As Russia’s military faltered and lost ground in its conventional war against Ukraine, concern grew in the West that Vladimir Putin might resort to nuclear weapons.  The Kremlin, however, has real reasons not to cross the nuclear threshold, and its hints of nuclear use have not brought Kyiv’s capitulation or an end to Western support for Ukraine any closer.  In recent weeks, Moscow has seemed to deescalate the nuclear rhetoric.

Russia’s military campaign in Donbas stalled over the summer, and Ukrainian counteroffensives in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions subsequently have liberated substantial tracts of territory.  As the Ukrainian army pressed forward, the Kremlin began to grow desperate, with Putin ordering mobilization of 300,000 men.  Many in the West began to fear that the Russian leader, facing an increasingly difficult situation, might play the nuclear card against Ukraine.

Putin set the stage for this early on. In February, just three days after the Russian army invaded Ukraine from the north, south and east, he ordered a “special combat readiness” for Russian nuclear forces.  In September, the situation deteriorated for Russia, and Putin set in motion his desired annexation of four Ukrainian oblasts (regions), none of which his military fully controlled.  His language, and that of other Russian officials, hinted at nuclear use.

Announcing the mobilization on September 21, Putin stated “In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity to our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us.  This is not a bluff.”  Many observers read “all weapons systems” as including nuclear arms.  Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev on September 27 said that it certainly “was not a bluff” and went on to “imagine” a Russian nuclear strike on Ukraine.

In a September 30 speech, Putin proclaimed Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts to be part of Russia and asserted “We will defend our land with all the forces and resources we have.”  In case anyone missed the point, he cited the U.S. nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 as having set a “precedent.”

Those remarks got attention.  On October 7, President Joe Biden commented in a private setting that he saw a direct threat of nuclear use for the first time since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.  Shortly thereafter, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley had conversations with their Russian counterparts.

The Kremlin may want Ukraine and the West to believe that Russia is prepared to escalate to the nuclear level, but it does not want a nuclear war.  Moscow has real reasons not to cross the nuclear threshold.

First, Ukraine does not mass its forces in a way that would create a tempting target for nuclear attack.  More importantly, a nuclear strike is unlikely to achieve the political objective of intimidating Kyiv into capitulation.  The Ukrainians understand all too well what Russian occupation means.  For them, this is an existential fight, and nothing suggests that the Russian threats have undercut their resolve.

Second, the same is true for the resolve of Ukraine’s Western supporters.  The flow of arms and other support for Ukraine continues, and Western officials have pushed back on the nuclear question.  Meeting on November 4, G7 foreign ministers stated “Russia’s irresponsible nuclear rhetoric is unacceptable.  Any use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with severe consequences.”  That echoed the message following Biden’s October 7 phone conversation with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz that consequences would be “extremely serious” and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s October 13 warning that Moscow not cross the “very important [nuclear] line.”  Russian officials—the senior military leadership, in particular—likely understand that, if they open the nuclear Pandora’s Box, no one can tell what would happen.

Third, Russian officials have to consider the reaction of other countries.  Putin’s close friend President Xi Jinping of China has been very clear in recent meetings.  Xi and Scholz on November 4 “rejected” the threat of nuclear weapons, and Xi and Biden on November 14 condemned Moscow’s nuclear threats.  The G20 leaders’ declaration issued on November 16 said “The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.”  Given his isolation from the West, Putin can hardly afford to alienate Xi or other countries in the Global South.  Few would like the precedent of Russia, a nuclear state, using nuclear arms against a smaller, non-nuclear neighbor after its conventional aggression had failed.

There are indications the Kremlin understands that it has overplayed its hand and in recent weeks has sought to tone down the nuclear rhetoric.

Speaking to the Valdai Discussion Club on October 27, Putin raised the question “that Russia might theoretically use nuclear weapons,” called “the current fuss” a “very primitive” attempt to turn countries against Moscow, and commented that “we have never said anything proactively about Russia potentially using nuclear weapons.”  While not exactly true, it was very different from the Russian leader’s September pronouncements.  A November 2 Russian Foreign Ministry statement said Russia is guided by the principle that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” reiterated commitment to the January 3, 2022 statement by the U.S., Russian, Chinese, British and French leaders on preventing a nuclear war, and noted that provocations with nuclear weapons could entail “catastrophic consequences.”

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reported that, in their November 16 meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had stated that nuclear use was “impossible and inadmissible.”  Representing Russia at the G20 summit, Lavrov agreed to the leaders’ declaration that included the language about the inadmissibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear arms.

Russian officials have backed away from the nuclear hints and threats of September and sought to tone down the rhetoric.  This does not mean they might not reemerge, but it does suggest that the Kremlin understands that the use of nuclear weapons would have significant consequences for Russia, and that its nuclear threats failed to achieve their desired political objectives while proving counterproductive for Russia’s image abroad.

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Ukraine is the victim of an unprovoked and unjustified war launched by Vladimir Putin’s Russia more than eight years ago. The latest stage in this war is the ongoing full-scale invasion that began on February 24, 2022. US President Joe Biden has said the United States will support Ukraine “for as long as it takes.”

Some question this commitment in view of other US priorities and argue that Russia, given history and geography, has a greater interest in Ukraine than does the United States. That latter point may be true, but it ignores the Ukrainians, who hold understandably strong views on the future of their country and have shown that they are prepared to fight tenaciously to defend their freedom. With Russia’s full-scale invasion now in its ninth month, it is vital to recognize that continued US support for Ukraine in this war is both the morally correct position and serves key national interests of the United States.

In 1994, Kyiv agreed to give up the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal, comprising some 1900 Soviet-era strategic nuclear warheads designed, built, and deployed to strike cities and other targets in the United States. Eliminating those weapons mattered a great deal to Washington. The Ukrainian government agreed to their elimination in large part because Russia, along with the United States and United Kingdom, committed in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence, and further committed not to use force or threaten to use force against Ukraine.

During the negotiations that preceded the signing of the Budapest Memorandum, Ukrainian officials asked what Washington would do if Russia were to violate its commitments. US officials said the United States would take an interest and support Ukraine.

Beginning with its seizure of Crimea in 2014 and continuing with this year’s invasion, Moscow has grossly violated the commitments it made in 1994. The morally correct response from the United States is to support Ukraine, as it has done with political measures and economic sanctions to punish Russia along with providing economic assistance, arms, and ammunition to Ukraine. Supporting Ukraine until its military drives Russian forces out of Ukrainian territory or, at a minimum, reaches a point where a negotiated settlement becomes possible on terms that Kyiv can accept, is not only morally the right thing to do. It is also very much in the US national interest.

First, the United States has had a vital national interest in a stable and secure Europe going back more than 70 years. This reflects the core security, political, and economic interests that provided the rationale for the formation of NATO in 1949. A Russian victory in the current war with Ukraine would have a major negative impact on stability and security in Europe. The countries of Europe, most of whom also support Ukraine, look to Washington for leadership. An insecure Europe would command more US resources, military power, and senior-level attention than would otherwise be the case.

Second, other countries are watching how Washington responds to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. China poses the largest strategic challenge facing the United States in the coming decades. If Putin succeeds in Ukraine, that could encourage President Xi Jinping to adopt a more hostile stance. Moreover, should Russia prevail, the resulting situation in Europe would mean that Washington has fewer resources, less military power, and less attention to devote to dealing with the China challenge.

Third, the United States has a strong interest in preserving international norms and a rules-based international order. A key norm in Europe, dating back to the UN Charter and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, is that large states should not use force to take territory from smaller states. That is precisely what Putin is attempting now. If international norms break down, other autocratic states will likewise be emboldened. A “dog-eat-dog” world without such norms will be a much more difficult place in which to pursue a range of US political, security, and economic interests.

Moreover, respect for basic human rights is an important part of international norms. Russia has waged a brutal military campaign, committing wide-scale war crimes and atrocities such as the destruction of Mariupol. Russian occupation of Ukrainian towns and cities has meant torture chambers, mass arrests, summary executions, filtration camps, and deportations, including of children separated from their parents and sent to Russia for adoption by Russian families. The United States has an interest in opposing such grave human rights abuses and in supporting Kyiv’s efforts to hold those responsible to account.

Fourth, it is not clear that Putin’s ambitions end with Ukraine. In a June conversation with young Russian entrepreneurs, the Russian leader asserted that he was not taking Ukrainian territory but “returning” historic Russian lands to Moscow’s control. The Russian Empire once included the Baltic states, Finland, and part of Poland. If Putin were to prevail in Ukraine, would he be tempted to seek the “return” of other “historic Russian lands?”

In the case of Ukraine, the United States is contributing money and weapons. If Putin’s ambitions were to extend to one or more of the Baltic states, which are members of NATO, the United States would have to contribute money, weapons, and the lives of American soldiers. The United States has a strong interest in stopping Putin’s ambitions in Ukraine.

Originally published on Atlantic Council's Ukraine Alert

Since Russia launched its most recent invasion of Ukraine in February, Moscow has threatened—sometimes subtly, other times explicitly—nuclear escalation should the war not go its way. Ukraine and the West have to take such threats seriously. But the Kremlin also needs to take their probable responses seriously and would have to weigh the substantial risks and costs of using a nuclear weapon.

Shortly after Russian forces assaulted Ukraine on Feb. 24, Vladimir Putin ordered a “special combat readiness” status for Russian nuclear forces. But it’s unclear what that means since the Pentagon has consistently said it sees no change in Russia’s nuclear posture. The alert may have amounted to little more than additional command post staffing.

Continue reading at time.com

Seven and a half months after it began, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine has not gone as the Kremlin had hoped. The Ukrainian military has resisted with skill and tenacity, in recent weeks clawing back territory in the country’s south and east. As the Russian invasion falters, concern has arisen that Putin might turn to nuclear weapons.

The nuclear threat needs to be taken seriously. Russia’s conventional forces appear stymied, the country has a large nuclear arsenal, and Putin thus far seems unwilling to lose or retreat. He has, if anything, doubled down, for example, ordering a mobilization and a sham annexation of Ukrainian territory. Moreover, Putin has made a string of miscalculations in launching and executing his war on Ukraine, and his comments have observers wondering if nuclear could be next. But there are reasons to believe Moscow would not press the nuclear button. Such use would not end the Ukrainian determination to resist. It would alienate countries such as China and India that have tried to remain on the sidelines of this war. Moreover, senior Russian political and military leaders understand that introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict would constitute a step into a murky and potentially disastrous unknown.

Continue reading at the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

Following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s bogus September 30 annexation of four partially-occupied Ukrainian regions, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy officially applied for fast-track NATO membership. The Ukrainian leader’s desire is understandable, but his timing is questionable. Zelenskyy should instead continue to press NATO members to provide Ukraine with the weapons it needs to defeat Russia’s invasion, while also seeking firm commitments to help Ukraine build a modern military capable of deterring a future Russian attack.

On September 23-27, Russia conducted sham referendums on joining Russia in the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts of Ukraine. These fake votes were illegal according to international law. No credible observers viewed the voting or counting process, while anecdotal reports indicated numerous instances of people forced to vote at gunpoint.

At a September 30 Kremlin ceremony, Putin signed agreements incorporating the four regions into Russia. He asserted that Russia would “defend our land with all the forces and resources we have.” However, Russia does not even control all of the territory it claims to be annexing. Meanwhile, the Russian leader’s declaration has not stopped the Ukrainian military from pressing forward with counteroffensives in the Kherson, Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Immediately following Putin’s signature of the incorporation agreements, Zelenskyy responded by stating that his country was seeking “accelerated accession” into NATO. This riposte again made clear that an earlier Ukrainian offer to accept neutrality was no longer on the table.

Zelenskyy’s rare misstep in appealing for fast-track NATO membership is understandable. His country has doggedly fought the Russians for nearly eight months. While Ukrainian forces have surprised the world, and especially the Russian General Staff, with their capabilities and tenacity, Ukraine has paid a heavy price in terms of military and civilian losses.

Ukrainians believe their fight has earned them the right to membership in the alliance. They see their forces defending not just Ukraine but also NATO members from a revanchist Kremlin that aims to overturn the post-Cold War order in Europe and whose ambitions extend beyond Ukraine.

However, it is often prudent in diplomacy to know the answer before asking the question, particularly before making a public ask. Kyiv cannot be happy with the responses to Zelenskyy’s September 30 appeal, but these responses should not have come as a surprise.

To be sure, on October 2, the leaders of nine Central and East European NATO members (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) issued a joint statement endorsing a membership path for Ukraine. Canada separately expressed support for Ukraine’s membership in the alliance.

That makes for only ten of NATO’s 30 members. The Bulgarian president declined to join the statement of his nine fellow regional leaders because he disagreed with the language on Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Others took a cautious approach. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg side-stepped the membership question, while US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said the membership process “should be taken up at a different time.” Many other NATO allies responded with silence.

Under NATO rules, approval for Ukrainian membership would require a consensus of all 30 members (32 once all current allies ratify the accessions of Finland and Sweden). The reality is that Ukraine does not currently have the votes it needs to get on a membership track.

The reason is clear. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty commits allies to treat an attack against one as an attack against all. If Ukraine, now under attack by Russia, became a member, other allies would be obligated to come to its defense, the assumption being with their own armed forces.

Many NATO countries are providing arms and other military assistance to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia. But they have drawn a red line against offering their forces for Ukraine’s defense and have made clear that they wish to avoid a direct NATO-Russia clash.

There is a logic to that. A Russian defeat against Ukraine would not be existential for Russia, although it certainly might not benefit Putin’s longevity in the Kremlin. However, were US and NATO military forces to enter the war on Ukraine’s behalf, that could well change how the conflict is viewed in Moscow, where many would regard US and NATO entry as aimed not just at defending Ukraine but at destroying Russia. They could then see the war as existential. Things could soon become unpredictable and very dicey.

Rather than seeking a NATO membership track that Kyiv cannot currently get, Zelenskyy should continue to focus on securing immediate help in the form of more arms and military assistance. This will be far easier for NATO allies to agree to provide. It took just a few months for military assistance for Ukraine to move from Javelin man-portable anti-armor weapons and Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles to Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems with a range of 50 miles and NASAMS short- and medium-range air defense systems.

NATO allies can and should provide more arms. ATACMS missiles with a range of some 200 miles come to mind. This should currently be Ukraine’s top priority. Moreover, this war will end at some point. Kyiv should consider what it will need to build a military capable of deterring a future Russian attack. Indeed, a modernized Ukrainian military would provide the country’s best security guarantee.

The Ukrainian shopping list could include weapons such as US M-1 and German Leopard main battle tanks, Western air defense missiles and aircraft, and perhaps US A-10 ground attack planes. While NATO membership for Ukraine would require a consensus decision by all alliance members, countries make decisions on providing arms and other military assistance to Ukraine on an individual basis. Many allies likely would prefer to commit to arming Ukraine than to taking on a commitment to defend the country.

After the war, Kyiv could still pursue the question of ultimate membership. NATO leaders at their July 2022 summit reiterated that the alliance’s open door policy remains in effect, including for Ukraine. In a post-war world, Kyiv might find that circumstances change sufficiently to make possible what is now not doable. For the present, however, Ukraine should concentrate on what it can get.