The development of "information warfare" presents international legal issues that will complicate nations' efforts both to execute and to respond to certain information warfare attacks, specifically those using computers, telecommunications, or networks to attack adversary information systems. Some legal constraints will certainly apply to information warfare, either because the constraints explicitly regulate particular actions, or because more general principles of international law govern the effects of those actions. Nevertheless, the novelty of certain information warfare techniques may remove them from application of established legal categories. Furthermore, the ability of signals to travel across international networks, and affect systems in distant countries, conflicts with the long-standing principle of national, territorial sovereignty.

The end of the Cold War creates both new challenges and new opportunities for improving nuclear weapons safety. Several post Cold War developments are likely to have negative effects on the safety of existing nuclear weapons arsenals. These potentially dangerous trends include an apparent decline of morale in the laboratories and military organizations responsible for weapons safety, the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons to new states, the likely discontinuation of nuclear testing for safety related purposes, and the introduction of new nuclear weapons operations, including large-scale warhead dismantlement and the relocation and long-term storage of large numbers of nuclear weapons.

In an effort to explore such challenges and opportunities, a NATO Advanced Research Workshop was held in Oxford, England from August 25^th through 27^th, 1994. The workshop produced seven specific proposals for consideration to increase nuclear weapons safety and security. The proposals represent a summary of the points discussed at the workshop and are not intended to imply complete consensus of all participants.

When a state develops a nuclear arsenal, these destructive weapons must be initially integrated into existing military forces and initially managed through existing civil and military institutions. The subsequent relationship between nuclear weapons and civil-military relations in possessor states is complex, however, and presents an important two-way puzzle. First, it is important to ask how existing patterns of civil-military relations in nuclear states have influenced the likelihood of nuclear-weapons use. Some scholars believe that military officers are less war-prone and hawkish than civilian leaders; others believe the opposite, that the military tends to be bellicose and biased in favor of aggressive military postures. Which view is right, especially when nuclear weapons are involved, is a question that has not been fully addressed in the literature. Second, it is important to flip the question around and also ask how nuclear weapons have influenced civil-military relations in the states that have acquired the ultimate weapon. Again, the answer is not clear. One might expect that the massive destructive power of these weapons would encourage much greater civilian involvement in military affairs. Yet, at the same time, one might predict that military organizations would maintain significant control over nuclear policy as they want to protect their operational autonomy, and because the perceived need for a prompt response would mitigate against tight civilian control.