Paragraphs

The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) provides that a state-party intending to withdraw from the treaty must give the UN Security Council three months' notice of its intention and provide the Security Council with its reasons for withdrawal. This provision was intended to give the Security Council an opportunity to deal with any withdrawal that might produce a threat to international peace and security.

More than two years ago, North Korea renewed its 1993 notice of withdrawal from the NPT, a notice that had been suspended a decade earlier during negotiations with the United States. That announcement left the Security Council with only a single day before North Korea would become the first country to withdraw from the NPT.

The Security Council did nothing. Indeed, it has continued to ignore North Korea's action even as Pyongyang has repeatedly stated its intention to produce nuclear weapons, sending a dangerous message to other states considering withdrawal. The once-every-five-years NPT review conference that will meet in New York this month provides a valuable opportunity to address the North Korea case and prod the Security Council to address similar cases that may emerge.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Arms Control Today
Authors
Authors
Karthika Sasikumar
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
"We hardly needed the 30th anniversary of the Vietnam War's end to remind us of that war," write CISAC Fellows Lien-Hang Nguyen and Karthika Sasikumar. "Iraq provides daily reminders, prompting frequent comparisons to Vietnam." If the United States applies some lessons from Vietnam, it need not repeat past mistakes in Iraq, the researchers argue in this op-ed.

We hardly needed the 30th anniversary of the Vietnam War's end to remind us of that war. Iraq provides daily reminders, prompting frequent comparisons to Vietnam. While many of the analogies are misplaced, looking back at America's intervention in Vietnam can be valuable.

The major challenge now facing the United States in Iraq is to establish a stable and powerful indigenous military to provide a secure environment for nation-building.

The U.S. Army's initial unwillingness to integrate South Vietnamese soldiers into its military plans--and its later inability to motivate the indigenous troops to take over the fighting--tells us what to avoid in Iraq.

The old Iraqi army fell apart in April 2003 as American soldiers marched on Baghdad. As the insurgency grew and American casualties mounted, the coalition forces started putting Iraq's army together again. Many of the same soldiers came back to sign up--it was only at the higher levels that Baathist officers were purged. Both Iraq and the United States have an interest in strengthening a purely Iraqi force.

Still some lessons

President Bush calls the comparison of Iraq with Vietnam a "false analogy" and accuses those who use it of sending the wrong message to the enemy and to the troops. Likewise, Rep. Richard Baker, R-La., calls the analogy "wrong, disturbing and dangerous."

In fact, Vietnam does not make for a good comparison with Iraq--but the differences are informative. The most striking difference between the two situations is in the sequence of war and nation-building. In Vietnam, the United States attempted nation-building under South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem's administration for nearly a decade before intervening directly with ground troops; in Iraq, a short and overwhelming display of force preceded nation-building. Moreover, the Americans were facing a much stronger adversary--including an organized army--in Vietnam.

Beginning in 1969, the Nixon administration implemented its policy of "Vietnamization," withdrawing U.S. troops while simultaneously turning over to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam the fighting and the pacification efforts. By 1973, the South Vietnamese army was the strongest in Southeast Asia, boasting more than 1 million soldiers and toting the most advanced weaponry, thanks to U.S. Army programs such as Enhance and Enhance Plus. However, unimpressive performances during a joint incursion into Cambodia and the 1972 spring offensive testified otherwise. Finally, on April 30, 1975, Saigon fell to the communists. Where did Vietnamization go wrong?

From the entry of American ground forces in 1965, South Vietnamese forces were made to feel marginalized in defending South Vietnam. This was mainly due to the U.S. Army's belief in 1965-69 that the South Vietnamese troops were essentially irrelevant to victory or defeat. Not only were the soldiers equipped with inferior weapons, underpaid and given poor housing compared to their American counterparts, but they also were relegated to so-called pacification missions.

U.S. soldiers had more respect for their enemies from the North than for their allies in the South. Training and communication were beset with linguistic, social and cultural barriers. By the time South Vietnamese soldiers started replacing U.S. soldiers in 1969, it was too late to induce them to adopt what had come to be regarded as U.S. strategic goals, rather than South Vietnamese ones.

It's not too late

Now, in Iraq, a window of opportunity is still open for Americans. According to Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the United States wasted the whole first year after the invasion in halfhearted attempts to create effective Iraqi military and police forces. The bulk of the army is made up of soldiers who were fighting Americans a few months ago. Ethnic and religious divisions among the men, and their legacy of service under an autocrat, make it difficult for them to attain modern professional military standards. However, the Iraqi people are much less distrustful of the Iraqi army than they are of occupying U.S. forces.

The Multinational Security Transition Command, set up late last year, must focus on the Iraqi army's esprit de corps. It is not too late to incorporate and integrate Iraqi forces in strategic planning and operations so that they have a stake in securing a stable Iraq. Otherwise, the Iraqi army will soon be overwhelmed by the size and hostility of a growing insurgency.

The Vietnam analogy has too often been deployed in times of political conflict in the United States. But the comparison can be useful. If we learn the right lessons from the mistakes in Vietnam, we need not be condemned to repeat them in Iraq.

All News button
1
Authors
William J. Perry
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
"Of the Pentagon's $419.3 billion budget request for next year, only about $10.5 billion--2 percent--will go toward basic research, applied research and advanced technology development," write %people1% and John M. Deutch, former secretary and assistant secretary of defense, respectively, in a New York Times op-ed. This 20 percent reduction will weaken national security in the long run, they warn, adding, "Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld should reconsider this request, and if he does not, Congress should restore the cut."

Of the Pentagon's $419.3 billion budget request for next year, only about $10.5 billion - 2 percent - will go toward basic research, applied research and advanced technology development. This represents a 20 percent reduction from last year, a drastic cutback that threatens the long-term security of the nation. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld should reconsider this request, and if he does not, Congress should restore the cut.

These research and development activities, known as the "technology base" program, are a vital part of the United States defense program. For good reason: the tech base is America's investment in the future. Over the years, tech base activities have yielded advances in scientific and engineering knowledge that have given United States forces the technological superiority that is responsible in large measure for their current dominance in conventional military power.

Research into basic understanding of methods for reducing radar signatures in the 1970's, for example, gave rise to "stealth" technology. Advances in electronic sensor technology enable the vast collection of information from satellites, and past work on computer systems permits distribution of this information in near real-time to military commanders. The combination of near-real-time intelligence and precision munitions are the heart of the so-called "revolution in military affairs" that avoids large and costly systems and approaches.

These advances require years of sustained effort by university, industry and government researchers. If the Pentagon does not make the required investments today, America will not have dominant military technology tomorrow.

The technology base program has also had a major effect on American industry. Indeed, it is the primary reason that the United States leads the world today in information technology. American companies not only draw heavily on the Pentagon's work, but they have also come to depend on it. The research and development programs of many of America's major information technology companies are almost exclusively devoted to product development.

It was the investment of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in a network known as ARPA-net in the 1960's and 70's, for example, that gave rise to the Internet. The JPEG file format for digital images is based on software and standards developed by the Pentagon. The global positioning satellite system, first developed for precision-guided munitions, is now used in many cellphones and has the potential to revolutionize our air traffic control system. America's ability to translate the Pentagon's technology base into commercial achievement is the envy of the world.

Of course, the administration and Congress need to make tough budget choices. But to shift money away from the technology base to pay for Iraq, other current military operations or research on large, expensive initiatives, is to give priority to the near term at the expense of the future. This is doubtful judgment, especially at a time when the nature of the threat confronting America is changing. New threats, like catastrophic terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, urgently call for new technology.

There should be no doubt that basic research will continue to make a contribution. Robotics, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, brain and cognitive sciences, nanotechnology, large-scale modeling and simulation: all these fields can have a huge impact. If properly supported, basic technology work is likely to lead to unprecedented results.

Mr. Rumsfeld has long championed the need to transform the military and exploit new technology. He has supported the technology base in the past and has urged the adoption of a more long-term view of security needs. He should, then, be willing to review and reverse the Pentagon's request for reducing its technology base. He should understand that short-term budget requirements for the armed services always tend to push out the technology base program - unless the Pentagon leadership supports it.

Perhaps the reason for this year's reduction is the mistaken belief that a one-year gap in financing does not matter, because innovation takes so long. But tech base advances occur because of stable financing. Fluctuating budgets cause wasted effort.

It is possible that Congress will restore the cuts in technology base programs and correspondingly reduce some other part of the defense budget. But Mr. Rumsfeld should not depend on Congress. It would be vastly better if the Pentagon understood the importance of the tech base effort, and acted on that understanding.

The Department of Defense's technology base programs have been an important factor in giving America the dominant military force in the world. They have also helped many American information technology companies become successful. The Pentagon should maintain its dedication to these programs, and that will require leadership from the secretary of defense - as well as support from Congress.

John Deutch, a professor of chemistry at M.I.T., was deputy secretary of defense from 1994 to 1995. William J. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997.

All News button
1
-

Cellular prion protein (PrPC) is present in the healthy adult brain. It is a presumably essential membrane protein but its cellular function is unclear. Like Ice-9 - the fictitious water allotrope in Kurt Vonnegut's Cat's Cradle, which "taught the atoms a novel way in which to stack, lock and crystallize until the oceans turned to ice" - cellular prion protein can, in a rare event, adopt a pathogenic and 'contagious' shape, PrPSc, which causes mad cow disease or Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). New variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD) is the human malady attributed to eating beef tainted with BSE. In comparison to the UK epidemic (at the peak of which 37,280 cases of BSE were reported in the single year 1992), the emergence of four North American mad cows since May 2003 is minor yet still alarming. This work examines the USDA's response to indigenous BSE as manifested in "The Final Rule" (9 CFR 93-96, Jan 4, 2005) and questions whether current regulations are stringent enough to keep PrPSc out of cattle feed and human food.

Sheila Healy is a CISAC Science Fellow. She is currently analyzing USDA policy addressing Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) or mad cow disease. She recently finished a postdoctoral appointment in Stanley Prusiner's laboratory in the Department of Neurology at the University of California, San Francisco. There she studied the molecular and structural requirements for the conversion of cellular prion protein to its pathogenic form, the agent that causes BSE. She holds a doctoral degree in biochemistry and molecular and cellular biology from the University of Arizona.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Sheila Healy
Seminars
-

Many critiques have been made of the U.S. Intelligence Community's performance in thwarting terrorist attacks (i.e. 9/11) and understanding the proliferation of WMD (i.e. Iraq). Given the reports from the 9/11 and WMD commissions as well as last year's legislation establishing the position of National Intelligence Director, what in fact are the deficiencies of the Intelligence Community and what changes have the best chance of correcting them and preventing future intelligence failures?

This seminar will feature a panel discussion by three experts on intelligence issues. They will focus their comments on the issues, challenges, and potential solutions for improving the U.S. Intelligence Community capabilities to provide timely warning and accurate assessments of future threats. They will then invite comments, questions, and discussion.

Sidney Drell is a professor of theoretical physics (Emeritus) at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. As a physicist and arms control specialist, he has been a leader in providing essential technical advice to the U.S. Government on national security issues. He is an active member of JASON, a group of distinguished scientists, and has served on a number of boards, including the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the President's Science Advisory Committee, and the Non-Proliferation Advisory Panel.

Keith Hansen is a consulting professor of international relations teaching courses on U.S. intelligence and arms control/proliferation. His 35-year government career included seven years on the National Intelligence Council, where he managed numerous national intelligence estimates and other interagency studies on strategic and nuclear issues, and where he served as the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs and Nuclear Proliferation.

Henry Rowen is Director Emeritus of the Asia/Pacific Research Center, professor of public policy and management (emeritus) at Stanford's Graduate School of Business, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense (1989-1991), Chairman of the DCI's National Intelligence Council (1981-1983), President of RAND Corporation (1968-1972), and Assistant Director of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget (1965-1966). Most recently, he was a Member of the President's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Henry S. Rowen Speaker
Keith Hansen Visiting professor of international relations Speaker
Sidney D. Drell Professor of theoretical physics (Emeritus) Speaker Stanford University
Seminars
-

When the Soviet Union dissolved on Dec. 25, 1991, the nuclear threat changed from the Cold War concern of ending civilization as we know it to one of securing "loose nukes" in chaotic Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. I had the opportunity to visit the secret cities of the Russian nuclear complex six weeks after the collapse and to initiate a program of scientific collaboration between U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists. Together, we made remarkable progress in reducing the threat in the early and mid-1990's because of the trust we were able to build based on mutual respect, similar objectives, and a common heritage in the great early-20th century school of European physics.

Although the number of joint U.S. - Russian cooperative threat reduction programs increased and the U.S. funding rose dramatically at the turn of the millennium, real progress slowed as U.S. and Russian objectives began to diverge, and the programs became politicized and bureaucratized. Major opportunities to reduce the long-term threat were lost. Cooperation was re-energized by the tragic events of 9/11 and the emerging threat of nuclear terrorism. Today, both Presidents Bush and Putin agree that keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists is their highest security priority. Yet, strategy and commitment on both sides appear incommensurate with the threat. I will discuss critical barriers to and opportunities for renewed cooperation to meet the threat.

Siegfried S. Hecker is currently a Senior Fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Hecker was Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986-1997. He joined the Laboratory as technical staff member of the Physical Metallurgy Group in 1973, following a postdoctoral assignment there in 1968-1970 and a summer graduate student assignment in 1965. He served as Chairman of the Center for Materials Science and Division Leader of the Materials Science and Technology Division before becoming Director. From 1970 to 1973 he was a senior research metallurgist with the General Motors Research Laboratories.

Dr. Hecker received his B.S. in metallurgy in 1965 and M.S. in metallurgy in 1967 from Case Institute of Technology and his Ph.D. in metallurgy in 1968 from Case Western Reserve University.

Dr. Hecker is a member of the National Academy of Engineering, Foreign Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Fellow of the TMS (Minerals, Metallurgy and Materials Society), Fellow of the American Society for Metals, Honorary Member of the American Ceramics Society, and Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Among other awards, Dr. Hecker received the American Nuclear Society Seaborg Medal (2004), the Acta Materialia J. Herbert Hollomon Award (2004), the Case Western Reserve University Alumni Association Gold Medal (2004) and Undergraduate Distinguished Alumni Award (2001), the New Mexico Distinguished Public Service Award, (1998); was named Laboratory Director of the Year by the Federal Laboratory Consortium, (1998); received an honorary Doctor of Science degree (Honoris Causa) from Case Western Reserve University (1998); received the Department of Energy's Distinguished Associate Award, (1997); the University of California's President's Medal, (1997); the ASM Distinguished Life Membership Award, (1997); an Honorary Degree of Scientiae Doctoris, Ripon College (1997); the Navy League New York Council Roosevelt Gold Medal for Science (1996); the Aviation Week Group Laurels Award for National Security (1995); the James O. Douglas Gold Medal Award (1990); the ASM International's Distinguished Lectureship in Materials and Society, (1989); the Kent Van Horn Distinguished Alumnus Award, Case Western Reserve University (1989); an Honorary Degree of Scientiae Doctoris, College of Santa Fe, (1988); the Year's Top 100 Innovations Award from Science Digest (1985); the Department of Energy's E. O. Lawrence Award, (1984); the American Society for Metals, Marcus A. Grossman Young Author Award (1976); and the Wesley P. Sykes Outstanding Metallurgist Award, Case Institute of Technology (1965). He is a member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Council on Foreign Relations, Tau Beta Pi Honorary Engineering Fraternity, Alpha Sigma Mu Honorary Metallurgical Fraternity, and the Society of Sigma Xi.

In addition to his current research activities in plutonium science and stockpile stewardship, he works closely with the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy on a variety of cooperative threat reduction programs. Dr. Hecker is also actively involved with the U.S. National Academies, serving on the Council of the National Academy of Engineering, serving as chair of the newly established Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the United States, and as a member of the National Academies Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation. He is a member of ASM International and TMS, the Minerals/Metals/Materials Society, having served both in numerous local and national positions, and a member of the Materials Research Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council. He serves on the Corporate Advisory Panel of the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment, is a member of the Advisory Group to the Cooperative Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), and previously served on the Board of Regents for the University of New Mexico.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C220
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-6468 (650) 723-0089
0
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Emeritus
Research Professor, Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus
hecker2.jpg PhD

Siegfried S. Hecker is a professor emeritus (research) in the Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He was co-director of CISAC from 2007-2012. From 1986 to 1997, Dr. Hecker served as the fifth Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Hecker is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction, and nuclear security.

Dr. Hecker’s current research interests include nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, nuclear weapons policy, nuclear security, the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy, and plutonium science. At the end of the Cold War, he has fostered cooperation with the Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials. In June 2016, the Los Alamos Historical Society published two volumes edited by Dr. Hecker. The works, titled Doomed to Cooperate, document the history of Russian-U.S. laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation since 1992.

Dr. Hecker’s research projects at CISAC focus on cooperation with young and senior nuclear professionals in Russia and China to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism worldwide, to avoid a return to a nuclear arms race, and to promote the safe and secure global expansion of nuclear power. He also continues to assess the technical and political challenges of nuclear North Korea and the nuclear aspirations of Iran.

Dr. Hecker joined Los Alamos National Laboratory as graduate research assistant and postdoctoral fellow before returning as technical staff member following a tenure at General Motors Research. He led the laboratory's Materials Science and Technology Division and Center for Materials Science before serving as laboratory director from 1986 through 1997, and senior fellow until July 2005.

Among his professional distinctions, Dr. Hecker is a member of the National Academy of Engineering; foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; fellow of the TMS, or Minerals, Metallurgy and Materials Society; fellow of the American Society for Metals; fellow of the American Physical Society, honorary member of the American Ceramics Society; and fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

His achievements have been recognized with the Presidential Enrico Fermi Award, the 2020 Building Bridges Award from the Pacific Century Institute, the 2018 National Engineering Award from the American Association of Engineering Societies, the 2017 American Nuclear Society Eisenhower Medal, the American Physical Society’s Leo Szilard Prize, the American Nuclear Society's Seaborg Medal, the Department of Energy's E.O. Lawrence Award, the Los Alamos National Laboratory Medal, among other awards including the Alumni Association Gold Medal and the Undergraduate Distinguished Alumni Award from Case Western Reserve University, where he earned his bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees in metallurgy.

Date Label
Siegfried S. Hecker Senior Fellow Speaker Los Alamos National Laboratory
Seminars
-

Has the Bush administration used the War on Terror to consolidate power in the executive branch? Is the United States in danger of undermining civil liberties and laying the foundation for an American police state? Arguing against conventional wisdom the authors answer these questions with an emphatic No. Drawing on evidence from the USA Patriot Act, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security Administration, intelligence reform, and the detention of enemy combatants, the authors argue that what is most striking about US homeland security policy in the wake of 9-11 is just how weak the response of the American state has been. This outcome is contrary to both conventional wisdom and theoretical expectation. The authors argue that this puzzle is best explained by focusing on the institutional structure of US domestic politics.

Jay Stowsky is an adjunct professor at the University of California, Berkeley's School of Information Management and Systems (SIMS) and is the executive drector of UC Berkeley's Services Science Program. Previously, he directed UC Berkeley's program on Information Technology and Homeland Security at the Goldman School of Public Policy and served in the Clinton administration as senior economist for science and technology policy on the staff of the White House Council of Economic Advisers. Stowsky has also served as associate dean at UC Berkeley's Haas School of Business and as director of research policy for the University of California system. He has authored several studies of U.S. technology policy, including "Secrets to Share or Shield: New Dilemmas for Military R&D in the Digital Age," in Research Policy (Vol. 33, No. 2, March 2004) and "The Dual-Use Dilemma," in Issues in Science and Technology (Winter 1996). He is co-author, with Wayne Sandholtz, et al., of The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System (Cambridge Oxford University Press, 1992).

Matthew Kroenig is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley and a Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Fellow at the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation. Kroenig's dissertation research explains the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapons states. Previously, he was a research associate with the Information Technology and Homeland Security Project and has also served in government as an intelligence analyst.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Matt Kroenig PhD Candidate Speaker Department of Political Science, UC Berkeley
Jay Stowsky Adjunct Professor Speaker School of Information Management and Systems, UC Berkeley
Seminars
-

Robert O. Keohane (PhD., Harvard University), James B. Duke Professor of Political Science, has taught at Swarthmore College, Stanford University, Brandeis University, and Harvard University where he was Stanfield Professor of International Peace.

He is the author of After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984), for which he was awarded the second annual Grawemeyer Award in 1989 for Ideas Improving World Order. He is editor or co-editor of, and contributor to, eleven other books, most recently, Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge 2003), with J.L. Holzgrefe. Between 1974 and 1980 he was editor of the journal, International Organization. He was president of the International Studies Association, 1988-89, and of the American Political Science Association, 1999-2000. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and has held a Guggenheim Fellowship and fellowships at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and the National Humanities Center. He is on leave from Duke this year, conducting research at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Robert Keohane
Seminars
-

Page Fortna is an assistant professor in the Political Science Department at Columbia University. Her research focuses on the durability of peace in the aftermath of both civil and interstate wars. She is the author of Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton University Press, 2004), and has published articles in World Politics, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, International Studies Review, and the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. She is currently working on a project evaluating the effectiveness of peacekeeping in civil wars, as well as a project on long-term historical trends in war termination.

During the 2004-2005 academic year, she is a fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. She has also been a visiting fellow at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, MA (2002-2003). Before coming to Columbia, Fortna was a pre-doctoral and then a post-doctoral fellow at CISAC. Her graduate work was done in the Government Department at Harvard University (Ph.D. 1998). Before graduate school, she worked at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a think tank in Washington DC. She is a graduate of Wesleyan University.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall

Page Fortna Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and Susan Louise Dyer Peace Fellow the Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Seminars
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs
This article originally appeared in Stanford Report.

By Dawn Levy

Responding to a terrorist attack employing biological or chemical agents requires knowledge spanning many disciplines. Three Stanford researchers were among nearly 135 leading scientists and technical experts from industry, academia and government invited to participate in the Gordon Research Conference on Chemical and Biological Terrorism Jan. 30-Feb. 4 in Buellton, Calif. The conference brought together public and private sectors to discuss what has worked, where problems are now and may appear in the future, and what needs more attention in responding to and preventing terrorism. The goal was to move toward a better "systems approach" to defense.

The Stanford participants were Margaret E. Kosal, a science fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) with a doctorate in chemistry; Steven M. Block, a professor of applied physics and of biological sciences and senior fellow, by courtesy, at the Stanford Institute for International Studies; and Mark A. Musen, a professor of medicine (medical informatics) and, by courtesy, of computer science.

The conference included discussions of public health surveillance and response, food supply vulnerabilities and agricultural security, forensics of biological and chemical evidence, and the changing nature of the threat environment.

Both biological and chemical terrorist attacks have the potential to cause a large number of causalities and overwhelm medical capabilities, or "surge capacity." The nation's terrorism defense plans focus on mass-effect bioterrorism--events with the potential to infect tens of thousands and kill more than a thousand. But those plans may not effectively counter small-scale biological or chemical attacks, much less nuclear or radiological attacks, Kosal asserted.

Musen spoke about the computational problems of automating surveillance for possible bioterrorism using "prediagnostic" indicators that become available even before health-care workers can identify a specific epidemic.

"There is enormous enthusiasm--and enormous spending--for combining databases of over-the-counter drug sales, absenteeism records, 911 calls and admitting diagnoses to emergency rooms and clinics," he said. "There has been virtually no empirical evaluation of any of these efforts, despite all the excitement."

Musen discussed difficulties computers have making sense of high-volume, low-signal data streams, including basic problems with the way that the data typically are represented, difficulties of integrating disparate data sources and uncertainty in how to present the results of computational analyses to public-health officials in an optimal way.

"Although there is enormous political pressure to be 'doing something' to monitor for bioterrorism, it's also important to take a step back and to engage in the research needed to determine what we really should be doing," Musen said.

Chemical threats are underestimated

The focus on bioterror threats may miss a more frequent occurrence--chemical attacks. In a presentation titled "The Shifting Face of Chemical Terrorism: Assessing an Emerging Threat," Kosal examined the growing trend of non-state actors to use improvised chemical devices (ICDs) that may include choking and blistering agents.

"The path from the 'street chemistry' of improvised explosive devices [IEDs] to ICDs incorporating commercial chemicals is very short, whereas the path from IEDs to transgenic biological agents effectively weaponized is a substantial leap for states and even more so for terrorists," Kosal said. "While U.S. policy is focused on defending against a mass-effect bioterrorism attack, we may be missing a lower-tech threat of much higher probability."

Half of the U.S. fatalities in Iraq have been due to IEDs, typically roadside bombs, Kosal said. "This strongly suggests there is a substantial tacit knowledge base and readily available materials for constructing these types of weapons--one guy has not been making them all in a Mosul garage." While incorporating chemicals into roadside bombs would not dramatically increase military casualties, incorporating them in devices employed in enclosed spaces could, Kosal said.

An analysis of terrorism between 1910 and 2003 from open-source information shows the lion's share of 265 terrorist attacks--76 percent--were chemical. Only 17 percent were biological, 0 percent nuclear (involving fissile material, such as that powering an atomic bomb) and 7 percent radiological (involving radioactive elements that cannot be used for fission or that contain less than a critical mass of fissionable material, such as those employed in "dirty bombs").

It used to be that the major threat of chemical weapons came from state-based programs. Chlorine and mustard gases were used extensively in World War I, for example. The United States and the former Soviet Union amassed stockpiles exceeding 40,000 tons, which are still being destroyed. International efforts to control the exchange of certain chemicals, such as precursors for nerve and blister agents, have been effective. Kosal cited the refusal in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war of the world community to sell Iraq the key precursor to mustard gas.

Nowadays, terrorists both foreign and domestic may disperse traditional chemical warfare agents using improvised methods. In 1995, for example, the Aum Shinrikyo group crudely dispersed a nerve agent in a Tokyo subway--killing 12 and panicking thousands--using umbrellas to puncture 11 garbage bags, each filled with a common solvent and about a pound of sarin. Today's chemical weapons may just as likely come from common commercial sources, such as agrochemicals. Radical Islamists have even attempted to weaponize a research chemical, osmium tetroxide, used to prepare biological specimens for electron microscopy.

In contrast with nuclear or mass-effect biological weapons, chemical weapons may not require sophisticated knowledge to produce. In 2003 at a rented storage space in Tyler, Texas, government agents seized half a million rounds of ammunition, more than 60 pipe bombs, remote-controlled bombs disguised as briefcases, pamphlets on how to make chemical weapons and improvised hydrogen cyanide dispersal devices hypothetically capable of killing thousands in a minute. The stockpiler, William J. Krar, described as a white supremacist and anti-government extremist, was sentenced to 11 years in federal prison. His specific objectives remain unknown to authorities.

Kosal said terrorists do not appear to be concocting new chemicals; they're co-opting existing ones. "Chemical terrorism is likely to be a crime of opportunity and familiarity with chemicals and chemistry," Kosal said. "Perhaps the basic knowledge and materials--commercial dual-use chemicals in this instance--are too globally widespread to justify efforts to control the capability of terrorists to co-opt them for malfeasant uses. . . . The best threat-reduction policy may be to reduce the motivation.

"Much of the academic and policy dialogue segregates the folks discussing motivation from the folks discussing capacity and vulnerability. The former tend to be historians and social scientists and the latter, biologists, chemists and physicists. It may prove that decreasing terrorist motivation is unfeasible in the near term, but here is an example where those with the technical knowledge and those with the social science knowledge need to be working cooperatively, the type of interaction that the CISAC Science Fellows program fosters," Kosal said.

Ten thousand fingers on the bioterror "button"

Block's talk focused on the growing threat of bioterror. While chemicals have killed more people to date than have biological weapons, future biological attacks using infectious, untreatable pathogens have the potential to kill more people than chemicals. Block wryly called such biological attacks "the gift that keeps on giving."

Block said post-9/11 restrictions aimed at keeping pathogens out of the wrong hands have backfired. One is the Department of Health and Human Services' "Select Agent Rule," which establishes requirements regarding possession and use in the United States, receipt from outside the United States and transfer within the United States of a particular list of agents and toxins.

"We're shooting ourselves in the foot," Block said. "We've made it so hard to work on these pathogens that even our so-called 'A-Team' can't do research with them." World-renowned plague researcher Stanley Falkow of Stanford and famed anthrax expert John Collier of Harvard have stopped working on live pathogens because of restrictive effects of recent legislation, according to Block. They now confine their research to a handful of cloned genes. "It's almost impossible to hire grad students or postdocs to work on Select Agents. Such research has been driven underground or into our national labs, which historically have not had the biological expertise found in the top academic labs and biotech companies."

Much of our response to bioterror threats is based on how we've historically responded to nuclear terror threats, Block said. "With nuclear weapons, only two things can be made to go 'boom'--plutonium and highly enriched uranium," he said. That made it comparatively easy to track and control materials, and to get a handle on the problem. "We tried to keep nuclear secrets secret. Not everyone knows how to make an atomic bomb."

In contrast, the genie has long been out of the bottle when it comes to biological agents. Virtually all research is reported in the open literature. "Even if we were to stop publishing everything now, there'd be enough public information to keep bioterrorists busy for at least another 50 years," he said.

"Back in the nuclear age, only a few countries were nuclear powers, and only a few people were authorized to have their 'fingers on the button,'" Block said. "Like them or not, they were responsible people. Contrast that with a world where genetically engineered weapons can be produced by, say, 10,000 people. Someone is guaranteed to press that button. We can't stop [bioterror acts] at the source any more than we can stop a computer virus at the source."

Rather than futilely attempting to thwart biological threats at their sources, which are ubiquitous, Block advocated shoring up the public health system so it can respond nimbly once threat turns to reality. A new generation of antitoxin, antiviral and antibacterial agents may mitigate ill effects, and improved vaccines may prevent damage altogether. "We need to work the problem from the other direction," he said. "To confine our attention to Select Agents alone is essentially putting on blinders. The future threats we may face may bear little relation to the organisms on the current list."

All News button
1
Subscribe to United States