To make his case, [Bush] has a powerful historical experience to draw upon: the end of the Cold War. Regime change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union fundamentally enhanced American national security. If Iraq possessed Russia's nuclear arsenal today, the United States would be in grave danger. Two decades ago we feared this same arsenal in the hands of the Kremlin. Today we do not. The reason we do not is that the regime in Russia has become more democratic and market-oriented and therefore also more Western- oriented.

Second, democratization on the periphery of Europe has stalled. A dictator who praises Stalin and Hitler runs Belarus. President Vladimir Putin has weakened democratic institutions and grossly violated the human rights of his own citizens in Chechnya in his attempt to build "managed democracy" in Russia. In Ukraine, President Leonid Kuchma aspires to create the same level of state control over the democratic process as Putin has achieved in Russia to ensure a smooth -- that is, Kuchma-friendly -- transition of power when his term ends in 2004. In contrast to Russia, Ukraine has a vibrant democratic opposition, whose leader, Viktor Yushchenko, is likely to win a free and fair presidential election. This vote in 2004 will be free and fair, however, only if the West is watching. Only in Moldova has authoritarian creep been avoided, but that's because of the weakness of the state, hardly a condition conducive to long-term democratic consolidation.

Book description:

The basic logic of preventive diplomacy is unassailable. Act early to prevent disputes from escalating; reduce tensions that could lead to war; deal with today's conflicts before they become tomorrow's crises. Yet as we look at the record of these first years of the post-Cold War era, it is quite mixed. There have been some preventive diplomacy successes and opportunities that have been seized by major powers and international organizations to help preserve and protect the peace. But there also have been other opportunities that have been missed, with some of the century's most deadly conflicts the result. This study examines ten major post-Cold War cases including Croatia-Bosnia, Rwanda, the Baltics, Russia-Ukraine, Macedonia, and North Koreato assess the key factors contributing to both the success and failure of preventive diplomacy. The method of case study analysis employed is based on the work of Alexander L. George. Authors include both leading academics and prominent policy officials with first-hand knowledge

Book chapter in Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World , B.W. Jentleson, ed., Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.

This report is the result of a workshop held in April 1998, when fifty policy experts, government officials and scholars met in Washington, DC. to discuss an issue of great import: the future of the relationship between Ukraine and NATO, This event, the Workshop on Ukraine-NATO Relations, was sponsored by the Harvard University Project on Ukrainian Security and the Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project. The express goal of the workshop was to bring together representatives of Ukraine, NATO, and the United States so that they could collaborate on developing concrete recommendations for short and long-term next steps to broaden and deepen Ukraine-NATO relations.

The conveners of this workshop believed that the relationship developing [at that time] between Ukraine and NATO had the capacity to evolve into an important force for stability and security in Europe and the world, and to serve as a model for other countries in the region. While the NATO-Ukraine Charter and Ukraine's participation in the Partnership for Peace and the NATO peacekeeping mission in Bosnia provided a strong foundation, the longer-term direction of this very important relationship continued to be largely undefined. Further, they strongly believed that the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership signed by Ukraine and NATO in the summer of 1997 was only the first step towards institutionalizing the growing Ukraine-NATO relationship. Ensuring that the Charter was meaningful depended on concrete implementation of the cooperation anticipated in that document. Thus they decided that a concerted effort needed to be made to develop a gameplan for the future.

The author concludes that strategy posited on the unchanging character of the differences that have separated Russia and the West is a self-fulfilling prophecy. The trouble with a status quo strategy is that it offers no vision of the opportunities available to construct a
security system in which power is constrained not just by countervailing power but by the exercise of democratic control over national decisions. Security in Europe is not just a question of military limitations and reductions. The essence of European security and the key to achieving a stable peace lies in the process of creating an inclusive community of
democratic nations.

Nuclear war is generally believed to bring risks of destruction out of proportion to any gain that may be secured by the war, or to any loss that may be averted, except perhaps for the loss of national independence and group survival. Nuclear-armed states, however, continue to project military force outside their own territory in order to carry out rivalries for power and influence. Will these rival power projections lead to war, as they often did in the past? If not, how will they be resolved? This paper makes the case that, because of the recognized destructiveness of nuclear weapons, rivalries among major nuclear-armed states for power and influence outside their own territory are not likely to lead to central war among them, but that definite lines separating zones of exclusive security influence, such as prevailed during the Cold War, will reappear where circumstances prevent
other compromises. This conclusion does not hold in the case of nuclear powers that are centrally vulnerable to conventional attack from each other: in that case, nuclear deterrence is less likely to be stable. Where lines are established, they may facilitate rather than prevent cooperation in dealing with the next century's global problems.

Executive Summary

This paper considers the emerging structure of the international security system after the end of the Cold War. It describes the changes that have taken place in world politics with the end of the bipolar confrontation, and the new threats and challenges that face the international community in the post-Cold War era. It discusses the implications that this new international system has for European security and, in particular, for the security of one of the newly independent states-Ukraine. The role of international organizations, in particular the United Nations, in countering new threats to global security is examined, and a number of recommendations proposed for reforming the UN to meet these challenges more effectively.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact has left Central and Eastern Europe in a security vacuum. Regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), however important, are unlikely to fill this vacuum and become an effective security structure for the new Europe. The further expansion of NATO may well have an adverse effect on the domestic political process in Russia. As a temporary measure, a "neutral area" could be created for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the security of which could be guaranteed by NATO and Russia.

As for Ukraine, it finds itself at the crossroads of regional politics, with influential domestic groups of both pro-Western and pro-Russian orientation. Its membership in NATO in the near future is neither likely nor desirable, and may have a negative effect on European security. However, the security of Ukraine, and in particular its relationship with Russia, is a very important factor for European stability and for relations between Russia and the West.

In this new global situation, the UN could become an effective center for global security. To adequately perform this function, the organization needs profound reform. This reform could include three main stages: strengthening the UN's role as a forum of discussion, creating a center for diplomatic coordination and conflict prevention, and creating a mechanism for implementing the UN's decisions. In the distant future, the UN may assume responsibility for administering the nuclear weapons remaining after global nuclear disarmament.

Other steps in the reform process may require altering the UN Charter, including expanding the Security Council to 20-21 members, with new members such as Germany and Japan (among other new regional leaders) taking the permanent seats; and revising the right of veto of the permanent five and possibly replacing it with a consensus or a majority vote mechanism.

The UN peacekeeping operation is another domain that requires close examination and restructuring. The organization should be primarily concerned with conflict prevention. Peace enforcement operations should take place only by decision of the Security Council, and member states should provide more support, financial and other, and be encouraged to contribute troops.

In the area of economy and development, the UN should take the leading role through creation of a UN Development Council. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) could perform the role of a coordinating body for other international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization and the World Bank.