Ambivalent nuclear technologies use or have a potential to produce nuclear weapon relevant materials like highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, tritium and U233. It is important to assess the proliferation potential and measures to strengthen the proliferation resistance of these technologies as early as possible (preventively) to find alternative more proliferation resistant designs or at least to identify sensitive parameters or even critical parts that should trigger international safeguards and export controls.

The conclusions of different case studies investigating the proliferation resistance of nuclear technologies such as spallation neutron sources, tokamak fusion reactors and plutonium fuels will be briefly presented. The main part of the talk will focus on the minimization or elimination of civil HEU usage and the role of research reactor conversion to the use of low enriched uranium, which is intrinsically more proliferation resistant. The conversion of the German high flux research reactor FRM-II will serve as an example for the complex political and technological challenges and problems one has to face, especially, if proliferation concerns are not taken seriously in the research and design phase. These case studies of relatively disparate nuclear technologies have in common that they are neutron producing technologies and some questions regarding their proliferation potential can be addressed using neutronic codes.

Finally, the talk will briefly outline the future research of the next year addressing centrifuge technology as another case study to explicate on exemplary basis general criteria for the proliferation resistant use of nuclear technologies.

Matthias Englert is a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC. Before joining CISAC in 2009, Matthias was a researcher at the Interdisciplinary Research Group Science Technology and Security (IANUS) and a PhD student at the department of physics at Darmstadt University of Technology in Germany. 

His major research interests include nonproliferation, disarmament, arms control, nuclear postures and warheads, fissile material and production technologies, the civil use of nuclear power and its role in future energy scenarios and the possibility of nuclear terrorism.  His research during his stay at CISAC focuses primarily on the technology of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment, the implications of its use for the nonproliferation regime and on technical and political measures to manage the proliferation risks. 

Matthias has been participating in projects investigating technical aspects of the concept of proliferation resistance with topics spanning from conversion of research reactors, uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges, reducing plutonium stockpiles with reactor based options,  spallation neutron sources and fusion power plants. Further research topics included fissile material stockpiles, fuel-cycles and accelerator  driven systems. Although a substantial part of his professional work of the last years was quite technical he is equally interested in and actively studies the historical, social and political aspects of the use of nuclear technologies. Research interests include the dispute about Article IV of the NPT, the future development of the NPT regime, possibilities for a nuclear weapon free world, preventive arms control, and history and development of proliferation relevant programs. By studying contemporary theory in philosophy of the interaction of science, technology and society, Matthias acquired analytical tools to reflect on approaches describing or addressing the problem of ambivalent technology.

Matthias is a vice speaker of the working group Physics and Disarmament of the German Physical Society (DPG) and a board member of the  German Research Association for Science, Disarmament and Security (FONAS).

Michael May is Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is the former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, having served seven years in that capacity through January 2000. May is a director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988, with some brief periods away from the Laboratory. While there, he held a variety of research and development positions, serving as director of the Laboratory from 1965 to 1971. May was a technical adviser to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty negotiating team; a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and at various times has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the General Advisory Committee to the AEC, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the RAND Corporation Board of Trustees, and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council on International Policy, and a Fellow of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. May received the Distinguished Public Service and Distinguished Civilian Service Medals from the Department of Defense, and the Ernest Orlando Lawrence Award from the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as other awards. His current research interests are in the area of nuclear and terrorism, energy, security and environment, and the relation of nuclear weapons and foreign policy.

The term laser weapon implies the use of a laser as part of a so-called directed energy weapon (DEW). In that case, the laser energy is causing the target damage. Military research led to the development of experimental lasers with continuous output powers up to 140 kW in 1966 and two Megawatts in 1980. However, those systems were huge and not part of laser weapon systems.

Since the 1980s the development in the military continued. Remarkably, civilian lasers, developed for industrial machining, have now reached output powers, which can be useful for DEW applications, too. Recently, several prototypes came into operation. On the one hand, there are industry-funded projects that use civilian of-the-shelf industrial lasers. On the other hand, there is government-funded research, which aims at high power laser systems. Major defense companies in the United States and elsewhere are working on both tracks.

Anti-satellite (ASAT) laser engagements would be a revolutionary laser application, as they would in principle enable an option of attacks on satellites with only minor debris. At the moment, attacking satellites implies the use of missiles with kinetic or explosive warheads. A kinetic impact creates debris, which would be harmful to the attacker's space assets, too. For that reason, space faring nations are discouraged from using kinetic energy attacks.

This fact enacts a kind of "natural" arms control. Lasers could change this situation, if they are used to heat up satellites just to a point where their electronics are damaged or only to impair their sensors. Hence, attacks on satellites would be more likely, if laser DEW with anti-satellite capabilities are fielded in peacetime. In a time of crisis, this would create additional political instabilities, as satellites are important early warning and reconnaissance assets.  A deployment of laser ASATs could eventually lead to an arms race in space. In order to make this scenario less likely arms control mechanism could be implemented.

This talk will focus on the technological background of laser ASATs. After a short introduction into recent technological developments, it will be examined whether current laser technology has the ability to endanger satellites. To achieve this, a physics-based method has been devised to assess laser DEW engagements. Damage mechanisms as well as possible distinctions between industrial laser setups and laser weapons will be examined in greater detail.  Options for controlling laser ASATs and obstacles for the implementations of such controls will be introduced.

Jan Stupl is a Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC. His research concerns the current developments in laser technology regarding a possible application of lasers as an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT), as well as the proliferation of ballistic missiles. The research on laser ASATs focuses on damage mechanisms, the potential sources and countries of origin of laser ASATs and ways to curb their international proliferation. Regarding missiles, Jan is interested in the methods which are used to acquire ballistic missiles and possible ways to control this process.

Before coming to CISAC, Jan was a Research Fellow at the Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg, Germany. His PhD dissertation was a physics-based analysis of future of High Energy Lasers and their application for missile defense and focused on the Airborne Laser missile defense system. This work was jointly supervised by the IFSH, the Institute of Laser and System Technologies at Hamburg University of Technology and the physics department of Hamburg University, where he earned his PhD in 2008.

Jan studied physics at the Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena, Germany and at Warwick University in Coventry, UK. He concluded his undergraduate physics degree with a thesis in laser physics, receiving a German National Diploma in Physics in 2004. His interest in security policy and international politics was fuelled by an internship at the United Nations in New York in 2003.

Clay Moltz joined the National Security Affairs faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in June 2007. Since November 2008, he has held a joint appointment with the Space Systems Academic Group at NPS. He currently teaches Space and National Security, Nuclear Strategy and National Security, International Relations, and Northeast Asian Security. Prior to his appointment at NPS, he served for 14 years in various positions at the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies, including: deputy director from 2003-2007, director of the Newly Independent States Nonproliferation Program from 1998-2003, and founding editor of The Nonproliferation Review from 1993-98. He was also a faculty member in the Monterey Institute’s Graduate School of International Policy Studies.

Dr. Moltz received his Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. He also holds an M.A. in Russian and East European Studies and a B.A. in International Relations (with Distinction) from Stanford University. Dr. Moltz worked previously as a staff member in the U.S. Senate and has served as a consultant to the NASA Ames Research Center, the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment. He held prior academic positions at Duke University and at the University of California, San Diego.

Abstract: Nuclear testing has a special place in the Indian nuclear discourse. India's activism on disarmament issues can be traced back to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's 1954 call for a test ban. In recent times, at three critical junctures: CTBT negotiations (1994-96), the dialogue with the U.S. after the nuclear tests of May 1998 (1998-2000) and the negotiations on the civil nuclear agreement with the U.S. (2005-2008), the testing issue has made a demand for answers on fundamental questions. Gill and Gopalaswamy believe that the debate on the politics and science of nuclear testing in India reflects two larger questions: firstly, in the manner in which India should relate to the wider nonproliferation regime pending nuclear disarmament and secondly what should be the nature and extent of the Indian nuclear deterrent in a world with nuclear weapons? Neither of these questions has been satisfactorily answered and thus it is still an open debate.

There are significant international dimensions to this debate. The first aspect is the fate of the CTBT, which India refused to sign after two and half years of engagement. The second aspect is the perceptions of the credibility of India's deterrent in a fluid strategic landscape. Gill and Gopalaswamy argue that while India has begun to be relatively more engaging with the nonproliferation regime, it is unlikely that New Delhi will ratify the CTBT anytime soon. Rather, engagement with India on fissile material/fuel cycle control and delegitimization of nuclear weapons may turn out to be a more productive use of scarce political capital in New Delhi and elsewhere in the short run. As this engagement develops, the CTBT would be seen less as a step child of the regime from which India was kept apart but more as one among a number of regimes that involve India in a network of mutual restraints, thus improving the prospects for India's participation in a formal, global ban on testing.

On the scientific aspects, Gill and Gopalaswamy argue that a ‘perceptual set' induced by U.S. nuclear history is at the heart of the controversy over the two-stage device tested on May 11, 1998. They believe that in the light of new data made available by Indian scientists, the option of renewed explosive testing should be considered by India only as a demonstration of intent to maintain the credibility of India's deterrent if certain redlines were to be crossed. The fact that India has such redlines in mind would act to induce more responsibility on part of the other nuclear weapon states relevant to India's decisions, thus reducing the probability of renewed testing by India.

Amandeep Singh Gill is a visiting fellow at CISAC. He is a member of the Indian Foreign Service and has served in the Indian Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, the Indian Embassy in Tehran and the High Commission of India in Colombo. At headquarters in New Delhi, he has served twice in the Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division of the Ministry of External Affairs from 1998 to 2001 and again from 2006 to 2008 at critical junctures in India’s nuclear diplomacy. He was a member of the Indian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament during the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. He has also served as an expert on the UN Secretary General’s panels of experts on Small Arms and Light Weapons and on Missiles.

His research priorities include disarmament, arms control and non proliferation, Asian regional security and human security issues.  He is currently working on the interaction of nuclear policies of major states, particularly in Asia.

Before joining the Indian Foreign Service, Amandeep Gill worked as a telecommunications engineer. He retains an abiding interest in the interaction of science, security and politics. He is founder of a non-profit called Farmers First Foundation that seeks to reclaim agriculture for the farmers and demonstrate the viability of integrated agriculture in harmony with nature.

Bharath Gopalaswamy is a postdoctoral associate at Cornell University's Peace Studies Program. He has a PhD in Mechanical Engineering with a specialization in Numerical Acoustics. He has previously worked at the Indian Space Research Organization's High Altitude Test Facilities and the European Aeronautics Defense and Space Company's Astrium GmbH division in Germany.

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Professor Mary Sarotte teaches in the interdisciplinary international relations program at the University of Southern California (USC).  She earned her BA in History and Science at Harvard University and her PhD in History at Yale University.  Before becoming a historian, Sarotte worked as a journalist in Europe for Time, Die Zeit, and The Economist (where she continues to write as a book reviewer).  A former White House Fellow, Sarotte has also held a Humboldt Scholarship, an Olin National Security Fellowship, and a postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard's Kennedy School.  She is the author of two books and a number of scholarly articles.  Sarotte is currently finishing her third monograph, 1989 & the Architecture of Order, to be published by Princeton University Press in the series "Studies in International History and Politics" in 2009.

Norman Naimark is the Robert and Florence McDonnell Professor of East European Studies: a professor of history; core faculty member of FSI's Forum on Contemporary Europe; and an FSI senior fellow by courtesy. He is an expert on modern East European, Balkan, and Russian history. His current research focuses on the history of genocide in the 20th century and on postwar Soviet policy in Europe. He is author of the critically acclaimed volumes: The Russians in Germany: The History of the Soviet Zone of Germany, 1945-1949 (Harvard 1995) and Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in 20th Century Europe (Harvard 2001).  Most recently, he has co-edited books on Yugoslavia and its Historians (Stanford 2003), Soviet Politics in Austria, 1945-1955: Documents from the Russian Archives (in German and Russian, Austrian Academy of Sciences, 2006), and The Lost Transcripts of the Politburo (Yale 2008). 

Naimark is a senior fellow by courtesy of the Hoover Institution and Burke Family Director of the Bing Overseas Studies Program at Stanford. He also was chair of Stanford's Department of History and programs in International Relations and International Policy Studies. He has served on the editorial boards of a series of leading professional journals, including: The American Historical Review, The Journal of Modern History, Slavic Review, and East European Politics and Societies. He served as President of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (1997) and as chairman of the Joint Committee on Eastern Europe of the American Council of Learned Societies and Social Science Research Council (1992-1997). 

Before joining the Stanford faculty, Naimark was a professor of history a Boston University and a fellow of the Russian Research Center at Harvard. He also held the visiting Catherine Wasserman Davis Chair of Slavic Studies at Wellesley College. He has been awarded the Officer's Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany (1996), the Richard W. Lyman Award for outstanding faculty volunteer service (1995), and the Dean's Teaching Award from Stanford University for 1991-92 and 2002-3. 

Abstract:  In 2003, General John Gordon, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and former Deputy Director of the CIA asked his staff to do an end-to-end evaluation of U.S. biodefense posture.  As a result, Homeland Security Staff, directed by Dr. Kenneth Bernard, Special Assistant to the President, did a government-wide review of national preparedness and response to a bioterrorist attack.   The resulting assessment led in 2004 to the combined Homeland Security Presidential Directive #10 and National Security Presidetial Directive #17:  "Biodefense for the 21st Century."  Dr. Bernard will discuss the process and outcome of this policy that remains the U.S. national strategy for preventing and responding to a bioterrorist event. Accomplishments, outcomes and remaining gaps will be detailed, along with budget and policy implications for the next administration. 

Admiral Kenneth Bernard was appointed by President Bush to be Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense on the Homeland Security Council (HSC) in November 2002. Dr. Bernard chaired the Whitehouse Biodefense Policy Coordinating committee and drafted Decision Directives for President Bush on both "Biodefense for the 21st Century" and Agricultural Bioterrorism, and he was the White House point person on Project Bioshield - a $5.6 billion congressional bill that is speeding development and procurement of new countermeasures against biological, chemical and radiological terrorist threats.

In January 2001, Dr. Bernard was assigned by the U.S. Surgeon General to the office of Senator Bill Frist to work on international health issues of priority concern to both the Congress and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).   After September 11, however, he was called back to HHS to create the position of Special Adviser for National Security, Intelligence and Defense for the Department of Health and Human Services. From August 1998 to January 2001, he served on President Clinton's National Security Council (NSC) staff as Special Adviser to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Prior to joining the NSC, Dr. Bernard served as the International Health Attaché and senior representative of the U.S. Secretary of Health at the U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva, Switzerland (1994-1998). From 1984-1989, he held positions as the Associate Director for Medical and Scientific Affairs in the Office of International Health, HHS, and as International Health Policy Adviser to the Director of the U.S. Peace Corps. He retired from the USPHS as a Rear Admiral.

He received his AB degree from the University of California, Berkeley in 1971, an M.D. from the University of California, Davis in 1975, and the DTM&H degree from the University of London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in 1977.  He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.