Stanford University

Opinion: Ukraine’s Nuclear Threat Today Is Nonexistent

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Steven Pifer
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Trying to justify Russia’s unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Kyiv sought to develop nuclear weapons. That is a glaring untruth, as he well knows. 

Thirty years ago, Ukraine had on its territory the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal. Kyiv gave those weapons up—in large part because Russia said it would respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and not use force against it. The country has never sought to reacquire nuclear arms. Read the rest. 

Originally for Aviation Week

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Vladimir Putin Adam Berry / Stringer accessed through GettyImages
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Trying to justify Russia’s unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Kyiv sought to develop nuclear
weapons. That is a glaring untruth, as he well knows.

Foreign Policy in Hard Economic Times

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For winter quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

                                                                                           

About the Event: Freddy Chen has developed a domestic political theory to explain the consequences of economic shocks for foreign policy. He argues that political leaders have incentives to improve their perceived competence by linking economic grievances to foreign countries. This linkage, in turn, increases public desire for more hawkish foreign policy. Nonetheless, leaders’ ability to make such connections depends on whether they can successfully manipulate information about the culpability for economic shocks. Therefore, the extent to which leaders can control the information environment determines whether an economic shock leads to more aggressive foreign policy. Survey experiments fielded on the American public and a unique sample of U.S. foreign policy analysts show that the information environment shapes elites’ expectations about leaders’ political behavior, public perceptions of leader competence, perceived culpability for the economic shock, and public preferences over foreign policy. Moreover, a cross-national analysis demonstrates that an economic shock tends to increase foreign policy hawkishness if the shock is more foreign-related or if the public has less access to a potential voice of the opposition. This article advances our understanding of the relationship between economic shocks, foreign policy, and public opinion as well as the interactions between domestic politics and international relations, with important implications for both political science research and policymakers.

About the Speaker: Frederick Chen is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and currently a Pre-doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His research focuses on how economics and security can interact to influence international relations, particularly through domestic political mechanisms. His work has appeared in the Journal of Politics and Conflict Management and Peace Science. He received the David A. Lake Award for best paper from the International Political Economy Society. He earned his M.A. in International Relations from Peking University (2016) and B.A. in International Politics from Tsinghua University (2013).

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Frederick R. Chen CISAC
Seminars
Research Seminar Series

Russia, Ukraine and NATO: The View from Paris

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 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 
 

SEMINAR RECORDING

YouTube

 

About the Event: Europe's attention has been transfixed for more than two months by the Russian military build-up near Ukraine, efforts to coordinate a trans-Atlantic response, and contacts with Russia and Ukraine.  France has been closely involved in shaping the West's policy and diplomacy, and President Macron in February visited both Moscow and Kyiv.  Sylvie Kauffmann, editorial director, leader writer and columnist for Le Monde, will discuss how the crisis has been viewed in Paris and the French government's policy response.

 

About the Speaker: Sylvie Kauffmann is Editorial Director, Leader Writer and Columnist for Le Monde, writing a weekly column on global affairs. Her opinions on European and international politics have also appeared in the New York Times. Previously, she was the first female Editor-in-Chief of Le Monde, including during the Wikileaks collaboration with El País, the Guardian and the New York Times. She has reported from Asia, Eastern Europe and the United States, where she wrote a prize-winning series of articles about life in America following the 9/11 attacks. Kauffmann graduated from the Institut d’Études Poltiques Aix-en-Provence and the faculty of law at the University of Provence Aix-Marseille.

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Sylvie Kauffmann
Seminars
European Security Initiative

The Kremlin Paints Itself into a Corner

Authors
Steven Pifer
News Type
Commentary
Date
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As the crisis between Russia and NATO and Ukraine has developed over the past three months, the Kremlin increasingly has painted itself into a corner.  Continuing its military build-up around Ukraine while rejecting U.S. and NATO offers of a diplomatic path to ease tensions, Moscow appears to be limiting itself to two choices:  war or an embarrassing climb-down.

The size of the Russian military arrayed near Ukraine has grown steadily and now numbers some 130,000 troops.  Large Russian formations have positioned themselves near the Russia-Ukraine border, in occupied Crimea and in Belarus, providing multiple potential attack vectors.

On February 11, National Security Advisor Sullivan warned of the possibility of a Russian assault and urged American citizens to leave Ukraine.  The same day, the Pentagon ordered 3000 U.S. soldiers to Poland.  They will augment 1700 troops already deployed there, and the U.S. military has moved 1000 other troops from Germany to Romania.  These will not enter Ukraine but will bolster NATO’s defense on its eastern flank (other allies are taking similar steps).

The Kremlin has framed the crisis as one between Russia and NATO, citing NATO enlargement as bringing the alliance closer to Russia.  However, the last ally to join NATO that borders on Russian territory joined in 2004.  So, why the crisis now?  Moreover, if Moscow’s beef is with NATO, why is it posturing its military to threaten Ukraine?

This Kremlin-manufactured crisis is as much if not more about Ukraine.  Moscow fears Ukraine is falling irretrievably out of its orbit, though nothing has done more than Kremlin policy to push Ukraine away from Russia and toward the West.  It should surprise no one that Russia’s military seizure of Crimea in 2014 followed by its instigation of and support for a conflict in Donbas that has taken 14,000 lives would affect Ukrainian attitudes toward Moscow.

This crisis is not about Ukraine’s entry into NATO.  Alliance members show little enthusiasm for putting Ukraine on a membership track.  Moscow knows that but wants more:  Ukraine in a Russian sphere of influence, denying Kyiv the right to choose its own foreign policy course. 

In December, the Russian government gave U.S. officials a draft U.S.-Russia treaty and draft NATO-Russia agreement, then promptly made them public—hardly a sign of serious negotiating intent.  U.S. and NATO officials responded in January meetings with their Russian counterparts and subsequently in writing.

Washington and NATO rejected Kremlin demands that NATO foreswear further enlargement and withdraw forces from the territory of allies who joined the alliance after 1997.  However, their responses picked up on some ideas in the Russian drafts, proposing discussions and possible negotiations on arms control, risk reduction and confidence-building measures that could make genuine contributions to European security, including Russia’s.

Moscow replied that the responses addressed only questions of secondary concern and ignored the key Russian demands regarding NATO.  Oddly, in addition to demands on no further enlargement and withdrawing forces, Russian President Putin claimed the West ignored his demand regarding offensive missiles near Russia.  In fact, both Washington and NATO indicated a readiness to negotiate the question of missiles.

While offering Russia a diplomatic “off-ramp” from the crisis, the United States, NATO and European Union have sought to deter a military assault by specifying costs they would impose on Moscow.  Those costs include substantially more painful sanctions, increased military assistance to Kyiv and a bolstering of NATO force presence on its eastern flank.

Washington has consulted intensively with its NATO allies, the European Union and Ukraine on how to manage the crisis.  The West seems relatively unified in its reaction to the Russian proposals and support for Ukraine—perhaps more so than the Kremlin expected.

French President Macron visited Moscow on February 7.  Following a five-hour meeting with Putin, he reported an agreement not to escalate the crisis.  The Kremlin spokesperson the next day refuted that claim, saying “Moscow and Paris could not have struck any deals. It is simply impossible…  France is a NATO member, where it doesn’t hold leadership—another country holds this bloc’s leadership.  So, what kind of deals can you talk about?”

On February 10, British Foreign Secretary Truss made no headway during a frosty meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov.  Lavrov played a game of gotcha and treated Truss brusquely at their joint press briefing.

On February 12, President Biden spoke to Putin, their third conversation in two months.  No breakthroughs resulted.  On February 15, German Chancellor Scholz will meet Putin in Moscow.

The current situation offers few grounds for optimism.  Moscow denies any intent to attack, but the Russian military build-up continues and has brought more troops and equipment close to Ukraine.  While Russian military capabilities may overmatch Ukrainian armed forces, the latter would fight, and Ukrainian civilians are arming up to resist as well.  (Above and beyond the penalties imposed by the West, the main costs to Russia of an assault would be inflicted by the Ukrainian military and partisan operations against an invading Russian force, particularly if the Russians got bogged down in a quagmire.)

Moscow thus far has turned aside Western attempts to engage in dialogue on de-escalating the crisis, insisting on demands it knows will not be met while not engaging on offers that could enhance the security of both sides.  The rude treatment accorded to Macron and Truss in Moscow does not bode well for diplomacy.

Putin may not yet have made a final decision, and Moscow has left the door ajar for negotiation.  But it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Kremlin is painting itself ever tighter into a corner.  It can launch an attack on Ukraine, one that would be viewed by the world as an act of outright aggression, or it can back down and accept offers that have been on the table for weeks.  The latter could prove embarrassing.  It could appear that Russia’s military build-up was a bluff that had been called.  Putin does not seem one who wants others to think that he bluffs.

If the Kremlin chooses war, that will be a calamity for Ukraine—and it could well prove the same for Russia.  Hopefully, Moscow will conclude that the costs of an attack would outweigh the political gains it might hope to achieve and turn to a more realistic diplomatic approach, however awkward that climb-down might seem. 

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As the crisis between Russia and NATO and Ukraine has developed over the past three months, the Kremlin increasingly has painted itself into a corner.

Mother Nature, Bioweapons and Lab Accidents: Guarding Against the Next Global Biological Catastrophe

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For winter quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

YouTube

                                                                                           


About the Event: With the devastating loss of life, economic disruption, and political instability it has wrought, COVID-19 has revealed that national governments and the international community are woefully unprepared to respond to pandemics—underscoring the world’s vulnerability to future catastrophic biological threats that could meet or exceed the severe consequences of the current pandemic. To effectively guard against future biological risks, leaders should take a longer-term view and recognize that, while naturally occurring pandemics remain a threat, the next global catastrophe could result from a laboratory accident or the deliberate misuse of bioscience and biotechnology.   This talk will provide a high-level overview of the broader biothreat landscape and outline actions that national leaders and the international community should take with a view to preventing catastrophic biological events—specifically by constraining capabilities and shaping the intent of powerful actors who may wish to exploit the tools of modern bioscience to cause harm. This talk will outline two priority NTI initiatives to strengthen international capabilities to prevent catastrophic biological events. We are working to develop and launch the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), a new international organization that will focus on preventing the deliberate abuse or accidental misuse of bioscience and biotechnology by strengthening international biosecurity norms and developing innovative, practical tools to reduce risks throughout the research and development life cycle. NTI is also working to develop the concept of a new Joint Assessment Mechanism to strengthen UN-system capabilities to investigate high-consequence biological events of unknown origin. The ability to rapidly discern the source of emerging pandemics is critical to mitigating their effects in real time and protecting against future risks.
 

About the Speaker: Dr. Jaime M. Yassif is Senior Director and Lead Scientist for Global Biological Policy and Programs at NTI, where her work focuses on strengthening governance of dual-use bioscience and reducing global catastrophic biological risks. Yassif previously served as a Program Officer at Open Philanthropy, where she led the Biosecurity and Pandemic Preparedness initiative. In this role, she managed approximately $40 million in biosecurity grants, which rebuilt the field and supported work in several key areas, including developing new biosecurity programming at leading think tanks, establishing the Global Health Security Index, and initiating new biosecurity work in China and India. Prior to this, Yassif served as a science and technology policy advisor at the U.S. Department of Defense and worked on the Global Health Security Agenda at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Jaime Yassif NTI
Seminars
Research Seminar Series

Russia, Ukraine and NATO: The View from London

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 All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

YouTube
 

                      

About the Event: The Russian military continues to mass forces near Ukraine, while the Kremlin says that the United States and NATO have addressed its secondary concerns but have ignored its key demands, such as that the Alliance foreswear further enlargement. Britain has played a critical role in NATO deliberations on how to respond to Moscow proposals and actions, and the British military is sending additional forces to bolster the Alliance's eastern flank. Sir Roderic Lyne, a former British ambassador to Russia and former foreign policy advisor to the prime minister, will describe how the crisis is viewed in London, the motivations driving Russian actions, and how the West should respond.

 

About the Speaker: Roderic Lyne served in the UK's Diplomatic Service for 34 years, including three postings to Moscow between 1972 and 2004, and was the last Head of the Soviet Department in the Foreign Office. In the mid-1990s he was the adviser to the Prime Minister on foreign affairs, security and Northern Ireland. Since retiring as Ambassador to the Russian Federation in 2004 he has visited Russia about fifty times as a business consultant and lecturer, and has written extensively on the subject. His most recent article was "Putin's Gamble: Must It End Up As Lose/Lose", published by Chatham House in late January. From 2009 to 2016 Roderic Lyne served on the UK's Inquiry into the Iraq conflict of 2003.

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Sir Roderic Lyne
Seminars
European Security Initiative

Early Warning Early Response Structures and the Challenge of Illegibility

For winter quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

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In Person

(Stanford faculty, visiting scholars, staff, fellows, and students only)

                                                                                           

 

About the Event: In Nigeria today, frequent conflicts, disappearances and mass violence, especially in the Northern region of the country, have amounted to large-scale destruction of human life and the displacement of large populations as unarmed civilians are caught in the crossfire. The effects of climate change on the Lake Chad basin are key triggers of conflict as herders migrate to other parts of the region to find fodder and water for their cattle. Existing responses to conflict and mass violence in Nigeria have been beset by challenges. The migration patterns of nomadic communities have begun to signal security concerns beyond the immediately impacted regions. In late 2017, state governments within the western and southern parts of the country began to set up community policing strategies to address growing security challenges around their states, including those relating to the (perceived) threats associated with the movement of cattle herders. Complicating this situation, the presence of large groups of cattle has incentivized “conflict entrepreneurship” as armed groups of young men across north-central, north-west and southern parts of the country engage in cattle rustling. Government efforts at various levels, ranging from the creation of legal and policy frameworks to programs on-the-ground, have been inadequate to protect civilians and have led to the development new mechanisms for human protection.  For example, interventions by the Nigerian Federal Government have, at times, accelerated conflict, as with the passage of an anti-grazing law that has fueled controversy over implementation at state and local levels of government. Local civil society initiatives have continued to emerge to address the gap and attempt to mitigate ever growing security concerns in the region. One such strategy has involved the development of Early Warning and Early Response Systems (EWER) using geospatial technologies and other forms of crowd sourcing imagery to enhance local resilience in the face of security threats and strengthen the ability of communities to protect themselves in a sustainable way. However, the potential of such technologies depends on the ability to “see” particular phenomena and render other phenomena illegible. This paper will argue that such geospatial technology’s interpretive power is concerned with assigning to future violence an interpretive code based on its baseline values.  As an act of decoding that is anticipatory, the power of EWER processes lies in its decoding potential. These interpretive code processes provide participants with the potential to engage in analyses that involve mapping patterns and potential risk that have the ability to produce indicators that have material effects. It is these material effects, drawn from visual codes, that are used to justify action that is life preserving as well as render other relations illegible and therefore invisible to intervention.  This paper explores the emergence of EWER strategies used to address widespread violence and the challenge of illegibility that is central to it.

 

About the Speaker: M. Kamari Clarke is the Distinguished Professor of Transnational Justice and Sociolegal Studies at the University of Toronto where she teaches in the Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies and the Centre for Diaspora and Transnational Studies. Over her career she has worked at The University of California Los Angeles (2018-2021), Carleton University (2015-2018), The University of Pennsylvania (2013-2015) Yale University (1999-2013), and at Yale she was the former chair of the Council on African Studies from 2007- 2010 and the co-founder of the Yale Center for Transnational Cultural Analysis.  For more than twenty years, Professor Clarke has conducted research on issues related to legal institutions, human rights and international law, religious nationalism and the politics of globalization. For more than 20 years, Professor Clarke has conducted research on issues related to legal institutions, international legal domains, religious nationalism, and the politics of globalization and race. She  is the author of nine books and over fifty peer reviewed articles and book chapters, including her 2009 publication of Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and Affective Justice (with Duke University Press, 2019), which won the finalist prize for the American Anthropological Association’s 2020 Elliot P. Skinner Book Award for the Association for Africanist Anthropology.  Clarke has also been the recipient of other research and teaching awards, including Carleton University’s 2018 Research Excellence Award.  During her academic career she has held numerous prestigious fellowships, grants and awards, including multiple grant awards from the National Science Foundation and from The Social Sciences and the Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC), the Rockefeller Foundation, the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research and, very recently, the 2021 Guggenhiem Award for Career Excellence.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Kamari Clarke University of Toronto / UCLA
Seminars
Research Seminar Series

Russia, Ukraine and NATO: The View from Berlin

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For winter quarter 2021, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

YouTube  

                                                                                           

 

About the Event: The year 2022 has begun with Russian military forces massed near Ukraine's borders while Moscow makes demands for security guarantees from NATO and the United States.  Managing the steps to deter a Kremlin decision to attack Ukraine and the accompanying diplomacy pose an early foreign policy challenge for the new German government, which just took office in December.  Amb Rolf Nikel, Vice President of the German Council on Foreign Relations and a long-time German diplomat, will discuss how the crisis is viewed from Berlin and what steps the West should be taking in response.

 

About the Speaker: Amb Rolf Nikel is Vice President of the German Council on Foreign Relations.  In 2021, he also was Chairman of the German Expert Commission on the Place of Remembrance and Encounter with Poland, a memorial that will commemorate the suffering of the Polish people during World War II.  Previously, Amb Nikel served forty years in the German diplomatic service, including assignments as Ambassador to Poland (2014-20), Federal Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament (2011-14), Deputy Foreign and Security Policy Advisor to Chancellor Angela Merkel (2005-11) and head of the Political Department of the Embassy in Washington, DC (2002-05).  He also served at the German embassies in Paris, Nairobi and Moscow. 

Virtual Only.

Rolf Nikel
Seminars
European Security Initiative

The Russian Military Threat to Ukraine: How Serious?

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For winter quarter 2021, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

YouTube

 

 

                                                                                           

 

About the Event: The Russian military has deployed and sustained major forces on or near Ukraine’s border, raising significant concerns in Washington and other NATO capitals that the Kremlin may be planning a new assault on its western neighbor.  Meanwhile, Moscow has demanded security guarantees for Russia and indicated that it otherwise will take unspecified “military-technical” measures.  Michael Kofman, Research Program Director in the Russia Studies Program at CNA, will discuss the Russian build-up, the military options it gives the Kremlin, and how a Russia-Ukraine conflict might play out.

 

About the Speaker: Michael Kofman serves as Research Program Director in the Russia Studies Program at CNA and as a Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, DC.  His research focuses on the Russia and the former Soviet Union, specializing in Russian armed forces, military thought, capabilities, and strategy. Previously, he served as a Program Manager and subject matter expert at National Defense University, advising senior military and government officials on issues in Russia and Eurasia.  Mr. Kofman is also a Senior Editor at War on the Rocks, where he regularly authors articles on strategy, the Russian military, Russian decision-making, and related foreign policy issues.  He runs a personal blog on the Russian armed forces at https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/.

Mr. Kofman has published numerous articles on the Russian armed forces, security issues in Russia/Eurasia, and analyses for the US government.  He holds an MA in International Security from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

This event is virtual only. This event will not be held in person.

Michael Kofman
Seminars
European Security Initiative

Moscow’s Proposed Security Agreements: A Genuine Opening for Bargaining?

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For winter quarter 2021, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

YouTube  

                                                                                           

 

About the Event: As large Russian military formations threaten Ukraine, the Kremlin demanded security guarantees and publicized draft U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agreements encapsulating its desired provisions.  With discussions with Russian officials set for mid-January, are these draft agreements intended for rejection in order to provide another pretext for Russian military action against Ukraine, or do they represent an opening bid in a negotiation that might ultimately address Western, Russian and Ukrainian security concerns?  Jim Goldgeier, Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and Rose Gottemoeller, Steven C. Házy Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, will discuss the Russian draft agreements, whether they offer a basis for serious negotiation, and how the United States and NATO should respond. 

 

About the Speaker: James Goldgeier is a Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a Professor of International Relations at the School of International Service at American University, where he served as Dean from 2011-17.  Previously, he was a professor at Cornell University and George Washington University.  He has held appointments or fellowships at the Library of Congress, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Transatlantic Academy at the German Marshall Fund, the Hoover Institution, and at the State Department and on the National Security Council Staff.  He is a senior adviser for the Bridging the Gap initiative and is co-editor of the Bridging the Gap book series at Oxford University Press.  He has authored or co-authored four books, and he currently serves as the chair of the State Department Historical Advisory Committee.

Rose Gottemoeller is the Steven C. Házy Lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and its Center for International Security and Cooperation. Before joining Stanford Gottemoeller was the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019, where she helped to drive forward NATO’s adaptation to new security challenges in Europe and in the fight against terrorism.  Prior to NATO, she served for nearly five years as the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, advising the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation and political-military affairs. While Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in 2009 and 2010, she was the chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation.

This event is virtual only. This event will not be held in person.

Rose Gottemoeller
James Goldgeier
Seminars
European Security Initiative
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