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Despite extensive and ongoing debate about economic sanctions, policy makers disagree about their effectiveness. This is to some extent surprising given the frequency and ceremony with which states sanction each other to achieve their policy goals. Analytically, this confusion is understandable; the multitude of factors that influence the outcome of a conflict involving sanctions confounds the task of evaluating the impact of sanctions.

Ongoing efforts by the United States and the United Nations to influence proliferators and human rights violators, such as Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Burma with sanctions suggest that they will remain a preferred policy tool for the major powers. In that light, it is essential to continue honing our understanding of the conditions under which they can be expected to achieve established policy goals.

This paper advances the debate about sanctions efficacy by assessing their role in a broader conflict management strategy. It argues that sanctions are more likely to succeed when they yield conditions conducive to bargaining between the parties to a dispute. The centrality of bargaining means that if sanctioners are unwilling to compromise over major policy goals, sanctions alone are unlikely to succeed. Therefore, countries aiming to achieve policy goals through sanctions must be prepared to engage, negotiate and compromise with their adversaries.

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NYU Center on International Cooperation
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The second nuclear nonproliferation conference sponsored by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Russian Academy of Sciences was held in Moscow, March 18-20, 2009. The first was held Oct. 23-25, 2002, a year after the 9/11 attacks. Much of the global security focus at that time was, understandably, on terrorism. In fact, the tragic Dubrovka Theater siege took place during the conference. A principal message of the first conference was not to forget the dangers of nuclear proliferation while the world responded to the growing potential of nuclear terrorism. The proceedings of the first conference are available on request from aedawson@stanford.edu.

Since 2002, the Libyan nuclear program and the AQ Khan network have been exposed; the Iranian covert uranium enrichment program has been discovered and found to have made significant technical progress; North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT and tested a nuclear device; and Syria has built a plutonium-producing reactor.

March 2009 was a propitious time to hold the second conference. US-Russian relations have deteriorated in recent years, reaching their nadir in August of 2008 with the invasion of Georgia. Now a new American administration is determined to "reset" relations between the two former superpowers. There are some reasons for cautious optimism leading toward a possible turning point in US-Russian relations. Cooperation on nuclear matters is crucial in this context and the events of the past seven years have demonstrated that such partnerships are necessary to make the world a safer place.

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Working Papers
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NTI, Russian Academy of Sciences
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Siegfried S. Hecker
David Holloway
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CISAC's Lew Franklin and his coauthor, Nick Hansen, contributed the latter half of a two-part article discussing the Korean peninsula's space programme competition. The beginning of their section of the article is highlighted in the attached document.

(Excerpt) South Korea's space programme has not developed in isolation. As Seoul has moved through guided missile development, satellite production and soon an SLV launch, North Korea has pursued a similar path towards the prestigious goal of the first indigenous Korean satellite launch.

Although more rapid, North Korea's programme has been less successful. Three SLV launches have failed to place a satellite into orbit, despite official claims to the contrary. The most recent launch, of the Unha-2 SLV on 5 April, failed in the third stage and fell into the Pacific Ocean, failing to place the Kwangmyongsong-2 satellite into orbit.

Much media attention surrounding these launches has concentrated on the possibility of such technology being used for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The Unha-2, with its relatively large first stage draws suspicion of a long-predicted ICBM, but the absence of a militarized launcher or re-entry vehicle/warhead testing programme suggests that this vehicle and both launch pads are primarily for satellite launches at this time, with the added benefit of dual-use military rocket technology spin-off. Analysis of commercial high-resolution satellite imagery, North Korean-released video of two of its three launches and public announcements on space activities suggests that North Korea is currently focused on SLV and satellite development; Pyongyang remains eager to pursue a space programme for the nationalistic, commercial and military benefits, probably including military space.

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Jane's Intelligence Review
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CISAC is pleased to announce that 14 seniors have been selected to participate in its Undergraduate Honors Program in International Security Studies

The program provides an opportunity for eligible students focusing on international security subjects in any field to earn an honors certificate.

Students selected intern with a security-related organization, attend the program's honors college in Washington, D.C. in September, participate in a year-long core seminar on international security research, and produce an honors thesis with policy implications.

  • Bertram Ang
    Departments of Economics & Political Science
    Restructuring of the Military Mindset
  • Amir Badat
    Program in International Relations
    Nuclear Disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
  • Daniel Cassman
    Departments of Political Science & Computer Science
    The Restart of Ended Civil Wars
  • Philippe de Koning
    Program in International Relations
    Minor in Economics
    The Influence of North Korea and China on Japanese Militarization
  • Daniel Leifer
    Department of Biology
    Rapid Mobilization of Health Care Workers in Times of Crisis
  • Ashley Lohmann
    Program in International Relations
    Tactical Change by Middle Eastern Terrorist Organizations, 1970-2004
  • Raffi Mardirosian
    Department of Economics & Public Policy Program
    The Adaptability of Terrorists and Rogue Nations to Financial Methods of Preventing WMD Proliferation and other Breaches of National Security
  • Ben Picozzi
    Department of Philosophy
    Minor in Classical Languages
    Norms and International Security with Respect to the Responsibility to Protect
  • Amir Ravandoust
    Department of Management Science & Engineering
    Minor in International Relations
    Nuclear Arab States: Is Proliferation Inevitable?
  • Sam Stone
    Department of Mathematics & Program in International Relations
    The Use of Energy Exports as a Foreign Policy Tool in the CIS and Eastern Europe
  • Gautam Thapar
    Department of Political Science
    Minor in Economics
    U.S. Aid to Pakistan
  • Son Ca Vu
    Department of Management Science & Engineering
    Minor in Political Science
    The A.Q. Khan Network: A Rogue Business Model
  • Georgia Wells
    Program in Human Biology
    Explaining the Radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
  • Hao Yan
    Departments of Political Science & Economics
    China's Global Strategy

 

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Philip Taubman
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Now that President Obama has set a promising arms reduction agenda with President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia, he faces the greater challenge of getting his own government and the American nuclear weapons establishment to support his audacious plan to make deep weapons cuts, Philip Taubman writes in the New York Times.

As President Obama will soon discover, erasing the nuclear weapons legacy of the cold war is like running the Snake River rapids in Wyoming — the first moments in the tranquil upstream waters offer little hint of the vortex ahead. Now that Mr. Obama has set a promising arms reduction agenda with President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia, he faces the greater challenge of getting his own government and the American nuclear weapons establishment to support his audacious plan to make deep weapons cuts and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons.

So far, Mr. Obama has effectively coupled an overarching vision of getting to a world without nuclear weapons, outlined in a speech in Prague earlier this year, with concrete first steps like the one-quarter reduction in operational strategic nuclear weapons promised in Moscow this week. Given his short time in office, and the looming December expiration of the treaty with Russia covering strategic nuclear arms reductions, the new limits are a good, realistic start. It is especially important to extend the monitoring and verification provisions of the expiring arms accord.

But the overall Obama approach involves a balancing act that requires him to move boldly while reassuring opponents that he is not endangering our security. Put simply, he has to maintain a potent nuclear arsenal while slashing it.

Mr. Obama might consider Ronald Reagan’s experience when he tried to set a similar course. The nuclear weapons crowd practically disowned Reagan when he proposed abolishing nuclear weapons during his 1986 summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. After the meeting, when Reagan asked his generals to explore the ramifications of possibly sharply cutting warheads and eliminating nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, they politely but firmly told their commander in chief it was a terrible idea.

Mr. Obama’s moment of truth with his generals is coming later this year when the Pentagon completes its periodic Nuclear Posture Review. This, in the Pentagon’s words, “will establish U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, strategy and force posture for the next 5 to 10 years.” So it will be the American nuclear weapons bible for the remainder of Mr. Obama’s presidency, one term or two.

President Obama must make sure it reflects his thinking. That will not be automatic, because the nuclear weapons complex — the array of Pentagon and Energy Department agencies involved in nuclear operations, including the armed services and the weapons labs — harbors considerable doubt about his plans. The same goes for the wider world of defense strategists. There is resistance in Congress, too.

The view in these quarters is that the weapons cuts Mr. Obama envisions — deeper than the modest goals set in Moscow this week — would dangerously undermine the power of America’s arsenal to deter attacks against the United States and its allies. Sentiment also favors building a new generation of warheads, a step Mr. Obama has rejected.

If the White House does not assert itself, the Nuclear Posture Review could easily spin off in unhelpful directions. The review that was produced when Bill Clinton was president in 1994 offered a rehash of cold war policies. The one that was done when George W. Bush took office in 2001 was more unconventional, but was quickly overshadowed by the terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the war in Iraq.

To serve Mr. Obama’s interests, the new review should lay the groundwork for pronounced cuts in weapons and shape America’s nuclear stockpile to fit a world in which threats are more likely to come from states like North Korea and Iran than from a heavily armed power like Russia.

After the review, the next big test for Mr. Obama will likely be Senate consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He has pledged to resubmit this 1996 United Nations treaty, which was flatly rejected by the Senate in 1999.

To get the two-thirds majority needed for its approval, Mr. Obama will need to hold his fellow Democrats in line — far from a sure thing — and also pick up some Republican support. Two influential Republican senators — John McCain and Richard Lugar — are pivotal. Both voted against the treaty in 1999.

Opponents wrongly argue that the treaty is unverifiable. That might have been the case a decade ago, but technological advances make monitoring of even small underground nuclear tests possible today. Critics also say a permanent ban on testing — the United States has honored a moratorium since 1992 — would eventually cripple the nation’s ability to maintain reliable warheads. So far, most weapons experts would say, that has not proven to be true and should not be for many years.

Few presidential moments are more glittering than the announcement of arms reduction accords in the Kremlin’s gilded halls. For Mr. Obama, that was the easy part.

 

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Two weeks before President Lee Myung-bak’s first full-fledged summit meeting with President Barack Obama, Pantech Fellow alumni of Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) will present their research findings on U.S.-South Korean relations and North Korea at a forum at the Seoul Press Center on June 2 from 2-5 P.M.

The public event, “The United States and Korea: Toward a Shared Future,” will feature Dr. Thomas Fingar, a Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford and the former U.S. Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, who will deliver a keynote address on “The United States and Northeast Asia.” National Assembly Speaker Kim Hyong O, American Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, and the Shorenstein APARC Director, Stanford University Professor Gi-Wook Shin, will offer congratulatory remarks.

Stanford Pantech Fellowships alumni will participate in two panels on U.S.-South Korean relations and North Korea. Scott Snyder, director of the Asia Foundation’s Center for U.S.-Korea Policy, will discuss his recent report, “Pursuing a Comprehensive Vision for the U.S.–South Korea Alliance.” David Straub, Korean Studies Program acting director at Shorenstein APARC, will review the work and findings of the “New Beginnings” policy research group on U.S.-South Korean relations. Donald Macintyre, Time Magazine’s first bureau chief in Seoul (2001-2006), will show how life in North Korea is changing at the grassroots level and what these changes mean for the international community's approach toward Pyongyang. Daniel Sneider, Shorenstein APARC associate director for research, will analyze North Korea as a peninsular, regional and global problem and discuss how it fits into the Obama administration’s overall foreign and security policy. The panels will be moderated by Seoul National University Professor Yoon Young-kwan, a former foreign minister, and Korea University Professor Hyug Baek Im.

The Pantech Group is a major supporter of the Korean Studies Program (KSP) at Stanford’s Shorenstein APARC and its programs of policy research on Korea and U.S.-Korean relations and the fostering of next-generation leaders in Korean affairs. Since the inception of the Pantech Fellowships for Mid-Career Professionals in 2004, nine experts on Korean policy affairs from government, journalism, and academia have each spent a year at Stanford’s Shorenstein APARC engaged in cutting-edge research.
The forum will be conducted in English. Interpretation will not be provided.

The Press Center, Seoul, Korea

Gi-Wook Shin Director, APARC Speaker

Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C-327
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-9149 (650) 723-6530
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Shorenstein APARC Fellow
Affiliated Scholar at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
tom_fingar_vert.jpg PhD

Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow from 2010 through 2015 and the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford in 2009.

From 2005 through 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94), and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969 and Ph.D., 1977 both in political science). His most recent books are From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from Intelligence Reform (Stanford University Press, 2021), Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011), The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform, editor (Stanford University Press, 2016), Uneasy Partnerships: China and Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (Stanford, 2017), and Fateful Decisions: Choices that will Shape China’s Future, co-edited with Jean Oi (Stanford, 2020). His most recent article is, "The Role of Intelligence in Countering Illicit Nuclear-Related Procurement,” in Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, William C. Potter, and Leonard S Spector, eds., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology (Cambridge, 2018)."

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Date Label
Thomas Fingar Payne Distinguished Lecturer, CISAC Keynote Speaker
David Straub Associate Director of Korean Studies Program, APARC Panelist
Daniel C. Sneider Associate Director of Research, APARC Panelist
Scott Snyder Former Pantech Fellow at APARC Panelist
Donald Macintyre Former Pantech Fellow at APARC Panelist
Hyug Baeg Im Professor, Korea University Panelist
Hyung O Kim Speaker of Korea National Assembly Speaker
Young Kwan Yoon Professor, Seoul National University Panelist
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