Stanford University

10 years after Obama’s nuclear-free vision, the US and Russia head in the opposite direction

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Steven Pifer
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This article originally appeared at Brookings.

April 5 marks the 10th anniversary of the speech in which Barack Obama laid out his vision for a world without nuclear weapons. It did not gain traction. Instead, the United States and Russia are developing new nuclear capabilities, while the nuclear arms control regime is on course to expire in 2021. The result will be a world that is less stable, less secure, and less predictable.

A WORTHWHILE VISION

Just 10 weeks after his inauguration, President Obama’s first trip to Europe took him to Prague. Speaking in Hradcany Square, Obama voiced his deep interest in reducing nuclear arms, including a “commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” He added that reaching that goal would require time, and that, as long as nuclear arms existed, the United States would maintain a “safe, secure and effective” nuclear arsenal.

Obama’s critics mocked him as naïve and idealistic. Achieving a world without nuclear arms would require, at a minimum, that nations conclude that they could protect their vital interests without nuclear arms; that new and very intrusive verification mechanisms were developed and agreed; and that an enforcement mechanism against any cheating state have real teeth—daunting challenges, to be sure. That said, a world in which nuclear arms were reliably and verifiably eliminated would be very much in the U.S. interest.

Nuclear war today poses the one existential threat to the United States. In a non-nuclear world, America would enjoy the advantages of geography (the protection afforded by two wide oceans and friendly neighbors in Canada and Mexico), the world’s most powerful conventional forces, and an unrivaled network of allies. Deterrence would not end; U.S. conventional forces could threaten enormous costs to any would-be adversary menacing America or its allies.

A big problem arises, however, in trying to persuade other states to accept a non-nuclear world. The balance of advantages and disadvantages that would make such a world so attractive for the United States would seem very different to other countries, such as Russia.

EVENTS TOOK A DIFFERENT COURSE

In any event, matters took a different course than Obama had hoped. Following signature of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in April 2010, he called for negotiations with Russia to further reduce strategic nuclear weapons and bring in non-strategic nuclear weapons. That raised the possibility that, for the first time ever, the two countries might negotiate limits on their entire nuclear arsenals.

Moscow chose not to engage in further bilateral negotiations—in part because Washington proved unready to discuss limits on missile defense or conventional strike systems. The Russians also sought a multilateral negotiation, though they have never offered a proposal or explained how one treaty could limit forces as disparate as those of the United States and Russia (4000 to 4500 nuclear weapons each) and China and France (less than 300 each). A Washington Naval Treaty-type agreement assigning unequal limits to its adherents presumably would be unwelcome in Beijing, Paris, and other capitals. 

Today, Russia and the United States have launched major nuclear force modernization programs. These programs focus largely on replacing old systems. Weapons systems age out and need replacement. Both sides, however, also plan to add new capabilities, including exotic strategic weapons and low-yield nuclear arms. One likely and unfortunate result: The threshold for employment of nuclear weapons will be lower.

While U.S. and Russian nuclear modernization proceeds, the regime that limits U.S. and Russian nuclear arms has begun to break down. Russia violated the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by deploying a prohibited cruise missile. Neither the Obama nor the Trump administration came up with an effective strategy to bring Moscow back into compliance, and it appears that President Trump barely tried, perhaps reflecting the influence of National Security Advisor John Bolton, who has long expressed skepticism about any agreements that constrain U.S. military forces. The INF Treaty will expire this August when the United States withdraws.

The end of the INF Treaty will leave New START, which caps the sides’ strategic missiles and bombers as well as their deployed strategic warheads, as the sole remaining nuclear arms control agreement. Unlike the INF Treaty, both sides have complied with New START’s limits, but it has less than two years to run before it expires.

New START’s terms allow for an extension of up to five years. Moscow historically has wanted some bounds on U.S. strategic forces. The Russians broached the idea of extension in early 2017 and have raised it several times since then. Extension should be a no-brainer for Washington: It would cap Russian strategic forces until 2026 while forcing no change in U.S. modernization plans, since the Pentagon designed those plans to fit within New START. Extension would also continue the flow of information that the United States receives about Russian strategic forces from New START’s verification measures. Unfortunately, Trump’s grasp of these questions appears weak, and Bolton does not appear a fan of New START.

AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

The two nuclear superpowers thus will likely find themselves in 2021 in a situation that they have not faced for decades—a world with no constraints on nuclear force numbers. For the United States, that world will prove less stable and less secure as new nuclear capabilities undermine the strategic balance and threaten America. It will prove less predictable, as the data exchanges, notifications, and on-site inspections provided by New START cease. And it will almost certainly prove more costly, as the Pentagon has to make worst-case assumptions.

True, achieving Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons now seems unrealistic. But we could use some presidential commitment to controlling those weapons.

 

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Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War

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Militaries around the world are racing to build robotic systems with increasing autonomy. What will happen when a Predator drone has as much autonomy as a Google car? Should machines be given the power to make life and death decisions in war? Paul Scharre, a former Army Ranger and Pentagon official, will talk on his new book, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War. Army of None was named one of Bill Gates’ Top 5 Books of 2018. Scharre will explore the technology behind autonomous weapons and the legal, moral, ethical, and strategic dimensions of this evolving technology. Paul Scharre is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.   

 

Drell Lecture Recording: https://youtu.be/ldvDjU1C4Qs

 

Drell Lecture Transcript: NA

 

Paul's Biography: Paul Scharre is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. He is author of Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War. Mr. Scharre formerly worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) where he played a leading role in establishing policies on emerging weapons technologies. He led the working group that drafted DOD Directive 3000.09, establishing DOD’s policy on autonomy in weapon systems. He is a former infantryman in the Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment and completed multiple tours to Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

Radha's Biography: Radha Iyengar is the head of Product Policy Research at Facebook and an adjunct economist at the RAND Corporation. Previously, she served in senior staff positions at the White House National Security Council, Department of Defense, and Department of Energy. Over the course of her government service, she was instrumental in executive actions on sexual assault and suicide prevention, budget and policy related to nuclear and energy infrastructure security and resilience, and security assistance and counterterrorism efforts in the the Middle East and North Africa. Her research has covered empirical evaluations of policies aimed at reducing violence including criminal violence, sexual assault, terrorist behavior, and sexual and intimate partner violence. 

 

Jeremy's Biography: Jeremy is a Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is also a non-resident fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, D.C. His research focuses on civil wars and political violence; ethnic politics and the political economy of development; and democracy, accountability, and political change. He is the author of Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge University Press), which received the William Riker Prize for the best book on political economy. He is also the co-author of Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action (Russell Sage Foundation), which received the Gregory Luebbert Award for the best book in comparative politics. He has published articles in the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Annual Review of Political Science, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Journal of Democracy, World Policy Journal, and the SAIS Review.

 

 

 

 

 

Stanford University CEMEX Auditorium (655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305)

Paul Scharre Senior Fellow and Director, Technology and National Security Program Center for a New American Security
Lectures
Drell Lecture

Putin's World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest

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Abstract: 
Why were Western expectations about how Russia would develop after the Soviet collapse so misplaced? How has Putin's Russia, with a GDP less than that of Italy, managed to reassert itself so effectively on the world stage? And how should the West respond to Russia going forward? Angela Stent will discuss her new book, focusing on how Russia's relations with Europe have evolved and how Europe-- caught between Putin's Russia and Trump's America--is reassessing its options.
 
Speaker's Biography:

Angela Stent is Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University and directs its Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies. She has also served in the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning and as National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council. She is the author of Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse and the New Europe; The Limits of Partnership: U.S-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century and Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest.

 

Angela Stent Professor of Government and Foreign Service Georgetown University
Seminars
European Security Initiative

Revisiting the “Broken Promise” Controversy: The 1989-90 Origin of Post-Cold War NATO Expansion, Thirty Years On

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Click here to RSVP

 

Abstract:  As Russian President Vladimir Putin pursues a more assertive policy toward the West, one of his primary grievances is that NATO enlarged despite 1990 assurances to the contrary.  At the end of the Cold War, did Washington in fact promise Moscow that it would refrain from expanding NATO eastward?  Russia says yes; the US says no; what does the evidence say?  Professor Sarotte, a historian, has conducted archival research and interviews on this topic in the US, Russia, Germany, Britain, and France. In this lecture, she will draw on both her previous publications and on newer declassifications to re-examine this controversy and its legacy for NATO expansion – even as President Donald Trump raises the possibility of a NATO contraction through US withdrawal.

 

Speaker's Biography:  Mary Elise Sarotte is the Marie-Josée and Henry R. Kravis Distinguished Professor of Historical Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington DC.  Her five books include The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall and 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe, both of which were named Financial Times Books of the Year, along with receiving other awards and commendations.  Sarotte earned her AB in History and Science at Harvard University and her PhD in History at Yale University.  After graduate school, she served as a White House Fellow and subsequently joined the faculty of the University of Cambridge.  Sarotte received tenure at Cambridge in 2004 and returned to the United States to teach at University of Southern California as the Dean's Professor of History before moving to Hopkins.  Sarotte is a former Humboldt Scholar, a former member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, a research associate of Harvard's Center for European Studies, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.  She is currently writing a book on NATO expansion; it is based (among other sources) on formerly secret Defense Department, State Department, and White House documents which she has declassified though Freedom of Information appeals.

Mary Sarotte Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Seminars
European Security Initiative

Collaboration networks in Conference Diplomacy: The Case of Non-Proliferation Regime

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Abstract: Multilateral conferences are the bread-and-butter of international politics. In such settings, countries may pursue their interests individually, but most of the time they prefer to act through coalitions. Such coalitions are overlapping, creating a network structure. States build and utilize networks to get agenda items pushed through or to block unfavorable ones. While sometimes they are formed on the basis of formal institutions (such as the NAM or the EU), frequently their membership is based on either ad hoc cooperation, or existing informal bodies (such as the NSG, New Agenda Coalition, or Zangger Committee). The attention to such networks is, however, still in its infancy. This paper looks at how state networks within one of the most important recurring diplomatic conferences – the quinquennial NPT Review Conference – develop and transform over time. By doing so, the paper maps the existing networks, and explains their transformation as an instrument of global governance.

 

Speaker Bio: Michal Onderco is a Junior Faculty Fellow at CISAC (2018-2019), and his research focuses on politics of multilateral nuclear diplomacy. His current project tries to understand how states build coalitions in multilateral diplomacy, and why are some coalitions more successful than others.

Michal is currently on leave from Erasmus University Rotterdam, where he is Assistant Professor of International Relations. Previously, he was a Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute, Fulbright Visiting Researcher at Columbia University in New York, and a short-term Stanton Fellow at Fundação Getúlio Vargas in São Paulo. He received his LLM in Law and Politics of International Security and PhD in Political Science from Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. His earlier work was published in International Studies Quarterly, European Journal of Political Research, Cooperation & Conflict, The Nonproliferation Review, and European Political Science Review.

Michal Onderco MacArthur Junior Faculty Fellow CISAC, Stanford University
Research Seminar Series

Extending New START is a no-brainer—And yet, we can’t count on it

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Steven Pifer
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This piece originally appeared at Brookings.

 

 

The Trump administration has finished off the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a treaty mortally wounded by Russia’s deployment of a banned intermediate-range missile. That leaves the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) as the sole agreement limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

New START has less than two years to run. At the February 15-16 Munich Security Conference, a senior Russian official reiterated Moscow’s readiness to extend the treaty. The administration, however, continues its odd reluctance to take up that offer. House Democrats should use their power of the purse on the issue.

WHY EXTENSION MAKES SENSE

Signed in 2010, New START limits the United States and Russia each to no more than 700 strategic ballistic missiles and bombers, and no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. Those limits took full effect in February 2018. Both sides have complied, although technical questions have arisen. Russian officials question the way in which the U.S. military converted some launchers so that they would not count.

By its terms, New START runs until February 5, 2021. It can be extended for up to five years by simple agreement between the U.S. and Russian presidents.

When asked about extension in 2017, administration officials said they would wait to complete the nuclear posture review and to see if the Russians met the New START limits. Both of those boxes were checked more than a year ago. Administration officials now say they are studying extension but see no need to rush.

New START extension is in the U.S. interest.

First, extension would constrain Russian strategic nuclear forces until 2026. It makes little sense to let the treaty lapse in 2021, when Russia has hot production lines churning out new missiles, submarines, and bombers.

Second, New START extension would not impact U.S. strategic modernization plans. They are sized to fit within New START’s limits. Moreover, the United States will not start producing significant numbers of replacement missiles, submarines, and bombers until the second half of the 2020s.

Third, extension would continue the flow of information that the sides share with each other about their strategic forces. That comes from data exchanges, notifications, on-site inspections and other verification measures, all of which end if New START lapses. Making up for that loss of information would require a costly investment in new national technical means such as reconnaissance satellites.

WHY WE SHOULD WORRY

Extension should be a no-brainer. However, in a White House that operates on its own facts and at times with an indecipherable logic, extension is not a given.

President Trump does not seem to understand much about nuclear arms control. During his first telephone conversation with President Putin, Trump reportedly dismissed New START as a bad deal done by his predecessor. He has taken delight in undoing the accomplishments of President Obama (witness the Iran nuclear accord).

National Security Advisor Bolton shows disdain for arms control and has criticized New START. One of its faults, according to Mr. Bolton: It provides for equal limits on the United States and Russia. He felt the treaty should allow the U.S. military to have more. (U.S. diplomats would have had an interesting time trying to negotiate that.) Asked about New START extension, Mr. Bolton notes two alternatives: renegotiation and a new treaty modeled on the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).

Renegotiation would allow U.S. officials to try to improve New START, perhaps with more intrusive verification measures, or even broadening the agreement to cover non-strategic nuclear weapons. Moscow, however, would seek changes as well, such as constraints on missile defenses—anathema to Washington.

Renegotiation would prove difficult, take considerable time, and have at best uncertain prospects for success. A wiser course would extend New START and then seek a renegotiation or a new follow-on treaty.

As for SORT, negotiated by Mr. Bolton, it limited deployed warheads only. Mr. Putin accepted that in 2002, but Russian officials have long since made clear that limits should apply to warheads and delivery vehicles, as they do in New START.

SORT, moreover, was “sort of” arms control. Lacking agreed definitions, counting rules or monitoring measures, it was unverifiable. In doing their own counts on the honor system, the U.S. and Russian militaries may not have even counted the same things.

Neither Secretary of State Pompeo nor Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan has shown interest in championing New START. The uniformed military leadership argued the treaty’s value in the past, but Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Joseph Dunford recently has hedged.

While ratification of a treaty requires consent from two-thirds of the Senate, the president alone can decide to leave a treaty. The Trump administration did not consult with either Congress or allies on withdrawal before Trump announced his intention to pull out of the treaty last October.

HOUSE DEMOCRATS TO THE RESCUE?

While the Trump administration shows little interest in arms control, it does want funding to modernize U.S. strategic forces. Democrats should recognize that and force the White House’s hand.

The U.S. strategic triad is aging. Ballistic missile submarines are the leg of the triad most in need of urgent replacement. They should be funded. Replacing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or building the B-21 bomber, however, are less urgent needs. As they work on the appropriations for the 2020 defense budget, House Democrats should make clear to the White House and the Pentagon that money for ICBM modernization or the B-21 would need to be paired with extension of New START. That will get attention.

Retaining a strategic triad makes sense (though the need for 400 deployed ICBMs is debatable). Retaining New START makes sense as well. House Democrats should simply insist on a trade.

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Russian Hybrid War, Ukraine, and US policy

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Abstract: This talk will discuss the evolution of Russian hybrid war and how the Russians executed it to perfection to seize Crimea. At the same time, it is important to understand some of the peculiarities of Ukraine to understand why the Russians are unlikely to have the same success elsewhere. The talk will describe internal balancing options that bordering nations can take to deter Russian aggression. Finally, the talk will also discuss the fits and formulation of U.S. policymaking with regards to Ukraine.

 

Speaker Bio: COL Liam Collins is the Director of the Modern War Institute and the Director of the Department Instruction at the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point. From 2016-2018, he also served Gen (ret.) Abizaid’s executive officer for his Secretary of Defense appointment as the Senior Defense Advisor to Ukraine, planning and executing meetings with senior Ukrainian and international officials to help reform Ukraine's defense establishment, and meetings with DoS, DoD, NSC, and HASC officials to inform and shape U.S. policy.

Previously, he served as the director of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point where he authored “The Abbottabad Documents: Bin Ladin’s Security Measures” and co-authored Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?  both of which studied documents captured during the Abbottabad raid and released to the CTC. His work has been cited by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, the White House Press Secretary, The New York Times, the Associated Press, CNN, ABC News, Fox News, NPR, The Wall Street Journal and USA Today.

COL Collins is a career Special Forces officer, who has served in a variety of special operations assignments. He has conducted multiple operational deployments including Operational Nobile Anvil (Kosovo ’99), Operation Joint Forge (Bosnia ’00, ’02), Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan ’01,’02,’11), Operation Iraqi Freedom (’03,’04) as well as operational deployments to South America and the Horn of Africa.

He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering (Aerospace) from the United States Military Academy (1992), and a Master in Public Affairs and a PhD from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.  He is also a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, the Special Forces Qualification Course, the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, and the Engineer Officer Basic Course.

COL Collins’ military awards and decorations include: Bronze Star Medal (with “V” device for valor and two oak leaf clusters), Defense Meritorious Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster), Meritorious Service Medal (with two oak leaf clusters), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal (with “V” device for valor and three oak leaf clusters), Army Achievement Medal (with four oak leaf clusters), Combat Infantryman’s Badge, Special Forces Tab, Ranger Tab, Sapper Tab, Military Free Fall Badge with Bronze Star (for combat jump), Master Parachutist Badge, and Air Assault Badge. He won the Army’s Best Ranger Competition in 2007 and was selected as the Army’s Coach of the Year in 2011.

 

Liam Collins Director of the Modern War Institute and the Director of the Department Instruction at the United States Military Academy (USMA) West Point
Seminars
European Security Initiative

The blame game begins over the INF Treaty’s demise, and Washington is losing

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Steven Pifer
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This piece originally appeared at Brookings.

 

In December, Secretary of State Pompeo said Russia had 60 days to come back into compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Otherwise, the United States would suspend its treaty obligations.

The clock runs out on February 2. Unfortunately, U.S. and Russian officials, already anticipating the treaty’s demise, have turned to finger-pointing…and Washington is losing the blame game.

CHARGES OF TREATY VIOLATIONS

In 2014, the United States charged Russia with violating the INF Treaty by testing a ground-launched cruise missile to intermediate range (500-5,500 kilometers). In 2017, Washington said Russia had begun to deploy the offending missile, later identified by the Russian designator 9M729.

U.S. officials for several years provided little public information to substantiate their charge. However, one could still believe that Russia had violated the treaty—or at least that the U.S. government believed that Russia had violated the treaty. When the Obama administration declared Russia in violation in 2014, it handed its Republican critics a large chunk of red meat, and they only too happily mocked President Obama as naïve in his desire to reduce nuclear arms. Had there been any ambiguity in the U.S. evidence, the Obama administration surely would not have exposed itself to that.

Moscow nonetheless has denied violating the treaty and charges Washington with three violations. Two charges don’t bear scrutiny, and Russian officials themselves seem to recite them merely for form’s sake, but the charge regarding the Mk-41 launcher for missile interceptors at the Aegis Ashore facility in Romania has some basis. Mk-41 launchers on U.S. warships can hold a variety of missiles, including cruise missiles.

The U.S. military does not have cruise missiles secreted in Romania, but the Russian concern is understandable. Were the positions reversed, Washington might well raise the point.

U.S. and Russian officials met in Geneva on January 15 to discuss the INF Treaty and compliance issues. The Russians reportedly offered some kind of exhibition of the 9M729 missile, but U.S. officials said it did not satisfy their concerns. It does not appear the American side tried to improve the terms of the Russian offer but instead sought total surrender by the Russian side, which was not going to happen.

Afterwards, American officials told the press that the Russian ideas did not break new ground. Russian officials called the U.S. approach “uncompromising.”

WHO KILLED THE TREATY?

The blame game is now on. Perhaps due to the partial government shutdown in Washington, Moscow is winning.

Russian officials have actively made their case since President Trump in October said the United States would leave the treaty. On January 23, the Russians held a briefing outside of Moscow for journalists and foreign military attachés to rehash their charges of U.S. treaty violations and explain their claim that the 9M729 was treaty-compliant. The briefing compared the dimensions of the 9M729 to the 9M728, a somewhat shorter missile with a range of less than 500 kilometers (thus treaty-compliant), and claimed the former had the same engine and fuel capacity but a larger warhead and thus a shorter range. The briefing revealed some previously undisclosed details about the 9M729, which may or may not be true.

Russian military officers then exhibited the 9M729 and 9M728 missiles. Well, no. They exhibited canisters labeled 9M729 and 9M728. Whether the canisters actually contained missiles is anyone’s guess.

The problem for Washington, however, is that the Russian narrative includes far more detail and specifics than the U.S. presentation. American officials handicapped themselves for years by refusing to reveal the basis for their charge about the 9M729, citing the need to protect sources and methods. Losing the public relations battle could have diplomatic consequences as Washington seeks to rally allies to its case.

It was only in December that Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats explained that the Russian military had tested the 9M729 from a fixed launcher to a range greater than 500 kilometers (that would be okay, if the missile were a sea-launched cruise missile). The Russians then tested the 9M729 from a mobile ground launcher to a range of less than 500 kilometers, apparently hoping the U.S. intelligence community would not make the connection between the two.

Coats’s briefing helped, but Washington continues to play catch up in the blame game. Since it is the United States that has said it will cease observing the treaty’s terms, it needs to do better to fix responsibility for the treaty’s end on Moscow.

SAVE THE TREATY?

In this regard, rejecting the Russian January 15 offer of an exhibition was a mistake. U.S. officials instead should have pocketed the proposal and defined terms for a meaningful exhibition and technical briefing. That would have meant looking not at canisters but at the missile and inside the missile to see things such as the engine and fuel tank. Procedures would have been needed to ensure a real 9M729 was exhibited. This would have taken negotiation, but smart technical experts might have worked out something.

In order to get the Russians to go that far, Washington would have had to be prepared to address Russian concerns about the Mk-41 launcher—perhaps an exhibition and technical briefing? The U.S. side was not ready for that.

That’s unfortunate. Taking up the Russian offer and then pressing to make the exhibit meaningful, combined with a readiness to exhibit the Mk-41, would have positioned Washington to show that it was making every effort to find a solution and that Russia, not the United States, bears responsibility for the end of the INF Treaty. And who knows? It would have created a small chance of finding a way to resolve the sides’ compliance concerns and save the treaty.

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Reliability of Nuclear Reactor Materials and Its Importance to International Security

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Abstract: Materials used in key components of nuclear power reactors, such as the fuel cladding and the pressure vessel, provide shields for the release of highly radioactive isotopes generated in the nuclear fuel to the environment, thus their reliability is an important issue in the safety evaluation.  The accident that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi in 2011 demonstrated that materials that are considered reliable during normal operating conditions will fail in an extreme accident condition. Subsequently, there has been an international effort on developing materials for Accident Tolerant Fuels (ATF). In addition, the development of new generation of nuclear reactors also calls for new materials that may withstand higher temperatures, higher radiation doses and with better performance under severe corrosive conditions.  This talk will outline the challenges and status for such developments using recent data from the authors’ own research group as examples.  Also, since China is building the most nuclear reactors now and “a nuclear accident anywhere of the world will be an accident of everywhere of the world”, the importance and challenges of collaborating with the Chinese in this area will be discussed. 

Bio: Dr. Lumin Wang is a professor of nuclear engineering, and materials science & engineering at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor (UM). He came to the US from China in 1982, and received his MS and PhD degrees in Material Science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1984 and 1988, respectively. He worked as a post-doctoral fellow at Argonne National Laboratory and a research scientist at the University of New Mexico before joining the faculty of UM in 1997.  His research has focused on the study of radiation effects of materials using ion beams and transmission electron microscopy. He served as the director of Electron Microbeam Analysis Laboratory, a campus-wide material characterization center at UM between 2005 and 2010. Dr. Wang has published more than 400 papers in research journals and delivered more than 100 invited talks internationally. He has been a member of the International Committee of the American Nuclear Society and an adjunct chair professor of Xiamen University of China since 2011. He has taken more than 100 UM students to China to observe the construction of nuclear reactors during the last 8 summers.

 

Professor
Lumin Wang Professor, College of Engineering University of Michigan
Research Seminar Series

Ukraine, nuclear weapons and the trilateral statement 25 years later

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Today, January 14, marks the 25th anniversary of the Trilateral Statement.  Signed in Moscow by President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, the statement set out the terms under which Ukraine agreed to eliminate the large arsenal of former Soviet strategic nuclear weapons that remained on its territory following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Among other things, the Trilateral Statement specified the security assurances that the United States, Russia and Britain would provide to Ukraine eleven months later in the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.  Unfortunately, Russia grossly violated those assurances in 2014 when it used military force against Ukraine.

Soon after regaining independence, Ukraine’s leadership indicated its intention to be a non-nuclear weapons state.  Indeed, the July 16, 1990 declaration of state sovereignty adopted by the Rada (parliament) adopted that goal.  Kyiv had questions, however, about the terms of the elimination of the strategic weapons.

First, eliminating the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), bombers, ICBM silos and nuclear infrastructure would cost money.  Ukraine’s economic future in the early 1990s was uncertain (the economy ended up declining for most of the decade).  Who would pay for the expensive elimination process?

Second, the strategic nuclear warheads had economic value as they contained highly enriched uranium.  That could be blended down into low enriched uranium to fabricate fuel rods to power nuclear reactors.  If Ukraine shipped warheads to Russia for dismantlement, how would it be compensated for the value of the highly enriched uranium they contained?

Third, nuclear weapons were seen to confer security benefits.  What security guarantees or assurances would Kyiv receive as it gave up the nuclear arms on its territory?

These questions were reasonable, and Kyiv deserved good answers.  In 1992 and the first half of 1993, Ukrainian and Russian officials met in bilateral channels to discuss them, along with other issues such as a schedule for moving warheads to Russia.  In parallel, U.S. officials discussed similar issues with their Ukrainian and Russian counterparts.

However, in September 1993, a Ukrainian-Russian agreement dealing with the nuclear issues fell apart.  Washington decided to become more directly involved out of fear that a resolution might otherwise not prove possible, giving birth to the “trilateral process.”  Discussions over the course of the autumn led U.S. negotiators in mid-December to believe that the pieces of a solution were ready.

In a negotiation in Washington in early January 1994, U.S. Ambassador-at-large Strobe Talbott, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov and Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov and their teams finalized answers to Kyiv’s three questions, and wrote them into what became the Trilateral Statement and an accompanying annex.

The United States agreed to provide Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction funds to finance the elimination of the strategic delivery systems and infrastructure in Ukraine.  Specifically, $175 million would be made available as a start.

The three sides agreed that Russia would compensate Ukraine for the value of the highly enriched uranium in the nuclear warheads transferred to Russia for elimination by providing Ukraine fuel rods containing an equivalent amount of low enriched uranium for its nuclear reactors.  In the first ten months, Ukraine would transfer at least 200 warheads, and Russia would provide fuel rods containing 100 tons of low enriched uranium.

The sides laid out in the Trilateral Statement the specific language of the security assurances that Ukraine would receive once it had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state.  Although Kyiv had sought security guarantees, Washington was not prepared to extend what would have been a military commitment similar to what NATO allies have; the assurances were the best that was on offer.

Two issues—the date for transfer of the last nuclear warheads out of Ukraine and compensation for the highly enriched uranium that had been in tactical nuclear warheads removed from Ukraine to Russia by May 1992—nearly derailed the Trilateral Statement.  The sides, however, agreed to address those in private letters.

Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin and Kravchuk met briefly in Moscow on January 14, 1994 and signed the Trilateral Statement.  That set in motion the transfer of nuclear warheads to Russia, accompanied by parallel shipments of fuel rods to Ukraine.  The deactivation and dismantlement of missiles, bombers and missile silos in Ukraine began in earnest with Cooperative Threat Reduction funding.

In December 1994, Ukraine acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and received security assurances from the United States, Russia and Britain in the Budapest Memorandum.  France and China subsequently provided Kyiv similar assurances.

Ukraine fully met its commitments under the Trilateral Statement.  The last nuclear warheads were transferred out of Ukraine in May 1996.

The other signatories met their commitments—with one glaring exception.  In 2014, Russia used military force to illegally seize Crimea, in violation of its Budapest Memorandum commitments “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine,” and “to refrain from the threat or use of force” against Ukraine.  Russian security and military forces then instigated a conflict in the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, a conflict that has claimed more than 10,000 lives and continues to simmer.

At the time, the Trilateral Statement was seen as a major achievement in Washington, as it eliminated hundreds of ICBMs and bombers and nearly 2,000 strategic nuclear warheads that had been designed and built to strike the United States.  Not surprisingly, in light of Russia’s aggression, many in Ukraine now question the value of the Trilateral Statement and Budapest Memorandum.  They argue that, had Ukraine held on to at least some nuclear weapons, Russia would never have dared move on Crimea and Donbas.

That argument is understandable and perhaps correct (although alternative histories are not always easy to envisage).  However, had Ukraine tried to keep nuclear weapons, it would have faced political and economic costs, including:

·      Kyiv would have had limited relations, at best, with the United States and European countries (witness the virtual pariah status that a nuclear North Korea suffers).  In particular, there would have been no strategic relationship with the United States.

·      NATO would not have concluded a distinctive partnership relationship with Ukraine, and the European Union would not have signed a partnership and cooperation agreement, to say nothing of an association agreement.

·      Kyiv would have received little in the way of reform, technical or financial assistance from the United States and European Union.

·      Western executive directors would have blocked low interest credits to Ukraine from the IMF, World Bank and European Bank of Reconstruction and Development.

To be sure, one can debate the value of these benefits.  But those who now assert that Ukraine should have kept nuclear arms should recognize that keeping them would have come at a steep price.  Moreover, in any confrontation or crisis with Russia, Ukraine would have found itself alone.

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