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Cover of book "Beyond Power Transitions" showing a Chinese painting of officials

Questions about the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China have dominated international policy discussion for years. But the leading theory of power transitions between a declining hegemon and a rising rival is based exclusively on European examples, such as the Peloponnesian War, as chronicled by Thucydides, as well as the rise of Germany under Bismarck and the Anglo-German rivalry of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. What lessons does East Asian history offer for both the power transitions debate and the future of U.S.-China relations?

Examining the rise and fall of East Asian powers over 1,500 years, Beyond Power Transitions offers a new perspective on the forces that shape war and peace. Xinru Ma and David C. Kang argue that focusing on the East Asian experience underscores domestic risks and constraints on great powers, not relative rise and decline in international competition. They find that almost every regime transition before the twentieth century was instigated by internal challenges, and even the exceptions deviated markedly from the predictions of power transition theory. Instead, East Asia was stable for a remarkably long time despite massive power differences because of common understandings about countries’ relative status. Provocative and incisive, this book challenges prevailing assumptions about the universality of power transition theory and shows why East Asian history has profound implications for international affairs today.


About the Authors


Xinru Ma is a Research Fellow on the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab research team at Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Her scholarship focuses on nationalism, great power politics, and East Asian security.

David C. Kang is Maria Crutcher Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, where he also directs the Korean Studies Institute. His Columbia University Press books include East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (2010) and, with Victor D. Cha, Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (revised and updated edition, 2018).


Book Review

 

By Stefan Messingschlager, Helmut-Schmidt-University Hamburg, Germany
International Studies Review, Volume 28, Issue 1, March 2026

 

"Beyond Power Transitions distinguishes itself through its theoretical originality, empirical rigor, and incisive critique of dominant IR paradigms. By adeptly integrating meticulous historical scholarship with critical theoretical insights, Ma and Kang not only challenge entrenched Eurocentric perspectives but significantly advance discourse on the normative underpinnings of international stability."

 

Extract


Amid escalating geopolitical tensions between the USA and China, Xinru Ma and David C. Kang’s Beyond Power Transitions thoughtfully engages one of the most pivotal contemporary debates in International Relations (IR): How can shifts between established and rising powers be conceptualized without presuming an inevitable conflict? Critically examining “power transition theory”—a paradigm famously articulated by A.F.K. Organski and recently popularized through Graham Allison’s concept of the “Thucydides Trap,” which contends that rapid shifts in relative power between a declining hegemon and an ascending challenger significantly heighten the risk of war—Ma and Kang persuasively argue that the theory’s predominantly materialist and Eurocentric foundations severely limit its explanatory power beyond Western historical contexts. By disproportionately emphasizing cases such as the Anglo-German rivalry of the late nineteenth century, traditional analyses systematically obscure alternative historical experiences and non-Western mechanisms for managing power shifts.

To redress this imbalance, Ma and Kang propose a theoretical recalibration that emphasizes the crucial role of normative and culturally embedded structures in managing interstate relations (Chapter 1). Central to their reconceptualization is the innovative notion of the “common conjecture,” defined as a socially constructed consensus among East Asian states regarding legitimate leadership roles, recognized hierarchies, and accepted status positions within the regional order (p. 5). Significantly, the authors stress that this normative consensus was not merely an abstract ideal but rather a concretely institutionalized system maintained through culturally embedded diplomatic rituals and tributary practices. Korea’s regular tribute missions to the Ming and Qing courts, involving highly formalized ceremonies, exemplify how these normative practices symbolically enacted legitimacy and mutual recognition, thereby actively reinforcing and stabilizing regional hierarchies. Ma and Kang convincingly argue that these normative frameworks functioned as “snap-back mechanisms,” effectively restoring regional stability after major disruptions, such as dynastic transitions or external invasions. Additionally, they underscore the strategic agency exercised by smaller states within these normative orders, demonstrating how such actors carefully balanced hierarchical obligations with their own political autonomy—thus highlighting the tangible political significance and practical effectiveness of normative diplomacy.

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The Lessons of East Asian History and the Future of U.S.-China Relations

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Last week, Seoul officially put its nuclear option on the table, for the first time since 1991. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol declared the country would consider building its own arsenal of nuclear weapons if the threat it faces from nuclear-armed North Korea continues to grow.

It will.

North Korea launched over 90 missiles in 2022. Those tests accompanied a major revision in North Korea’s nuclear strategy, which now allows the preemptive use of nuclear weapons in the early stages of a crisis. Experts expect North Korea’s ramped-up nuclear aggression will continue into the new year. Many even expect Pyongyang to conduct a new nuclear test, which would be the country’s first since 2017 and a watershed event against a backdrop of global turmoil.

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Last week, Seoul officially put its nuclear option on the table, for the first time since 1991.

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Earlier this month, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol set off alarms. In an off-the-cuff remark, he warned that Seoul might need to develop nuclear weapons—or demand redeployment of U.S. nuclear arms to the Korean Peninsula—to counter North Korean nuclear threats. In doing so, Yoon spotlighted a popular view once reserved for hawkish commentators, defense intellectuals, and former military officials. Keeping nuclear weapons out of South Korea will ultimately be a U.S. responsibility that requires addressing both the deteriorating security environment and the domestic drivers underlying Yoon’s statement.

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Yoon Suk-yeol’s call to develop nuclear weapons is fundamentally a call for South Korea to know it can protect itself in a changing security environment.

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Abstract: My research investigates the formal institutionalization of inter-governmental cooperation among the three major Northeast Asian powers – China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea—in the face of a continued North Korean threat. How much of a shadow, if any, has North Korea’s nuclear weapons cast over the development of multilateralism in the region? Since 1999, the Northeast Asian region has seen intensifying institutionalization of cooperation among its major powers. In a region where the realist logic of state-centric nationalism, sovereignty, and balance of power still prevails, this new development of trilateral cooperation among the former and potential adversaries deserves serious scholarly investigation. What started as economic and functional cooperation, trilateral cooperation has since been substantially expanded to include political and security agendas at the highest level of government. What explains the emergence and endurance of trilateral cooperation and to what extent has containing the North Korean nuclear crisis shaped its institutional trajectory and outcomes? By examining the evolution of trilateral cooperation, I address some critical gaps in our understanding of formal institution building and the economic-security nexus in one of the most dynamic regions in the world.

 

Speaker's Biography: Yeajin Yoon is a 2018-2019 MacArthur Nuclear Security Pre-doctoral Fellow at CISAC and a doctoral candidate in the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford. Her dissertation examines the evolution of trilateral cooperation among the most militarily and economically dominant states in Northeast Asia, namely, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, and considers when and how their relations become implicated in the North Korean nuclear crisis.

 

Prior to entering academia, Yeajin travelled extensively across Asia and worked with national governments, international organisations, and NGOs in the region. She led the development of the inaugural issue of the 'Oxford Government Review’ and helped facilitate a Track II dialogue on wartime history issues in Asia at Stanford University. Previously, she worked as a founding member of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, the official intergovernmental organisation for China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea and managed a development fund focused on the ASEAN region at the Korean Foreign Ministry.

 

Yeajin received a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science with Honors from Stanford University and a Master of Public Policy degree from Oxford University.

Yeajin Yoon MacArthur Nuclear Security Pre-doctoral Fellow CISAC, Stanford University
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Following the abrupt ending of the highly anticipated second bilateral summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Hanoi, APARC and CISAC scholars evaluate the result of the summit, its implications for regional relations in Northeast Asia, and the opportunities moving forward towards the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

This Q&A with Noa Ronkin features Andray Abrahamian, the 2018-19 Koret Fellow in Korean Studies at APARC, whose work with the nonprofit Choson Exchange has taken him to the DPRK nearly 30 times; Siegfried S. Hecker, top nuclear security expert, former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Research Professor of Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus, and Senior Fellow at CISAC/FSI, Emeritus; and Gi-Wook Shin, Professor of Sociology, William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, Director of APARC, and founding Director of the Korea Program.

Q: What is your assessment of the summit outcome? Considering Trump's decision to end the summit early, do you support that “no deal is better than a bad deal?” Do you think the summit would have been better off with even a small deal just significant enough to keep the momentum going? 
 
Abrahamian: It's a disappointment, but we don't know yet if it is a catastrophe. I think that, ideally, once it was clear that both sides were escalating towards a grand bargain no one was ready for, the U.S. and DPRK teams could have taken a break and reconvened to attempt something less ambitious. For both sides it is better domestically to go back and be able to look tough rather than concede too much, but I do wonder why there was no intermediary position available between no deal and something too big.
 
Hecker: I am disappointed, but still optimistic. Disappointed because the opportunity to take concrete steps toward denuclearization and normalization was missed. Optimistic, because Trump and Kim did not return to the ‘fire and fury’ days of 2017. They left Hanoi on good terms. I don’t believe it was a question of bad deal or no deal. Rather, it appears the two sides were actually quite close to taking important steps, but couldn’t quite get there this time. It is not clear whether time just ran out or if President Trump’s challenge to Kim Jong-un to “go bigger” moved the goal posts at the last minute. 
 
Shin: Trump made the right move. No deal is better than a small or pointless deal that could hamper future negotiations. His decision sent a warning signal to North Korea that he wouldn’t let the country continue to set the tone and pace for the negotiations. Also, he gained more domestic political slack than the alternative would have gained him. The misfortune in Hanoi may impart a new, different kind of momentum to what is destined to be a fluctuating, arduous diplomatic process.
 
Q: So what's next? What do you expect from the US and DPRK given this new dynamic? What do you think needs to be done at the working level and at the leadership level? And what do you think will be the biggest hurdle in future negotiations? 
 
Abrahamian: Both sides carefully left future talks open through their statements after the summit. If one is searching for a positive outcome, it's that the leaders perhaps now realize that much, much more will have to be agreed upon before they meet again. This should help empower working-level talks. But time is short: a U.S. election looms next year and Donald Trump faces political challenges at home. This was a missed opportunity to consolidate a relationship-building process.
 
Hecker: The American and North Korean statements following the summit paint different pictures of the final bargaining positions, but both were positive and committed to return to the bargaining table. These differences should be surmountable at the bargaining table, but it will take time and a more concerted effort. So long as North Korea ends nuclear and missile testing, we have time to come to a proper compromise, but it must clearly involve some sanctions relief for the North Korean economy. One of the biggest hurdles on the American side is to overcome internal political divisions.
 
Shin: A return to hostility is unlikely. Both sides have refrained from escalating tension and are still committed to a diplomatic solution. The negotiations will resume. The Hanoi summit served as an opportunity for a much-needed reality check, for both sides, of the lingering divergences. The biggest hurdle continues to be how to define the terms and scope of denuclearization and the U.S. corresponding measures (simultaneous and parallel actions). Now that the discrepancies have become more apparent and starker, the working-level discussions need to agree on basic yet fundamental concepts and principles, while Trump and Kim should continue the process of trust-building; confidence and trust are a must in a top-down setting.
 
Q: Are there some roles that other key players can play, such as South Korea and China? Are there any impacts of this outcome on regional relations in Northeast Asia, such as inter-Korean and China-DPRK relations? 
 
Abrahamian: Perhaps South Korea can play a bridging role again, the way it did before the Singapore summit, when Trump "pre-emptively pulled out." In that case, President Moon's intervention helped get things back on track. It is unclear if he has the political capital with either side to make that happen again, but I suspect he will try. The collapse impacts a Kim Jong-un visit to Seoul, as now it would seem to be pressure on the US, rather than operating in space the US created. China is relatively marginalized, but happy to see no secondary sanctions threats or additional testing of missiles. Japan is perhaps the most pleased of all, given how isolated it has become on North Korea issues.
 
Hecker: The Moon Jae-in administration was hoping for a more positive outcome to allow it to promote economic cooperation with the North, which I consider to be one of the most important elements of achieving a peaceful Korean Peninsula. The Hanoi outcome may require an intensified North-South dialogue to assist the North-U.S. deliberations. I am not sure how all of this will affect China-DPRK relations. I would have preferred an outcome that allows DPRK to move closer to South Korea through some sanctions relief, than to have it depend more on China through continued maximum pressure. 
 
Shin: The outcome is clearly a major setback for South Korea, as it was anticipating progress on core issues that could jumpstart inter-Korean projects. It also became unclear whether Kim would make the planned visit to Seoul anytime soon. At the same time, this might be a perfect time for South Korea to play a meaningful role. So far, the country has been seen as advocating North Korea’s position with regards to an end-of-war declaration and to a lifting or easing of sanctions. This time around, President Moon needs to convince Chairman Kim that North Korea’s bold move toward denuclearization cannot be delayed if he wishes not to lose this rare opportunity with a U.S. president who is eager to make a “big” deal.
 
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For more U.S.-DPRK diplomacy analysis and commentarty by APARC scholars, see our recent media coverage.
 
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South Koreans watch TV screen reporting on the U.S. President Donald Trump press conference at Seoul Railway Station on February 28, 2019 in Seoul, South Korea
South Koreans watch TV screen reporting on the U.S. President Donald Trump press conference at Seoul Railway Station on February 28, 2019 in Seoul, South Korea.
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This interview was first published in the Korea JoongAng Daily; the post below was originally posted in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

In a recent interview in Seoul, nuclear scientist Siegfried S. Hecker said demilitarization of North Korea might be wiser than a complete denuclearization and the process could be sped up by converting its nuclear and missiles program into joint civilian-use projects.

He said that if North Korean leader Kim Jong-un dismantles the Yongbyon nuclear facility, “That is a big deal; it would be a major positive, signal that they are serious. Because without plutonium, they will really not be able to have major improvements in their nuclear weapons program.”

In May, Hecker proposed a 10-year road map for denuclearizing North Korea in three stages: a halt, roll back and elimination. He has estimated that denuclearization of the North could take up to 15 years, but that could be shortened depending on the political situation.

Hecker advocates shortening the time frame through the conversion of North Korea’s military nuclear and missile program into civilian use with the involvement of South Korea and the United States, and possibly China and Russia as well. This could be in areas as such as building nuclear reactors for electricity generation and medical isotopes and joint space programs.

“When you do it cooperatively, then that’s when verification becomes possible, because you’re there, you’re talking with the people, seeing the facilities,” said Hecker on such joint civilian nuclear projects. “It’s the only way I can see shortening that time frame significantly.”

He went onto encourage building “trust and a cooperative spirit” to prevent North Korea’s concealment of its nuclear weapons in the future.

“If the United States and South Korea stay together, clearly locked together in a strong alliance, we’ll be able to handle anything North Korea can do, and we can take a chance to see whether he’s really serious,” he said, referring to North Korean leader Kim.

Since 2004, Hecker has made seven trips to North Korea. In his first visit, he recounts holding in his hand North Korean plutonium in a sealed glass jar at its Yongbyon nuclear complex. He is also one of the few Americans who has visited its uranium enrichment facility, which he and a team did in 2010.

Hecker warned that last year we were on the “precipice of war,” welcoming efforts by South Korean President Moon Jae-in, U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim since the beginning of this year to engage in dialogue and summit meetings. He added that “it’s worth finding out” if North Korean leader Kim is serious about his pledges to complete denuclearization. Hecker later Thursday made a speech at Yonsei University as a part of its William J. Perry lecture series entitled: “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: A Treasured Sword or An Unnecessary Burden?”

The following are edited excerpts of the interview with the JoongAng Ilbo and JoongAng Daily newspapers.

What do you think of the dramatic change in President Trump’s attitude to North Korea in his UN General Assembly speech Tuesday compared to last year’s speech?

A. From my perspective, it’s a very welcome change. Since I’m a technical nuclear specialist, I would say that 2017 was a very dangerous year. It was dangerous because of the technical advances that North Korea made with its nuclear programs, namely the big nuclear test, the ICBM [intercontinental ballistic] missile tests. That was dangerous, and then on top of that, the political rhetoric was extremely dangerous … However, so many things happened in 2018, and the most important is that politically, we stepped away from the precipice of war, and that’s good news …What happened is a number of really important political steps initiated to some extent by Kim Jong-un and President Moon but also apparently welcomed by President Trump.

How do you view the United States’ demand for North Korea to submit a list of nuclear weapons, materials and facilities as a first step toward substantive denuclearization, while North Korea demands a declaration to end the 1950-53 Korean War?

From my perspective, what’s more important first is to take steps that I call risk reduction. For example: no nuclear testing, no long-range missile tests and no more plutonium [production]. Perhaps a list of the Yongbyon facilities would be possible early on. But the full declaration, I think, is not yet possible. And then the end-of-war declaration, clearly that’s a political matter; the U.S. has to decide as to when to do that. Just like eventually there has to be a full declaration [by North Korea], eventually there has to be an end-of-war declaration.

At the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang last week, Kim agreed to permanently dismantle the Tongchang-ri missile engine test site and missile launch pad under the observation of outside experts. Can this be considered as a meaningful progress toward denuclearization?

That’s not the ICBM launch site, and so whereas it’s important, it’s not the most important for missile launches because the North Koreans have launched their missiles from unprepared sites. So, what I found most surprising is for Chairman Kim to say that he’s going to essentially decommission that site that was scheduled to be used for future satellite launches … and I would have thought North Korea would want to retain a peaceful space program. But having international inspectors there is good because it’s a confidence-building step.

North Korea said it is willing to take additional steps such as permanent dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear site if the United States takes a corresponding measure. Should Washington consider this proposal seriously?

Of course it should consider that seriously, but it’s a conditional proposal. So to me, the most important part would be: Can one begin to take the steps that demonstrate that they are actually dismantling parts of Yongbyon? Yongbyon is a huge facility. For example, it would be very important to first stop and then dismantle the 5-megawatt plutonium production reactor. If they did that, I would say that’s a really big deal … it would be a major positive signal that they are serious.

Some say that the Yongbyon nuclear facility is already old and aging, so North Korea’s proposal is not meaningful.

It helps to have been there: I don’t agree with that. Yes, the Yongbyon facilities are old, but they are operable.

Contrary to your estimation that it could take 15 years to denuclearize North Korea, the United States and North Korea are talking about the completion of denuclearization by the end of Trump’s first term as president in 2021. Is this a feasible goal?

It would be very nice; I don’t think it’s possible. First of all, the political situation has now improved substantially, because we’re talking to each other, but one still has to build the trust to convince the North Koreans they can actually get rid of those substantial facilities. And I think that will take more than a few years. The technical matters will also take some time. My three-stage proposal was recognizing the difficulties in agreeing to actually take significant steps. I believe that immediate elimination of all nuclear weapons is not going to happen. So instead, let’s do this in a reasonable way. First halt – in other words, don’t make it worse. Second, take specific steps to roll back, reduce the threat – so no nuclear, no missile testing, no more plutonium. They’ve already done the first two. And then, understanding what the issues are with the uranium enrichment, because they have one facility we know of. I was in that facility for centrifuges in 2010. We know they have more facilities. I think it may be doable in 10 years, but again, it depends on political situations.

Trump said in a press conference Wednesday that he is not in a hurry and no longer playing a “time game” with North Korea. Has he realized denuclearization cannot be resolved in a short period of time?

I think the president and his team understand that it takes time … What’s happened in 2018 was taking us away from the precipice of war. The political climate has toned down substantially, especially as just indicated with President Moon’s summit with Kim Jong-un. And because of that, politics has created space that now allows you to step back and do things in a more deliberate, sensible manner, and so now you have more time … to do that sort of negotiation correctly.

In your June 25 Foreign Policy article, you claimed that helping North Korea to convert North Korea’s military nuclear and missile program into civilian use is the best way to solve the North Korean nuclear issue.

My view is, how can we shorten that 10-year time frame, and I believe that in an adversarial situation it won’t be possible because they would have to make a declaration, we’d have to verify the declaration, the verification isn’t just one time, you have to continue to watch the facilities, the people, what happens to all those things … What benefit can be in denuclearization for the North Koreans from the nuclear and technical standpoint? First of all, say what we are after: Denuclearization should really mean demilitarization. In other words, everything in the nuclear complex and the missile complex that feeds the military program, that has to go. In order to get them to agree to that, then we actually turn around, in particular jointly with South Korea, and say we’re going to help you convert the military to peaceful use. And we’re going to it together. That’s the key … Because that means we’ll have South Koreans, Americans in Yongbyon, helping them to convert. When you do it cooperatively, then that’s when verification becomes possible, because you’re there, you’re talking with the people, seeing the facilities. It’s the only way I can see, shortening that time frame significantly.

North Korea declared the completion of its nuclear arsenal and is no longer conducting nuclear or missile tests. Do you think that North Korea actually secured the ICBM capability to hit the U.S. mainland?

The bottom line is that I do not believe that North Korea today can deliver a nuclear-tipped ICBM to the United States, anywhere in the United States. And the reason for that is that they have the components, the pieces of what’s needed, but they have not done enough testing to pull those pieces together. However, to me, the issue is: Do they have a deterrent, the nuclear capability, to keep the U.S. out? I believe that they already have a deterrent: They most likely can put a nuclear warhead on the Scud and Rodong missiles that can reach South Korea and Japan.

North Korea’s blowing up of the Punggye-ri test site was not just a performance?

I think it was a substantial step. Could they can make more tunnels, yes, but it’s going to take much more time.

 

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Immediate denuclearization of North Korea is dangerous to both North Korean and American interests, say Stanford scholars in a new research report. Instead, they advocate for phased denuclearization to take place over 10 years or more, allowing the United States to reduce the greatest risks first and address the manageable risks over time.

Immediate denuclearization of North Korea is unrealistic, said Stanford scholars in an in-depth report released by the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).
 
Instead, denuclearization should be phased over a 10-year period to allow the United States to reduce and manage risks, said Siegfried Hecker, who authored the study with his research assistant Elliot Serbin and Robert Carlin, a visiting scholar at CISAC.
 
In the report, the scholars laid out a “roadmap” for denuclearization, recommending what they call a “halt, roll back and eliminate” approach. Their advice – which includes informative color charts and detailed, qualitative analysis – emerged from a longer-term project about the nuclear history of North Korea between 1992 and 2017.
 
According to the research, the most important steps toward denuclearization include halting nuclear tests, stopping intermediate or long-range missile tests, stopping the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and banning all export of nuclear weapons, materials or technologies to North Korea.
 
“The roadmap lays out a reasonable timeline for denuclearization, but politics may delay final denuclearization as much as 15 years,” said Hecker, who worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory for almost two decades, where he served as its directors for 11 of those years. He joined CISAC as a senior fellow in 2005.
 
Building trust and interdependence
In the short term, North Korea and the United States should take steps to build trust and interdependence, which the researchers believe are pivotal for a viable long-term solution like complete demilitarization of North Korea’s nuclear program. North Korea, they argue, will likely want to retain some parts of its nuclear program as a hedge should any potential agreement fall apart. This is a manageable risk, they said.
 
The scholars also encourage Pyongyang to front-load its concrete plan towards  permanent nuclear dismantlement to make a phased approach more appealing to the US administration. This would include actions like halting nuclear and missile tests for intercontinental ballistic missiles.
 
According to Hecker, North Korea’s recent demolition of its nuclear test site is a significant step in that direction.
 
“The so-called ‘Libya model’ – complete and immediate denuclearization – is not a viable solution,” Hecker said. “Our approach leaves each party with a manageable level of risk. Even though it takes longer, it is safer for the world.”
 
Hecker also encouraged the US to recognize North Korea’s desire for civilian programs, including energy production, the use of radioactive substances in medical research, diagnosis and treatment, and a peaceful space program. These types of civilian programs can also foster opportunities for a collaborative relationship between the United States and North Korea. Further, increased cooperation –including with South Korea – can help make efforts for verification and monitoring with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) more reliable. The verification process that will confirm to what extent North Korea dismantles and destroys its military nuclear program is a big issue for negotiations, the scholars said.
 
Recent reconciliation
Critically, the researchers note that recent détente between North Korea and South Korea provides a window of opportunity to accomplish denuclearization – and that the US should take advantage of that window smartly. They  said they hope that the risk-management approach outlined in the report can maximize chances for a successful agreement.
 
“In the past, the US has missed opportunities to manage incremental risk,” Hecker said. “Now is the time to pay attention to that history and be prepared to implement a risk-management approach to denuclearization.”
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Siegfried Hecker meets with members of North Korea’s nuclear scientific community during a visit to Yongbyon.
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Uneasy Partnerships presents the analysis and insights of practitioners and scholars who have shaped and examined China's interactions with key Northeast Asian partners. Using the same empirical approach employed in the companion volume, The New Great Game (Stanford University Press, 2016), this new text analyzes the perceptions, priorities, and policies of China and its partners to explain why dyadic relationships evolved as they have during China's "rise."

Synthesizing insights from an array of research, Uneasy Partnerships traces how the relationships that formed between China and its partner states—Japan, the Koreas, and Russia—resulted from the interplay of competing and compatible objectives, as well as from the influence of third-country ties. These findings are used to identify patterns and trends and to develop a framework that can be used to illuminate and explain Beijing's engagement with the rest of the world.

This book is part of the Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center series at Stanford University Press.

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Abstract: Relative to the struggles Western nuclear powered countries have experienced in the recent past, South Korea and China have had notable success building up nuclear power at an impressive scale. China today leads the world in new builds of nuclear reactors. Moving beyond indigenous construction, South Korea is on the verge of completing its first exported power reactor in the UAE, marking an impressive accomplishment for this relatively new nuclear startup. However, China and South Korea now face a challenge other more established nuclear powered countries have yet to solve, an unresolved structure of the back end of the fuel cycle. Despite the uncertainty that exists about the ultimate fate of the spent fuel, the more immediate problem of interim storage is urgent. In this talk, I will review the status and urgency of this problem in the two countries with quantitative results from modeling accumulation, storage and transportation. I will then outline immediate policy mitigations needed in the short term as well as strategies for designing a more permanent solution.

About the Speaker: Rob Forrest is currently a member of the technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories where his research interests include nuclear power, cybersecurity, and nonproliferation. As a member of the systems research group, he specializes in data driven methods and analysis to inform policy for national security.

As a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC, his research focused on one of the most pressing technical issues of nuclear power: what to do with spent nuclear fuel. Specifically, he looked at the more short term issues surrounding interim storage as they affect the structure of the back end of the fuel cycle. He focuses mainly on countries with strong nuclear power growth such as South Korea and China.

Rob’s interest in policy and nuclear issues began during his fellowship in the 2008 Public Policy and Nuclear Threats program at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at UC San Diego. In 2010, he also participated in the PONI Nuclear Scholars Initiative at CSIS.

Before coming to CISAC in 2011, Rob received his Ph.D. in high-energy physics from the University of California, Davis. Most of his graduate career was spent at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) in Batavia, IL where he performed a search for signs of a theory called Supersymmetry. Before beginning his graduate work, Rob spent two years at SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory. In 2001, Rob earned his B.S. in physics from the University of California, San Diego where, throughout his undergraduate career, he worked for NASA. 

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Rob Forrest is currently a member of the technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories where his research interests include nuclear power, cybersecurity, and nonproliferation. As a member of the systems research group, he specializes in data driven methods and analysis to inform policy  for national security.

As a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC, his research focused on one of the most pressing technical issues of nuclear power: what to do with spent nuclear fuel. Specifically, he looked at the more short term issues surrounding interim storage as they affect the structure of the back end of the fuel cycle. He focuses mainly on countries with strong nuclear power growth such as South Korea and China.

Rob’s interest in policy and nuclear issues began during his fellowship in the 2008 Public Policy and Nuclear Threats program at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at UC San Diego. In 2010, he also participated in the PONI Nuclear Scholars Initiative at CSIS.

Before coming to CISAC in 2011, Rob received his Ph.D. in high-energy physics from the University of California, Davis. Most of his graduate career was spent at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab) in Batavia, IL where he performed a search for signs of a theory called Supersymmetry. Before beginning his graduate work, Rob spent two years at SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory. In 2001, Rob earned his B.S. in physics from the University of California, San Diego where, throughout his undergraduate career, he worked for NASA. 

 

CV
Seminars
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Abstract: In international politics, the division between allies and adversaries appears quite clear. For example, it is conventional wisdom that North Korea is China’s ally and South Korea is the United States’ ally. In proliferation literature, the main catalyst for nuclear proliferation is threats from adversaries, while an ally’s nuclear umbrella mitigates the threat and willingness to proliferate. However, in reality the division between a credible ally and threatening foe is less clear-cut. Contrary to conventional wisdom, security threats alone do not trigger the decision of an ally to develop its indigenous nuclear weapons program. In other words, security could be a necessary condition for wanting the nuclear bomb, but it is not a sufficient condition for starting an indigenous program. Rather, the sense of abandonment or clashes of national interests between two friendly states triggers a state to pursue an indigenous weapons program. Using newly available declassified documents to conduct process tracing, and comparing the decision-making in the cases of China and South Korea, I show that Chinese and South Korean nuclear weapons programs were triggered not by their foes, the U.S and North Korea, respectively, but by their friends, the Soviet Union and the U.S. 

About the Speaker: Jooeun Kim is a MacArthur Nuclear Security Predoctoral fellow at CISAC for 2016-17. She is completing her PhD in international relations at Georgetown University’s Department of Government. She studies credibility, alliance management, and nuclear proliferation within military alliances.

Her dissertation examines the credibility of a patron ally as the source of a protégé ally’s nuclear decisions, through analyzing allies’ behaviors during international crises.

She completed an MA in Government at Georgetown University, an MA in International Affairs at George Washington University, and a BA in Political Science at Waseda University, Japan. She speaks Korean, Japanese, and Chinese.

Outside of her dissertation writing, she is a certified yoga instructor and enjoys sculling on the Potomac River. 

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

MacArthur Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow CISAC
Seminars
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