India's nuclear tests in May 1998 shocked the world. On May 11 and 13, India conducted a total of five tests. According to official Indian statements, the tests comprised three low-yield explosions, a 12 kiloton (kt) fission bomb, and a 43 kt thermonuclear device. The Indian tests triggered a quick response from Pakistan. On May 28 Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests, followed by a further test on May 30. Although some Western analysts have cast doubt on whether the two countries actually carried out the number and size of tests they claimed, India and Pakistan did conduct nuclear testing. These tests run counter to the global trend of nuclear arms reduction and have undermined not only the peace and stability of South Asia but of the world as well.

India and Pakistan have long been regarded by the international arms-control community as "nuclear threshold" or "de facto" nuclear-weapon states. They have now become declared nuclear-weapon states. The nuclear testing in South Asia will inevitably have a serious impact on regional and world politics, security, and diplomacy. This paper, which draws upon Chinese sources, analyzes the motivations of India and Pakistan and the consequences of the nuclear tests.

History has demonstrated that national leadership, time, and diplomatic genius will be needed to solve the thorny issue of the nuclear arms race in South Asia, so closely connected is it to the underlying and enduring Indian-Pakistani hostility. A Chinese source has quoted a senior Indian official as saying: "[t]he Cold War does not end in South Asia." The Chinese estimate that this confrontation will last well into the twenty-first century. How the international community responds to the tests will be crucial in determining whether the nonproliferation norm survives with credibility or is further eroded.

The nuclear crisis in South Asia is serious. However, "crisis" in the Chinese language is composed of two characters: wei--danger--and ji--opportunity. The new international situation, characterized by the coexistence of "opportunity" and "challenge," does hold out some hope that the nuclear arms race in South Asia can be capped. The challenge that confronts the international community is to turn this threat into an opportunity. The international community must move urgently in the matter. China recognizes this challenge and will play its role in this regard.

This report reviews Chinese participation in the international negotiations for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva and provides background for China’s decision-making procedures during the negotiations.

The CTBT negotiations marked the first important international negotiations for a multilateral disarmament treaty in which China participated from beginning to end. They were the first important international negotiations in which China, as a nuclear power, had great influence. The Chinese delegation to the CD assumed a serious and responsible attitude during the entire course of the negotiations. In part to increase international confidence that it would sign the CTBT by 1996 as scheduled and in part to indicate its intent to adapt itself to the world trend toward increased international cooperation and nuclear arms reduction, China announced during the latter stage of the negotiations that it would suspend nuclear testing.

As an example of successful multilateral negotiations, the conclusion and signing of the treaty, although long postponed, is an important achievement in arms control. As the sole declared nuclear-weapon state of the Third World at that time and the last among the five nuclear-weapon states (P5) to cease nuclear testing, China’s stance toward the CTBT negotiations was the object of world attention and concern. The population of China accounts for nearly one-quarter of the world’s total; China’s positive position on the CTBT and its contributions toward this end has a major worldwide impact now and in the future.

Prior to the commencement of the CTBT negotiations in Geneva, China declared on October 5, 1993, that while supporting an early conclusion of the treaty it would “take an active part in the negotiating process and work together with other countries to conclude this treaty no later than 1996.” China kept its promise.

China pursued a fair, reasonable, and verifiable treaty with universal adherence and unlimited duration. During the negotiations, China presented many working papers, non-papers, and suggestions regarding the CTBT draft text (including a number of revisions), and dealt with a series of critical issues in the Preamble, Basic Obligations, Organization, Verification, and Entry into Force sections of the treaty. The Chinese delegation played an active role at the conference table, and contributed positively to the weekly P5 consultations that ran in parallel with the CTBT talks.

China adhered toughly to its positions on two issues in the latter stage of the CTBT negotiations. One concerned potential abuses of the on-site inspection procedures. The other was that all nuclear-test-capable states (assumed to be the P5, India, Israel, and Pakistan) must accede to the treaty in order for it to enter into full legal force. Although China was not entirely satisfied with the final draft CTBT, it accepted the treaty. It agreed to sign the CTBT in the belief that the treaty text represented the best achievable result of the negotiations of the preceding two and a half years, reflected by and large the state of the negotiations, and was in general balanced.

Signing the CTBT was in line with China’s consistent stand in support of “the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.” This was one of the major reasons China supported an early conclusion of the treaty. Of course, China’s desire to meet the trend of the modern world also motivated it to sign. Because economic development had long been Beijing’s top priority, China needed a peaceful security environment in order to devote itself completely to the modernization of the nation. To this end, its defense buildup had been steadily subordinated to national economic development. Beijing’s decision on the CTBT negotiations stemmed also from its self-defense and no-first-use nuclear policies. China had established an effective nuclear force for self-defense.

China is now making preparations for the treaty to enter into force. After the conclusion of the CTBT, China will continue efforts in pursuit of world peace, development, and cooperation. Meanwhile, China will continuously ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons without nuclear testing.

Whether China can achieve its economic and political goals depends very much upon whether PRC's domestic stability can be maintained and large-scale devastating military conflict, either internally with Taiwan or externally with major foreign powers, can be avoided. This article will speculate on China's security role in the region and in the world ten to fifteen years hence, and assess China's likely intentions, capabilities, and strategies in domestic and foreign affairs, in light of the changes in China's geopolitical environment.

This paper focuses on the impact of a comprehensive test ban on China's nuclear program and security policy. After a general review of China's nuclear doctrine and development, the study analyzes the relationship between China's nuclear strategy and its desire for testing, and explores the reasons China decided to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. By comparing the maturity of the nuclear programs of the nuclear states and the degree of their preparations for a cessation of nuclear tests, this paper concludes that a comprehensive test ban would place greater constraints on China's nuclear program than on those of the others. Efforts such as a deeper reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the principal nuclear powers, a no-first-use commitment by all nuclear states, and the adherence to the ABM treaty by its signatories would be critical to reducing China's concerns. The progress of international arms control negotiations in the above directions would further encourage China to make even greater contributions in the field of global arms control in the post-comprehensive test ban era.

By the end of 1995, China had built the world's ten largest telecommunications networks and the industry was growing at a faster rate than any other sector of the booming Chinese economy. For example, the country's 40 million telephone subscribers with 50 million telephone numbers represented an average annual growth rate of nearly 100 percent over a ten-year period. Internet users served by ChinaNet jumped from 6,000 in 1995 to 53,739 in March 1997. Progress was qualitative as well, as China procured state-of-the-art fiber-optic and satellite technologies and narrowed the gap between itself and the United States and between its own urban and rural areas. The achievement can be attributed to the government's commitment to telecommunications as the key to further development--a commitment backed by preferential policies; to foreign financial and technical support; and to changing attitudes of the Chinese people themselves.

However, China faces some major problems. The gap in living standards between coastal and interior provinces is widening, as people migrate from poor villages to increasingly affluent cities. The government must focus more on developing isolated regions. Rapid development of telecommunications cannot be sustained under a government monopoly, which aids the government's economic and security interests but discourages foreign companies from investing and transferring technology. At the same time, there has been little headway in developing domestic telecommunications products. Management of the industry is chaotic in the absence of clear regulations, and a multilayered bureaucracy encourages wasted resources, duplication, red tape, and corruption. Political problems are likely to emerge as telecommunications continues to help open Chinese society and young Chinese come to embrace Western industrial culture.

Nevertheless, China is destined to become and remain the world's "super market" as long as it remains politically stable in its transition from a plannned to a market economy. Telecommunications will continue to play a key role during this transition.

This paper reviews the activities and accomplishments of the Chinese space community in international cooperation and discusses appropriate ways of further cooperation with other nations. It is part of an effort to study how to enhance China's space industry and to share with the rest of the world the benefits of fair exploitation of outer space, which belongs to all mankind.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, global economic competition has come to play an increasingly important role in defining national security and the shape of the future world order. As international conflict shifts from military to economic competitiveness, many nations are now hoping to extract economic advantage from their investments in defense research and production. This volume brings together papers on several key aspects of defense commercialization and attempts to bridge the divide between research on conversion efforts in the United States and studies of transition in post-Communist economies.

Using major new documentary sources, this book tells the story of why and how China built its nuclear submarine flotilla and the impact of that development on the nation's politics, technology, industry and strategy.