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Siegfried Hecker: What the U.S. should do about North Korea

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CISAC scholars made international news in November after North Korean scientists revealed to them that they had started construction on a small light-water reactor and completed a new uranium enrichment facility. The revelation dramatically changes the security calculus in Northeast Asia. In a Foreign Affairs article, Siegfried S. Hecker argues that denuclearization remains the goal. But that will take time. Now Washington should pursue a policy that begins with what he calls "the three no's -- no more bombs, no better bombs, and no exports -- in return for one yes: Washington's willingness to seriously address North Korea's fundamental insecurity." In a piece in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Hecker said "this approach may just be enough to get Beijing to take a much more aggressive stance to help shut down Pyongyang's nuclear import and export networks."
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A North Korean soldier looks south, as a South Korean soldier (front) stands guard, at the truce village of Panmunjom in the DMZ. December 8, 2010.
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North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex: A presentation by Siegfried S. Hecker at the Korea Economic Institute

CISAC's Siegfried Hecker presented the findings of his recent trip to North Korea, where he was given a tour of a nuclear facility reportedly capable of enriching uranium. In his remarks he described two new nuclear facilities, a small light-water power reactor in early stages of construction, and a "modern, clean centrifuge plant" for uranium enrichment. Following his presentation he and Robert Carlin, a CISAC visiting professor, spoke about North Korean nuclear programs and the international reaction to North Korea's nuclear ambitions. This event occurred the day after North Korean military attacks on the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong.

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Dr. Hecker's Nov. 23, 2010 Presentation at the Korea Economic Institute (C-Span video)




Korea Economic Institute

Siegfried S. Hecker

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C220
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-6468 (650) 723-0089
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Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Emeritus
Research Professor, Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus
hecker2.jpg PhD

Siegfried S. Hecker is a professor emeritus (research) in the Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He was co-director of CISAC from 2007-2012. From 1986 to 1997, Dr. Hecker served as the fifth Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Hecker is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction, and nuclear security.

Dr. Hecker’s current research interests include nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, nuclear weapons policy, nuclear security, the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy, and plutonium science. At the end of the Cold War, he has fostered cooperation with the Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials. In June 2016, the Los Alamos Historical Society published two volumes edited by Dr. Hecker. The works, titled Doomed to Cooperate, document the history of Russian-U.S. laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation since 1992.

Dr. Hecker’s research projects at CISAC focus on cooperation with young and senior nuclear professionals in Russia and China to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism worldwide, to avoid a return to a nuclear arms race, and to promote the safe and secure global expansion of nuclear power. He also continues to assess the technical and political challenges of nuclear North Korea and the nuclear aspirations of Iran.

Dr. Hecker joined Los Alamos National Laboratory as graduate research assistant and postdoctoral fellow before returning as technical staff member following a tenure at General Motors Research. He led the laboratory's Materials Science and Technology Division and Center for Materials Science before serving as laboratory director from 1986 through 1997, and senior fellow until July 2005.

Among his professional distinctions, Dr. Hecker is a member of the National Academy of Engineering; foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; fellow of the TMS, or Minerals, Metallurgy and Materials Society; fellow of the American Society for Metals; fellow of the American Physical Society, honorary member of the American Ceramics Society; and fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

His achievements have been recognized with the Presidential Enrico Fermi Award, the 2020 Building Bridges Award from the Pacific Century Institute, the 2018 National Engineering Award from the American Association of Engineering Societies, the 2017 American Nuclear Society Eisenhower Medal, the American Physical Society’s Leo Szilard Prize, the American Nuclear Society's Seaborg Medal, the Department of Energy's E.O. Lawrence Award, the Los Alamos National Laboratory Medal, among other awards including the Alumni Association Gold Medal and the Undergraduate Distinguished Alumni Award from Case Western Reserve University, where he earned his bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees in metallurgy.

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Robert Carlin

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C245 - Desk 2
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Bob Carlin is a Visiting Scholar at CISAC. From both in and out of government, he has been following North Korea since 1974 and has made 25 trips there. He recently co-authored a lengthy paper to be published by the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, entitled "Politics, Economics and Security: Implications of North Korean Reform."

Carlin served as senior policy advisor at the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) from 2002-2006, leading numerous delegations to the North for talks and observing developments in-country during the long trips that entailed.

From 1989-2002, he was chief of the Northeast Asia Division in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State. During much of that period, he also served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Special Ambassador for talks with North Korea, and took part in all phases of US-DPRK negotiations from 1992-2000. From 1971-1989, Carlin was an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, where he received the Exceptional Analyst Award from the Director of Central Intelligence.

Carlin received his AM in East Asian regional studies from Harvard University in 1971 and his BA in political science from Claremont Men's College.

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North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex: A Report by Siegfried S. Hecker

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Excerpt: "On November 12, during my most recent visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex with Stanford University colleagues John W. Lewis and Robert Carlin, we were shown a 25 to 30 megawatt-electric (MWe) experimental light-water reactor (LWR) in the early stages of construction. It is North Korea's first attempt at LWR technology and we were told it is proceeding with strictly indigenous resources and talent. The target date for operation was said to be 2012, which appears much too optimistic."

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John Lewis on keeping 'the genie in the bottle'

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With a Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives and anticipation building in Beijing for a change in leadership in 2012, domestic politics in both countries are playing a major role in the bilateral relationship. On the eve of his own milestone—his 80th birthday—John W. Lewis, one of the world’s foremost China scholars and the director of CISAC's Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region, discussed the direction of the U.S.-China relationship, the importance of dialogue between the two powers, and the potentially rocky road ahead. Excerpts:

CISAC: The conventional wisdom seems to be that relations between the two countries are not very good and getting worse. Can you provide some context?

Lewis: There have been many, many times when the relationship has been worse. The fundamentals in U.S.-China relations, in my view, have over time gradually gotten better. Both sides recognize that there is a complementarity in their relations in the Pacific. There is a kind of synergy that is very important, and when things get bad, as they are now certainly—or not good—both sides try to keep the genie in the bottle. Several things are important: even though the Chinese think we made the Taiwan problem worse with the sale of $6.4 billion worth of advanced weapons, the Cross-Strait relationship is actually pretty good. That ingredient in our relationship with China is not a serious problem. The issues that we have are not abnormal in big power relationships.

What is so sad at this point is that the militaries on both sides—the Pentagon and the People's Liberation Army—they both want to have a serious engagement with each other. They want to have a security relationship with us, but we have these constant issues such as the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea. It changes every day, but now they say they want to put the USS George Washington in the Yellow Sea, or what the Koreans call the West Sea. It's stupid militarily and it's provocative from the Chinese point of view, and you can't defend it other than that the South Koreans want it. And from the Chinese point of view, they cannot imagine why during the calm periods with North Korea, for example, we don’t try to take advantage of that, why we don’t try to make progress in the Six-Party talks. So they see this constant set of problems that project into China that do affect U.S.-China relations. Add into that the political rhetoric in this country, the loss of jobs to China, for instance. It's a big political deal in the United States now. With China, there are endless things we could do. But politically Obama will not do it because he’s going to take a hit domestically. The anger against China is so strong in Washington, and perhaps in the rest of the country, whether it’s because of human rights or questions related to their currency exchange rate. But again, the fundamentals are quite different. They are actually pretty sound.

CISAC: China is gearing up for a major transition of power. How will this affect the relationship?

L: Now that Xi Jinping has been made vice chairman of the Central Military Commission it’s pretty clear that the jockeying is already moving in the direction [that he will succeed President Hu Jintao]. Can something happen? The Chinese always worry, as any politician would, about the next round. So they’re not going to make any mistakes, and they’re not going to do anything that gets themselves off track. They cannot back down [on foreign policy]. No one can back down against the United States or anyone else, particularly now with the Japanese. They’re going to come right at the Japanese.

CISAC: So the transition makes things more difficult?

L: Absolutely, and it’s true in the United States. Obama's looking at the election and he's going to do everything he can to move to the right and look like he’s really tough on all the things the Republicans can hammer him on. That’s going to shape how the Chinese pick their leadership in 2012. Their selection will come at about the same time as ours in 2012—the campaigns will be simultaneous—and it’s too bad. If we become very nationalistic, it’s going to look very hostile to them. And we’re going to be wagged by the Japanese and South Korean dog, and this great power, the United States, is going to look helpless to them. China is offering opportunities to solve problems and we are not prepared to take them, and they're saying, ‘are you not willing to talk to us?’?

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Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Siegfried S. Hecker

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C220
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-6468 (650) 723-0089
0
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Emeritus
Research Professor, Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus
hecker2.jpg PhD

Siegfried S. Hecker is a professor emeritus (research) in the Department of Management Science and Engineering and a senior fellow emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He was co-director of CISAC from 2007-2012. From 1986 to 1997, Dr. Hecker served as the fifth Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Dr. Hecker is an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction, and nuclear security.

Dr. Hecker’s current research interests include nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, nuclear weapons policy, nuclear security, the safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy, and plutonium science. At the end of the Cold War, he has fostered cooperation with the Russian nuclear laboratories to secure and safeguard the vast stockpile of ex-Soviet fissile materials. In June 2016, the Los Alamos Historical Society published two volumes edited by Dr. Hecker. The works, titled Doomed to Cooperate, document the history of Russian-U.S. laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation since 1992.

Dr. Hecker’s research projects at CISAC focus on cooperation with young and senior nuclear professionals in Russia and China to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism worldwide, to avoid a return to a nuclear arms race, and to promote the safe and secure global expansion of nuclear power. He also continues to assess the technical and political challenges of nuclear North Korea and the nuclear aspirations of Iran.

Dr. Hecker joined Los Alamos National Laboratory as graduate research assistant and postdoctoral fellow before returning as technical staff member following a tenure at General Motors Research. He led the laboratory's Materials Science and Technology Division and Center for Materials Science before serving as laboratory director from 1986 through 1997, and senior fellow until July 2005.

Among his professional distinctions, Dr. Hecker is a member of the National Academy of Engineering; foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; fellow of the TMS, or Minerals, Metallurgy and Materials Society; fellow of the American Society for Metals; fellow of the American Physical Society, honorary member of the American Ceramics Society; and fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

His achievements have been recognized with the Presidential Enrico Fermi Award, the 2020 Building Bridges Award from the Pacific Century Institute, the 2018 National Engineering Award from the American Association of Engineering Societies, the 2017 American Nuclear Society Eisenhower Medal, the American Physical Society’s Leo Szilard Prize, the American Nuclear Society's Seaborg Medal, the Department of Energy's E.O. Lawrence Award, the Los Alamos National Laboratory Medal, among other awards including the Alumni Association Gold Medal and the Undergraduate Distinguished Alumni Award from Case Western Reserve University, where he earned his bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees in metallurgy.

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North Korea's Choice: Bombs Over Electricity

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Nuclear power and nuclear weapons have a common technological foundation. In pursuit of a civilian fuel cycle-making fuel, building reactors to burn the fuel, and dealing with nuclear waste, which might include extracting some valuable by-products of spent reactor fuel-a nation can develop the capability of producing the material necessary for a bomb, either highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Under civilian cover, North Korea developed a fuel cycle ideally suited to harboring a latent capability for weapons production. In fact, although the country now has the bomb, it does not have much of a nuclear arsenal or any nuclear-generated electricity.

In the 1970s, South Korea was also interested in the bomb, but it gave up those aspirations and, with international assistance, turned its nuclear focus to civilian energy. Today the South Korean nuclear power industry provides nearly 40 percent of the country's electricity, and South Korea is in a position to become a major international exporter of nuclear power plants. The factors that led North Korea to build the bomb and those that led South Korea to forsake it can be instructive for the United States in formulating a policy to restrain Iran's nuclear weapon ambitions, although the political situation there is dramatically different.

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CISAC launches new initiative to reduce nuclear risks

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William J. Perry, former secretary of defense, and Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, have joined forces to launch the Nuclear Risk Reduction initiative to address the changing nuclear threat following the end of the Cold War and the rise of international terrorism. The project is based at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), which Hecker co-directs.

"I have worked with Sig for many years, both inside and outside government," Perry said. "I am particularly pleased to have such an able collaborator on this effort, which I have said is the work to which I will dedicate the rest of my career."

Hecker said he is excited to work with Perry to reduce the global nuclear threat. "Our primary objectives will be to work toward a world with fewer weapons, to have fewer fingers on the nuclear trigger and to keep nuclear weapons and materials out of the wrong hands," he said. "Time is of the essence both because of the urgency of the threat and because of the renewed hope that major powers are willing to take serious steps to realize these goals."

Hecker and Perry, both giants in the field of nuclear defense and security, plan to bring their considerable experience and associations with the U.S. and international policy, military and scientific communities to achieve these objectives.

The Nuclear Risk Reduction initiative (NRR) builds on the work of the Preventive Defense Project (PDP) that was established at Stanford and Harvard 13 years ago under the leadership of Perry and Ashton B. Carter, a former assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. The two men, during their time in government, tackled some of the most important security issues following the breakup of the Soviet Union through promoting the concept of preventive defense, which seeks to diminish the possibility of potential threats escalating into actual threats and conflict. Carter is serving currently in the Obama administration as undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics.

Hecker, as director of Los Alamos, was instrumental in creating the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War environment without nuclear testing. He also helped reduce the nuclear threat posed by Russia and other republics in the chaotic years that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union. At Stanford, he has expanded his activities to include work in Northeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East.

NRR's three-prong approach for making the world a safer place:

1. Working toward a world free of nuclear weapons

Perry, along with former secretaries of state George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, and former Sen. Sam Nunn, launched a joint effort in 2007 to refocus world attention on the critical need to eliminate nuclear weapons, starting with practical measures to make the world a safer place. President Obama, who has embraced this vision, has begun to adopt policies that will move the United States in this direction. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed April 8, 2010, by Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, reduces the number of strategic arsenals in each country to 1,550 warheads. Now Perry and Hecker, through NRR, are conducting a risk/benefit analysis of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), another critical piece of legislation linked to nuclear weapon reductions. They will also explore with Russian colleagues deeper cuts in their respective nuclear arsenals along with engaging other nuclear weapons states on such critical issues.

2. Preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons

Perry and Hecker believe the risk of using nuclear weapons increases as more countries acquire them. Much of their focus is on the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran, both of which threaten international peace and stability. In addition, as more states possess nuclear weapons and materials, it will become increasingly likely that fissile materials for an improvised nuclear device could fall into the hands of sub-national groups or terrorists.

Meanwhile, if there is to be a global renaissance of nuclear power, nations must learn how to manage potential proliferation risks associated with nuclear reactors and their fuel cycles. This is particularly critical if nuclear power spreads to developing countries that have expressed interest in this form of energy, since many have neither the requisite technological basis nor political stability to guarantee security.

3. Preventing nuclear terrorism

The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. highlighted the importance of keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. As President Obama stated, "It is increasingly clear that the danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global security-to our collective security." Despite this, some nations view the terrorist threat with less alarm. NRR plans to engage the technical and military leadership in key countries to promote a common understanding of the dangers posed by such threats and what steps are needed to mitigate them.

President Obama also warned, "Nuclear materials that could be sold or stolen and fashioned into a nuclear weapon exist in dozens of nations." Harvard's Graham Allison stated if countries could, "Lock down all nuclear weapons and bomb-usable material as securely as gold in Fort Knox, they [could] reduce the likelihood of a nuclear 9/11 to nearly zero." During the Nuclear Summit, Obama announced a goal to "lock down" all nuclear materials by 2014. This is a laudable objective, but Perry and Hecker know it will require much more than physical security to protect nuclear sites worldwide. The two men will work toward a cooperative, global effort to help countries develop modern, comprehensive nuclear safeguard systems that can provide proper control and accounting, along with physical protection.

Hecker has experience regarding such work. In 1994, he initiated a nuclear materials protection, control and accounting program (the lab-to-lab program) with Russia's nuclear complex. Perry and Hecker, through NRR, plan to reinvigorate and broaden the scientific cooperation that existed between the United States and Russia in the 1990s. Moreover, they plan to collaborate with the technical, military and policy communities in key countries to realize NRR's ambitious agenda of making the world a safer and more secure place.

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