Authors
Robert Carlin
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
Reprinted with permission from Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Company and The Washington Post

Those who think that dealing with North Korea is impossible are wrong. Unfortunately, those who think that it is, in fact, possible to deal with North Korea often are not much closer to the truth. The basic problem is that people of both views simply haven't figured out what it is that the North really wants.

We tend to confuse North Korea's short-term tactical goals with its broader strategic focus. We draw up list after list of things we think might appeal to Pyongyang on the assumption that these will constitute a "leveraged buyout," finally achieving what we want: the total, irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.

But this list of "carrots" (energy, food, the lifting of sanctions) does not include what the North thinks it must have. It can, of course, help keep the process on track and moving ahead, and it could help cement a final deal and hold it together through the inevitable political storms. But these things are not the ends that North Korea seeks.

North Korea feeds our misperceptions by bargaining so hard over details and raising its initial demands so high. For our part, we tend to be taken in by Western journalists' repetition of stock phrases about it being "one of the poorest nations," "one of the most isolated," "living on handouts." Accurate or not, these factors are irrelevant to Pyongyang's strategic calculations.

Those who realize that North Korea does not have visions of grand rewards sometimes move the focus to political steps that many see as "key" to a solution. These include replacing the armistice with a peace treaty, giving the North security guarantees, discussing plans for an exchange of diplomats. But these, like the economic carrots, are only shimmering, imperfect reflections of what Pyongyang is after.

What is it, then, that North Korea wants? Above all, it wants, and has pursued steadily since 1991, a long-term, strategic relationship with the United States. This has nothing to do with ideology or political philosophy. It is a cold, hard calculation based on history and the realities of geopolitics as perceived in Pyongyang. The North Koreans believe in their gut that they must buffer the heavy influence their neighbors already have, or could soon gain, over their small, weak country.

This is hard for Americans to understand, having read or heard nothing from North Korea except its propaganda, which for years seems to have called for weakening, not maintaining, the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula. But in fact an American departure is the last thing the North wants. Because of their pride and fear of appearing weak, however, explicitly requesting that the United States stay is one of the most difficult things for the North Koreans to do.

If the United States has leverage, it is not in its ability to supply fuel oil or grain or paper promises of nonhostility. The leverage rests in Washington's ability to convince Pyongyang of its commitment to coexist with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, accept its system and leadership, and make room for the DPRK in an American vision of the future of Northeast Asia. Quite simply, the North Koreans believe they could be useful to the United States in a longer, larger balance-of-power game against China and Japan. The Chinese know this and say so in private.

The fundamental problem for North Korea is that the six-party talks in which it has been engaged -- and which may reconvene soon -- are a microcosm of the strategic world it most fears. Three strategic foes -- China, Japan and Russia -- sit in judgment, apply pressure and (to Pyongyang's mind) insist on the North's permanent weakness.

Denuclearization, if still achievable, can come only when North Korea sees its strategic problem solved, and that, in its view, can happen only when relations with the United States improve. For Pyongyang, that is the essence of the joint statement out of the six-party talks on Sept. 19, 2005, which included this sentence: "The DPRK and the United States undertook to respect each other's sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies."

And that is why the North so doggedly seeks bilateral talks with Washington. It desires not "drive-by" encounters, not a meeting here and there, but serious, sustained talks in which ideas can be explored and solutions, at last, patiently developed.

Robert Carlin, a former State Department analyst, participated in most of the U.S.-North Korea negotiations between 1993 and 2000. John Lewis, professor emeritus at Stanford University, directs projects on Asia at the university's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Both have visited North Korea many times, most recently in November.

Copyright 2006, Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive and The Washington

Post. All rights Reserved.

All News button
1
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs
A delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea visited the San Francisco Bay Area March 1-2. Led by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan, the DPRK delegation stopped here on the way to New York for official discussions with Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, as part of the initial steps for implementing the Six-Party Talks' Joint Statement of September 2005. While in the Bay Area, the DPRK delegation was hosted by a group led by John W. Lewis, who heads Stanford's Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region and who has visited North Korea many times.
All News button
1
Paragraphs

British tradition and the American Constitution guarantee trial by jury for serious crime.1 But terrorism is not ordinary crime, and the presence of jurors may skew the manner in which terrorist trials unfold in at least three significant ways.

First, organized terrorist groups may deliberately threaten jury members so the accused escapes penalty. The more ingrained the terrorist organization in the fabric of society, the greater the degree of social control exerted under the ongoing threat of violence.

Second, terrorism, at heart a political challenge, may itself politicize a jury. Where nationalist conflict rages, as it does in Northern Ireland, juries may be sympathetic to those engaged in violence and may acquit the guilty. Alternatively, following a terrorist attack, juries may be biased. They may identify with the victims, or they may, consciously or unconsciously, seek to return a verdict that conforms to community sentiment. Jurors also may worry about becoming victims of future attacks.

Third, the presence of jurors may limit the type of information provided by the state. Where national security matters are involved, the government may not want to give ordinary citizens insight into the world of intelligence. Where deeply divisive political violence has been an issue for decades, the state may be concerned about the potential of jurors providing information to terrorist organizations.

These risks are not limited to the terrorist realm. Criminal syndicates, for instance, may try to intimidate juries into returning a verdict of not guilty, and public outrage often accompanies particularly heinous crimes. But the very reason why these other contexts give rise to a similar phenomenon is because terrorist crimes have certain characteristics-characteristics that may be reflected in other forms of crime, but which are, in many ways, at the heart of what it means for an act to be terrorist in nature: terrorist organizations are created precisely to coerce a population, or specific individuals, to accede to the group's demands. The challenge is political in nature, and the method of attack is chosen for maximum publicity. Terrorist organizations, moreover, can and often do use information about the state to guide their operations. It is in part because of these risks that the United Kingdom and United States have changed the rules governing terrorist trials-at times eliminating juries altogether.

This Article reflects on the relationship between terrorism and jury trial and explores the extent to which the three dangers identified can be mitigated within the criminal-trial framework.2 It does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the rich case law and literature that address jury trial-one of the most studied legal institutions on both sides of the Atlantic. Instead, its aim is more modest: The text weighs the advantages and disadvantages of suspending juries specifically for terrorism. Here, the United Kingdom's experiences prove illustrative. The Article considers the extent to which similar concerns bear on the U.S. domestic realm, and the decision to try Guantánamo Bay detainees by military tribunal. It suggests that the arguments for suspending juries in Northern Ireland are more persuasive than for taking similar steps in Great Britain or the United States.

This Article then considers ways to address concerns raised by terrorism that stop short of suspending juries. Juror selection, constraints placed on jurors, and the conduct of the trial itself provide the focus. Of these, emphasis on juror selection, although not unproblematic, proves most promising. Again, distinctions need to be drawn between the United Kingdom and the United States. In the former, for instance, occupational bars to jury service could be lowered, while in the latter, increased emphasis on change in venue may prove particularly effective. Changes in the second category, constraints on jurors, may be the most damaging to the states' counterterrorist programs. Finally, while changes in the trial process may help to address risks, they also may prove contentious and be prone to seeping into the criminal realm. The Article concludes by questioning whether and to what extent such alterations could be insulated from the prosecution of non-terrorist criminal offenses.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Stanford Law Review
Authors
Paragraphs

The White House still avoids the label, but by any reasonable historical standard, the Iraqi civil war has begun. The record of past such wars suggests that Washington cannot stop this one -- and that Iraqis will be able to reach a power-sharing deal only after much more fighting, if then. The United States can help bring about a settlement eventually by balancing Iraqi factions from afar, but there is little it can do to avert bloodshed now.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Foreign Affairs
Authors
James D. Fearon
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Siegfried S. Hecker, a prominent U.S. expert on nuclear technology and policy, was appointed co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University on Jan. 16. He also assumed positions as a professor (research) in the Stanford School of Engineering's Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow at FSI.

Hecker's "scientific achievements as a metallurgist, his leadership and talent as the head of a renowned U.S. Department of Energy laboratory and his decades-long dedication to improving global security make him an extraordinary choice to help direct CISAC in the years ahead," FSI Director Coit D. Blacker said, announcing the appointment.

Political science Professor Scott Sagan, whom Hecker joins as a co-director of CISAC, said he is "thrilled to have Sig Hecker as a partner" in leading the center. "Hecker follows in a long line of distinguished scientists--Sidney Drell, William Perry, Michael May, and Christopher Chyba--who have become leaders of CISAC's efforts to produce cutting edge policy-relevant research," Sagan noted. "Stanford University is extremely fortunate to be able to have a scholar-practitioner of Sig Hecker's stature coming to CISAC to help guide our multidisciplinary efforts to address the tough security challenges facing the world right now."

The center, traditionally co-directed by a scientist and social scientist since its founding in 1983 by physicist Drell and political scientist John Lewis, draws from a range of disciplines to focus on current problems in international security.

An emeritus director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Hecker has fostered U.S. cooperation with Russian nuclear laboratories for 15 years to secure the vast stockpile of former Soviet nuclear weapons and materials. At CISAC, where he has been a visiting professor since fall 2005, Hecker has contributed to international projects to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and secure materials for making them.

Looking forward to the new assignments, Hecker said, "I have enjoyed the Stanford environment--the students, faculty, and the great range of international issues being examined. I look forward to the new challenge of leading CISAC with Scott Sagan, as well as teaching and research in management science and engineering."

With Lewis, Hecker has made three visits to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the last three years, gaining rare access to and expertise on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. His reports on the program's status provide valuable insights to U.S. diplomats and scholars seeking to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. With Sagan, Hecker has participated in meetings with security experts from China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States to secure nuclear weapons and materials and lessen tensions in South Asia.

Last fall, Hecker co-taught Stanford's popular management science and engineering course, Technology and National Security, with CISAC and MS&E colleague Perry. Hecker lectured on nuclear weapons history and technical fundamentals, nuclear terrorism, and North Korea.

"Dr. Hecker has added 'outstanding professor' to his list of many accomplishments," Perry said. "I am delighted he has accepted this appointment and look forward to working with him."

All News button
1
Paragraphs

Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on Jan. 27, 2007, on the situation in Iraq and the Bush administration's strategy. The full committee heard testimony from William Perry, co-director of the Preventive Defense Project at CISAC and former secretary of defense; Ambassador Dennis B. Ross, counselor and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former director for policy planning in the Department of State, and former special Middle East coordinator; and General John M. Keane (retired, U.S. Army), former Army vice chief of staff.

It has become clear to the American public that we need a new way forward in Iraq. In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group (ISG), a bipartisan group formed by the Congress, concluded nine months of study and proposed a new way forward. The ISG proposal recognized that the key actions needed in Iraq must be taken by the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army, and provided the incentives for those actions. The ISG proposal also recognized that the U.S. needed to begin the redeployment of its overstretched ground forces in order to meet its security responsibilities outside of Iraq.

Perhaps, most importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan ISG provided an opportunity for the nation to come together on Iraq. Last week, President Bush announced what he called a 'New Way Forward' in Iraq that does not follow the ISG ecommendations. He has instead chosen a course of action that I believe is not likely to succeed because it is tactical, not strategic; because it does not entail real conditionality for the Iraqi government; and because it will only deepen the divide in the country. So in my testimony today I will explain the differences in the two approaches, and why I believe that the ISG proposals better serve the interests of the United States.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Testimonies
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee
Authors
William J. Perry
-

Ambassador Sen was born on 9 April 1944. After graduating from college he joined the Indian Foreign Service in July 1966. From May 1968 to July 1984, Sen served in Indian missions and posts in Moscow, San Francisco, Dhaka and in the Ministry of External Affairs. He also served as secretary to the Atomic Energy Commission of India.

From July 1984 to December 1985, Sen served as the joint secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs. He was thereafter joint secretary to the prime minister of India from January 1986 to July 1991 where he was responsible for foreign affairs, defense, and science and technology.

Mr. Sen was ambassador to Mexico from September 1991 to August 1992; ambassador to the Russian Federation from October 1992 to October 1998; ambassador to Germany from October 1998 to May 2002; and high commissioner to the United Kingdom from May 2002 to April 2004. He assumed charge as ambassador of India to the United States of America in August 2004.

The Ambassador participated in summit meetings in the United Nations, Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement, Six Nation Five Continent Peace Initiative, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, IAEA, G-15 and other forums and also in over 160 bilateral summit meetings. He had several assignments as special envoy of the prime minister of India for meetings with foreign government representatives and heads of state.

The Ambassador's visit is co-sponsored by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Freeman Spogli Institute and the Stanford Center for International Development at Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

Philippines Conference Room

Ronen Sen Ambassador of India to the United States of America Speaker
Seminars
Subscribe to United States