From Harper Collins publishers:

Offering a clear analysis of the danger of nuclear terrorism and how it can be prevented, The Partnership sheds light on one of the most divisive security issues facing Washington today. Award-winning New York Times journalist Philip Taubman illuminates our vulnerability in the face of this pressing terrorist threat—and the unlikely efforts of five key Cold War players to eliminate the nuclear arsenal they helped create. Bob Woodward calls The Partnership a “brilliant, penetrating study of nuclear threats, present and past,” and David Kennedy writes that it is “indispensable reading for all who would understand the desperate urgency of containing the menace of nuclear proliferation."

Book Description

A terrorist attack with nuclear weapons is the most dangerous security issue America faces today—and we are far more vulnerable than we realize. Driven by this knowledge, five men—all members of the Cold War brain trust behind the U.S. nuclear arsenal—have come together to combat this threat, leading a movement that is shaking the nuclear establishment and challenging the United States and other nations to reconsider their strategic policies.

Illuminating and thought-provoking, The Partnership tells the little-known story of their campaign to reduce the threat of a nuclear attack and, ultimately, eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. It is an intimate look at these men—Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and the renowned Stanford physicist Sidney Drell—the origins of their unlikely joint effort, and their dealings with President Obama and other world leaders. Award-winning journalist Philip Taubman explores the motivations, past conflicts, and current debates that drive, and sometimes strain, their bipartisan partnership. Through their stories, he examines the political and technological currents that shaped nuclear strategy during the Cold War—including the 1986 Reykjavik summit, at which Reagan and Gorbachev narrowly missed a landmark agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons—and illuminates how the end of that conflict gave rise to the dangerous realities of today. He reveals the heated discussions taking place in Washington and in nuclear-weapons laboratories, and spotlights current threats and the frantic efforts of America and its allies to prevent the spread of fissile materials.

Meticulously researched and compellingly told, The Partnership demands that we turn our attention to an issue that has the potential to alter our world order. Philip Taubman has provided an important and timely story of science, history, and friendship—of five men who have decided the time has come to dismantle the nuclear kingdom they worked to build.

Critical Praise for The Partnership

“The Partnership artfully weaves the threads of five notable lives into a fascinating account of nuclear strategizing over the last five decades. This unfailingly compelling narrative is indispensable reading for all who would understand the desperate urgency of containing the menace of nuclear proliferation.”
— DAVID KENNEDY, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY EMERITUS, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

“This brilliant, penetrating study of nuclear threats is in the tradition of David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan. Taubman has, perhaps as importantly, unlocked the history of the war we never had. Readers will tremble at the dangers the world has faced and still faces today.”
— BOB WOODWARD

“A richly detailed account of one of the most important issues of our time, The Partnership should be on the bedside of every presidential candidate, national affairs journalist and engaged citizen.”
— TOM BROKAW

"Whether China and the United States maintain basically cooperative or fundamentally antagonistic relations obviously has very different implications for the region and for the prospects and policies of others in—and beyond—NEA," states Thomas Fingar in the chapter "Alternate Trajectories of the Roles and Influence of China and the United States in Northeast Asia and the Implications for Future Power Configurations" (One Step Back? Reassessing an Ideal Security State for Asia 2025, 2011). Fingar examines several key factors and interactions between countries that he predicts are likely to play a role in configuring the security structure of Northeast Asia between now and 2025.

Edited by L. Gordon Flake, executive director of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, One Step Back? Reassessing an Ideal Security State for Asia 2025 is the second collection of papers published as a part of a research project to identify and refine the "ideal" state of peace and security in Northeast Asia in 2025. Full-length versions of the two publications are available for download, free of charge, at the Foundation website.

The legacy of the late North Korean leader Kim Il Sung's decision in the early 1990s to pursue a strategic partnership with the United States has run its course. In its place, the focus of Pyongyang's policies has decisively shifted to Beijing. However wary the North Koreans may be of their neighbor, the fact is that from Pyongyang's viewpoint, the Chinese have delivered and the United States did not.

Any shards remaining from the North's previous, decades-long effort to normalize ties with the U.S. were swept away by current leader Kim Jong Il's trip in May to China, his third in barely a year. Based on our discussions with Chinese officials, we believe that during that visit, Pyongyang and Beijing came to an understanding that, in preparation for planned, major domestic political events in 2012, both sides require sustained political stability, a convergence of interests that provides the opportunity for expanding bilateral relations beyond anything enjoyed in the past. The North is building toward a "prosperous and powerful" nation in celebration of the Kim Il Sung centenary in April; the Chinese are looking toward their 18th Party Congress scheduled for late next year. In both cases, it was apparently decided, stability on the Korean peninsula would serve economic programs and the succession of a new generation of leaders.

In the arrangements — formal and informal — that emerged from Kim Jong Il's discussions with his hosts, Pyongyang agreed not to "make trouble" (as the Chinese described it to us) in the short term, presumably meaning no deliberate military provocations, no third nuclear test and no launch of another ballistic missile. Beyond that, the talks ended in a compromise that neither side found entirely satisfactory. Kim came away with less aid and a smaller Chinese commitment of support than he had sought, though Pyongyang typically asks for more than it can get.

The North did, however, receive increased access to both Chinese capital and technology in spite ofUnited Nations and other foreign sanctions. Kim also obtained, through the establishment of joint economic zones with China along the Yalu River, a locale to test adjustments necessary to economic development, adjustments that would fall short of what Beijing considers genuine economic reform. Chinese President Hu Jintao, we were told, had to settle for Kim's promise to cause less trouble but without a North Korean commitment to serious steps toward denuclearization.

We believe that this pivot toward Beijing is no routine oscillation in North Korean policy. The drive to normalize relations with the U.S. from 1991 to 2009 had been real, sustained and rooted in Kim Il Sung's deep concern about the regime's future in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perhaps there was no better demonstration of the North's approach in those years than the situation on Oct. 25, 2000 — the 50th anniversary of the entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers into theKorean War. Who was in Pyongyang on that date meeting Kim Jong Il? The Chinese defense minister? No, he was cooling his heels while Kim met with the U.S. secretary of State. That was no accident of scheduling on Pyongyang's part; it would not happen again today.

If the paradigm shift is real, we expect the North in the near to medium term to make far less overt trouble. Less tension on the Korean peninsula? What could be wrong with that? Nothing, as long as it is understood that such tranquillity will also provide a veil for the North's continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons and increasingly sophisticated delivery systems. With the onset of stability and growing Chinese-North Korean cooperation, Pyongyang may well calculate that the outside world's focus on the North Korean nuclear program will become diffuse. Indeed, the North Koreans have long assumed that given enough time, the world would resign itself to their nuclear weapons, as happened with India and Pakistan.

To help things along, it isn't out of the question that Pyongyang might even agree to some U.S. efforts to contain the nuclear program through a series of what Washington calls "pre-steps." The North has repeatedly expressed willingness to consider discussion of its uranium enrichment program and moratoriums on missile and nuclear tests. As unilateral actions, these would have short-term benefits by further stabilizing the situation to provide additional room for discussions. But in the absence of long, serious negotiations between the two sides, they will turn out to be no more meaningful than the ill-considered agreements of the now moribund six-party talks.

All of which brings us back to the deepening North Korean-Chinese ties, and the downgrading in Pyongyang's calculations of relations with the United States. There was considerable momentum behind the North's strategy for engaging the U.S. in past negotiations. That is no longer the case, with consequences we have only started to feel.

Abstract:

US-Russia ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation can improve strategic stability between both countries, but this cooperation would pose a potential threat to China’s strategic security, especially if it is a closed and deep cooperation. The United States and Russia should make their bilateral cooperation an open regime, and let China and other countries join, so that improvement of US-Russia strategic stability is not based on the sacrifice of strategic stability with China and other countries. China and the United States may also cooperate on BMD in areas of early warning and mutual launch notification. The security costs of these cooperative measures are very low, and the benefits would improve stability, confidence, and mutual trust. Finally, BMD cooperation between the United States
and its East Asian allies (Japan and Taiwan) is threatening Sino-US strategic stability. The United States could improve Chinese confidence by increasing transparency about and limiting the performance of BMD systems.