Authors
Steven Pifer
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

Russia maintains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and the most powerful conventional military forces in Europe. Russian military units currently are deployed — uninvited and unwanted — in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. As Russia’s massing of military power near Ukraine prompted a crisis, President Vladimir Putin has demanded legally-binding security guarantees for… Russia.

On December 17, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the unusual step of publishing draft U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agreements that encapsulate Moscow’s desired guarantees. The substance of the drafts and the way the Russians publicized them do not suggest a serious negotiating bid.

If the Kremlin is serious about negotiating and deescalates the situation near Ukraine, the West could engage on some elements of the drafts. Many, however, will go nowhere — as Moscow surely knew.

DRAFT NATO-RUSSIA AGREEMENT

Russia’s draft “Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” would require that NATO members commit to no further enlargement of the alliance, including in particular to Ukraine. There is little enthusiasm within NATO now for putting Ukraine on a membership track, as Putin and other Russian officials undoubtedly understand. However, the alliance will not reverse its long-standing “open door” policy. That would require consensus, and few allies, let alone all 30, would agree that Russia can dictate NATO policy in this way.

This suggests that a middle ground of “not now but not never” might offer a way to kick this thorny can down the road. That is, if Moscow wishes to defuse the situation.

Another article in the Russian draft would require that NATO deploy no forces or weapons in countries that joined the alliance after May 1997. That month, NATO committed not to permanently station substantial combat forces in new members and said it had “no intention, no plan, and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory. From 1997 to 2014, NATO deployed virtually no troops or equipment in new member states.

That changed following Russia’s seizure of Crimea. NATO now deploys, on a rotating basis, relatively small multinational battlegroups in the Baltic states and Poland. It is difficult to see NATO agreeing to withdraw them absent a significant change in Russia’s military posture. However, the draft treaty would impose no requirements for redeployment of Russian forces.

Such provisions will prove non-starters with the alliance. Others might get a more positive reception. These include language on consultative mechanisms, such as the NATO-Russia Council, and the establishment of a hotline between NATO and Russia. Indeed, NATO has proposed NATO-Russia Council meetings, though Moscow suspended diplomatic relations with NATO in October.

The draft treaty also would bar deployment of intermediate-range missiles in areas where they could reach the other side’s territory. Of course, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty banned all U.S. and Russian intermediate-range missiles. However, Russia’s deployment of the intermediate-range 9M729 cruise missile in violation of the treaty led to its collapse.

This idea sounds like Putin’s 2019 proposal for a moratorium on deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe. While NATO turned that aside, it might be worth a second look, provided that Russia affirmed that it would apply to the 9M729 and had appropriate verification measures.

The draft treaty’s proposed bar on any NATO military activity in Ukraine, eastern Europe, the Caucasus, or Central Asia is an overreach, but some measures to limit military exercises and activities on a reciprocal basis might be possible. There is a history of such provisions, for example, the Vienna Document’s confidence- and security-building measures.

DRAFT U.S.-RUSSIA TREATY

The draft “Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees” also contains unacceptable provisions. Washington likely will not agree to a requirement that the two countries “not implement security measures … that could undermine core security interests of the other Party.” Moscow has shown it has a very broad definition of what it thinks could undermine its security. Likewise, it is unrealistic to ask the United States to prevent further NATO enlargement; Washington will not agree to close the “open door,” and even if it were to do so, it could not persuade all 29 other allies to agree to change the policy.

While interest could develop in the draft NATO-Russia agreement’s provision on intermediate-range missiles, there will be no interest in the draft U.S.-Russia treaty provision which would effectively ban U.S. intermediate-range missiles from Europe while leaving Russia free to deploy such missiles against NATO countries. The provision limiting the ability of heavy bombers and surface warships to operate in and over international waters will find no fans in Washington or, for that matter, in the Russian military.

Discussion on other provisions regarding military activities might be possible. It is unreasonable for Moscow to seek a veto over Kyiv’s foreign policy direction. However, the concern expressed by Putin earlier in December and then repeated about U.S. offensive missiles in Ukraine able to strike Moscow in a matter of minutes poses a different question. That concern could prove easy to address, as there is no indication that Washington has ever considered it. Other such Russian concerns might also be addressed, along with U.S. (and NATO) concerns about certain Russian military activities.

The draft provision requiring that all nuclear weapons be deployed on national territory should go into another forum. Biden administration officials hope to begin a negotiation with Russia that would cover all U.S. and Russian nuclear arms. That is the proper place for this issue. Whether a requirement that all nuclear weapons be based on national territory would prove acceptable to Washington would depend on the overall agreement and consultations with allies.

PROPOSALS INTENDED TO FAIL?

The unacceptable provisions in the two draft agreements, their quick publication by the Russian government, and the peremptory terms used by Russian officials to describe Moscow’s demands raise concern that the Kremlin may want rejection. With large forces near Ukraine, Moscow could then cite that as another pretext for military action against its neighbor.

If, on the other hand, these draft agreements represent an opening bid, and the Russians seek a serious exchange that also addresses the security concerns of the other parties, some draft provisions could offer a basis for discussion and negotiation. The North Atlantic Council stated last week that NATO is “ready for meaningful dialogue with Russia.” U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan reiterated that point: “We’ve had dialogue with Russia on European security issues for the last 20 years… That has sometimes produced progress, sometimes produced deadlock. But we are fundamentally prepared for dialogue.”

A deescalation of the situation near Ukraine would help greatly. U.S. and NATO officials will not want to engage as long as Russia hangs a military threat over Kyiv. Another question is the format. Washington and Moscow can have bilateral discussions, but negotiations have to include all affected parties, including Ukraine. The United States and Russia cannot cut a deal over the heads of the Europeans and Ukrainians. As Sullivan said, “nothing about you without you.”

The sides should come to the table prepared to address the other’s legitimate security concerns. Agreeing on the meaning of “legitimate” will consume long hours. For example, it is unlikely that the United States (or NATO) will compromise on the principle — to which Moscow has agreed as a signatory to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act — that states have a right to choose their own foreign policy course. The question of military activities in the NATO-Russia region is a different issue, and NATO has already shown its readiness to undertake commitments in that regard.

These discussions and any negotiation will be long, complex, and arduous. That is the kind of work that diplomats do. Getting started down that path, however, will require very different signals than those the West and Ukraine have seen from Moscow the past several weeks.

Originally for Brookings Institution's Order from Chaos blog

All News button
1
Subtitle

Russia maintains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and the most powerful conventional military forces in Europe. Russian military units currently are deployed — uninvited and unwanted — in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

Authors
Steven Pifer
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

At dinner at the American ambassador’s residence in Moscow some years ago, I asked a former senior foreign policy official if anyone in the Kremlin understood Ukraine.  He replied that someone there understood Ukraine very well.  He then added “but nobody listens to him.” 

The abject failure of Russian policy toward Ukraine over the past seven years suggests the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin have a flawed understanding of the country. 

On Dec. 17, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said, “Have we [Russia] lost Ukraine as a partner, ally and so on?  At this point, yes, completely.” 

The Russian leadership presumably did not intend this.  Thus, the question of whether the Kremlin and Putin understand Ukraine.  Many signs suggest that they do not. 

Putin’s last visit to Kiev occurred in 2013, when he traveled to mark the 1025th anniversary of Kievan Rus’s acceptance of Christianity. In a speech Putin said, “We are all spiritual heirs of what happened here 1025 years ago.  And in this sense we [Ukrainians and Russians] are, without a doubt, one people.”  

What an utterly tone-deaf statement to make in Ukraine.  Millions of ethnic Ukrainians heard it as a denial of their culture, history and language.  Putin has since often repeated that point. 

Russia’s use of military force to seize Crimea following the Maidan Revolution could hardly be expected to win over Ukrainian sympathies.  Nor would sparking and sustaining a conflict in Donbas that has now claimed more than 13,000 lives. 

Shortly after the Russia-Ukraine conflict began in 2014, Putin and other Russians started speaking of “Novorossiya” — the idea that much of eastern and southern Ukraine would rise in revolt against Kiev.  The allure of Novorossiya held sway in Moscow long after it became clear that there was little enthusiasm among Ukrainians for breaking away. 

Volodymyr Zelenskiy won the Ukrainian presidency in 2019.  He came to office a political novice who comfortably spoke Russian and promised a different approach from that of his predecessor, whom Moscow despised.  Zelensky endorsed the Minsk agreements as the basis for resolving the Donbas conflict and spoke approvingly of the “Steinmeier formula” for moving forward—politically risky steps for the new president given growing frustration and anger in Ukraine about the failure of the Minsk agreements to deliver peace in Donbas. 

What did that get Zelensky?  Putin agreed to a meeting in December 2019 with the Ukrainian leader, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron.  The meeting produced agreement on a prisoner exchange, a full ceasefire in Donbass and a follow-up meeting in spring 2020.  Only the prisoner exchange occurred. 

Rather than seek compromise, the Kremlin leaders seemed to calculate that they could force the newcomer to make humiliating concessions.  

Moscow increasingly took the position that it was not a party to the conflict — despite a Russian signature to the Minsk II agreement — and sought to force Kiev to deal directly with the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics.”  The Kremlin now swats away any request by Zelensky to meet Putin. 

The unsurprising result:  Zelenskiy’s attitude toward Moscow has hardened.  While he brought to office an ambivalent view of the Ukraine-NATO relationship, he now publicly calls for an early membership path for Ukraine.  

Kremlin policy has driven Ukraine away.  More than anything else, it has persuaded the Ukrainian government and an increasingly large segment of the Ukrainian population that they can find security and stability only if their country is anchored in institutions such as the European Union and NATO. 

The Kremlin appears intent on continuing this course.  Putin released an essay in July in which he all but denied Ukraine’s right to exist as a sovereign nation.  In October, former President Dmitry Medvedev termed talking to Kiev “pointless.”   

The Russian military has massed tens of thousands of troops and tanks, artillery and other combat vehicles in staging areas near Ukraine, suggesting that Russia is preparing a major military assault. 

That would not bring Ukraine back to Russia.  It would instead generate more sanctions on Russia, an increased flow of Western arms to Ukraine, a bolstering of NATO military presence near Russia’s borders — and dead Russian soldiers.   

The Russian military is undoubtedly stronger, but the Ukrainian military would exact a price.  Moreover, Kiev is preparing for partisan warfare, and an early December poll showed that one-third of those asked, including one-fourth in the country’s east, would take up arms if the Russians invade. 

It is time for the Russian leadership to reexamine the premises on which it has based its approach.  Bad understanding leads to bad policy, and the Kremlin appears poised to make another in a line of mistakes in its approach toward Ukraine.  This one would prove a tragedy for Ukraine … but also for Russia. 

Originally for The Moscow Times

Hero Image
All News button
1
Subtitle

The abject failure of Russian policy toward Ukraine over the past seven years suggests Vladimir Putin has a flawed understanding of the country.

-

For winter quarter 2021, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

This event is virtual only. This event will not be held in person.

Shirin Sinnar Professor of Law & John A. Wilson Faculty Scholar Stanford Law School
Seminars
Authors
Steven Pifer
Adrianna Pita
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

As Russian troops gather on Ukraine’s borders, the outstanding question is whether Russian President Putin is prepared to bear the domestic and international costs of a full-scale invasion or if he’ll stop at pressuring NATO and the West for political concessions. Steven Pifer explains why a military incursion in 2022 will not be as easy for Russia as annexing Crimea in 2014, and where there are avenues for dialogue to defuse the brewing confrontation.

Read the rest at Brookings

All News button
1
Subtitle

As Russian troops gather on Ukraine’s borders, the outstanding question is whether Russian President Putin is prepared to bear the domestic and international costs of a full-scale invasion or if he’ll stop at pressuring NATO and the West for political concessions.

-

For winter quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

                                                                                           

 

About the Event: How do states communicate internally about foreign policy and how does this change over time? Applying concepts from linguistics to a novel corpus of all President’s Daily Briefs from 1961 to 1977, we analyze change over time in the variety of terms used in national security writing (“lexical diversity”). We find a consistently declining level of lexical diversity across presidential administrations and despite variation in exogenous changes in foreign affairs. We argue that this increasingly homogenized language reflects a larger process of bureaucratization in American national security institutions in the 1960s and 1970s. We build on the concept of “organizational sensemaking” and argue that bureaucratization directly and indirectly compresses the terminological range used by individual bureaucrats and homogenizes the language of its outputs. One key payoff is shedding light on what is “lost in translation” when bureaucratic experts communicate with leaders and the foreign policy mistakes and misperceptions that may follow. Our research contributes to work on bureaucracy and perceptions in IR by identifying a subtle shift in the spectrum of terms with which the state interprets the world – a finding that is only tractable by combining computational and linguistic techniques with a large corpus of formerly classified intelligence materials.

 

About the Speaker: Eric Min is Assistant Professor of Political Science at UCLA. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University, where he was the Zukerman Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation for the 2017-2018 academic year. He is a 2020 Henry Frank Guggenheim Foundation Distinguished Scholar. His research interests focus on the application of machine learning, text, and statistical methods to the analysis of interstate war, diplomacy, decision-making, and conflict management. His research has been published or is forthcoming in American Political Science Review, International Organization, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, and Journal of Strategic Studies.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

0
ericmin_rsd17_076_0432a.jpg

Eric Min is Assistant Professor of Political Science at UCLA. He is received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University, where he was the Zukerman Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation for the 2017-2018 academic year. From 2011-2013 he held the Sakurako and William Fisher Family Graduate Fellowship at Stanford, and from 2013-2017 he held a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship. His dissertation, entitled “Negotiation in War,” was the recipient of the 2018 Kenneth Waltz Dissertation Prize from American Political Science Association’s International Security Section. His work has won the Midwest Political Science Association’s 2017 Robert H. Durr Award (for best paper applying quantitative methods to a substantive problem), Stanford University’s 2016 Goldsmith Writing Prize, and he won the New York University Roland P. Beattie Award as the 2010 university valedictorian. He is an expert on the application of machine learning, text, and statistical methods to the analysis of interstate war, diplomacy, and conflict management.

Affiliate
CV
Seminars

This event has been cancelled.  It will be rescheduled  at a later date.

                                                                                 

About the Event: “Strategic planning,” so-called, is a practice into which states, firms, universities, and many other large organizations regularly invest substantial resources. The study of strategic planning is, however, mostly absent in the academy. Strategic planning had its heyday as a field of study in the three or four decades following World War II, mostly in the discipline of strategic management, but research on the subject has steadily declined in volume since the mid-1980s. Much of the contemporary literature on strategy, including on states’ grand strategies, has focused on strategy content – explaining its causes, effects, or the relative merits of competing proposals – rather than on strategy process. This book project undertakes an intellectual history that aims to explain the apparent disconnect between the on-going, widespread, real-world practice of strategic planning and the decline in scholarly research on the subject. Based on this history, this book proposes a new conceptual framework and methodology for multidisciplinary research on strategic planning, and discusses its particular application to the study of grand strategy in the discipline of international relations. These concepts and methods are applied two cases of US strategic planning: The planning of the so-called “pivot to Asia” and the planning of the Air-Sea Battle operational concept.

 

About the Speaker: Dr. Nina Silove is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. Her research focuses on grand strategy, strategic planning, and US policy toward the Asia-​Pacific.

Nina holds a DPhil (PhD) in International Relations from the University of Oxford and a degree in law with first class honors from the University of Technology, Sydney. Previously, she was the Tutor for International Politics in Diplomatic Studies at the University of Oxford, a Predoctoral Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, a Research Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, and Assistant Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University, where she remains a Non-​Resident Fellow.

This event will be rescheduled at a later date.

Nina Silove Senior Researcher ETH Zurich
Seminars
-

For winter quarter 2021, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

This event is virtual only. This event will not be held in person.

David Sloss Professor of Law Santa Clara University
Seminars
Authors
Lauren Sukin
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

Approximately 100,000 Russian troops housed in rows upon rows of barracks have amassed near the Russia-Ukraine border. Moscow claims they are there to conduct routine military exercises. And they have. Amidst political crisis in Belarus this fall, for example, up to 200,000 Russian and Belarusian forces participated in the Zapad 2021 exercise series.

Yet many observers worry these exercises are largely a pretense, and the soldiers’ stay may be more permanent. US military intelligence reported Russia may be preparing as many as 175,000 troops for offensive operations into Ukrainian territory.

Read the rest at Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

All News button
1
Subtitle

As Russia builds up forces near Ukraine, it continues to insist its troops are there simply to conduct military exercises. While exercises are routine, they have also historically been used by Russia and others to prepare for war and to cover up plans for surprise attacks.

Authors
Steven Pifer
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

Russia’s massing of military power near Ukraine was certain to dominate the December 7 video conference between Presidents Biden and Putin. A Russian assault would turn into a bloody affair (for Russians and Ukrainians alike) and plunge relations between Russia and the West deeper into crisis. Is Putin prepared to take that step?  Perhaps even he has not yet decided.

By all appearances, Biden did what he had to do. He spelled out for Putin the costs that would ensue if Russia attacked. These include more painful Western economic sanctions, more military assistance for Ukraine, and a bolstering of NATO’s military presence in the Baltic states and Poland. Moreover, he strengthened his hand by consulting the day before with the leaders of Britain, Germany, France and Italy.  That meant he could talk to Putin on the basis of a consolidated Western position.

Biden also described a way out of the crisis: de-escalation and dialogue, or dialogues, to address the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Donbas and broader European security questions. Neither of those discussions will prove easy. For example, NATO will not, and should not, accede to the Kremlin’s demand that the alliance renounce its "open door" policy on enlargement. But diplomacy is all about finding ways to defuse such difficult problems.

Did Biden succeed? That remains to be seen. One thing to watch is whether Moscow’s recent over-the-top rhetoric moderates. Of course, the more important signal would come from the movement of Russian troops away from Ukraine and back to their regular garrisons.

Read more views on what the Biden-Putin video call means for the regional security situation on Atlantic Council.

All News button
1
Subtitle

US President Joe Biden and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin spoke via video link for around two hours on December 7 in a hastily arranged virtual summit to address international concerns over a major Russian military build-up along the country’s border with Ukraine.

Authors
Steven Pifer
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

All eyes are on Ukraine (including ours). Steven Pifer, a William J. Perry Research Fellow at CISAC and former ambassador to Ukraine, joins co-host Tom Collina to discuss Putin’s motivations for Ukraine and more. 

 

Ploughshares Fund · Will Russia Invade Ukraine?

 

Hero Image
All News button
1
Subtitle

All eyes are on Ukraine (including ours). Steven Pifer, a William J. Perry Research Fellow at CISAC and former ambassador to Ukraine, joins co-host Tom Collina to discuss Putin’s motivations for Ukraine and more.

Subscribe to Russia