished. Anguished experts like Paul Krugman are left accurately to foretell a doom that the political systems of the West willfully do nothing to avoid.

It is this self-inflicted crisis that drives the timing of the scale-down of the global war on terror currently underway. After all, nation-building at home or abroad requires taxes. Rather than occupying countries in a "forward strategy for freedom", as Bush termed the invasion of Iraq, the war on terror will transform into the police, spy and special operations war Western liberals had originally called for in 2001.

Unifying the eras of the Cold War, the 1990s, and the decade following 9/11, are reinvigorated efforts to control the politics, economies and populations of the global South in the wake of the collapse of formal empire in 1945. Wars of tremendous folly and human cost have marked this entire period, in Korea, Vietnam, Algeria, Mozambique, and across Central and Latin America, among others. Bush's travesties in Iraq and Afghanistan will likely bring this series to an historical close. The tentative approach to Libya is a transition to a future of reduced Western ambition in the global South.

The retreat of the West from extensive and effective political and military efforts to control the global South - a history which began in the 16th century - rings the death knell of Western world power. The decade since 9/11 is the penultimate chapter in this history.

 

Tarak Barkawi is a senior lecturer in War Studies at the Centre of International Studies in the University of Cambridge. He also authored the book Globalization and War (Rowman and Littlefield). He has held fellowships at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University; the Department of War Studies, King’s College London; the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University; and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Ohio State University. 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy. 

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More than 40,000 people have died in drug-related homicides in Mexico since 2006, and recent figures indicate that the pace and severity of drug-related violence is increasing. Organized crime is widespread and appears deeply embedded throughout much of the country. Citizens feel an increasingly pervasive sense of insecurity, and the situation is causing growing concern throughout the hemisphere. 

In an attempt to understand and develop potential solutions to these problems, a group of political scientists, economists, lawyers, policy-makers, and military experts from around the world will visit Stanford this October for a private, two-day conference that will explore problems of violence, organized crime, and governance in Mexico, as well as other countries that have experience tackling similar issues. 

“The increasing violence in Mexico is a major problem for Mexicans and the entire region,” says Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, incoming co-director of Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, one of the lead sponsors of the event. “The situation underscores the urgency of problems involving crime, security, and governance not only in our hemisphere but throughout the world. Investigating these problems from a comparative perspective will bring us closer to solutions that can improve security and accountability.” 

In a series of discussions, panelists from the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Germany will examine the effect Mexico's violence has had on civil society, the role of U.S. policies in affecting organized crime and violence, and what lessons may have been learned about combating violence in other contexts, such as the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, police and security reform in Brazil, and the sharp decline in drug-related violence in Colombia. Participants will also look at the potential mechanisms for developing institutional capacity and the rule of law in some of the world’s most fragile democracies. 

“Conflict and insecurity pose the greatest challenge to the development of effective institutions of governance and rule of law in Mexico,” says Beatriz Magaloni, a political scientist and the director of the Program on Poverty and Governance at Stanford University's Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law. “But surprisingly little is known about the dynamics of violence. Greater understanding could help policy makers craft and pursue effective strategies for tackling the issues in a comprehensive way.” 

The event, scheduled for October 3 and 4, will conclude with a public address by Karl Eikenberry, the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan. He is currently in residence at Stanford as the 2011-2012 Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. 

Other sponsors of the conference include the Center for Latin American Studies and the Stanford Law School.

 

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"Restrepo" is a feature-length documentary that chronicles the deployment of a platoon of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan's Korengal Valley. The movie focuses on a remote 15-man outpost, "Restrepo," named after a platoon medic who was killed in action. It was considered one of the most dangerous postings in the U.S. military. This is an entirely experiential film: the cameras never leave the valley; there are no interviews with generals or diplomats. The only goal is to make viewers feel as if they have just been through a 90-minute deployment. 

The film was creaetd by Sebastain Junger and Tim Hetherington, both of whom were embedded with battle company of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, in the remote and heavily contested Korengal valley of eastern Afghanistan. Reporting on the war from the soldiers’ perspective, they spent weeks at a time at a remote outpost that saw more combat than almost anywhere else in the entire country. 

Following the screening, Junger will be in conversation with Kristine Samuelson (Art and Art History).

On February 21, Junger is in conversation with Professor Tobias Wolff.

Watch the trailer.

For additional information on the series, please visit the Stanford Ethics and War series website.

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"The Fixer:The Taking of Ajmal Naqshbandi" is a feature-length documentary that follows the relationship between an Afghan interpreter and his client, American journalist Christian Parenti. This intimate portrait of two colleagues shifts dramatically when Ajmal is kidnapped along with an Italian reporter. The situation goes from bad to worse as foreign powers pressure for fast results, the Afghan government bungles its response and the specter of Taliban power looms in the background. What follows is the tragic story of one man forgotten in the crossfire: a brutal allegory of the proud land and perilous misadventure that is Afghanistan.

Following the screening, Ian Olds (the film's Director) will be in conversation with Robert Crews (History, Stanford).

This event is sponsored by the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies (CREEES). It is free and open to the public. 

The Fixer / View the trailer

 

 

For additional information on the series, please visit the Stanford Ethics and War series website.

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On October 3, Karl Eikenberry, the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, will deliver this year's inaugural Payne Distinguished Lecture at Cemex Auditorium at the Knight Management Center.

The public address will be given in conjunction with a private, two-day conference that will bring to Stanford an international group of political scientists, economists, lawyers, policy-makers, and military experts to examine from a comparative perspective problems of violence, organized crime, and governance in Mexico. 

Cemex Auditorium
Zambrano Hall
Knight Management Center

641 Knight Way, Stanford, California 94305

Karl Eikenberry Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and Retired U.S. Army Lt. General Speaker
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar Speaker Center for International Security and Cooperation

Dept. of Political Science
Encina Hall, Room 436
Stanford University,
Stanford, CA

(650) 724-5949
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations
Professor of Political Science
beatriz_magaloni_2024.jpg MA, PhD

Beatriz Magaloni Magaloni is the Graham Stuart Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science. Magaloni is also a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, where she holds affiliations with the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). She is also a Stanford’s King Center for Global Development faculty affiliate. Magaloni has taught at Stanford University for over two decades.

She leads the Poverty, Violence, and Governance Lab (Povgov). Founded by Magaloni in 2010, Povgov is one of Stanford University’s leading impact-driven knowledge production laboratories in the social sciences. Under her leadership, Povgov has innovated and advanced a host of cutting-edge research agendas to reduce violence and poverty and promote peace, security, and human rights.

Magaloni’s work has contributed to the study of authoritarian politics, poverty alleviation, indigenous governance, and, more recently, violence, crime, security institutions, and human rights. Her first book, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico (Cambridge University Press, 2006) is widely recognized as a seminal study in the field of comparative politics. It received the 2007 Leon Epstein Award for the Best Book published in the previous two years in the area of political parties and organizations, as well as the Best Book Award from the American Political Science Association’s Comparative Democratization Section. Her second book The Politics of Poverty Relief: Strategies of Vote Buying and Social Policies in Mexico (with Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and Federico Estevez) (Cambridge University Press, 2016) explores how politics shapes poverty alleviation.

Magaloni’s work was published in leading journals, including the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Criminology & Public Policy, World Development, Comparative Political Studies, Annual Review of Political Science, Cambridge Journal of Evidence-Based Policing, Latin American Research Review, and others.

Magaloni received wide international acclaim for identifying innovative solutions for salient societal problems through impact-driven research. In 2023, she was named winner of the world-renowned Stockholm Prize in Criminology, considered an equivalent of the Nobel Prize in the field of criminology. The award recognized her extensive research on crime, policing, and human rights in Mexico and Brazil. Magaloni’s research production in this area was also recognized by the American Political Science Association, which named her recipient of the 2021 Heinz I. Eulau Award for the best article published in the American Political Science Review, the leading journal in the discipline.

She received her Ph.D. in political science from Duke University and holds a law degree from the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México.

Director, Poverty, Violence, and Governance Lab
Co-director, Democracy Action Lab
CV
Date Label
Beatriz Magaloni Speaker Center on Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law
Lectures
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