The military campaign unleashed in Chechnya in September 1999 was portrayed by the Russian leadership as a limited and carefully targeted counter-terrorist operation aimed at eliminating the threat to Russia posed by "international terrorism." In a 14 November article in the New York Times, then Prime Minister Putin sought to deflect American criticism of Russian actions and to win acquiescence, if not sympathy, by likening Russias effort in Chechnya to U.S. anti-terrorist actions. The Russian military, he insisted, had chosen "accurately targeted strikes on specifically identified terrorist bases" to avoid direct attacks on Chechen communities.

But the radical discrepancy between the initial rationale and the actual conduct of the campaign makes it clear that what we are seeing is in fact a deliberate resumption of the 1994-96 war by the Russian Government--and a unilateral abrogation of the agreements that terminated it--now pursued with even greater determination and brutality, with even less regard for civilian casualties, and with a more sophisticated military and public relations strategy.

Not only is there a massive chasm between the professed aims of the campaign and its actual conduct; there appears to be a major disconnect between the real problems of the region and the Russian Government's response. Indeed, the attempt at military subjugation and occupation of Chechnya by Russian forces is likely to exacerbate rather than solve the deeper problems of the Northern Caucasus.

This analysis focuses on three broad issues: (a) the challenge facing Moscow in Chechnya more broadly, and in particular why the opportunity for a political solution of the conflict afforded by the Khasaviurt and other peace agreements was squandered; (b) the assumptions that appear to underlie the actions of the Russian Government and why some of these assumptions appear to be questionable; and (c) the prospects for a political resolution of the conflict and for establishing longer-term peace and stability in the region.

Reprinted in Central Asia and the Caucasus, no. 4, August 2000.

Chapter in Chechnya: The International Community and Strategies for Peace and Stability, edited by Lena Jonson and Murad Esenov.

China and the United States share a new and rapidly expanding border-the Internet. It is a border that neither country fully understands. The possibility for misunderstanding is great because the Internet is not only transforming the relationship between the two countries, it is also transforming the countries themselves. It could be argued that China is going through the greater change. Unlike the past where information was mediated by the State, the mass media, and the work unit, Chinese citizens with Internet connections and a command of English have unprecedented direct and immediate access to information and people around the world. Because of abundance of Chinese language content, Chinese who can only read Chinese still have access to a wealth of information. The Chinese government has imposed its own unique regime on the networks in China that connect to the Internet. Though the United States and China both participate in the Internet, the regimes that they use to govern their networks are very different.

On July 19, 2000 the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS) gathered forty preeminent scientists, security experts, and political analysts for a Roundtable Discussion on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at Stanford University. The day-long seminar was intended to explore the diverse set of topics that arose during the October 1999 Sentate debate of the Treaty and to develop a consensus on steps that the United States should now take with regard to the CTBT. This booklet includes a transcript of that discussion along with a collection of short papers submitted by experts who were unable to attend.

How should the United States deal with so-called rogue states that threaten to use chemical or biological weapons against the U.S. homeland or its troops abroad? Scott Sagan of Stanford University examines Washington's "calculated ambiguity doctrine," which holds that the United States does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack. Sagan argues that the risks associated with this doctrine outweigh the benefits. He warns that although the ambiguity doctrine might decrease the likelihood of a chemical or biological attack, it also raises the probability that Washington would feel compelled to use nuclear weapons to respond to such an attack. Sagan concludes that the United States should renounce the nuclear option and instead recommit itself to meeting a chemical or biological attack with overwhelming conventional force.

The United States has a global security strategy, in deeds if seldom clearly in words. The U.S. security strategy is to enlarge the areas of the world that it can control militarily and to weaken all states outside those areas. The strategy does not rely solely on military means, but enlarged military control is the end and military means--armed interventions, alliance extensions, arms sales--usually lead the way. Aside from a 1992 Pentagon trial balloon, which was poorly received though accurate enough as far as it went, and a few other statements, the strategy has been manifested via a series of consistent actions rather than formal statements.

Along with this overall strategy, the United States also has policies regarding nuclear weapons. Some of these policies are stated, some are tacit. The stated policies include de-emphasizing nuclear weapons, discouraging nuclear proliferation, and pursuing nuclear arms reductions, a comprehensive test ban, and other nuclear-arms-control measures. The tacit policy is reliance on deterrent nuclear forces to limit escalation of conventional conflicts and to offset the nuclear forces of other powers.

These two policies, military enlargement and reliance on nuclear stability and arms control, are not compatible. Continued enlargement backed or led by military force will not support de-emphasis of nuclear weapons, let alone nuclear disarmament. It may not support nuclear nonproliferation even among allies, depending on whether the United States is seen to become overextended or overcommitted at home or abroad. Military enlargement weakens support for several of the arms-control measures on the U.S. agenda. Enlargement is also likely to lead to crises that will test the stability of nuclear deterrence more seriously than it has been tested since the early years of the Cold War.

In this paper I first remind the reader of the main components of the U.S. military enlargement strategy. Next I describe why other states, given the U.S. enlargement strategy, find and will continue to find nuclear weapons useful. These states are not all potential opponents. Third, I explain how the U.S. enlargement strategy undermines nuclear arms control. What is more important, I show why it will inevitably lead to nuclear crises. Last, I discuss the alternative strategy of military restraint and show how it would ensure U.S. influence for a longer time and with greater safety than the present strategy of unilateral U.S. military enlargement.