Although Iraq dominates the headlines, the situation in Afghanistan may be more decisive to longterm international security, said Sarah Chayes, who has lived in the country since 2001 after covering the last stand of the Taliban for National Public Radio (NPR).

Chayes, an American who directs Arghand, a cooperative in Kandahar that produces soap from local plants and fruits as an alternative to opium production, spent Wednesday, Nov. 5, at Stanford. During several talks with CISAC faculty, staff, students and donors she discussed regional security, the future of democracy in Afghanistan and the stresses of everyday life in the ancient city of Kandahar, where she lives and where civilians must carry firearms to protect themselves. 

Chayes strongly criticized efforts to negotiate with the Taliban, which has fought a protracted guerilla war against the Afghan government since 2004. The extremist movement ruled the country from 1996 to 2001, when the Northern Alliance and NATO forces removed its leaders from power. "There is no intrinsic support from the population for the Taliban," Chayes said. "The Taliban want all, they understand they won't get all so they are trying to get what they can. Negotiating with the Taliban [offers] zero benefit."

Instead, according to Chayes, Afghanistan needs to experience the "real substance of democracy," not simply elections. It also needs a surge of non-military volunteers trained to mentor leaders working in civil society. "Thirty years of combat undoes a lot of structure" in society, she said. "People get things done as fast as possible because they might be shot in the next 50 seconds."

Chayes is the author of The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban. In 2006, she was awarded The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists' inaugural Ruth Adams Award for her work explaining the impact of U.S. policy on Afghanistan after 9/11. The prize recognizes journalists who translate complex issues of peace and security into everyday language and images. Chayes left NPR in 2002 to help rebuild Afghanistan. Initially, she served as field director for Afghans for Civil Society, a non-profit founded by the brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. She founded Arghand in May 2005.

The civilian nuclear cooperation deal between the United States and India, which President George W. Bush signed into law last week, has been controversial from the moment it was first outlined in New Delhi about three years ago. It would allow Washington to trade nuclear technology with New Delhi despite the fact that India is a de facto nuclear weapons state outside of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Critics of the deal insist, fairly convincingly, that doing so would cause irreparable harm to the nonproliferation regime, leaving the non-nuclear weapon states that abide by the NPT to question what tangible benefits exist for dutifully assuming their treaty obligations and submitting to NPT restrictions. Conversely, supporters of the deal legitimately point out that the benefits of a good relationship between India and the United States outweigh any potential harm. As with most things, the truth is probably somewhere in the middle--it's unlikely that the nonproliferation regime would remain unscathed, but it's quite possible that the damage could be contained.

A major sticking point for critics is that the deal actually makes it easier for India to continue producing fissile material for its nuclear weapons program by allowing New Delhi access to the world market in nuclear fuel for its power reactors, thereby freeing its scarce uranium resources for the production of weapons-usable plutonium in dedicated reactors that are exempt from any international safeguards. Moreover, India's breeder reactor program--another potential source of weapon-grade plutonium--is also free from safeguards. It's hardly encouraging that India would have the capability to increase its stock of weapon materials, but in reality, this doesn't much matter--probably the main reason why India got away with keeping that capability. There seems to be a worldwide consensus that once New Delhi crossed the nuclear threshold, the amount of weapons in its arsenal is unimportant. In fact, in some important aspects this is exactly the case--beyond its symbolic value India's nuclear arsenal hardly provides any security for the country. Indeed, if the U.S.-India nuclear deal helps strengthen this understanding, it provides some silver lining to the nuclear arrangement's drawbacks.

The deal could also provide a much needed incentive for a critical review of some of the current nonproliferation regime's assumptions. One such assumption is implicit in Article VI of the NPT--nuclear weapon states and their close allies have control over nuclear technologies. This is still largely true for advanced commercially viable technologies, but the monopoly on weapon-relevant technology is firmly in the past. An idea that emerged during discussion of the U.S.-India nuclear deal was to ban the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to India, supposedly to limit its ability to ramp up production of weapon materials. Limiting production of weapon-grade materials is a reasonable goal, but if the only approach is to deny a country access to advanced centrifuges or reprocessing plants, that battle is already lost.

Similarly, much ink has been spilled over the effort to have India commit to a moratorium on nuclear testing as part of the deal. The intent behind the idea was certainly laudable. But if the threat of cutting off the supply of fuel for nuclear reactors is our best hope to prevent India from nuclear testing, the effort to prevent new nuclear tests is in big trouble.

Without a doubt, the U.S.-India nuclear deal presents a serious challenge to the NPT. But it also presents an opportunity to strengthening the regime and its most important, relevant elements. In particular, for all of its problems and challenges, the NPT has successfully established a norm that assumes that countries shouldn't have nuclear weapons. The official signing of the U.S.-India nuclear deal is a good time to remind New Delhi that if it wants to be a responsible partner in the nuclear trade, it must assume the obligations that come with this norm--even if India never signed the NPT. Of course, this would require the nuclear weapon states to get serious about their NPT obligations and responsibilities as well. And that's not such a bad thing either.

Important planning for responding to a future anthrax attack has quietly been under way since the last attacks seven years ago. A key part of this effort has been figuring out how best to deliver prophylactic antibiotics quickly to the people living in the city that is attacked.

This is at least as difficult and complicated as it might seem. First, an attack must be detected, either by one of the BioWatch air monitors that have been placed in many cities or by finding symptoms of anthrax poisoning in a victim. Either way, this can take at least 12 to 30 hours. Next, an adequate supply of antibiotics must be sent from the Strategic National Stockpile (held at 12 sites around the country) to the affected city, ideally within 12 hours.

Finally, the city must get the drugs out to its population. This third step is potentially the most time-consuming of all. But it can be speeded up - and made twice as effective in preventing deaths - by strategically involving the United States Postal Service and by greatly increasing the amount of medicine initially sent out to the affected city.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has directed 72 major American cities to devise plans to distribute anthrax antibiotics to all their residents within 48 hours of receiving them. So far, few of these cities are able to meet that goal. The traditional approach to dispensing medical supplies to a large population is to place the medicines in schools and other public places and instruct people to pick them up. The main shortcoming of this "PODs" approach (for "points of dispensing") is labor: there are not enough public health workers to distribute the antibiotics quickly, and cities would have to rely largely on volunteers to perform unfamiliar (albeit simple) tasks in unfamiliar settings.

A better way is to let residents stay home and have mail carriers, escorted by police officers, go door to door delivering antibiotics. This can be done within eight hours, trials in Seattle, Boston and Philadelphia have shown. While the mail carriers (who have already taken antibiotics) distribute pills, public health workers can make bulk deliveries to special populations like universities, nursing homes, detention centers, homeless shelters and large hotels.

After the mail carriers have finished their routes, the next police shift can be assigned to PODs, opened up to serve anyone who may have fallen through the cracks and to supply additional antibiotics so that each citizen can ultimately be given enough for the full 60-day course of treatment.

Besides being faster, the postal approach can reach those people who, surveys suggest, might refuse to go to a dispensing point. It would also require fewer workers, and it would be much better executed - mail carriers cover their routes six days a week through rain, sleet and snow. And the elderly, the handicapped and those without cars could obtain their pills more easily.

So the mail carrier strategy is a great start. But it won't work unless the federal government provides the city with a sufficient supply of antibiotics within 12 hours of the request. The Strategic National Stockpile has the capacity now to immediately send enough medicine to last 1.8 million people for 10 days. (The rest of its supply of antibiotics is in bulk form, not prepackaged, so it cannot be delivered until 24 to 36 hours after the request.) But for many cities, the 10-day supply for 1.8 million people is not enough. The stockpile should at least triple its inventory of antibiotics that are prepackaged so they can be delivered within 12 hours.

Mathematical models suggest that such a well-executed and well-supplied approach to delivering antibiotics would result in half the number of deaths as would occur using the traditional PODs approach.

Finally, it is important that planners take into account the possibility of a campaign of attacks on several cities. After all, producing 10 pounds of anthrax spores may not be much more difficult than making one pound. To address this threat, the Strategic National Stockpile should ultimately be ready to mobilize, according to my calculations, roughly half of its inventory of anthrax antibiotics. Then, soon after sending antibiotics to the city under attack it could also distribute five-day supplies to people in all the other cities (again via mail carriers).

Most people would never need to take the medicine, but they would have it on hand in the event of an attack. This would greatly reduce the level of fear nationwide, and it might also serve as a strong deterrent to people who would consider waging such a series of attacks. It is our responsibility to stay one step ahead of them.

The article by Daniel Kleppner, Frederick Lamb, and David Mosher (Physics Today, January 2004, page 30) summarizes the results of the excellent American Physical Society study released in July 2003 on boost-phase options for national missile defense. The study represents one of the most authoritative analyses to date on the subject and will enhance the quality of the public debate on missile defense for years to come. However, although I agree with many of the study's conclusions, the overall assessment is somewhat pessimistic, especially with respect to the feasibility of intercepting solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Robert Cowan, a laboratory fellow, have been awarded the 2008 Los Alamos Medal, the institution's most prestigious award.

Established in 2001, the medal is the highest honor the laboratory can bestow upon an individual or small group. Laboratory Director Michael Anastasio will present the medals to Hecker and Cowan during a formal awards ceremony and reception.

Recipients of the award are selected by a review committee on the basis of whether they have "made a contribution that changed the course of science, facilitated a major enhancement to the laboratory's ability to accomplish its mission, had a significant impact on lab sustainability, and established a major direction for the institution or the nation."

Hecker was selected "based on his many important and signature contributions to scientific research as a technical staff member, to the management of science at Los Alamos during his brief but critical leadership of the emergent Center for Materials Science and later as laboratory director, and to national policy, including stockpile stewardship and plutonium aging, engaging Russian nuclear weapons scientists after the collapse of the Soviet Union, promoting the importance of the study of terrorism as an emerging threat, and acting as a senior representative of the nuclear weapons complex in the North Korea nuclear weapons situation," the committee wrote.

Hecker's contributions to the science of plutonium metallurgy and his scientific leadership have been recognized by election to the National Academy of Engineering, as a member of the American Physical Society, as a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and as a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Hecker also has received the U.S. Department of Energy's E.O. Lawrence Award.

As laboratory director, Hecker helped transition the laboratory to a post-Cold-War environment and promoted collaboration with Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the ex-Soviet stockpile of fissile materials. "As both a scientist and as a manager, Hecker was a passionate and eloquent spokesman for science, a legacy that will continue to be felt at Los Alamos for many years," the committee wrote.

Hecker and Cowan join a distinguished coterie of past Los Alamos Medal winners, including Nobel Laureate Hans Bethe, former laboratory Director Harold Agnew and Louis Rosen, father of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center.